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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See 
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
KUHLMANN, SUPERINTENDENT, SULLIVAN 
CORRECTIONAL F AGILITY v. WILSON 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
No. 84-1479. Argued January 14, 1986-Decided June 26, 1986 
After his arraignment on charges arising from a 1970 robbery and murder 
in New York, respondent was confined in a cell with a prisoner, named 
Benny Lee, who had previously agreed to act as a police informant. Re-
spondent made incriminating statements, and Lee reported them to the 
police. Prior to trial in a New York court, respondent moved to sup-
press the statements on the ground that they were obtained in violation 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, 
the trial court denied the motion, finding that Lee had obeyed a police 
officer's instructions only to listen to respondent for the purpose of iden-
tifying his confederates in the robbery and murder, but not to question 
respondent about the crimes. The court also found that respondent's 
statements to Lee were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited." In 1972, re-
spondent was convicted of, and sentenced to imprisonment for, common-
law murder and felonious possession of a weapon, and the Appellate Di-
vision affirmed. In 1973, respondent sought federal habeas corpus 
relief, asserting that his statements to Lee were obtained by police in-
vestigative methods that violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The 
District Court denied the writ, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
After the 1980 decision in United St,ates v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264-which 
applied the "deliberately elicited" test of Massiah v. United States, 377 
U. S. 201, to suppress statements made to a paid jailhouse informant-
respondent unsuccessfully sought to have his conviction vacated by the 
state courts on the basis of his Sixth Amendment claim. In 1982, re-
spondent filed the instant habeas corpus petition in Federal District 
Court, again asserting his Sixth Amendment claim. The District Court 
denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed. As an initial matter, 
the court concluded that under Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 
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KUHLMANN v. WILSON 
Syllabus 
III 
sion to entertain a successive petition. Although§ 2244(b) makes no ref-
erence to the "ends of justice," that phrase still may be used generally to 
describe the standard for identifying those cases where successive re-
view may be appropriate. However, specific guidance should be given 
to the federal courts as to the kind of proof that a state prisoner must 
offer to establish that the "ends of justice" will be served by relitigation 
of claims previously decided against him. Balancing the State's inter-
ests in finality of convictions and the prisoner's interest in access to a 
forum compels the conclusion that the "ends of justice" are served by 
successive review only where the petitioner supplements his constitu-
tional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. The prisoner 
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued in this 
case--the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully admitted. Here, 
the Court of Appeals conceded that the evidence of respondent's guilt 
"was nearly overwhelming," and respondent's constitutional claim did 
not itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. Pp. 6-17. 
POWELL, J ., announced the judgm,Jl_nt of the CQµrt and delivered the 
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV1 and V, in which BURGER, 
C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, 
and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a con-
curring op1mon. BRENNAN,· J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
MARSHALL, J ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
6 KUHLMANN v. WILSON 
A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Ap-
peals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F . 2d 741 (1984). 
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact 
that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to 
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned 
that the circumstances under which respondent made his in-
criminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from 
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry 
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new 
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to 
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejec ed 
respon ent"s claim haa erred, and remanded the case to the 
District Court with mstructions to order respondent's release 
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5 
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. -- (1985), to consider 
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition 
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the 
facts of this case. We now reverse. 
II 
A 
In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respond-
ent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals 
5Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority con-
ceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed con-
duct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now un-
constitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the 
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respond-
ent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual deter-
minations. Id., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregard-
ing "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings 
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KUHLMANN v. WILSON 7 
relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), 
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow 
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "succes-
sive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in 
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28 
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the 
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ. 
Id. , at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that 
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern 
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sand-
ers framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the 
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas 
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner 
on a prior ·petition if "the ends of justice would not be served 
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." Id., 
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on 
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sand-
ers provided little specific guidance as to the '-kind of proof 
that aprisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of jus-
tice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously 
decided against him. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates 
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opin-
are not fairly supported by the record." Id., at 749. In Judge Van 
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' jus-
tify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has 
gone on before." Ibid. (citations omitted). 
6 The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct 
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised 
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U. S., at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circum-
stances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of 
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the 
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition 
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, 
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks," 
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that 
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KUHLMANN v. WILSON 9 
U. S. 218, 254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During 
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on 
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of 
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed 
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright 
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
475-478. The Court initially accomplished this expansion 
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing 
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79. 
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction 
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims 
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and 
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 
104-105 (1942). 
Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope 
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed 
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes a state prison-
er's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the pris-
oner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amend-
ment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Al-
though the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of 
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded 
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth 
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially cre-
ated exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by 
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational sys-
tem of criminal justice." Id., at 494. Among those costs 
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a crimi-
nal trial "from the ultimate questiol). o:t'guilt or innocence,,;-,' 
and exclusion o! relia'6re evidence that was "often the m ost 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant." Id., at 490. Our decision to except this cate-
gory of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger 
10 KUHLMANN v. WILSON 
that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an in-
nocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." 
Id., at 491-492, n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who 
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was 
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[ d] no 
bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." Id., at 492, 
n. 31. 
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the 
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes 
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas 
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by eq-
uitable principles." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963), 
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573 
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the 
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to 
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in 
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at 
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as 
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus 
were off ended when a conviction was issued by a court that 
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intoler-
able convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional 
/c
ommands. But the Court never has defined the scope of 
he writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure 
hat an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of 
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its 
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests 
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitu-
tional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the 
state courts. E.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129 
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia, 
supra, at 426-434. 8 
8 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our cases deciding that federal 
habeas review ordinarily does not extend to procedurally defaulted claims 
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KUHLMANN v. WILSON 15 
countervailing interests served by according finality to the 
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the 
prisoner. 
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second 
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration. 
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed 
the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the 
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have 
determined that his trial was free from constitutional error, a 
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtain-
ing his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for 
which he was incarcerated. That mterest does not extend, 
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As 
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an 
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the cer-
tainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention 
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was 
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be re-
stored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harlan J., dissenting). 
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a 
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the in-
terests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes. 
Finality serves many of those important interests. Avail-
ability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defend-
ants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring 
crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to 
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity be-
lieve there is a possibility that they will escape punishment 
through repetitive collateral attacks. 14 See Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly, finality serves the 
""Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the law 
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punish-
ment."' Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Fi-
nality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963). 
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KUHLMANN v. WILSON 17 
cence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970). 
In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the 
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal ha-
beas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the 
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such peti-
tions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional 
claim with a colorable showing; of fa~u_al innocence. This 
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a dec-
ade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As 
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that 
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of inno-
cence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in 
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this 
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress tFiat 
successive federal habeas review should be granted only in 
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of 
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite 
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence 
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner 
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued 
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully 
admitted. 17 
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., con-
curring). Despite those costs, Congress has continued to afford federal 
habeas relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society 
for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to 
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., 
at 491-492, n. 31. 
17 As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable 
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not, 
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been uncon-
stitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner 
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the. evidence, including 
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any 
18 KUHLMANN v. WILSON 
C 
Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that 
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of 
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's 
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of 
resnondent's wlt "was nearly overwliel:rmng." 742 F. 2d, at 
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not 
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The 
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this successive petition under § 2244(b) on the ground 
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim 
was final. 18 
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly ex-
cluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts 
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote 
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite 
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt 
or innocence. 
18 The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes our opinion in several re-
spects. The dissent states that the plurality "implies that federal habeas 
review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his 
first federal petition a properly preserved [constitutional claim]." Post, at 
2 (emphasis added). This case involves, and our opinion describes, only 
the standard applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas corpus re-
lief. Thus, the first six pages of the dissent have little, ifany, relevance to 
this case. There, JUSTICE BRENNAN merely reiterates at length his views 
as to the general scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, with no ex-
planation of how those views apply when a district judge is required to con-
sider a habeas corpus petition presenting an issue decided on the merits in 
a previous federal habeas proceeding. 
The dissent further mistakenly asserts that we reject Sanders' holding 
that the question whether successive review is proper should be decided 
under a "'sound discretion' standard." Post, at 1. As we have stated, 
the permissive language of§ 2244(b) of course gives the federal courts dis-
cretion to decide whether to entertain a successive petition, and since 
Sanders those courts have relied on the phrase "ends of justice" as a gen-
eral standard for identifying cases in which successive review may be ap-
propriate. What Sanders left open-and the dissent today ignores-is the 
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In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah 
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse inform-
ant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of 
Massiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in 
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and 
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] re-
vealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This 
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably 
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used 
his position to secure incriminating information from [the de-
fendant] when counsel was not present." Id., at 270. Al-
though the informant had not questioned the defendant, the 
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant 
in order to "elicit" incriminating information. Id., at 273; 
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts, 
like the facts of Massiah, amounted to "'indirect and surrep-
titious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. Id., at 273. 
Earlier this term, we applied the Massiah standard in a 
case involving incriminating statements made under circum-
stances substantially similar to the facts of Massiah itself. 
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. -- (1985), the defendant 
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accom-
plice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During 
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to 
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the 
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant 
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the 
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. Id., at 
The Court concluded that these investigatory tech-
niques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pend-
ing charges. 21 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, be-
cause of the relationship between the defendant and the 
21 The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]n-
criminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth 
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course, 
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Moulton, supra, at--. 
22 KUHLMANN v. WILSON 
informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active 
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit" 
incriminating statements from the defendant. Id., at --, 
I 
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversa-
tion was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Ibid. 
(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL, 
J., concurring)). 
As our recent r.eeeflt examination of this Sixth Amendment 
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the 
Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investiga-
tory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police in-
terrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated 
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains in-
criminating statements from the accused after the right to 
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at --, citing United 
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a 
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply 
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrange-
ment or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to 
the police. - Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that 
the police and their informant took some action, beyond 
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit in-
criminating remarks. 
B 
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in con-
cluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under 
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from 
any· disagreement with the District Court over appropriate 
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from 
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that opeP.. 
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mis-
take, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the 
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correct-
ness expressly required by 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). Patton v. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
TEAGUE v. LANE, DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPART-
MENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
· No. 87-5259. Argued October 4, 1988-Decided February 22, 1989 
Petitioner, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court of 
attempted murder and other offenses by an all-white jury. During jury 
selection, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challe!}ges to 
exclude bl~cks. Petitioner twice unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial, 
arguing that he was "entitled to a jury of his peers." The prosecutor 
defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a bal-
ance of men and women on the jury. After an unsuccessful state-court 
appeal, in which he argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative 
of the community, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal 
District Court, repeati~fs fair cross secf10n cfaim. He further argued 
that the opinions of several Justices concurring in and dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, had in-
vited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 702, as to what a 
defendant must show to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
with respect to a peremptory challenge system. He also argued, for the 
first time, that under Swain a prosecutor could be questioned about his 
use of peremptory challenges once he volunteered an explanation. The 
District Court held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent 
and denied relief. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with peti-
tioner that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement that 
applied to a jury venire also applied to a petit jury, and held that he had 
made out a prima facie case of discrimination. But the Court of Appeals 
voted to rehear the case en bane and postponed rehearing until after this 
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79. Ultimately, 
Batson was decided anq overruled that portion of Swain setting forth 
tiie evidentiapr showing ne~ facie case of ra-
II TEAGUE v. LANE 
Syllabus 
cial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with respect to a peremptory challenge system. Batso.n 
held that a defendant can establish such a case by showing that he is a 
"member of a cognizable racial group," that the prosecutor exercised 
"peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the de-
fendant's race," and that these "facts and any other relevant circum-
stances raise a_D j nference that the prosecutor used that practice to 
exclude the veniremenffom the petit jury on account of their race." 4 76 
U. S., at 96. The Court of Appeals then held that petitioner could not 
benefit from the Batson rule because in the meantime Allen v. Hardy, 
478 U. S. 255, had held that Batson could not be a lied retr act'vely to 
cases on collateral review. The Court of Appeals also held that petition-
er's Swain claim was procedurally barred and in any event meritless, 
and that the fair cross section requirement was li~ 
venire. -Held: The judgment is affirmed. 
820 F. 2d 832, affirmed. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to 
Parts I, II and III concluding that: 
1. Allen v. Hardy prevented petitioner from benefiting from the rule 
announced in Batson, since his conviction became final before Batson 
was decided~ The opinions filed in McCray-which involved the ques-
tion whether the Constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges 
to exclude members of a particular group from the jury, based on the 
prosecutor's assumption that they would be biased in favor of other 
members of the same group-did not destroy Swain's precedential ef-
fect, as petitioner urges they did, since a denial of certiorari imports no 
expression of opinion on the merits of the case and concomitantly opin-
ions accompanying such denial cannot have the same effect as decisions 
on the merits. Pp. 3-5. 
2. Petitioner is procedurally barred from raising the claim that he has 
established a ~ olation of the Equal Protection Clause under Swain and 
that Swain did not preclude an examination of the prosecutor's stated 
reasons for his peremptory challenges to determine the legitimacy of his 
motive. Since petitioner did not raise the Swain cl ·m at t ial or on 
direct appeal, he fo e1 e review o e claim in collateral proceedings in 
the state courts. Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, he is 
barred from raising the cfa1m m a federal habeas cornus proceeding, ,. .. ~ 
since he made no attempt to show cause for his def: lt and the Illinois 
Appe ate Court, contrary to 1s contention, did not address the Swain 
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(Slip Opinion) 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See 
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
HARRIS v. REED, WARDEN, ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 87-5677. Argued October 12, 1988-Decided February 22, 1989 
Petitioner's state-court murder conviction was affirmed by the Appellate 
Court of Illinois on direct appeal, where petitioner challenged only the 
sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court then dismissed his petition 
for postconviction relief-which alleged ineffective :issistance by his trial 
counsel in several respects, including the failure to call alibi witnesses -
and the Appellate Court again affirmed. Although referring to the 
"well-settled" Illinois principle that issues that could have been, but 
were not, presented on direct appeal are considered waived, and finding 
that, "except for the alibi witnesses," petitioner's ineffective-assistance 
claim "could have been raised [on] direct appeal," the court nevertheless 
went on to consider and reject that claim on its merits. Petitioner then 
pursued the claim b filing a habeas corpus petition in the Federal Dis-
trict Court under 8 e recognizing that, absent a 
showing either of "cause and prejudice" or a "miscarriage of justice," 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, would have barred its consideration 
of the claim had the State Appellate Court held the claim waived under 
state law, the federal court determined that there had been no waiw r 
holding, and went on to consider the claim in its entirety and to dismiss it 
on its merits. In affirming the dismissal, the Court of Appeals ruled 
that it was precluded from reviewing the claim's merits because it be-
lieved the claim to be procedurally barred. Finding the State Appellate 
Court's order to be "ambiguous" on the waiver question, the court never-
theless concluded that it was bound by the order's "suggest[ed]" inten-
tion "to find all grounds waived except that pertaining to the alibi 
witnesses." 
Held: 
1. The '"plain statement' rule" of Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 
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y opinion in 
I join the 
SUPREME COURT OF fflE UNITED STATES 
No. 87-5677 
WARREN LEE HARRIS, PETITIONER v. MARVIN 
REED, WARDEN, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[February 22, 1989] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion and am in general agreement 
with it~n -~~~:[ th~ "plain state~ ent" ~ e of Michi-
gan v. Long, 4630. -s. 1032 (1983), to the state courts' invo-
cation of state procedural default rules. I write separately 
to emphasize two points. First, I do not read the Court's 
opinion as addressing or altering the well-settled rule that 
the lower federal courts, and this Court, may properly in-
quire into the availability of state remedies in determining 
whether claims presented in a petition for federal habeas cor-
pus have been properly exhausted in the state courts. See 
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 515-517 (1972); ex parle 
Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1944). 
In 28 U. S. C. § 22,5i{,b), Congress has provided that a writ 
of habeas CO:i:£US "shall not be [Eanted unless it ap~ars that 
the applicant has exhaust ct he remedies available in the 
courts of thg_State, or that there is e1 er an absence of avail-
able State co';ective processes or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to prote~ the 
rights of the prisoner." The exhaustion requirement 1s no~ 
satisfied if the habeas petitioner "has the right ~ the law 
of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question 
presented." §2254(c). Thus, in · determining whether a 
remedy for a particular constitutional claim is "available," the 
2 HARRIS v. REED 
federal courts are authorized, indeed required, to assess the 
likelihood that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner 
a hearing on the merits of his claim. 
~ he rule requiring that a habeas petitioner exhaust avail-
~ abl remedies in state court before seeking revi~w of the 
same claims via federal habeas corpus serves two 1mp(!.rtant 
in~ts. ~ . its roots lie in the respect which the federal 
courts owe to the procedures erected by the States to correct 
_. judges, take, and should be encouraged to take, their con-I 
constitutional errors, and the confidence that state court 
~ stitutional duties seriously. ~ . the rule furthers the_in-
V terest in the efficiency of federafhabeas corpus, by assurmg 
that in general the factual and legal bases surrounding a peti-
tioner's constitutional claim or claims will have been devel-
oped in a prior adjudication. See generally Rose v. Lundy, 
455 u. s. 509, 518-519 (1982). 
To protect these interests we have held that where a fed-
eral habeas petitioner raises a claim which has never been 
presented in any state forum, a federal court may properly 
determine whether the claim has been procedurally defaulted 
under state law, such that a remedy in state court is "unavail-
able" within the meaning of § 2254(c). See Engle v. Issac, 
456 U. S. 107, 125-126, n. 28 (1982). The lower courts have 
consistently looked to state procedm:al default rules in mak-
ing the "availability" determination, both before and after 
our decision in Engle. See, e. g., Watson v. Alabama, 841 
F. 2d 1074, 1077, n. 6 (CAll), cert. denied, _488 U. S. -
(1988); Leroy v. Marshall, 757 F. 2d 94, 97 (CA6), cert. de-
nied 474 U. S. 831 (1985); Wayne v. White, 735 F. 2d 324, ' . 
'325 (CA8 1984); Williams v. Duckworth, 724 F. 2d 1439, 1442 
e(CA7), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 841 (1984); Richardson v. 
Turner, 716 F. 2d 1059, 1061-1062 (CA4 1983); Beaty v. Pat-
ton, 700 F. 2d 110, 112 (CA3 1983); Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F. 
2d 867, 869 (CA9 1982); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F. 2d 318, 
319-321 (CA9 1982); Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581, 584 
(CA6 1979); Smith v. Estelle, 562 F. 2d 1006, 1007-1008 (CA5 
1977); Unitea 
1383, 1385-1 
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4 HARRIS v. REED 
Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527 (1986). In these decisions, 
the Court reaffirmed the h,2lding of Wainwright v. Sy_l!:.§s, 433 
U. S. 72, 90-91 (1977), that a state pr"isoner pursuin_g_.fuderal 
habeas r e ies must show b '~e or a_procedural de-
fill!lt a_ prej_udic~" flowing rom the alle ed constitutional 
violation for a federal court o entertain his claim on e mer-
its des ite the existence of an otherwise preclusive ~state-law 
ground for decision. n urray v. arrier, e Court re-
jecte~ ng of the cause and prejudice test . . . to 
dispense with the requirement that the petitioner show cause 
and instead to focus exclusively on whether there has been a 
'manifest injustice' or a denial of 'fundamental fairness.'" 
477 U. S., at 493. The Court went on to indicate that: 
"We remain confident that, for the most part, 'victims 
of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the 
cause-and-prejudice standard.' But we do not pretend 
that this will always be true. Accordingly, we think 
that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional vi-
olation has probably resulted in the conviction of one 
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may 
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause 
for the procedural default." Id., at 495-496 (citation 
omitted). 
At several points in its opinion, the Court refers to a "mis-
carriage of justice" test to be applied in conjunction with 
the cause and prejudice inquiry. See ante, at 2, and n. 2; 
ante, at 3, n. 3; ante, at 6. I do not read the Court's opinion 
as suggesting any alteration of the relationship between the 
cause and prejudice inquiry and the narrow exception to the 
cause requirement where a petitioner cannot show cause but 
'can make a strong showing of probable factual innocence. 
See Smith, supra, at 538-539 ("We similarly reject the sug-
gestion that there is anything 'fundamentally unfair' about 
enforcing procedural default rules in cases devoid of any sub-
stantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy 
of the guilt or sentencing determination"). The operative 
' I 
test is cau 
for the "e)i 
tual innoc, 
With this · 
(Slip Opinion) 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See 
Uniwd Staws v. Detroit Lumber Co. , 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
CASTILLE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADEL-
PHIA COUNTY, ET AL. v. PEOPLES 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 87-1602. Argued December 6, 1988-Decided February 22, 1989 
Following the Pennsylvania Superior Court's affirmance, on direct appeal, 
of respondent's conviction of assault, robbery, and related crimes, he 
filed with the State Supreme Court successive unsuccessful petitions for 
allocatur, which, under state law, can be granted in the court's discretion 
"only when there are special and important reasons therefor." Re-
spondent next filed a petition for federal habeas relief, raising various 
federal claims, some of which had been raised before the state courts 
only in one or the other of respondent's unsuccessful petitions for 
allocatur. The Federal District Court dismissed the petition for failure 
to exhaust state remedies. The Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded. Without considering whether respondent could obtain state 
collateral review of his claims, the court held that their inclusion in the 
allocatur petitions sufficiently exhausted state remedies, since the 
State's highest court had thereby been given an opportunity to correct 
the alleged constitutional infirmities in respondent's conviction. 
Held: 
1. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(c) provides that a state-law judgment can-
not be reviewed on federal habeas if the petitioner has a state-law right 
"to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." This bar 
does not apply where the petitioner has already made a "fair presenta-
tion" of the particular claim to the state courts, and has exhausted his 
direct appeals, since in such a situation it can reasonably be assumed that 
even if further state procedures are available, resort to them would be 
useless. That assumption is not justified, however, when the claim has 
been presented to the state courts for the first and only time in a proce-
dural context in which its merits will not be considered unless "there are 
special and important reasons therefor." Raising the issue in that fash-
I 
;ion, and the bar of 
therefore erred in 
his state remedies 
1llocatur petitions. 
exists because re-
. Pennsylvania law 
l. Pp. 5-6. 
.irt. 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 87-1602 
RONALD D. CASTILLE, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
MICHAEL PEOPLES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[February 22, 1989] 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Following a jury trial in the Pennsylvania Court of Com-
mon Pleas, respondent Michael Peoples, who had been ar-
rested for robbing a man and then setting him on fire, was 
convicted of "arson - endangering persons," aggravated 
assault and robbery. The Pennsylvania Superior Court af-
firmed his conviction on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. 
Peoples, 319 Pa. Super. 621, 466 A. 2d 720 (1983). Respond- ~ 
ent then filed a pro se petition for allocatur and appointment -of counsel with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Under 
Pennsylvania law, such allocatur review "is not a matter of -----right, but of sound judicial discretion, and an appeal will be 
allowed only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor." Pa. Rule App. Proc. 1114. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court granted the request for counsel without 
reaching the merits of the claims presented. Shortly there-
after, respondent, represented by appointed counsel, submit-
ted a second petition for allocatur, raising some, but not all, 
of the claims he had raised pro se. On November 4, 1985, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the second petition 
without opinion. 
On July 28, 1986, respondent filed a petition for federal ha-
beas relief in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, asserting: (1) that the prosecu-
tor violated state law, and thereby due process, by cross-
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The function of the criminal justice system might best be 
summed up as the protection of the innocent. In criminal 
prosecutions, an extensive system of rights and procedures guards 
against the conviction of an innocent person. Equally important, 
enforcement of the criminal law in all its phases -- crime 
prevention, police investigations, criminal prosecutions and 
corrections -- also aims at protection of the innocent. By 
detecting, convicting and punishing those who break our laws, we 
protect innocent people from the depredations of criminals. 
To protect the innocent effectively, the criminal justice 
system must be devoted to discovering the truth. The truth is 
the surest protection an innocent defendant can have. Uncovering 
the truth and presenting it fully and fairly in criminal 
proceedings is also of critical importance to the effort to 
restrain and deter those who prey on the innocent. 
Over the past thirty years, however, a variety of new rules 
have emerged that impede the discovery of reliable evidence at 
the investigative stages of the criminal justice process and that 
require the concealment of relevant facts at trial. This trend 
has been a cause of grave concern to many Americans, who perceive 
such rules as being at odds with the goals of the criminal 
justice system. Within the legal profession and the law 
enforcement community, debate over these rules has been 
complicated by disagreements about the extent to which 
constitutional principles or valid policy concerns require the 
subordination of the search for truth to other interests. 
This report is a contribution to that debate. It was 
prepared by the Office of Legal Policy, a component of the 
Department of Justice which acts as a principal policy 
development body for the Department. At my request, the Office 
of Legal Policy has undertaken a series of studies on the current 
status of the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice 
system. 
This volume, "Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State 
Judgments," is the seventh in that series. It reviews the 
historical development of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction; 
examines the contemporary operation of that jurisdiction as a 
- 2 -
means by which lower federal courts review state judgments; and 
discusses the constitutional and policy considerations affecting 
the continuation or restriction of this type of review. It also 
analyzes the prospects for reform in this area, considering both 
legislative and litigative options. 
In light of the general importance of the issues raised in 
this report and its companion volumes, it is fitting that they be 
available to the public. They will generate considerable thought 
on topics of great national importance, and merit the attention 
of anyone interested in a serious examination of these issues. 
~:m: 
EDWIN MEESE III 
Attorney General 
Executive Summary 
Under contemporary practice, a state prisoner who has exhausted 
his avenues of appeal in the state court system may continue to litigate 
the validity of his conviction or sentence by applying for habeas corpus in 
a federal district court. In the habeas corpus proceeding, the prisoner 
may raise and secure a redetermination of the same claims of federal 
right that have already been fully litigated and rejected at the multiple 
levels of adjudication and review in the state court system. In practical 
effect, this procedure places federal trial judges in the position of 
reviewing courts, with authority to overturn the considered judgments of 
state courts of appeals and state supreme courts in criminal cases. 
An intelligent assessment of this review jurisdiction must start from 
a clear understanding of the fact that the contemporary "writ of habeas 
corpus" by which the lower federal courts review state judgments is not 
the Great Writ of the Constitution and the common law. Rather, it is a 
purely statutory remedy that is fundamentally different from the 
traditional habeas corpus remedy whose suspension is prohibited by the 
Constitution. The emergence of this non-constitutional remedy as the 
basis for a quasi-appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in state 
criminal cases is essentially the result of judicial innovations that have 
taken place since the 1950's. In Justice Powell's words, the result of this 
development is that we now have a system of review that "assures no end 
to the litigation of a criminal conviction," a system that "is viewed with 
disbelief by lawyers and judges in other countries." 
This Report carries out a review of the historical development of the 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction; examines its contemporary character 
and operation; and discusses relevant policy considerations. The Report 
concludes that federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for 
state prisoners should be abolished or limited as far as possible. The 
limited reform proposals that were passed by the Senate in 1984 and that 
are currently before Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice 
Reform Act provide the best immediate prospect for improvement. 
In greater detail, the main findings and recommendations of the 
Report are as follows: 
I. History of Habeas Corpus 
The right to habeas corpus as understood at common law and by 
the framers of the Constitution was essentially a right to judicial 
protection against unlawful executive detention. A person who had been 
taken into custody by executive authorities could apply to a court to issue 
a writ of habeas corpus which would direct the custodian to produce the 
prisoner and state the cause of his commitment. If the government made 
an adequate return stating that the petitioner was being held on a 
criminal charge, the court could set bail for the petitioner in cases where 
bail was legally authorized, and otherwise would allow him to remain in 
detention pending trial. If the government could state no legal ground for 
the detention, the court would order his release. 
Thus, habeas corpus in its traditional character was essentially a 
pre-trial remedy which guarded against executive oppression. It could 
not be used to challenge a person's incarceration pursuant to the 
judgment of a court unless the judgment was void because the court 
lacked jurisdiction. 
The Constitution's prohibition of suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus was intended to perpetuate habeas corpus in its traditional 
character as a check on lawless incarceration by executive authorities. 
The right to habeas corpus under the Constitution and under the First 
Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, was also only a limitation on the power of 
the federal government, and had no application to persons detained or 
incarcerated pursuant to state authority. 
In 1867, Congress created an enlarged statutory habeas corpus 
remedy -- not confined to federal prisoners -- to provide a federal remedy 
for former slaves who were being held in involuntary servitude in 
violation of the recently enacted Thirteenth Amendment. The remedy 
under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was initially applied in a manner 
consistent with the traditional nature of habeas corpus; it could generally 
not be used to challenge imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a 
competent tribunal. Following Moore v. Dempsey in 1923, a somewhat 
broader approach emerged in the decisions under which relief on federal 
habeas corpus could be available if no meaningful process existed in the 
state courts for considering a prisoner's federal claims. Finally, innova-
tive judicial decisions of the 1950's and 1960's effectively transformed 
federal habeas corpus into a general appellate jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts over state criminal judgments by eliminating the conven-
tional limitations on the scope and availability of habeas corpus review 
and drastically expanding the federal rights of state defendants. 
Legislative changes in federal habeas corpus since 1867 have 
generally been directed to restricting its availability to prisoners in state 
or local custody. For example, Congress has barred access to federal 
habeas corpus for persons convicted in the local court system of the 
District of Columbia; created a presumption of correctness for state court 
fact-finding in habeas corpus proceedings; and enacted a rule that 
unreasonably delayed petitions can be dismissed in certain circumstanc-
es. 
Congress has also given partial approval on a number of occasions 
to more far-reaching reforms. In 1956, and again in 1958, the House of 
Representatives passed legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference 
that would have virtually eliminated federal habeas corpus for state 
prisoners. In 1968, legislation that would have abolished federal habeas 
corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners reached the Senate 
floor as part of the proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act. In 1984, the Senate passed by a vote of 67 to 9 legislation supported 
by the Administration that would create a time limit for habeas corpus 
applications, narrow the standard of review for previously adjudicated 
claims, and effect a number of other important reforms. These proposals 
are currently before Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice 
Reform Act (S. 1970 and H.R. 3777). 
II. The Current Jurisdiction 
Habeas corpus applications by state prisoners were a relatively rare 
occurrence prior to the creation of a quasi-appellate federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction by judicial decisions of the 1950's and 1960's. 
However, they now constitute a major category of federal litigation. In 
1941, state prisoners filed 127 habeas corpus petitions in the federal 
district courts. In 1961, the corresponding figure was 1,020. In 1987, it 
was 9,542. 
More detailed statistical information is available from an extensive 
empirical study of habeas corpus litigation that was funded by the 
Department of Justice and completed in 1979. The study indicated that 
habeas corpus litigation entails substantial burdens for judges and state 
authorities, but rarely results in the granting of relief to the petitioner. 
There is no reason to believe that a "better" result is obtained in any 
objective sense in the small proportion of cases in which the federal 
habeas court does reach a different conclusion from the state courts. 
The study also indicated that most habeas corpus petitioners had 
been convicted of serious, violent offenses. Over 80% had been convicted 
after trial and about the same percentage had had or were having direct 
appellate review of their cases in the state system. About 45% had 
pursued collateral remedies in the state courts and over 30% had filed at 
least one previous federal petition. Thus, federal habeas corpus typically 
serves to provide additional review for prisoners whose cases have 
already received an abundance of judicial process in comparison with the 
average criminal case. 
The 1979 study also found extraordinary delays in habeas corpus 
filings in comparison with normal appellate mechanisms. About 40% of 
petitions in the study were filed more than five years after conviction and 
nearly a third were filed more than ten years after conviction. Delays of 
up to more than fifty years from conviction were noted in some cases in 
the study. 
The problem of delay is particularly acute in capital cases, which 
are characterized by interminable litigation and re-litigation that impede 
the execution of death sentences. Thirty-seven states authorize capital 
punishment and about 2,000 prisoners are currently under sentence of 
death, but fewer than a hundred executions have occurred in the past 
twenty years. The federal habeas corpus jurisdiction provides an avenue 
for obstruction and delay in these cases which the state legislatures are 
powerless to address. 
The Supreme Court in its current habeas corpus decisions has given 
weight to considerations of finality and federalism that were ignored or 
shrugged off in the expansive decisions of the 1960's. A number of 
significant limitations have resulted. For example, McMann v. Richard-
son in 1970 and Tollett v. Henderson in 1973 narrowed the range of 
claims that can be raised on habeas corpus by prisoners who have pied 
guilty. Wainwright v. Sykes in 1977 restricted the raising of claims in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings that were not properly raised before 
the state courts. Stone v. Powell in 1976 barred consideration of Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule claims by federal habeas courts where 
state proceedings provide a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate such 
claims. Sumner v. Mata in 1981 strengthened the interpretation and 
application of the statutory presumption in favor of deference by federal 
habeas courts to the factual determinations of state courts. 
III. Considerations of Policy 
Various contemporary features of the federal habeas corpus juris-
diction reflect a failure of the standards and procedures associated with 
federal habeas corpus to keep pace with its expanding scope. This 
expansion has come about almost entirely through judicial innovation, 
without legislative sanction. No legislature would pass a law stating that 
a defendant has a right to appeal his conviction, but that he may wait as 
long as he wishes before doing so. No legislature would pass a law stating 
that a defendant may appeal again and again if dissatisfied with the 
results the first time around. No legislature would pass a law stating that 
a defendant has a right to further mandatory review of a nearly unlimited 
range of alleged procedural errors that have already been thoroughly 
considered and rejected by other courts of appeals. Yet all of these 
characteristics can be found in the current federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction. 
Proposals for correcting these anomalies are frequently met with the 
fallacious contention that doing so would interfere with the Great Writ of 
the common law, whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution. 
Contentions of this sort reflect a simple verbal confusion. The common 
law writ referred to in the Constitution and the contemporary statutory 
writ by which the lower federal courts review state judgments are not the 
same. The constitutional "writ of habeas corpus" is a remedy that federal 
prisoners can use before trial to test the existence of grounds for 
detention by executive authorities. The current statutory "writ of habeas 
corpus" is a remedy that state prisoners can use after trial and exhaustion 
of state appellate remedies to secure additional review of the judgments 
of state courts. These two writs have fundamentally different functions 
and are directed against the actions of different governments. They have 
nothing in common but a name. 
Various other arguments have been offered in support of the current 
system of review of state judgments by the lower federal courts through 
"habeas corpus." On examination, these arguments generally conceal a 
one-sided concern with defense interests -- and a correlative disregard of 
competing public interests and constitutional values -- or an unjustified 
preference for aggrandizing the lower federal courts at the expense of the 
state judiciaries, or some combination of these two biases. Both history 
' 
and contemporary practice refute the notion that defendants in state 
proceedings must routinely have access to a federal forum for the 
adjudication of their federal claims. The argument that habeas corpus 
review promotes increased fidelity to the Constitution or furthers the 
interests of justice is also unpersuasive. The notion that habeas corpus 
litigation provides a beneficial type of "recreational therapy" for 
prisoners ignores the fact that frivolous and harassing litigation is itself a 
seriously antisocial activity, and disregards its potential effect of 
increasing the arrogance of unrepentant criminals. 
IV. Reform Options 
In 1983, Attorney General William French Smith suggested that 
the optimum solution to the problems of the federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction would be the enactment of legislation abolishing federal 
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners. We agree. 
A reform of this sort would not affect in any manner the traditional writ 
of habeas corpus whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution and 
would not upset any deep-seated tradition or historically sanctioned 
practice. State convicts would retain the right to seek direct review of 
their cases by the Supreme Court following such a reform, in addition to 
having access to the appellate and collateral review mechanisms provided 
in the state court systems. The same reform has already been in effect for 
close to twenty years in the District of Columbia, with no discernible 
adverse effect on the quality or fairness of criminal proceedings. 
A second possibility would be to limit federal habeas corpus to the 
role of a backstop remedy, whose availability would be conditioned on a 
state judicial system's failure to provide some meaningful process for 
raising and deciding a federal claim. This would also constitute a 
fundamental improvement over the pointless redundancy of the current 
system. 
A final legislative option is limited reform measures focusing on 
particular problems of abuse or excess that arise under the current 
system of review. This approach is taken in the reform legislation that 
was passed by the Senate in 1984 as S. 1763 and that is now before 
Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act (S. 1970 
and H.R. 3777). The legislation would create a one-year time limit on 
habeas corpus applications, normally running from exhaustion of state 
remedies; establish a relatively simple and uniform standard of review 
under which the federal habeas court would l!enerallv defer to the state 
courts' determination of a claim if the determination was reasonable and 
arrived at by procedures consistent with due process; clarify the 
standards for entertaining claims that were not properly raised before the 
state courts; and effect various technical improvements in habeas corpus 
procedure. These limited reform proposals provide the best immediate 
prospect for effecting basic improvements over the current system of 
review. 
Finally, it may be possible to achieve some significant improve-
ments through litigation, though the litigative options are constrained by 
existing statutory standards and settled judicial precedents. The possibili-
ties in this area include securing judicial decisions extending the 
deferential standard of Stone v. Powell -- which now applies to Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule claims -- to Miranda and Massiah claims; 
securing the uniform application of restrictive standards concerning the 
raising of claims that were not properly raised before the state courts; 
and securing a stronger interpretation of the rule permitting the dismissal 






The proceedings of the [Constitutional] Convention do not 
cast much direct light on just what the Framers assumed the 
"privileges" of the writ to be; but it was of course the clear 
contemporaneous understanding that the fundamental func-
tion of the writ was to test executive detention and that 
convictions by a criminal court of competent jurisdiction 
could not be reexamined on habeas corpus at all. 
-- Hart & W echsler's 
The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 
Another cause of overload of the federal system is [28 U.S.C.] 
§ 2254, conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review 
state court criminal convictions. There is no statute of 
limitations, and no finality of federal review of state convic-
tions. Thus, repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know of no 
other system of justice structured in a way that assures no end 
to the litigation of a criminal conviction. Our practice in this 
respect is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and judges in other 
countries. Nor does the Constitution require this sort of 
redundancy. 
-- Justice Lewis F. Powell 
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I 
am sure it will be, it is clear that we should strive to make both 
the federal and the state systems strong, independent, and 
viable. State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to 
litigate federal constitutional questions. State judges in assum-
ing office take an oath to support the federal as well as the 
state constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion 
when given the responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a 
step in the right direction to defer to the state courts and give 
finality to their judgments on federal constitutional questions 
where a full and fair adjudication has been given in the state 
court. 
-- Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW 
OF STATE JUDGMENTS 
Introduction 
The objective of the law in criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court 
has stated, is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." 1 
As the earlier reports in this series have documented, the criminal justice 
system in the United States has, in many areas, lost sight of this simple 
truth. The process of investigation and adjudication in criminal cases is 
burdened with rules and procedures that are in conflict with its basic 
function. 
A number of our earlier reports have been concerned with 
impediments to the search for truth that have their primary impact at the 
stages of investigation and trial. For example, the police are frequently 
barred by the Miranda rules from engaging in non-coercive, constitution-
ally proper questioning of suspects. At trial, these rules and other 
judicially created rules may require that a defendant's pre-trial state-
ments be concealed from the jury, though freely-given, probative, and 
reliable. Similarly, the search and seizure exclusionary rule requires that 
the trier be kept ignorant of physical evidence of unquestioned reliability 
and probative value. 2 
The objectives of accuracy and substantive justice may also be 
disserved beyond the point of conviction by unsound mechanisms of 
appeal and review. The government is generally barred from seeking 
correction by an appellate court when the public is endangered through 
the erroneous acquittal of a criminal, but review of convictions at the 
instance of the defendant is, in contrast, essentially open-ended. Under 
the contemporary operation of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, a 
person convicted of a crime by a state court may repeatedly seek to have 
his conviction overturned in the lower federal courts, with no particular 
1 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
2See Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 35, 36-37, 43-44, 
47-52, 53-56, 62-63, 76-79, 97 & n.157 (1986) (Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. l); 
Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule (1986) 
(Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 2); Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel under the Massiah Line of Cases (1986) (Truth in Criminal 
Justice Report No. 3). 
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limit on how long he may wait before doing so. The grounds on which 
relief from the state court judgment is sought may cast no doubt on the 
defendant's factual guilt, and may tum on close or unsettled questions on 
which the lower federal courts themselves disagree. 
The frequent practical effect of this procedure is to convert "the 
process of review in criminal cases into a kind of interminable game, an 
open-ended hunt for official error. In this attenuated process the question 
is not whether an innocent defendant, mistakenly convicted, may enlist 
the aid of an appellate court in correcting a miscarriage of justice. 
Rather, it is whether a persistent defendant, however guilty, may 
eventually get lucky and persuade some judge or court to find error, 
given unlimited opportunities to do so." 3 
This report examines the process by which we have come to have a 
system of review which "assures no end to the litigation of a criminal 
conviction," a system which "is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and 
judges in other countries." 4 Section I reviews the history of habeas 
corpus. Section II describes the current federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Section III discusses pertinent policy considerations. Section IV sets 
out the possibilities and prospects for reform. 
3 
Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman at a Seminar on the 
Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland, 
at 1-2 (Mar. 8, 1986). 
4 
Address of Justice Lewis F. Powell before the American Bar Association Division of 
Judicial Administration, at 9 (Aug. 9, 1982). 
I. HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 
The right to habeas corpus as understood at common law and by 
the framers of the Constitution was elisentially a right to judicial 
protection against unlawful executive detention. The habeas corpus 
remedy could not be used to challenge the detention of a person pursuant 
to the judgment of a court unless the judgment was void because the 
court lacked jurisdiction. The Constitution's prohibition of suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus was intended to perpetuate habeas corpus in its 
traditional character as a check on lawless incarceration by executive 
authorities. The right to habeas corpus under the Constitution and under 
the First Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, was also only a limitation on the 
power of the federal government, and had no application to persons 
detained or incarcerated pursuant to state authority. 
In 1867, Congress created a broader statutory habeas corpus 
remedy to provide a federal remedy for former slaves who were being 
held in involuntary servitude in violation of the recently enacted 
Thirteenth Amendment. While later applications of the statutory remedy 
went beyond the narrow compass anticipated by its framers, its scope 
initially remained quite limited. In the initial period of judicial applica-
tion, the courts generally adhered to the traditional standards under 
which a prisoner could not challenge his incarceration pursuant to the 
judgment of a court unless the judgment was void because the court 
lacked jurisdiction. Following Frank v. Mangum in 1915 and Moore v. 
Dempsey in 1923, a somewhat broader inquiry emerged in the decisions 
under which federal habeas corpus could be available if no meaningful 
process existed in the state courts for considering a prisoner's federal 
claims. The final step in the creation of the current habeas corpus 
jurisdiction came in decisions of the 1950's and 1960's which eliminated 
the conventional limitations on the scope and availability of habeas 
corpus review and drastically expanded the federal rights of state 
defendants. The practical effect of this development has been to create a 
general appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in relation to 
state criminal judgments. 
The legislative interventions in the development of the habeas 
corpus jurisdiction since 1867 have consistently involved restrictions on 
the availability of federal habeas corpus to prisoners in state or local 
custody. Congress has barred access to federal habeas corpus for persons 
convicted in the local court system of the District of Columbia; 
conditioned appeals from district court denials of habeas corous oetitions 
I - I 
, ..... , 
on obtaining a certificate of probable cause; created a presumption of 
correctness for state court fact-finding in habeas corpus proceedings; and 
enacted a rule that delayed petitions can be dismissed in certain cases on 
grounds of "!aches." Congress has also given partial approval on a 
number of occasions to reform proposals that would have virtually 
abolished federal habeas corpus for state prisoners or enacted more far-
reaching limitations on its availability. 
A. The Common Law, the Constitution, and the First 
Judiciary Act 
At common law, habeas corpus was essentially a means of securing 
judicial review of the existence of grounds for executive detention. If a 
person was taken into custody by executive authorities, he could petition 
a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, which would order the custodian 
to produce the prisoner and state the cause of his commitment. If the 
government made an adequate return stating that the petitioner was 
being held on a criminal charge, the court could set bail for the 
petitioner, or would allow him to be detained pending trial, depending on 
whether the offense charged was bailable or non-bailable. If the 
government could state no legal ground for holding the petitioner, the 
court would order his release. 5 
5 See, e.g., Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States -- 1776-1865, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243, 243-45, 
262 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court -- Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 
451, 451, 460-61, 468 (1966); Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System 1513 (2d ed. 1973); R. Rader, Bailing Out a Failed Law: The Constitution and 
Pre-Trial Detention in P. McGuigan & R. Rader, eds., Criminal Justice Reform: A 
Blueprint 91, 94-96 (1983); Developments -- Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 
1038, 1042-45 (1970) [hereafter cited as "Developments 'l 
The description in the accompanying text reflects the basic functions of the common law 
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (the "Great Writ"). The writ assumed its mature 
form in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c.2, which strengthened and partially 
codified the common law procedures for eliciting a statement of charges and enforcing 
bail rights. The Act exempted persons committed on charges of felony or treason from 
the benefits of the writ under its general provisions, but prescribed time limits for 
indicting and trying such persons. See id.; Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts --
Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 335, 337-38 (1952). 
Habeas corpus could also serve some miscellaneous functions in the common law period, 
such as testing the validity of process under which a person was held before trial, 
challenging unlawful restraint by private persons, or testing a committing court's 
jurisdiction. A general survey of early American practice appears in Oaks, supra (1965 
article). 
The importance of habeas corpus in this character -- as a safeguard 
against arbitrary executive detention -- was recognized by the framers, 
who included in the Constitution a prohibition of suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus, "unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
safety may require it." The writ of habeas corpus referred to in the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution, however, differs in two funda-
mental respects from the present-day statutory writ by which the lower 
federal courts review state criminal judgments. 
First, the right to habeas corpus set out in the Constitution was only 
intended as a check on abuses of authority by the federal government, 
and was not meant to provide a judicial remedy for unlawful detention 
by state authorities. This point is evident, to begin with, from the 
placement of the Suspension Clause in Section 9 of Article I of the 
Constitution, which is an enumeration of limitations on the power of the 
federal government. The corresponding enumeration of restrictions on 
state authority in Section 10 of Article I contains no right to habeas 
corpus. 
The same understanding was evident in the debate over the 
Suspension Clause at the constitutional convention. There was no dissent 
from the desirability of protecting the right to habeas corpus from federal 
interference, but the convention divided on whether a proviso should be 
stated to this general principle that would enable the federal government 
to suspend the writ in emergency situations. It was assumed in the debate 
at the convention that the states would remain free to suspend the writ 
even if the Suspension Clause were adopted in an unqualified form, and it 
was argued unsuccessfully that this made federal suspension power 
unnecessary. 6 Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, the First 
Congress in 1789 made the restriction of the federal habeas corpus right 
to federal prisoners explicit, providing in the First Judiciary Act (ch. 14, 
§ 20, 1 Stat. 81-82): 
6 
See 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 438 (1966); 3 id. at 
157, 213, 290. The majority was evidently unpersuaded that the individual states' 
suspension power would be equal to the exigencies of invasion and rebellion. The 
minority position also failed to take account of the potential need to suspend the writ in 
response to rebellion by a state, as opposed to rebellion against a state. This point 




[T]he justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the 
district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus 
for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. 
Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to 
prisoners in gaol [i.e., jail], unless where they are in custody, 
under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are 
committed for trial before some court of the same . . . . 
Second, the writ referred to in the Constitution, as noted above, was 
the common law writ of habeas corpus, whose essential function was to 
serve as a check on arbitrary executive detention. Recognition of the 
common law scope of the writ is reflected in the Constitution's 
authorization of the suspension of the writ in cases of rebellion or 
invasion, whose obvious purpose was to permit in such circumstances 
executive detention unconstrained by normal legal processes and stan-
dards. 
7 
As Blackstone explained: 
To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, 
without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an 
act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny 
throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the 
person, by secretly hurrying him to [jail], where his sufferings 
are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and 
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. 
And yet sometimes, when the state is in real danger, even this 
may be a necessary measure ... . [T]he ... legislative power, 
whenever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by suspend-
ing the habeas corpus act for a short and limited time, to 
imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so 
doing ... . [T]his experiment ought only to be tried in cases of 
extreme emergency; and in these the nation parts with its 
liberty for a while, in order to preserve it for ever. 8 
The framers' conception of habeas corpus as a check on executive 
abuses and a pre-trial remedy that could be used to elicit a statement of 
the cause of commitment and enforce bail rights was also reflected in 
other ways in the materials associated with the adoption and implemen-
tation of the Constitution. Before the proviso to the Suspension Clause 
7 
See the sources cited in note 6 supra. 
8
1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 131-32 (1765). 
permitting suspension in cases of rebellion or invasion was voted on at 
the constitutional convention, a final objection was heard that the 
suspension authority was unnecessary because judges already had 
discretion to commit persons or bail them in most important cases. 9 In 
Federalist No. 84, Hamilton explained the habeas corpus right in the 
proposed Constitution by citing Blackstone's characterization of habeas 
corpus as a remedy for arbitrary, secret imprisonment. As noted above, 
the First Judiciary Act described the function of the writ as "inquiry into 
the cause of commitment" and referred to its availability to federal 
prisoners "committed for trial." 
B. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 
Between 1789 and the end of the Civil War, there was little change 
in the character of federal habeas corpus. In response to particular 
incidents of state resistance to the execution of federal law and 
interference with a foreign agent, acts of 1833 and 1842 extended the 
availability of federal habeas corpus to certain agents of foreign 
governments and to federal officers detained in the states for acts done in 
carrying out their duties. 10 In other respects, the First Judiciary Act's 
limitation of the availability of habeas corpus in the federal courts to 
persons in federal custody remained operative. The writ's application to 
federal prisoners continued to be limited to its common law functions. 
After the Civil War, however, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1867, which extended the availability of the federal writ to persons 
"restrained of . . . liberty" in violation of federal law, without any 
requirement of federal custody. The Act was drafted in response to a 
resolution of December 19, 1865, of the House of Representatives 
directing its Judiciary Committee 
to inquire and report to this House, as soon as practicable, by 
bill or otherwise, what legislation is necessary to enable the 
courts of the United States to enforce the freedom of the wives 
and children of soldiers of the United States under the joint 
resolution of Congress of March 3, 1865, and also to enforce 
the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitu-
9 2 M. Farrand, supra note 6, at 438. 
10 Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 31, 33 (1965). 
tional amendment abolishing slavery. 11 
The "resolution of March 3, 1865" referred to in this directive was a 
measure pre-dating the Thirteenth Amendment (see 13 Stat. 571) which 
freed the families of Black Union soldiers who lived in areas that were 
not covered by the earlier Emancipation Proclamation. The reference to 
the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery was to the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which went into effect the day before the directive was 
adopted. 
The initial version of the bill resulting from this directive extended 
the availability of habeas corpus in the federal courts to persons held in 
"slavery or involuntary servitude," but a later version of the bill, which 
was eventually enacted, contained the broader "restraint of liberty" 
language. The probable reason for this language change may be found in 
tlie efforts of the slave states to circumvent emancipation by enacting 
oppressive apprenticeship, contract labor, and vagrancy laws that 
restrained the liberty of former slaves. The broader language of the final 
version of the bill would have been more readily applicable to restraints 
of liberty under these laws than the earlier "slavery or involuntary 
servitude" version. 12 
The reformulated bill was brought up on the floor of the House of 
Representatives by Representative Lawrence in the first session of the 
39th Congress. The general merits of the proposal were not debated, but 
Representative Le Blond objected to a proviso in the bill which stated 
that it was inapplicable to persons held by the military authorities on 
charges of military offenses or of participation in rebellion against the 
federal government prior to the passage of the act. Lawrence responded 
that the bill was not addressed to the situation of persons in military 
custody. Rather, he explained, the bill was introduced pursuant to the 
resolution of December 19, 1865 (pp. 7-8 supra), and would correct the 
inadequacy of federal jurisdiction to protect the rights and liberties of the 
persons referred to in the resolution. Following this brief interchange, the 
bill was passed by the House. 13 
11 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865). 
12 See Mayers, supra note 10, at 34-35, 43-44. 
13
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 4150-51 (1866). See generally Mayers, supra note 10, 
at 36-38. 
In the Senate, the bill was then brought up by Senator Trumbull, 
whose discussion of the measure indicated that it was a House bill with 
which he had limited familiarity. As in the House, the debate was brief, 
and focused on the proviso relating to persons in military custody and 
some minor collateral issues. In the course of the debate, Trumbull 
pointed out that the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the habeas corpus 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to persons held under federal laws. He 
stated that the point of the bill was to extend the availability of federal 
habeas corpus to persons who might be held under state laws in violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the United States (Cong. Globe, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 4228-30). Trumbull's explanation may have been an 
improvisation based on the face of an unfamiliar proposal, 14 or may have 
been an unelaborated reference to the state laws which were being used to 
keep freed slaves in a de facto state of servitude. 15 On account of the 
objections raised about collateral matters in the Senate, the bill was held 
over. It passed in the next session without further significant debate 
(Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730, 790). 
Overall, the legislative history of the Act shows a clear purpose of 
providing a federal remedy for emancipated slaves who were being 
deprived of liberty in the states. It does not show that the creation of a 
broadly applicable federal remedy for state prisoners was intended or 
anticipated. 16 
14 See Mayers, supra note 10, at 38-39. 
15 In 1868, while arguing for withdrawal of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the 
denial of habeas corpus to a person in military custody, Senator Trumbull explained the 
original purpose of the Act of 1867 as follows (Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096): 
"The act of 1789 authorized the issuing of .. . writs in cases where persons were 
deprived of their liberty under . .. color of authority of the United States. Why, then, 
was the Act of 1867 passed? It was passed to authorize writs of habeas corpus to issue in 
cases where persons were deprived of their liberty under State laws or pretended State 
laws. It was the object of the Act of 1867 to .. . meet a class of cases which was arising 
in the rebel States, where, under pretense of certain State laws, men made free by the 
Constitution of the United States were virtually being enslaved, and it was also 
applicable to cases in the State of Maryland where, under an apprentice law, freedmen 
were being subjected to a species of bondage." Accord, id. at 2168 (Representatives 
Hubbard and Wilson). Maryland was mentioned separately from the "rebel" states in 
Trumbull's statement because it was a slave state that sided with the Union. See 
Mayers, supra note 10, at 43-44, 52 & n. 80. 
16 Some post-enactment statements indicated that the Act of 1867 was adopted to protect 
Union loyalists or officers, as well as freed slaves, from persecution in the rebel states. 
See Ex parte Mccardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 322 (1867) (argument of Senator 
IJ 
However, the language of the Act -- together with the absence of 
committee reports and the perfunctory discussion of its purpose on the 
House and Senate floors -- contained the seeds of later expansive 
developments. On its face, the enacted bill provided a general authoriza-
tion for exercising federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for the benefit of 
persons who were being denied liberty in violation of federal law. In 
contrast, the initial version of the proposal (see p. 8 supra) had expressly 
limited its application to persons held in slavery or involuntary servitude. 
This difference in formulation would not have appeared particularly 
significant at the time of the bill's enactment in 1867. Imprisonment 
pursuant to the judgment of a court was generally not considered to be in 
violation of law for purposes of habeas corpus, even if the judgment was 
predicated on legal error. 17 Moreover, there were virtually no limitations 
on restraints of liberty in the states under federal constitutional or 
statutory law, aside from the Thirteenth Amendment and related civil 
rights legislation: The rights of criminal defendants against the states 
under the original Constitution were minimal; the Bill of Rights did not 
apply to the states; and the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been 
proposed or ratified. 18 However, with the ensuing expansion of federal 
procedural rights through constitutional amendment and judicial innova-
Trumbull as counsel for the government); Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2126 
(1868) (Senator Buckalew). This interpretation was initially proffered in the context of 
efforts to prevent Southern resisters from using the Act to challenge the military 
governance of the subjugated Confederacy. It may have originated as an afterthought 
which permitted unfavorable comparisons between the resisters who sought to use the 
Act and the loyal persons it was meant to protect. See Mayers, supra note 10, at 48-52 
& n. 70. It may also have reflected some confusion between the Habeas Corpus Act and 
other Reconstruction measures. See id. at 39 n. 37; Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 
2119-20. Even if these post-enactment statements are taken as accurate, however, they 
show no broader purpose than dealing with specific evils arising from the unique 
conditions attending Reconstruction. 
17 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830); Bator, Finality in Criminal 
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus/or State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 466, 474-75 
(1963); Oaks, supra note 5, at 262 (1965 article). 
In the final stages of the Senate debate on the Habeas Corpus Act, Senator Johnson 
raised the possibility of an application being made under the Act by a person convicted 
and imprisoned in a state, but his statements indicate that he was considering the case 
of a person in federal custody being held within the territory of a state pursuant to the 
judgment of a federal tribunal that lacked jurisdiction. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. , 2d 
Sess. 730, 790. Granting relief in such a case would have been consistent with the 
traditional scope of habeas corpus. See pp. 11-12 infra. 
18 See Mayers, supra note 10, at 44-45, 52-55. 
tion, the potential resulted for broad federal court review of state 
criminal judgments, to the extent that the federal courts were willing to 
abrogate the traditional restrictions on the function of the habeas corpus 
remedy. The course by which these restrictions were eroded and 
eventually abandoned is examined in the next part of this report. 
C. Subsequent Judicial Developments 
The development of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction subse-
quent to 1867 falls naturally into three stages. In the initial period, the 
common law standards generally remained in effect and habeas corpus 
could not be used to challenge a conviction entered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. In the course of the second period, the jurisdic-
tional standard was supplanted by a general approach under which the 
availability of federal habeas corpus would depend on whether the state 
had provided some meaningful process for considering a defendant's 
federal claims. In the third period, innovative decisions of the 1950's and 
1960's effectively converted the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction into a 
general appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in relation to 
state criminal judgments. 
1. The Jurisdictional Standard 
As discussed earlier, the essential function of the common law 
habeas corpus remedy that was incorporated into the Constitution was to 
guard against abuses of executive power affecting personal liberty. 
Imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a court could accordingly not 
be challenged through a habeas corpus application. The only significant 
qualification to this principle was that the question of a committing 
court's jurisdiction could be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding, 
reflecting the view that a judgment entered without jurisdiction was a 
nullity. 19 
19 See, e.g. , Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830); Oaks, supra note 5, at 
261-62 (1965 article). Even jurisdictional challenges were often effectively precluded by 
a presumption that a court of general jurisdiction acted within the scope of its 
authority. A broader inquiry was authorized in relation to the judgments of "inferior" 
courts under a rule that the jurisdiction of such a court must be shown affirmatively. 
However, "inferior" courts in the relevant sense only included certain courts of limited 
jurisdiction -- for example, a court martial might be so classified -- and did not include 
the regular lower federal courts or state courts of general jurisdiction. See Ex parte 
Watkins, 28 U.S. at 203-05, 207-09; W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus §§ 266-68 (2d ed. 1893). 
a. Federal Prisoners 
The Supreme Court consistently applied these common law princi-
ples in relation to federal prisoners in its early decisions under the First 
Judiciary Act. For example, in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 
201-03 (1830), the Supreme Court refused to consider the merits of a 
habeas corpus application alleging that the petitioner had been convicted 
pursuant to a defective indictment. The Court explained: 
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is 
rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment of 
a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on 
all the world as the judgment of this court would be .. . . It 
puts an end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it ... . 
An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, 
unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a 
nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, 
although it should be erroneous. 
The enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 made it possible 
for federal prisoners to point to that Act, as well as to the original habeas 
corpus provisions of the First Judiciary Act, as the basis for their 
applications. This did not, however, result in any change in the scope of 
the writ. Federal convicts were still confined to the assertion of 
jurisdictional defects. 20 
Post-Civil War cases involving federal prisoners did, however, 
generate some extension of the notion of a "jurisdictional" defect. 21 The 
Supreme Court held in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375-77 (1879), 
that a conviction pursuant to an unconstitutional statute could be 
attacked on habeas corpus, stating that "[a]n unconstitutional law is 
void, and is as no law," and that "if the laws are unconstitutional and 
void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes." This 
20This was consistent with the intent behind the 1867 Act. Federal habeas corpus had 
been available to federal prisoners under settled common law standards from the 
beginning of the nation, and both the House and Senate managers of the 1867 Act 
emphasized that its purpose was to create an enlarged jurisdiction for the benefit of 
certain persons who were "restrained of . .. liberty" in the states (see pp. 8-9 supra). 
They presumably would have taken it for granted that the traditional standards would 
continue to apply in any overlapping application of the new jurisdiction to federal 
prisoners. 
21 See Bator, supra note 17, at 465-74; Developments, supra note 5, at 1045-48. 
doctrine, as the cited passages indicate, reflected the notion that a 
prosecution pursuant to an invalid statute was tantamount to a 
prosecution carried out without any kind of legal authority. The late 
nineteenth century cases also reflected a greater willingness to grant 
review by habeas corpus where a claim implicated the sentencing 
authority of the committing court. 22 
The tendency to apply an extended notion of "jurisdiction" in 
certain areas apparently resulted in part from the pressures generated by 
the general preclusion of appellate review in federal criminal cases during 
most of the nineteenth century. Even this limited extension of habeas 
corpus review was curtailed after federal defendants were given the right 
to appeal. 23 Throughout this period, the general rule continued to be that 
a conviction would not be overturned in a habeas corpus proceeding if 
the court rendering the judgment had the authority to hear and decide 
the case. 24 
b. State Prisoners 
In relation to state prisoners, it became apparent in the early cases 
that the text of the 1867 Act provided inadequate guidance concerning 
the exercise of the enlarged federal habeas corpus jurisdiction it had 
created. State defendants filed petitions under the Act while state 
proceedings were underway or after they had been concluded, but the 
Act contained no provision concerning deference to prior state adjudica-
tions or pending state proceedings. Rather, it provided simply that the 
district court was to find the facts in a summary fashion on the basis of 
the testimony and arguments of the interested parties. 
These features of the Habeas Corpus Act become more understand-
able when one considers its narrow original purpose. The typical case 
anticipated by the Act's framers would not have been that of a defendant 
in a state prosecution, but of an emancipated slave who was unlawfully 
being kept in a state of servitude by a private slaveholder, perhaps under 
the purported authority of a state statute re-designating the slave as an 
"apprentice" or holding him to a labor contract under threat of criminal 
sanctions. In such a case, the question of deference to state judicial 
22 See Bator, supra note 17, at 467-68, 471-72. 
23 See id. at 473-74 (rejection in early twentieth century cases of habeas corpus review of 
constitutionality of criminal statutes). 
24See id. at 471-74, 483-84. 
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processes would not arise. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
authorized the removal of state proceedings to federal court as protection 
against violations of its provisions by state authorities. 25 Thus, there 
already existed in 1867 a more complete protection against violations of 
the narrow range of existing federal rights in state prosecutions. This 
would also have tended to eliminate any reason for the framers of the 
Habeas Corpus Act to anticipate or make provision for the case of a 
defendant who asserted violations of federal rights in state judicial 
proceedings. 26 
Hence, the state defendant who sought relief under the Habeas 
Corpus Act presented a case whose procedural ramifications had not 
been addressed in the formulation of the statute. When cases of this sort 
did subsequently arise, the Supreme Court adopted two doctrines in 
dealing with them. 
First, the Court held that the power conferred by the Habeas 
Corpus Act should ordinarily not be exercised until the state courts had 
had an opportunity to address the petitioner's allegations in the normal 
course of state proceedings. The doctrine was first articulated by the 
Court in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), which rejected a 
petitioner's pre-trial challenge to his detention on a state indictment 
pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional statute. The doctrine deriving 
from Ex parte Royall and its progeny, termed the requirement of 
"exhaustion of state remedies," is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-
(c). 
25The Civil Rights Act conferred national citizenship on blacks and provided for equality 
of civil rights regardless of race. Section 3 of the Act authorized removal to federal 
court of state proceedings against persons who were denied or could not enforce in the 
state courts the rights secured by the Act, and state proceedings against officers for acts 
done pursuant to the Civil Rights Act or the Freedmen's Bureau Act. See Act of April 
9, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
26 See Mayers, supra note 10, at 43-48. 
The only reference to the effect of state proceedings in the Act of 1867 was a provision 
declaring "null and void" state proceedings relating to the subject of a habeas corpus 
petition which took place while habeas corpus proceedings or appeals therefrom were 
underway, or after a final judgment in such proceedings discharging the petitioner. 
Considering the general purpose of the Act, the obvious point of this provision was to 
prevent a slaveholder from invoking state judicial processes to regain custody of the 
slave after habeas corpus proceedings had been instituted. See id. at 47-48. 
Second, in cases involving state prisoners -- as in cases involving 
federal prisoners -- the jurisdictional standard was applied, following the 
traditional understanding of the nature and function of the habeas corpus 
remedy. In the absence of a jurisdictional defect, violations of a 
defendant's constitutional rights in state proceedings were not grounds 
for relief in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 27 
2. Adequacy of State Processes 
The second stage in the development of the statutory habeas corpus 
remedy -- in which the jurisdictional standard of review was ultimately 
abandoned -- arose from the decisions of Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 
(1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
In Frank v. Mangum, the petitioner argued that relief on federal 
habeas corpus should be available because the state proceedings involved 
denials of due process -- specifically, mob influence on the trial and the 
defendant's absence from the court when the verdict was returned -- that 
were sufficient to divest the trial court of jurisdiction and make the 
judgment against the defendant a nullity (237 U.S. at 318-23). The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the petitioner 
had not established that he had been subjected to any denial of due 
process. 28 In addressing these issues, the Court emphasized that the state 
proceedings as a whole had to be considered, including the "corrective 
process" provided by the state for considering the trial irregularities 
alleged by the petitioner. In light of the state courts' consideration and 
rejection of the petitioner's contentions in the context of new trial 
motions and appeals to the state supreme court, the Court found that no 
27 See Bator, supra note 17, at 478-84; Developments, supra note 5, at 1048-50; Fay v. Noia , 
372 U.S. 391, 452-54 (1963) (Harlan, J ., dissenting). The extended notion of a 
"jurisdictional" defect encompassing the unconstitutionality of the governing statute 
was also applied in cases involving state prisoners. See Bator, supra, at 479-80; 
Developments, supra, at 1049. 
28 The Court assumed that a due processs violation would constitute a "jurisdictional" 
defect because the Fourteenth Amendment denies the state authority Uurisdiction) to 
deprive a person of life or liberty without due process. See 237 U.S. at 326-28, 331-32. 
However, this did not entail any broad scope of review because of the narrowness of the 
general concept of due process at that time -- notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before a competent tribunal -- and because of the Court's insistence that the whole 
course of the state proceedings must be considered in determining whether adequate 
process had been provided. See id. at 326-27, 335-36, 340. 
ILL 
due process violation had occurred. 29 
Eight years later, the Court invoked the Frank decision's standards 
in holding that another mob-domination claim could properly be 
reviewed on habeas corpus. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), 
involved several black defendants who had been convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death in a situation of widespread racial conflict and 
violence in Arkansas. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the 
convictions with an essentially conclusory rejection of the defendants' 
allegations of mob domination at trial. 30 
The defendants then applied for federal habeas corpus on the 
ground that "the proceedings in the State Court, although a trial in form, 
were only a form, and that the [defendants] were hurried to conviction 
under the pressure of a mob without any regard for their rights and 
without according to them due process of law" (261 U.S. at 87). The 
district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court overturned the 
dismissal, holding that federal habeas review was properly available, in 
the absence of adequate state corrective process, to examine a claim that 
the state trial was a sham proceeding conducted under mob domination 
(261 U.S. at 90-92): 
In Frank v. Mangum . .. it was recognized of course that if in 
fact a trial is dominated by a mob ... and ... "if the State, 
supplying no corrective process, carries into execution a 
judgment . .. produced by mob domination, the State deprives 
the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law." 
We assume in accordance with that case that the corrective 
process supplied by the State may be so adequate that 
interference by habeas corpus ought not to be allowed. It 
certainly is true that mere mistakes of law ... are not to be 
corrected in that way. But if the case is that the whole 
proceeding is a mask -- that counsel, jury, and judge were 
swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, 
and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither 
perfection in the machinery for correction nor the possibility 
29
The "corrective process" point was emphasized in rejecting the claim of mob-
domination. The claim relating to the defendant's absence at the end of the trial was 
rejected on the ground that the state could validly treat it as waived in light of the 
procedural history of the case (237 U.S. at 338-44). 
30 
See Bator, supra note 17, at 488-89. 
that the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding 
an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from 
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights .... We 
shall not say more concerning the corrective process afforded 
to the petitioners than that it does not seem to us sufficient to 
allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of 
examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they 
make the trial absolutely void. 
The specific holding in Moore v. Dempsey was narrow, 31 and later 
habeas corpus decisions continued for some time to speak the language of 
"jurisdictional" error. As a practical matter, however, cases following 
Moore showed a greater receptivity toward utilizing habeas corpus as a 
means of reviewing claims which could not be raised or considered by 
other means. 32 In Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942), the 
Court held explicitly that non-jurisdictional claims could be entertained 
in certain circumstances in habeas corpus proceedings. 33 
It must be emphasized, however, that the relaxation of standards in 
this period did not immediately result in a quasi-appellate habeas corpus 
jurisdiction. Moore v. Dempsey itself had observed that "[i]t certainly is 
true that mere mistakes of law . . . are not to be corrected" by habeas 
corpus, 34 and much later decisions continued to reflect a conception of 
habeas corpus as a backstop remedy which would only come into play if 
31 The Court's decision in Moore is intelligible in terms of common law habeas corpus 
standards. It apparently reflected the view that the general rule against challenging the 
results of a judicial proceeding on habeas corpus did not apply if there had been no real 
judicial proceeding. There was evidence that the trial court had effectively acted as an 
instrument of the mob, rather than as a judicial forum in any realistic sense, making the 
proceedings "void." Cf Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 426 (1926) (in Moore there was 
allegedly "only the form of a court under the domination of a mob"). 
32 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 
(1938). 
33 Waley involved a habeas corpus petition by a federal prisoner who alleged that his 
guilty plea was coerced. The Court held that the claim could be raised on habeas corpus 
because the alleged threats against the petitioner were off the record and could not be 
considered on appeal (316 U.S. at 104-05). 
34 261 U.S. at 91; see Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445-47 (1925) ("habeas corpus calls in 
question only the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is challenged .. . the 
judgment of state courts in criminal cases will not be reviewed on habeas corpus merely 
because some right under the Constitution of the United States is alleged to have been 
denied to the person convicted"). 
its unavailability would effectively leave the petitioner with no possible 
remedy. 
35 
The general approach of the period was summed up by the 
Court in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, ,118 (1944): 
Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the 
merits of [a petitioner's] contentions ... a federal court will 
not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus the 
questions thus adjudicated .... But where resort to state court 
remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the 
federal contentions raised, either because the state affords no 
remedy, see Mooney v. Holohan . . . or because in the particular 
case the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice 
unavailable or seriously inadequate, cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U.S. 86; Ex parte Davis, 318 U.S. 412, a federal court should 
entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be 
remediless. 36 
3. Creation of a Quasi-Appellate Habeas Corpus 
Jurisdiction 
The final stage in the expansion of the federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction came in the decisions of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963). These decisions abrogated the conventional limitations on the 
habeas corpus remedy and also provided that habeas corpus review was 
not to be subject to the normal constraints applicable in direct review by 
appellate courts. In conjunction with the expansion of substantive 
constitutional rights by decisions of the 1960's, this created a general 
reviewing jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts over the judgments of 
state courts in criminal cases. 
35 
See Bator, supra note 17, at 493-99. 
36
The facts of the cases cited in relation to potentially appropriate circumstances for 
habeas corpus review were as follows: In Mooney v. Holohan , 294 U.S. 103 (1935), the 
petitioner alleged that his conviction was solely based on the prosecution's knowing use 
of perjurious testimony, and that the factual basis of this claim could not have been 
discovered through reasonable diligence prior to his new trial motion and state appeal. 
It was unclear whether this type of claim could be raised under any state remedy. Moore 
v. Dempsey was the mob-domination case discussed at pp. 16-17 supra. In Ex parte 
Davis, the petitioner alleged that he could not pursue a state appeal because the state 
would not provide a free transcript of a trial court proceeding and he could not afford 
to pay for a transcript. 
a. Expansion of the Scope of Review 
Brown v. Allen involved state prisoners whose claims of discrimina-
tion in jury selection and coerced confessions had been considered and 
rejected in state proceedings. The Supreme Court nevertheless reexam-
ined the merits of the prisoners' claims before affirming the state 
judgments when they were brought up on habeas corpus. In the words of 
Professor Henry Hart, the decision "manifestly broke new ground": 
[The decision] seems to say that due process of law in the case 
of state prisoners is not primarily concerned with the adequacy 
of the state's corrective process or of the prisoner's personal 
opportunity to avail himself of this process . . . but relates 
essentially to the avoidance in the end of any underlying 
constitutional error. 37 
In its specific formulation, Brown v. Allen involved two major 
opinions -- the formal opinion of the court authored by Justice Reed, and 
a separate opinion by Justice Frankfurter. 38 Justice Reed's opinion for 
the Court was characterized by a certain vagueness in its treatment of the 
standard-of-review issue. The Court noted that a state court's determina-
tion of a petitioner's claims was not res judicata, but emphasized that a 
federal court had discretion to reject a petition on the state record if 
satisfied that "the state process has given fair consideration ... and has 
resulted in a satisfactory conclusion," and that no hearing "on the merits, 
facts or law" was required if the court was "satisfied that federal 
constitutional rights have been protected" (344 U.S. at 458, 463- 64). In 
turning to the specific claims raised in the case, the Court stated that it 
was reviewing the district court's conclusion that the state "accorded 
petitioners a fair adjudication of their federal questions" (344 U.S. at 
465), but it then proceeded to carry out a detailed consideration of the 
merits of those questions. 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion was far more emphatic in its specifica-
tion of the duties of a federal habeas court in reviewing a state judgment. 
State fact-finding could be relied on, he stated, in the absence of some 
37 Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 106 (1959). 
38 Justice Frankfurter wrote formally for the Court only on the effect in a habeas corpus 
proceeding of a prior denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court. See 344 U.S. at 451-52. 
However, four other Justices apparently agreed with the general views expressed in his 
opinion. See id. at 488, 497, 513. 
"vital flaw" in the state process, but Congress has "commanded" federal 
district judges to exercise independent judgment concerning questions of 
law and the application of law to fact (344 U.S. at 506-09): 
State adjudications of questions of law cannot, under the 
habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely 
these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide 
Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not 
dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal 
significance of such facts . .. the District Judge must exercise 
his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values. 
Thus, so called mixed questions or the application of constitu-
tional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of 
adjudication with the federal judge ... . Although there is no 
need for the federal judge .. . to shut his eyes to the State 
consideration of such issues, no binding weight is to be 
attached to the State determination. The congressional re-
quirement is greater. The State court cannot have the last say 
when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally 
may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal 
constitutional right .. . . 
These standards ... preserve the full implication of the 
requirement of Congress that the District Judge decide 
constitutional questions presented by a State prisoner even 
after his claims have been carefully considered by the State 
courts. Congress has . . . seen fit to give this Court power to 
review errors of federal law in State determinations, and in 
addition to give to the lower federal courts power to inquire 
into federal claims, by way of habeas corpus. 
Unfortunately, Justice Frankfurter failed to explain the provenance 
of the legislative mandate that a federal trial judge reconsider the 
substantive accuracy of state court determinations of such questions and 
that he override those determinations whenever he happens to disagree 
with them. No such purpose can be inferred from the legislative history 
of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and Congress never subsequently 
voiced any objection to the far narrower standards of review that had 
been applied in innumerable decisions by the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts between 1867 and 1953. 
The legislative history of the version of the habeas corpus statutes 
that was before the Court in Brown v. Allen -- enacted as part of the 1948 
revision of the Judicial Code ~- also did not provide any support for the 
legislative "command" discerned by Justice Frankfurter. Rather, it 
showed an assumption that a prisoner could seek federal habeas corpus 
relief if he was denied a "fair adjudication" of his federal claims in state 
proceedings. 39 This was not the quasi-appellate standard of Brown v. 
Allen, but the adequacy-of-state-process standard that had emerged in 
decisions following Moore v. Dempsey. 
Finally, Justice Frankfurter failed to explain why Congress -- which 
allegedly had mandated that federal trial judges protect constitutional 
rights by automatically re-determining relevant non-factual issues --
nevertheless left the same judges with discretion to let possible constitu-
tional violations go by if they resulted from erroneous state court 
determinations of the facts relevant to the resolution of a constitutional 
claim. 40 
The last major steps in the expansion of the habeas corpus 
jurisdiction came in 1963, with the decisions of Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293, and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391. 
In Townsend, the Court replaced the rather diffuse pronouncements 
of Brown v. Allen concerning the discretion of district judges to defer to 
state fact-finding with a detailed set of limitations on the authority of 
federal habeas courts to respect state court determinations. Specifically, 
the Court held that a new evidentiary hearing would have to be held by 
the habeas court whenever "( 1) the merits of the factual dispute were not 
resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not 
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure 
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair 
hearing; ( 4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; 
39 The House bill contained explicit "fair adjudication" language in proposed 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254. The House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 
(1947), characterized this as declaratory of existing law as set out in Ex parte Hawk (see 
pp. 17-18 supra), a decision that gave a particularly clear statement of the principle of 
deference to adequate state processes. The Senate deleted this language and made other 
changes because the House formulation conflated the standard of review and the 
exhaustion requirement and because it was assumed that review under the fair 
adjudication standard would be available in any event following exhaustion of state 
remedies. See S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong. , 2d Sess. 9 (1948). 
40 
See generally Bator, supra note 17, at 502. 
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court 
hearing; or ( 6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not 
afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing" (293 U.S. at 313). 
The Court in Townsend also stated that the district judge may not defer 
to the state courts' findings of law and must independently apply federal 
law to the facts, indicating that these points had been settled by Justice 
Frankfurter's opinion in Brown v. Allen (293 U.S. at 318). 
Finally, in Fay v. Noia, the Court addressed the question of when 
federal habeas courts could consider claims that had not been raised 
before the state courts in conformity with applicable state procedural 
rules. Proceeding under remarkable misconceptions concerning the 
historical function of habeas corpus, 41 the Court held that procedural 
defaults which would bar raising a claim on direct review would not be 
accorded the same effect in habeas corpus proceedings. Rather, a claim 
could be denied on such grounds only if a petitioner "deliberately by-
passed" state procedures, and even in such a case, entertaining the claim 
would remain within the discretionary authority of the federal habeas 
judge. 
b. Expansion of Substantive Rights 
Thus, by the early 1960's, the Supreme Court had removed 
practically all significant limitations on the ability of federal district 
courts to entertain and review federal claims raised by state prisoners in 
habeas corpus proceedings. 
The effect of these innovations was vastly magnified by the 
concomitant increase in the federal rights that were available for 
assertion. The Court's caselaw of the 1960's was characterized by 
unprecedented expansions of the general concept of constitutional due 
process; innovative decisions which held, contrary to earlier precedent, 
that most of the specific procedural provisions of the Bill of Rights 
applied in state proceedings; and expansive interpretations and exten-
sions of those provisions. The general effect of this development was to 
eliminate state discretion with respect to most basic questions of criminal 
procedure, and to make it possible to dress up almost any sort of alleged 
41 See Oaks, supra note 5 (1966 article); Mayers, supra note 10; Friendly, ls Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 170-71 
(1970); Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1465-66 (2d ed. 
1973). 
procedural irregularity or error as a constitutional claim. As Judge 
Friendly has observed: 
) 
[T]he limitation of collateral attack to "constitutional" 
grounds has become almost meaningless . . . . 
The dimensions of the problem of collateral attack today 
are a consequence of two developments. One has been the 
Supreme Court's imposition of the rules of the fourth, fifth, 
sixth and eighth amendments concerning unreasonable 
searches and seizures, double jeopardy, speedy trial, compul-
sory self-incrimination, jury trial in criminal cases, confronta-
tion of adverse witnesses, assistance of counsel, and cruel and 
unusual punishments, upon state criminal trials. The other has 
been a tendency to read these provisions with ever increasing 
breadth . ... The result of these two developments has been a 
vast expansion of the claims of error in criminal cases for 
which a resourceful defense lawyer can find a constitutional 
basis. 
Any claimed violation of the hearsay rule is now 
regularly presented not as a mere trial error but as an 
infringement of the sixth amendment right to confrontation. 
Denial of adequate opportunity for impeachment would seem 
as much a violation of the confrontation clause as other 
restrictions on cross-examination have been held to be. Refusal 
to give the name and address of an informer can be cast as a 
denial of the sixth amendment's guarantee of "compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses." Inflammatory summations or 
an erroneous charge on the prosecution's burden of proof 
become denials of due process. So are errors in identification 
procedures. Instructing a deadlocked jury of its duty to 
attempt to reach a verdict or undue participation by the judge 
in the examination of witnesses can be characterized as 
violations of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 
Examples could readily be multiplied. Today it is the rare 
criminal appeal that does not involve a "constitutional" claim 
Whatever may have been true when the Bill of Rights 
was read to protect a state criminal defendant only if the state 
had acted in a manner "repugnant to the conscience of 
J 
mankind," the rule prevailing when Brown v. Allen was 
decided, the "constitutional" label no longer assists in apprais-
ing how far society should go in permitting relitigation of 
criminal convictions. 42 
In conjunction with the elimination of constraints on the scope and 
availability of habeas corpus review, the pervasive constitutionalization 
of state procedure effectively converted the federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction into a general review jurisdiction of the inferior federal 
courts in relation to state criminal judgments. While the claims that 
could be asserted were still limited to "constitutional" claims, the relative 
trivialization of the concept of constitutional error tended to deprive this 
constraint of practical significance. 
D. Subsequent Legislative Developments 
Following the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 
Congress has never moved ahead of the courts in extending the scope or 
availability of federal habeas corpus. Its interventions in this area have 
primarily been directed to limiting or offsetting the effects of judicial 
innovations that resulted in an increased availability of federal habeas 
corpus. 
The earliest and best-known restriction of the federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction following the Civil War resulted from the case of Ex parte 
Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). The Reconstruction Act of 1867 
(Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 3, 14 Stat. 428) divided the rebel states 
into military districts and authorized the use of military commissions or 
tribunals to control the civilian population in the subjugated areas. The 
framers of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 had sought to guard against 
its use by persons in military custody through an express proviso in the 
legislation, but the proviso only exempted from the Act's coverage 
persons held for military offenses or for "having aided or abetted 
rebellion ... prior to the passage of this act." This did not, by its terms, 
apply to acts of resistance subsequent to the passage of the Habeas 
Corpus Act, and Southern resisters promptly attempted to take advan-
tage of the loophole. 
Mccardle, a civilian held in custody by the military authorities for 
trial by a military commission, was denied a writ by a federal district 
42 Friendly, supra note 41, at 149, 155-57. 
court, and appealed the denial to the Supreme Court. Concerned that the 
Supreme Court might hold the Reconstruction scheme unconstitutional, 
Congress divested the Court of jurisdiction over appeals under the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. The Court upheld the validity of this 
restriction in Ex parte McCardle, supra, and dismissed the appeal. The 
Court's review jurisdiction under the Act was not restored until 1885.
43 
While the earliest legislative restriction of habeas corpus under the 
Act of 1867 related to a federal prisoner, the focus of subsequent 
concerns has been state prisoners' use of the Act to challenge their 
convictions. As early as 1884, a House Judiciary Committee Report 
(H.R. Rep. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.) strongly criticized the practice 
of lower federal courts under the Act of entertaining challenges to state 
convictions. In the Committee's view, the Act was part of the legislative 
response to the danger to Union loyalists and resistance to emancipation 
that existed in the Confederacy following the Civil War, and was not 
meant to give the inferior federal courts the authority to overturn the 
judgments of state courts. However, the Committee declined to take any 
direct action against this type of review on the grounds that the "special 
causes" which had motivated the Act's adoption might still exist to some 
extent, and that restoring the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction 
might be adequate to secure a satisfactory construction of the Act. 
In the current century, a number of significant restrictions on 
federal habeas corpus have been enacted, and more far-reaching reforms 
have received partial approval by Congress on a number of occasions. 
Measures currently in effect and other reform efforts will be discussed 
separately. 
1. Reforms Currently in Effect 
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2553 and Fed. R. App. P. 22, a 
state prisoner is barred from appealing the denial of habeas corpus by a 
district court unless a circuit judge or district judge certifies that there is 
probable cause for the appeal. This requirement derives from an 
enactment of 1908 whose specific purpose was to curb the use of habeas 
corpus appeals and the associated stay of state proceedings to delay the 
execution of capital sentences. It currently serves the general purpose of 
avoiding the need for a full-dress appeal where the petitioner cannot 
43 See Mayers, supra note 10, at 41 & n. 44, 51 & n. 76. 
make a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right. 44 
In 1966, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which creates a 
presumption of correctness for state court fact-finding in habeas corpus 
proceedings if certain conditions are satisfied, and provides that the 
petitioner has the burden of overcoming this presumption by "convincing 
evidence." This goes beyond the rule of Townsend v. Sain (see pp. 21-22 
supra), which only held that a habeas court could dispense with an 
evidentiary hearing in certain circumstances. 45 
In 1976, Congress adopted Rule 9(a) as part of a general set of 
procedural rules for habeas corpus proceedings. The rule provides that a 
petition may be dismissed if the state has been prejudiced in its ability to 
respond by delay in filing unless the petitioner shows that the petition is 
based on grounds he could not have discovered through reasonable 
diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred. This 
overturned judicial precedents which held that petitions could not be 
dismissed on grounds of delay ("laches"). 46 
In addition to the foregoing reforms affecting state prisoners, two 
noteworthy changes affecting the habeas corpus right of federal prisoners 
have been brought about through legislation. 
First, in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, Congress replaced 
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners with a 
statutory motion remedy codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The rule of habeas 
corpus procedure requiring a prisoner to apply to the court having 
44
See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-93 & n.3 (1983). 
The utility of the certificate-of-probable-cause requirement has been limited by the 
vesting of authority in district judges as well as circuit judges to grant certification, and 
by its inapplicability to appeals in collateral proceedings involving federal prisoners. 
Proposed remedial legislation is discussed at p. 64 infra. 
45
Section 2254(d) was enacted as part of legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference 
that also contained restrictions relating to repetitive applications (now § 2244(b)-(c)). 
The Committee Reports are S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., and H.R. Rep. No. 
1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
The utility of the § 2254(d) presumption has been limited by the fact that it only applies 
to purely factual determinations and by the vagueness of some of the statutory 
conditions on the application of the presumption. Proposed remedial legislation is 
discussed at p. 63 infra. 
46
The background, interpretation, and limitations of Rule 9(a) are discussed at pp. 69-71 infra. 
jurisdiction over the place where he is incarcerated had resulted in a 
concentration of habeas corpus petitions in the judicial districts contain-
ing major federal prisons. Section 2255 effected a more equitable 
distribution of prisoner litigation among the district courts by providing 
instead that a prisoner must apply to the court that sentenced him. It did 
not change the substantive standards governing applications for collater-
al relief by federal prisoners, but did tend to ensure that applications for 
such relief would be made in the district where pertinent records and 
witnesses are most readily available, "where the facts with regard to the 
procedure followed are known to court officials, and where the United 
States Attorney who prosecuted the case will be at hand to see that these 
facts are fairly presented." 47 
Second, in establishing a separate court system for the District of 
Columbia in 1970, Congress barred D.C. prisoners from seeking habeas 
corpus in the federal courts, limiting them instead to a collateral remedy in 
the D.C. courts. The practical effect of this reform is that prisoners in D.C. 
have no access to the lower federal courts to review their convictions or 
sentences, but such review remains available for persons convicted in the 
substantially similar court systems of the states. The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of this reform in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 
(1977). 48 The significance of the experience in D.C. is further discussed in a 
later portion of this report (pp. 57-59 infra). 
47 Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 175, 178 (1949); United 
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-19, 220-21 (1952). 
48 The Court rejected the argument that the motion remedy under the D.C. Code is an 
inadequate substitute for habeas corpus because the D.C. judges (like most state judges) 
lack life tenure. See 430 U.S. at 381-83. The Court also relied on the fact that the Code 
preserves the potential availability of habeas corpus where the motion remedy "is 
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of ... detention." However, this 
qualification has proven to be essentially theoretical. No decision has found the local 
remedy inadequate or ineffective to examine alleged errors at the trial level. See 
generally Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Streater v. Jackson, 691 F.2d 
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1982), raised the possibility that a D.C. prisoner's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on appeal might be considered on federal habeas corpus in light of 
the unavailability of the statutory motion remedy to review appellate proceedings, but 
the federal petition was dismissed in light of the D .C. Court of Appeals' subsequent 
rejection of the petitioner's claims. See Streater v. United States, 478 A.2d 1055 (D.C. 
App. 1984). 
2. Other Reform Efforts 
In the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the requirement of 
exhaustion of state remedies in habeas corpus proceedings was codified in 
28 U.S.C. § 2254. The codification, after stating that access to federal 
habeas was generally barred unless state remedies were exhausted, went 
on to specify: 
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the 
meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the 
State to raise, by any available procedure, the question 
presented. 
The enactment of this prov1s1on -- now § 2254(c) -- was the 
culmination of efforts by the Judicial Conference in the course of the 
1940's to secure the limitation of federal habeas corpus for state 
prisoners. 49 Judge Parker, who chaired the Judicial Conference's habeas 
corpus committee and played the leading role in its work on this 
legislation, explained that the provision would generally bar access to 
federal habeas corpus in any state which permitted repetitive recourse to 
its collateral remedies. He also expressed the view that this would have 
the practical effect of abolishing federal habeas corpus as a post-
conviction remedy for state prisoners across the board: 
The effect of this ... provision is to eliminate, for all practical 
purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal courts for 
habeas corpus in all states in which successive applications 
may be made for habeas corpus to the state courts; for, in all 
such states, the applicant has the right, notwithstanding the 
denial of prior applications, to apply again to the state courts 
for habeas corpus and to have action upon such later 
application reviewed by the Supreme Court ... on application 
for certiorari .... [T]here should be no more cases where 
proceedings of state courts, affirmed by the highest courts of 
the state, . . . will be reviewed by federal circuit or district 
judges. 50 
49 See generally Parker, supra note 47; Reports of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States 22-23 (1943), 22 (1944), 28 (1945), 21 (1946), 46 (April 1947), 17-18 (Sept. 1947). 
soParker, supra note 47, at 175-78. 
Notwithstanding the unequivocal language of the prov1s1on of 
§ 2254(c) and Judge Parker's observations concerning its meaning, the 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen refused to give it effect (344 U .S. at 
447-50), and held that exhaustion does not require repetitive recourse to 
state remedies. In reaching this result, the Court stated that it was 
unwilling to accept so radical a change from prior habeas practice 
without "a definite congressional direction." 
Shortly after Brown v. Allen, the Judicial Conference tried again. 
The legislation it proposed this time provided that a federal habeas 
corpus application by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
state court could be entertained 
only on a ground which presents a substantial Federal 
constitutional question (1) which was not theretofore raised 
and determined, (2) which there was no fair and adequate 
opportunity theretofore to raise and have determined, and (3) 
which cannot thereafter be raised and determined in a 
proceeding in the State court, by an order or judgment subject 
to review by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of 
certiorari. 51 
This proposal was supported by the Judicial Conference, the 
Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National Association of 
Attorneys General, the section on judicial administration of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, and the Department of Justice. 
52 
Following 
hearings in the first session of the 84th Congress before a subcommittee 
of the House Judiciary Committee, 53 it was voted out by the Judiciary 
Committee (H.R. Rep. No. 1200) and passed by the House of Represen-
tatives on Jan. 19, 1956 (102 Cong. Rec. 935-40). It was passed a second 
time by the House of Representatives on March 18, 1958 (104 Cong. Rec. 
4668, 4671-75). 
In the course of Congress's consideration of this proposal, the 
proponents of the legislation pointed out that the use of habeas corpus as 
a writ of review was a recent development that was unrelated to its 
historical function. The general purpose of the legislation was to bar 
51 Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955). 
52 See id. at 7. 
53 Cited in note 51 supra. 
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access to habeas corpus in the inferior federal courts whenever a means 
was available for raising a claim and creating a record for Supreme Court 
review in the state courts. It was argued that this reform would correct 
the increased caseload burdens, indefinite prolongation of litigation, 
delay in carrying out capital sentences, and conflict between the state and 
federal judiciaries that had resulted from the recent expansions off ederal 
habeas corpus. It was also noted that legislation to the same effect had 
been enacted in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, and that the new 
legislation was necessitated by the Supreme Court's refusal in Brown v. 
Allen (see pp. 28-29 supra) to give effect to this reform in the absence of a 
clearer expression of legislative intent (102 Cong. Rec. 935-36, 939). 
Despite repeated passage in the House, the Judicial Conference's 
proposal was never brought to a vote in the Senate. In contrast, the next 
"abolition" proposal that made significant progress in Congress originat-
ed in the Senate. Title II of the proposed Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets of 1968 was formulated as a general response to Warren 
Court activism in the criminal justice area. 54 It contained provisions 
designed to overturn Miranda v. Arizona and other Supreme Court 
decisions barring the use of traditionally admissible evidence, and also 
contained a provision, proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2256, which would have 
abolished federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state 
prisoners: 
The judgment of a court of a State .. . in a criminal action 
shall be conclusive with respect to all questions of law or fact 
which were determined, or which could have been determined, 
in that action until such judgment is reversed, vacated, or 
modified by a court having jurisdiction to review by appeal or 
certiorari such judgment; and neither the Supreme Court nor 
any inferior [federal] court . . . shall have jurisdiction to 
reverse, vacate, or modify any such judgment of a State court 
except upon appeal from, or writ of certiorari granted to 
review, a determination made with respect to such judgment 
upon review thereof by the highest court of that State having 
jurisdiction to review such judgment. 55 
54
Title II is generally discussed in the first Report in this series. See Office of Legal 
Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial lnlerrogation 64-67 (1986). 
55 
I 14 Cong. Rec. 14182. 
The bill was voted out by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The 
Committee Report stated that the proposal relating to habeas corpus 
would correct the problems of delay and abuse resulting from recent 
Supreme Court decisions that had transformed habeas corpus into a 
quasi-appellate mechanism. In supporting the constitutionality of the 
reform, the Report noted that the constitutional writ of habeas corpus 
was only a means of eliciting a statement of the grounds for detention 
and could not be used to challenge a conviction by a court with 
jurisdiction; that the Constitution's preservation of the habeas corpus 
right only operates against the federal government and not the states; and 
that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was only enacted as a means of 
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. 56 
Following extensive debate on the Senate floor, a compromise was 
reached under which the anti-Miranda provisions of the legislation --
now 18 U.S.C. § 3501 -- were retained, but proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2256 
and the other provisions of Title II restricting federal court jurisdiction 
were deleted. 57 
The contemporary focus of legislative reform efforts has been bills 
based on a set of limited reform proposals that Attorney General William 
French Smith initially transmitted to Congress in 1982. 58 The current 
reform proposals would establish a one-year time limit on habeas corpus 
applications by state prisoners, normally running from exhaustion of 
state remedies; narrow the standard of review in habeas corpus 
proceedings; clarify the circumstances under which claims that were not 
properly raised before the state courts can be raised in habeas corpus 
proceedings; make technical improvements in habeas corpus procedure; 
and institute certain comparable reforms in the collateral remedy for 
federal prisoners. The nature and rationale of these proposals are more 
fully discussed in a later portion of this Report (pp. 61-64 infra). 
These proposals were approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and passed by the full Senate in 1984 by a vote of 67 to 9. 59 In the 99th 
56
See 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2150-53. 
57 
See Report, supra note 54, at 66-67. 
58
See generally The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2216 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
59
1n the 98th Congress, the proposals were transmitted by the President to Congress as 
title VI of the proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Act. Following hearings, see 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on 
-
Congress (1985-86) they were not brought to a vote in the Senate because 
of filibustering by opponents of the legislation at Senate Judiciary 
Committee mark-ups. 60 In the House of Representatives they have been 
introduced with broad sponsorship in various bills, 61 which have 
invariably been buried at the subcommittee level in the House Judiciary 
Committee. No significant action has occurred in the House because of 
opposition by the House leadership. 
In the current (100th) Congress, the reform proposals have recently 
been transmitted to Congress again by the President as title II of the 
proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act (H.R. 3777 and S. 1970). 
II. THE CURRENT JURISDICTION 
Justice Robert Jackson, in his separate opinion in Brown v. Allen, 
complained that judicial expansions of the federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction were resulting in "floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious 
petitions [which] inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our 
own" (344 U.S. at 536). The "flood" to which Justice Jackson referred 
consisted of 541 petitions in the preceding year (1952). In comparison, 
9,542 federal habeas corpus petitions were filed by state prisoners in the 
most recent reporting year (ending June 30, 1987). As these figures 
indicate, habeas corpus applications were a relatively rare occurrence 
prior to the creation of a quasi-appellate federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion by judicial decisions of the 1950's and 1960's, but now constitute a 
major category of federal litigation. More detailed statistical and 
quantitative information is set out in the first part of this section. 
While the volume of habeas corpus litigation has grown in recent 
years, the marked tendency of the Supreme Court's decisions since the 
start of the 1970's has been to draw back from the heady expansion of 
inferior federal court review of state judgments that characterized the 
Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence of the 1960's. The most significant 
Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, 32-41, 
160-65 (1983), the proposals were voted out by the Senate Judiciary Committee as a 
separate bill (S. 1763), see S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and passed by 
the Senate, see 130 Cong. Rec. 1854-72 (1984). 
6()There was an additional hearing in the 99th Congress. See Habeas Corpus Reform: 
Hearing on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1985). 
61 E.g. , H.R. 5594 of the 98th Congress. 
decisions of the current period are described briefly in the second part of 
this section. 
A. Empirical Findings 
Information concerning the volume of habeas corpus applications 
and other federal litigation is available in the Annual Reports of the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. As noted above, 
these figures show that large-scale habeas corpus litigation by state 
prisoners is a recent phenomenon in historical terms. In 1941 there were 
127 petitions. In 1961 there were 1,020. The number of applications 
thereafter increased astronomically in the course of the 1960's, reaching 
9,063 in 1970; subsided in the early 1970's, reaching a low of 6,866 in 
1977; and has since increased fairly steadily. The figures for habeas 
corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in the federal district courts over 
the past ten years are as follows: 
62 
1978 1979 1980 
1981 1982 1983 - - - - - -7,033 7,123 7,031 7,790 8,059 8,532 
1984 !W.. 1986 1987 - - -8,349 8,534 9,045 9,542 
More detailed statistical information is available from a study of 
habeas corpus litigation that was funded by the Justice Department and 
62
The figures in the text are drawn from the Annual Reports of the Director of the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The aggregate figures for state prisoner 
habeas corpus petitions include, in addition to normal petitions in which jurisdiction is 
predicated on claimed violations of federal rights ("federal question" petitions), a small 
number of petitions by prisoners in United States territories where the federal courts 
have jurisdiction over local criminal matters (" local jurisdiction" petitions). For 
example, the 1987 figure of 9,542 comprised 9,524 "federal question" petitions and 18 
"local jurisdiction" petitions, and the 1986 figure of 9,045 comprised 9,040 "federal 
question" petitions and 5 "local jurisdiction" petitions. In addition to reporting 9,542 
habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners, the most recent report (1987) noted 1,808 
habeas corpus petitions and 1,664 "motions to vacate sentence" by federal prisoners 
(Table C2). 
A tabular summary of the volume of prisoner litigation between 1961 and 1982 appears 
in S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 4 n.11 (1983). A more comprehensive summary 
of statistical data relating to habeas corpus litigation appears in Special Report of the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Review of State Prisoner Petitions : Habeas Corpus 
(March 1984) [hereafter cited as "Statistical Report"]. 
completed in 1979. The study, carried out by Professor Paul Robinson, 
examined a sample containing 1,899 petitions filed between 1975 and 
1977, which comprised about one-eighth of all habeas corpus applica-
tions filed in the country in the relevant period. 63 The general picture of 
habeas corpus litigation that emerges from the available empirical data 
and other factual information is as follows: 
1. Workload and Results 
The work involved in processing habeas corpus cases constitutes a 
substantial burden on state officials and the court system. In connection 
with a typical petition, the state is required to transmit records and to 
respond to the legal and factual contentions raised by the petitioner. The 
district court must review the record to the extent necessary and re-
determine each claim that is properly presented, working from the 
evidentiary basis set out in the record together with the submissions and 
arguments of the parties. Frequently the district court's decision is 
appealed, resulting in additional work for judges, state officials and 
defense counsel at the level of the federal courts of appeals. 64 Since a 
prisoner is required to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal 
habeas corpus, the lure of an additional level of review in the federal 
courts -- in which claims rejected at the state level are open to re-
litigation -- results in increased recourse to state remedies. The availabili-
ty of federal habeas corpus accordingly increases the workload of the 
state courts as well as the federal courts. 65 
Despite the substantial expenditure of prosecutorial and judicial 
resources entailed in habeas corpus litigation, the normal outcome is 
dismissal of the petition or affirmance of the state judgment. In the 1979 
study, only 3.2% of petitions resulted in any form of relief and only 1.7% 
63The findings of the study were initially reported in P. Robinson, An Empirical Study of 
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Judgments (Federal Justice Research 
Program 1979). The data gathered in the study was later independently analyzed in 
Allen, Schachtman, & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and its R eform: An Empirical 
Analysis, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 675 (1982). A concise summary of the main findings of 
these reports appears in Statistical Report, supra note 62, at 5-7. 
64 See P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 21-23; The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: 
Hearing on S.2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
42-44 (1982); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S.829 Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 41 (1983). 
65 See generally Friendly, supra note 41 , at 144 n. 10. 
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resulted in an order directing release from custody. 
66 
Even these low 
figures cannot be taken as reliable indications of the "benefits" of habeas 
corpus review, since there is no reason to believe that the federal court 
determination in such cases is generally "better" than the contrary state 
judgment it supersedes. In purely descriptive terms, a successful petition 
normally means only that a federal trial judge disagreed with a number 
of state trial and appellate judges. 67 The judgmental or subjective nature 
of the determinations required is suggested by the large differences 
observed in the 1979 study between the granting rates for different 
federal judges -- a small number of judges accounted for a large 
proportion of successful petitions. 68 As Judge Friendly has observed: 
In the vast majority of cases we agree with the state courts 
... . In the few where we disagree, I feel no assurance that the 
federal determination is superior .. . . [W]e do not know how 
many of these [successful habeas] cases represented prisoners 
.. . whom society has grievously wronged . .. or how many 
were black with guilt. The assumption that many of them fall 
in the former category is wholly unsupported. 
69 
In considering the low incidence of successful petitions, an analysis 
of the study data concluded that "[i]f one considers only the statistically 
measurable benefits of habeas review, they appear to be outweighed by 
the costs of expansive habeas review." 
70 
66 See P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 4(c), 14. 
67 Even where an appellate panel affirms the granting of a writ, the issue remains one of 
disagreement among federal and state judges who are equally bound to uphold the 
Constitution and federal law. See generally pp. 42-49 infra. 
68 See P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 53 (out of 51 judges who handled state habeas 
petitions, three judges accounted for 29.9% of all petitions granted and twelve judges 
accounted for over two-thirds of all petitions granted). 
69 Friendly, supra note 41, at 165 n. 125, 148 & n. 25; see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 
(1953) (opinion of Jackson, J.) ("Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by 
another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook 
normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However, reversal . . . is 
not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a 
super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would 
also be reversed."). 
70 Allan, Schachtman, & Wilson, supra note 63, at 683. But cf id. at 683-90 (noting non-
quantitative costs and benefits alleged for habeas corpus review). These non-
quantitative considerations are examined at pp. 40-53 infra. 
2. Character of Petitioners and Prior Proceedings 
The 1979 study indicated that habeas corpus petitioners constitute a 
highly atypical class of prisoners. Most petitioners had been convicted of 
serious, violent offenses. Over 80% had been convicted after trial, and 
practically the same proportion had had, or were having, direct appellate 
review of their cases in the state system. Moreover, about 45% of 
petitioners had pursued collateral remedies in the state courts, including 
over 20% who had filed two or more previous state petitions. Over 30% 
of petitioners had filed at least one previous federal petition. 71 
In contrast, the vast majority of state defendants plead guilty and 
have no trial or appeal. Thus, habeas corpus typically operates as a 
mechanism for providing additional review to prisoners whose cases have 
already received an abundance of judicial process in comparison with the 
average criminal case. 
3. Delay in Filing 
Another finding of the 1979 study is that there are frequently 
enormous delays between the conclusion of the normal adjudicatory 
process in the state courts and the filing of a habeas corpus petition. 
About 40% of the petitions in the study were filed more than five years 
after conviction and nearly a third were filed more than ten years after 
conviction. Still longer delays were noted in some cases in the study, up 
to more than fifty years from the time of conviction. 72 
71 
See P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 4(a), 7, 15. Even where a petitioner has not had prior 
state court review of his claims, this does not imply that means for raising such claims 
are unavailable in the state courts. Prisoners frequently by-pass state remedies and file 
procedurally defective habeas corpus petitions. See id. at 13. 
72 
See Allen, Schachtman, & Wilson, supra note 63, at 703-04. The cited report's 
characterization of this data as showing that "lengthy delay ... rarely occurs," see id., 
is idiosyncratic. 
Legitimate post-conviction delays in filing of up to a few years can result from the 
exhaustion requirement, but this cannot account with any frequency for time intervals 
exceeding a decade, which the study found to be common. The average time prisoners 
took to exhaust state remedies was 2.8 years from conviction. See id. at 705. This 
average figure would actually exaggerate the time necessary to complete the state 
review process, since it would be inflated by cases in which prisoners failed to pursue 
certain claims at trial or on direct review and then delayed a number of years before 
presenting them on collateral attack in the state system. 
Delays of the length and frequency noted in the report also cannot be explained on the 
The tolerance shown in habeas corpus proceedings for lengthy 
delays in seeking review is particularly striking in comparison with other 
procedures for seeking review or re-opening of criminal judgments in the 
federal courts, which are subject to definite time limits. Federal 
defendants, for example, generally must decide whether to appeal within 
ten days (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)); state convicts seeking direct review of 
their convictions in the Supreme Court generally must apply within sixty 
days (Sup. Ct. R. 20); and even a federal prisoner who claims to have new 
evidence of his innocence discovered after trial is subject to a two-year 
time limit on seeking a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. 
The problem of delay has been particularly acute in capital cases. In 
such cases, the continuation of litigation prevents the sentence from 
being carried out. While thirty-seven states currently authorize capital 
punishment, and about 2,000 prisoners are currently under sentence of 
death, the typical capital case is characterized by interminable litigation 
and re-litigation, and fewer than a hundred executions have been carried 
out in the past twenty years. 73 The federal habeas corpus jurisdiction 
provides an avenue for obstruction and delay in these cases which the 
states are powerless to address. Attorney General William French Smith 
has observed: 
[T]he inefficiency of current court procedures has resulted in a 
de facto nullification of the decisions of most state legislatures 
to impose capital punishment for some crimes. The "public 
interest" organizations that routinely involve themselves in the 
litigation carried on in capital cases have fully exploited the 
system's potential for obstruction. Delay is maximized by 
deferring collateral attack until the eve of execution. Once a 
basis of petitions challenging events that occurred some time after conviction, such as 
parole denial or revocation. Petitions of this sort were a small part of all petitions in the 
study; nearly a third of all petitions were filed more than ten years after conviction, but 
the average time intervals for petitions challenging post-conviction events were far less 
than that; and the average delay in the various districts covered by the study was not 
correlated with the incidence of such petitions. See id. at 703-04 n. 103, 706 & nn. 
109-10. 
73 NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. (Nov. I, 1987). A 
general analysis of the problem of dilatory habeas corpus litigation in capital cases 
appears in Statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Paul Cassell concerning 
Habeas Corpus and Capital Punishment Litigation before the Subcomm. on Govern-
ment Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government 
Operations (Feb. 26, 1988) (hearing held in Madison, Florida). 
stay of execution has been obtained, the possibility of carrying 
out the sentence is foreclosed for additional years as the case 
works its way through the multiple layers of appeal and review 
in the state and federal courts. 
The solution to this problem lies in part in the reform of 
state court procedures . . . . The efficacy of state reforms is 
severely limited, however, by the availability of federal habeas 
corpus, which cannot be limited by the state legislatures .. .. 
It ... prevents correction of the practical nullification of all 
capital punishment legislation that has resulted from litiga-
tional delay and obstruction. 74 
Overall, the available data provides a more definite empirical 
content to Justice Jackson's characterization of habeas corpus petitions 
as "stale, frivolous and repetitious." The delays involved in habeas 
corpus litigation greatly exceed those allowed under any other appellate 
mechanism, the prospect of success is slight, and the review that is 
provided generally amounts to another round on claims that have 
already been thoroughly worked over in the state courts. 
B. Recent Judicial Decisions 
The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus jurisprudence, has 
given weight to considerations of finality and federalism that were 
ignored or shrugged off in the expansive decisions of the 1960's. While 
the Court's ability to make changes in this area is constrained by 
precedent and existing statutory provisions, some noteworthy limitations 
have emerged in recent decisions. The most important decisions include 
the following: 
First, the decisions in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), 
and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), generally limit a defendant 
74
Smith, Proposals for Habeas Corpus Reform, in P. McGuigan & R. Rader, eds., 
Criminal Justice Reform: A Blueprint 137, 145-46 (1983). 
Executions have resumed on a significant basis within the past few years, though the 
number carried out remains a minute fraction of the number of prisoners under capital 
sentence. The causes of this development presumably include the Supreme Court's 
resolution of various issues in its capital punishment caselaw whose uncertainty had 
previously impeded executions, and a toughening of the Court's stance toward delay in 
capital cases through habeas corpus litigation. See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 
880 (1983). 
challenging a guilty plea in a habeas corpus proceeding to the claim that 
he was denied effective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea. 
This normally precludes challenges to pleas based on alleged antecedent 
violations of constitutional rights, such as a claim that the plea resulted 
from a coerced confession obtained at an earlier point. 
Second, the Court has narrowed the grounds for excusing procedur-
al defaults in habeas corpus proceedings. Under normal standards of 
appellate review, claims that are not properly raised in a proceeding in a 
lower court are generally barred on review. Nevertheless, Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963), held that a failure to raise a claim in conformity 
with state procedural rules would not justify dismissing the claim in a 
subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the defendant 
"deliberately bypassed" state procedures (seep. 22 supra). Fay v. Noia 's 
rejection of all ordinary concepts of finality and orderly procedure has 
since been repudiated by the Court, which held in Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72 (1977), that procedural defaults will generally not be excused 
unless the petitioner establishes "cause" for the default and "prejudice" 
resulting from the alleged violation. Later decisions have generally given 
narrow readings of the notion of "cause," holding, for example, that an 
attorney's error in failing to raise a claim is not "cause" in the relevant 
sense unless it was so serious as to amount to constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 75 
Third, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held that 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims cannot be raised on federal 
habeas corpus, so long as a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the 
claim was provided in state proceedings. As a practical matter, this 
generally bars review of Fourth Amendment claims in habeas corpus 
proceedings. 76 
Fourth, the decision in Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), put 
teeth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)'s general rule of deference to state court fact-
finding (see p. 26 supra). It required lower federal courts to identify the 
specific statutory criterion that was not satisfied in cases in which the 
presumption of correctness for state fact-finding is not applied, and to 
explain the basis for the conclusion that the criterion was not satisfied. 
75
The most recent and comprehensive explication of the "cause and prejudice" standard 
appears in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). · 
MS . ee Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Excluswnary Rule After Stone v. 
Powell, 82 Colum. L. Rev. I (1982). 
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY 
Federal habeas corpus operates today as a quasi-appellate mecha-
nism by which the litigation of state criminal cases can be continued and 
indefinitely prolonged in the lower federal courts. While it is generally 
taken for granted that one appeal as a matter of right beyond the trial 
stage satisfies the interest in fairness to the individual litigant, habeas 
corpus provides additional mandatory review beyond the various levels 
of direct review and collateral review in the state court systems. While 
federal review of the judgments of state courts has traditionally been 
confined to direct review in the Supreme Court, the current habeas 
corpus jurisdiction enables individual federal trial judges to overturn the 
considered judgments of state supreme courts in criminal cases. 
A particularly striking feature of the current system is the failure of 
the standards and procedures associated with federal habeas corpus to 
keep pace with its expanding scope. If habeas corpus is limited to 
providing a judicial check on arbitrary detention by executive authorities 
-- the basic scope of the "habeas corpus" right under the Constitution 
(see pp. 4-7 supra) -- there is no need for time limits or rules concerning 
deference to prior judicial determinations. If a statutory habeas corpus 
remedy authorizes original proceedings in the federal district courts to 
challenge the continued enslavement of blacks in violation of the post-
Civil War emancipation (see pp. 7-11 supra), there is similarly no need or 
place for any particular constraints on the proceedings. 
However, once habeas corpus has been transformed into a regular 
appellate mechanism -- by which state prisoners may obtain additional 
review of claims that have already been considered and rejected at 
multiple levels of the state court system -- the result is an essentially 
redundant litigative process which imposes costs and strains that would 
not be tolerated in any other context. No legislature would pass a law 
stating that a defendant has a right to appeal, but that he may wait as 
long as he wishes before doing so. No legislature would pass a law stating 
that a defendant may appeal again and again if dissatisfied with the 
results the first time around. No legislature would pass a law stating that 
a defendant has a right to further mandatory review of a nearly unlimited 
range of alleged procedural errors that have already been thoroughly 
considered and rejected by other courts of appeals. Yet all of these 
characteristics can be found in the current federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction. 77 
To the extent that this extraordinary type of review is to be retained, 
one would expect to find some extraordinary justification for doing so. 
The policy considerations bearing on this question will be examined in 
the remainder of this section. 
A. Traditional Reverence for the Great Writ and its 
Constitutional Status 
Proposals for modifying the existing scope of federal habeas corpus 
are frequently met with confused arguments that such proposals would 
interfere with the Great Writ of the common law, whose suspension is 
prohibited by the Constitution outside of extreme situations of public 
emergency. The traditional esteem of habeas corpus, it is argued, 
precludes or at least strongly militates against any reform that would 
impair its scope or availability. 78 
Arguments of this sort do not rise above the level of a simple logical 
fallacy -- the fallacy of equivocation 79 -- because the common law writ 
referred to in the Constitution and the contemporary statutory writ by 
which lower federal courts review state judgments are distinct remedies 
that, in fact, have nothing to do with each other. The constitutional "writ 
of habeas corpus" is a remedy that federal prisoners can use before trial 
to test the existence of grounds for detention by executive authorities. 80 
The current statutory "writ of habeas corpus" is a remedy that state 
77 As discussed elsewhere in this Report, there is no time limit on habeas corpus 
applications and the restriction of the claims raised to federal questions has become 
largely meaningless (pp. 22-24, 36-37 supra). Delay in filing is constrained only by the 
")aches" doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a). Under Rule 9(b), grounds for relief 
rejected on the merits in an earlier federal petition may be dismissed if presented again 
in a successive petition, but dismissal on this basis is a matter of discretion and grounds 
not previously presented can be dismissed only if their earlier omission "constituted an 
abuse of the writ." 
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See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 41, at 142, 170-71 (noting and responding to argument). 
79
"Equivocation" involves drawing specious inferences by using a term with a particular 
meaning at one point in an argument and using the same term with another meaning at 
a different point in the argument. This occurs in arguments which infer that the 
contemporary statutory "habeas corpus" remedy should not be restricted because the 
common law revered and the Constitution protects a different "habeas corpus" remedy. 
80 
See pp. 4-7 supra. As a practical matter, there is virtually never any need to use the 
constitutional writ in contemporary criminal cases because other rules and mechanisms 
prisoners can use after trial and exhaustion of state appellate remedies to 
secure additional review of judicially imposed detention. 
The only discernible similarities between these two remedies are 
that (1) they have the same name, and (2) both can be used -- albeit in 
completely different circumstances -- to seek relief from detention or 
incarceration which is alleged to be legally unjustified. Similarity (1) is 
purely verbal, and similarity (2) would apply equally to all other 
mechanisms for reviewing or re-opening criminal judgments, such as 
ordinary appeals and new trial motions. No one has yet suggested that 
the use of appeals and new trial motions to challenge convictions and 
imprisonment transforms them into "habeas corpus" in the constitution-
al sense. The grounds for identifying the current statutory habeas corpus 
remedy with the traditional writ safeguarded by the Constitution are 
equally insubstantial. 
B. The Right to a Federal Forum 
Another argument commonly offered in support of the existing 
habeas corpus jurisdiction is that a person asserting a federal claim has a 
right to have access to a federal forum for the adjudication of that 
claim. 81 
The short answer to this argument is that the Constitution itself and 
historical practice are inconsistent with the existence of such a right. The 
constitutional convention was divided on the question whether lower 
federal courts should be established, and accordingly left the matter to 
Congress's discretion. Since the Constitution does not require that lower 
federal courts exist at all, there can be no right of access to such courts 
for any particular claim. 82 
In terms of historical practice, the general federal question jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts is a late nineteenth century development. Prior 
to that time, litigants asserting claims under the federal Constitution or 
federal laws were frequently limited to filing suit in state court, and even 
have developed which ensure that an arrestee will be promptly notified of the charges 
against him and brought to trial on those charges. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 5. 
81 
See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 605, 627-28 & n. 57 (1981) (noting and responding to argument). 
82
See id.; Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts & the Federal System 11 -12 (2d ed. 
1973); Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980). 
today, there are some areas in which federal causes of action can only be 
brought in state court. When litigants currently assert federal defenses or 
immunities in suits brought in state court, they generally have no right of 
removal to federal court, and can obtain a hearing in a federal forum only 
in the infrequent cases in which the Supreme Court grants review. 83 
In state criminal cases, the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was 
not a general reviewing mechanism with respect to federal claims prior to 
the historically recent expansion of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction 
(see pp. 11-22 supra). Currently, if a criminal defendant is only sentenced 
to a fine, he has no access to federal habeas corpus for consideration of 
his federal claims, since habeas corpus can only be used to challenge 
unlawful custody. If a defendant is sentenced to less than a few years in 
prison, habeas corpus review is also likely to be barred as a practical 
matter, since his sentence will have run its course by the time state 
remedies are exhausted. 
If a defendant has pleaded guilty, a federal habeas court is generally 
barred from entertaining a claim of an antecedent violation of a 
constitutional right under the rule of McMann v. Richardson and Tollett 
v. Henderson. In other circumstances, access to a federal forum may be 
barred by the rule of Stone v. Powell concerning Fourth Amendment 
claims, the "cause and prejudice" procedural default standard of 
Wainwright v. Sykes, or the !aches doctrine of habeas corpus rule 9(a) (see 
pp. 26, 38-39 supra). 
Thus, the premise of this argument -- that there is generally a right 
to have a federal forum hear a federal claim -- has no basis in reality. If 
the argument rests on the more modest assertion that there are special 
reasons for providing access to a federal forum in light of the high stakes 
involved in criminal cases, then it must fall back on other arguments that 
would establish this underlying assumption. The most common argu-
ment on this point -- that federal courts show superior sensitivity and 
receptiveness to the constitutional claims advanced by criminal defend-
ants -- is addressed in the next part. 
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See Bator, supra note 81 , at 606 n. 3; District Court Reorganization : Hearing on H.R. 
5994 and Related Bills before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
48-52 ( 1984). 
C. Enforcement of the Constitution 
Perhaps the most common justification offered for the current 
habeas corpus jurisdiction is that the federal courts have a superior 
sensitivity to federal rights and are more receptive than the state courts 
to claims based on such rights. Ensuring the adequate protection of 
.constitutional rights for criminal defendants accordingly requires that 
review of state court decisions on federal claims be available in the 
inferior federal courts. 84 
This argument depends on a questionable empirical generalization 
about the disposition of the federal courts and the state courts which is 
obviously not true in many particular instances, if it is true at all. 
Decisions by state courts which define the rights of defendants more 
expansively than the decisions of federal courts are not uncommon. 85 
Normally, federal habeas courts reach the same conclusion as the state 
courts ( see pp. 34-35 supra ). However, even if it were true that federal 
courts are generally more likely to grant defendants' claims, it would not 
follow that greater fidelity to the Constitution will result from expansive 
federal court review. 
In its basic provisions, the Constitution establishes a republican 
form of government under which public policy decisions at the federal 
level are made by a legislature accountable to the public in the enactment 
of laws and an executive accountable to the public in their execution. The 
federal government as a whole is confined to the exercise of the powers 
enumerated in the Constitution, and any powers not so delegated "are 
reserved to the States . . . or to the people" (Amendment X). 
This general system of self-government is qualified by constitutional 
provisions establishing various important rights against the government. 
Even these provisions, however, reflect a recognition of the need to 
maintain a fair balance between the individual's right to security against 
crime and the right of defendants and suspects to be free of governmental 
abuse or overreaching. For example, the Fourth Amendment does not 
bar non-consensual searches and seizures in the investigation of crime, 
84 This argument is developed at length in a broader setting in Neuborne, The Myth of 
Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). A general response appears in Bator, supra note 
81, at 623-35. 
85 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. 
Rev. 489, 498-501 (1977). 
but generally prohibits such activities only if they are unreasonable. The 
fifth Amendment creates no presumption against obtaining incriminat-
ing admissions from a suspect or defendant and using them in 
prosecution, but only bars compelling a person to be a witness against 
himself. 86 The Fifth Amendment also recognizes that the government 
may properly deprive offenders of life, liberty, and property in further-
ance of law enforcement objectives, stipulating only that it may not do so 
without due process. The Eighth Amendment does not bar severe 
punishment for serious crimes, or even capital punishment, but only 
prohibits punishment that is cruel and unusual. A judge who erroneously 
grants a claim by misinterpreting or disregarding the Constitution's 
limitations on the scope of the rights it defines departs from the 
Constitution no less than a judge who erroneously denies a claim that 
validly asserts a constitutional right. 
With these considerations in mind, there is little force to the 
argument for habeas corpus review based on allegedly superior federal 
court sensitivity to constitutional values. It has not been shown that 
federal courts are generally more likely than state courts to respect the 
Constitution's limitations on judicial overriding of legislative and 
executive decisions affecting criminal investigation and prosecution. It 
has also not been shown that federal courts are more likely to respect the 
Constitution's limitations on federal authority over state procedures, or 
the Constitution's limitations on the scope of particular federal rights 
that may be applicable in state proceedings. Overall, there is no 
particular plausibility to the view that federal habeas corpus review 
results in greater fidelity to the Constitution. The argument to the 
contrary reflects partisanship for expansive interpretations of selected 
portions of selected provisions of the Constitution, rather than a 
commitment to the Constitution itself. As Professor Paul Bator has 
observed: 
We are told that federal judges will be more receptive to 
constitutional values than state judges. What is really meant, 
however, is that federal judges will be more receptive to some 
constitutional values than state judges. And the hidden 
assumption of the argument is that the Constitution contains 
only one or two sorts of values: typically, those which protect 
86 See generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 
102-03 (1986). 
the individual from the power of the state, and those which 
assure the superiority of federal to state law. 
But the Constitution contains other sorts of values as 
well. It gives the federal government powers, but also enacts 
limitations on those powers. The limitations, too, count as 
setting forth constitutional values. Will the federal judge be 
more sensitive than the state judge in insuring that these 
limitations are complied with? Whose institutional "set" is 
likely to make one more sensitive to the values underlying the 
tenth amendment? ls a federal judge likely to be more 
receptive than the state judge in honoring other structural 
principles, such as separation of powers? Why don't these sorts 
of issues ever seem to count? 
87 
D. The Need for Surrogate Supreme Courts 
Another argument for the current habeas corpus jurisdiction is that 
the expansion of federal rights and the increase in the general volume of 
litigation in recent times has made it impossible for the Supreme Court to 
maintain an adequate degree of supervision over the state judiciaries in 
criminal cases through direct review. It is accordingly necessary to 
empower the lower federal courts to review state criminal judgments -- in 
effect, to serve as surrogate Supreme Courts -- to maintain an adequate 
reviewing capacity at the federal level. 
88 
Taken in its most obvious sense, this argument presupposes that 
extensive day-to-day oversight of the state judiciaries by federal courts is 
currently necessary to secure an acceptable degree of compliance with 
Supreme Court precedent by the state courts. The weaknesses of this 
argument are similar to the weaknesses of the argument that habeas 
corpus review is essential to securing fidelity to the Constitution. It 
assumes with no adequate basis that state courts are insufficiently 
sensitive or receptive to claims of federal right based on Supreme Court 
precedent, 89 and ignores the full range of constitutional values that are 
87 Bator, supra note 81, at 631-34. 
88 
See Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-
Finding Responsibility, 75 Yale L. J. 895, 897-98 (1966). 
89 
See Bator, supra note 81, at 629-3 l (disputing, in relation to habeas corpus review, 
alleged superiority of federal judges in sensitivity and competence under contemporary 
conditions); Friendly, supra note 41, at 165 n. 125 (similar); O'Connor, Trends in the 
46 
recognized in the Supreme Court's decisions. Are federal courts more 
likely than state courts to implement faithfully the Supreme Court's 
decisions limiting judicial authority to override legislative and executive 
decisions affecting criminal investigation and prosecution? Are federal 
courts more likely to respect the Court's decisions concerning the limits 
of federal authority over state procedure, or its decisions concerning the 
limits on the scope of particular federal rights that apply in state 
proceedings? 
Overall, there is no particular plausibility to the view that habeas 
corpus review results in greater fidelity to Supreme Court precedent. 
Indeed, the Court is regularly required to devote a portion of its limited 
time to reviewing and overturning the decisions of lower federal courts 
which have erroneously granted writs of habeas corpus in reviewing state 
cases. 90 
A somewhat different version of the "surrogate Supreme Court" 
argument holds that habeas corpus review is necessary to secure 
uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law. In this 
sense, however, the lower federal courts are inherently incapable of 
serving as surrogate Supreme Courts. Only the Supreme Court itself can 
prescribe nationally uniform and nationally binding caselaw rules. The 
close to a hundred federal district courts and twelve regional federal 
appellate courts can differ in their decisions concerning matters that the 
Supreme Court has not resolved, and their views on such issues are not 
binding on the state courts outside of the particular cases brought up on 
federal habeas corpus. 
Moreover, even in areas in which there is no review of state 
judgments in the lower federal courts -- e.g., civil litigation -- the state 
Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court 
Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 812-14 (1981) (similar); Smith, supra note 74, at 
149 (unlikelihood under contemporary circumstances of state court misapplication or 
resistance to Supreme Court precedent); see also Neuborne, supra note 84, at 1119 ("We 
are not faced today with widespread state judicial refusal to enforce clear federal 
rights."). 
90 See Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (l 985) [hereafter cited as "1985 Hearing"] (listing 
of recent decisions in which Supreme Court overturned federal court of appeals 
decisions favorable to habeas corpus petitioners). The cited cases include both cases in 
which the court of appeals' decision was wrong on the merits and cases in which the 













courts are attentive to the opinions of the federal appellate courts on 
unsettled questions of federal law, and the conclusions they reach are 
likely to fall within the range of options appearing in the decisions of the 
federal courts of appeals. In general, it is not apparent that the interest in 
uniformity is significantly advanced by habeas corpus review, and not 
apparent that harmful disparities would occur with any greater frequen-
cy if the state supreme courts had the same latitude as federal appellate 
courts to adopt different resolutions and make their own judgments 
concerning questions that the Supreme Court has left open. 
On a more mundane level, the "surrogate Supreme Court" argu-
ment is sometimes raised as a caseload issue. The restriction or 
elimination of habeas corpus review, it is argued, would result in an 
excessive burden on the Supreme Court's direct review jurisdiction. 
However, the Justices of the Supreme Court do not appear to share 
this concern, since a number of them have spoken out strongly in favor of 
fundamental restrictions on federal habeas corpus, and the general trend 
of the Court's recent decisions has been to limit the availability of federal 
habeas corpus. 91 Recourse to the Supreme Court on direct review is 
limited by a normal sixty day limit under Supreme Court Rule 20, a 
safeguard against a burdensome volume of applications that is simply 
lacking in the case of habeas corpus. Moreover, the Supreme Court is 
regularly required each term to grant certiorari in a number of cases to 
resolve unsettled questions of habeas corpus procedure or to reverse 
unsound decisions by federal appellate courts granting writs of habeas 
corpus. For the foregoing reasons, there is no adequate basis for believing 
that limiting or eliminating federal habeas corpus would result in any net 
increase in the Supreme Court's caseload. 
Finally, it may be noted that the current habeas corpus jurisdiction 
arose in a period in which the criminal justice systems in many states 
were undermined by state-enforced racial segregation. This evil has since 
been corrected by the civil rights legislation of the 1960's and by the 
Supreme Court's decisions following Brown v. Board of Education. In 
commenting on the import of these changes for habeas corpus review, 
Attorney General William French Smith has observed: 
91 See S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 & nn. 13-16 (1983) (statements by 
Justices critical of habeas corpus); pp. 38-39 supra (recent decisions limiting habeas 
corpus). 
The unique historical circumstances obtaining at the time 
of the decision of Brown v. Allen may have led the Supreme 
Court to see a need for a broad supervisory authority of the 
lower federal courts over state criminal proceedings. One may 
question the validity of perpetuating this authority into a time 
when the circumstances that gave rise to it no longer exist. 92 
E. Providing a Vehicle for the Articulation of 
Constitutional Rights 
It is sometimes asserted that habeas corpus proceedings provide an 
important vehicle for the articulation of constitutional rights by the 
federal courts. 93 
In relation to the Supreme Court, this assertion is groundless. Most 
of the Court's important decisions in the past thirty years concerning 
constitutional criminal procedure have been made in direct review cases. 
While some important issues have fortuitously been addressed in the 
context of habeas corpus litigation, the same issues could have been 
considered and decided in cases coming up on direct review. In relation 
to the federal courts of appeals, most rulings by these courts on 
constitutional questions occur in the context of appeals from convictions 
in federal prosecutions. Habeas corpus review does sometimes enable 
federal appellate courts to pass on the constitutionality of unique features 
of state procedure that have no counterpart in federal proceedings, where 
the proper resolution on the basis of Supreme Court precedent is unclear. 
However, unless some other argument establishes that the decisions of 
federal appellate courts on these unsettled questions are likely to be 
"better" than those of state supreme courts, there is no particular value 
in having lower federal courts "articulate" the relevant rules. 
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Smith, supra note 74, at 149; see Bator, supra note 81, at 631 ("the argument seems to 
me to derive primarily from a special historical experience, involving the division of the 
country on the issue of racial segregation, which is no longer of dominating significance 
in governing the attitudes of state court judges"); see also Neuborne, supra note 84, at 
1119 n. 55 ("The widespread breakdown of Southern justice which motivated 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ... and similar breakdowns during the height 
of the civil rights movement which provoked calls for significant expansions of federal 
jurisdiction . . . do not exist today"). 
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F. Correcting Injustices 
Another argument is that habeas corpus review is needed to correct 
miscarriages of justice occurring in state proceedings. 
94 
A first problem with this argument is that habeas corpus review is a 
very poorly suited means to this end. Guilt and innocence, as such, are 
not in issue in habeas corpus litigation; only violations of constitutional 
rights can be asserted. A federal habeas court may overturn a state 
conviction on the basis of a constitutional violation that does not cast any 
doubt on the factual accuracy of the verdict. Conversely, even conclusive 
proof of innocence does not support the issuance of a writ, in the absence 
of constitutional violations in the state proceedings. As a practical 
matter, it is not federal habeas corpus, but the various remedies available 
to defendants at the state level that provide the essential vehicle for the 
correction of miscarriages of justice. 
95 
A second problem with this argument is that it fails to address the 
question of limits. There is no limit in principle to the number of layers of 
review that can be piled on top of each other. If fifty levels of mandatory 
review were added to those now available, no doubt each additional level 
might detect and correct some potential injustice that had gotten by at all 
earlier stages. However, unless it is maintained that every prisoner should 
be given a trial de novo whenever he wants one, there is an unavoidable 
need to make the judgment that the costs of permitting additional re-
litigation at some point outweigh its benefits. 96 The infrequency with 
which relief is granted and the dearth of cases in recent years in which 
demonstrated injustices have been corrected through habeas corpus (see 
pp. 34-35 supra) tend to support the conclusion that the existing habeas 
corpus jurisdiction goes well beyond that point. In general, it is assumed 
that one appeal as of right strikes the proper balance. Habeas corpus 
review provides far more than that. 
Finally, in assessing the force of this argument, it must be kept in 
mind that justice is due to the actual and potential victims of crime, and 
to society at large, as well as to suspects and defendants. Injustice occurs 
when the convictions of criminals are overturned after the lapse of time 
94 See Bator, supra note 81, at 613-14 n. 25 (noting and responding to argument). 
95 See 1985 Hearing, supra note 90, at 45-46. 
96 See Bator, supra note 81, at 614 & n. 27. 
has made re-trial impossible. Injustice also occurs when the anguish of 
crime victims and their families is prolonged for years or decades by 
continued litigation and the prospect that the person who has ruined 
their lives may yet be set free to claim other victims. The open-ended 
review of state judgments by federal habeas corpus, extending far past 
the conclusion of the normal adjudicatory process, carries particularly 
acute risks of causing such injustices. 97 
G. Effects on the Behavior of Prisoners 
It is sometimes asserted that engaging in habeas corpus litigation 
provides valuable "recreational therapy" for prisoners, relieving the 
tensions generated by the prison environment and helping to keep them 
occupied. 98 
While it is true that some prisoners who spend their time preparing 
and litigating habeas corpus petitions may be diverted from other 
harmful activities -- e.g., assaulting other inmates or engaging in drug 
abuse -- it must also be recognized that frivolous and harassing litigation 
is itself a seriously antisocial activity that carries substantial costs to the 
system. More basically, viewing emotional gratification to petitioners as 
an independent ground for authorizing habeas corpus review presupposes 
a view of the federal courts as a kind of video arcade for bored prisoners 
who should be free to toy with the system in order to keep them out of 
worse sorts of trouble. This is irreconcilable with the proper view of 
courts as impartial organs of the law whose function is to entertain 
genuine claims of legal right and accurately resolve them. 
This argument also assumes that engaging in habeas corpus 
litigation will in fact improve the attitudes of prisoners and lessen their 
disposition to commit antisocial acts. However, the view is widely held 
by judges and writers that it has the opposite effect. Like other forms of 
litigation, habeas corpus litigation provides prisoners with a cost-free 
means of striking at the system and gaining increased esteem among 
fell ow inmates. The more specific message of permitting endless challen-
ges to convictions and sentences is that the system never really regards 
the prisoner's guilt as an established fact, and that he need never accept 
and deal with it. While the ability to command the time and attention of 
97 Some cases illustrating these points are described in the Appendix to this Report. 
98 Cf Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4261, at 












judges and prosecutors by filing a petition may be gratifying to many 
prisoners, any positive "recreational" value of this practice must be 
balanced against its potential effect of increasing the arrogance of 
unrepentant criminals. As Professor Bator has observed: 
A procedural system which permits an endless repetition of 
inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate 
certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibility of 
justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of the 
underlying substantive commands . . . . The first step in 
achieving [rehabilitation] may be a realization by the convict 
that he is justly subject to sanction . . . and a process of 
reeducation cannot, perhaps, even begin if we make sure that 
the cardinal moral predicate is missing, if society itself 
continuously tells the convict that he may not be justly subject 
to reeducation and treatment in the first place. The idea of just 
condemnation lies at the heart of the criminal law, and we 
should not lightly create processes which implicitly belie its 
possibility. 99 
H. Other Arguments 
Other arguments are also occasionally offered in support of habeas 
corpus review. For example, it is said that habeas corpus provides a 
necessary means for securing a relatively detached and "isolated" 
consideration of a defendant's federal claims, free of the multiplicity of 
issues and factual complications that characterize earlier stages of 
litigation. This argument would be more convincing if there were no 
appellate courts in the states. In fact, however, the federal habeas court's 
review is typically a revisiting of claims that have already received 
detached consideration, in a setting isolated from the exigencies of trial 
litigation, in the course of the prisoner's appeals in the state court system. 
Another argument is that habeas corpus review of state judgments 
fosters a constructive "dialogue" between state and federal courts 
concerning the issues that arise in habeas corpus litigation. 100 However, 
99 Bator, supra note 17, at 452; see Friendly, supra note 41, at 146; Spalding v. Aiken, 460 
U.S. 1093, 1096-97 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J.); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 
U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). 
100 See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale 
L.J. 1035 (1977). 
habeas corpus is not needed to create such a dialogue. In the absence of 
habeas corpus review, prosecutors and defense attorneys in criminal 
cases would continue to cite both state and federal precedents supporting 
their positions, and the judges of each system would continue to consider 
the views of their counterparts in the other system in the ordinary course 
of litigation. To the extent that habeas corpus does foster a federal-state 
dialogue, it is not a dialogue of equals, but of superior and inferior. It is 
the federal habeas court that gets the final word on the disposition of the 
particular case under review, and the state courts within its domain may 
depart from its views only at the risk of having their judgments 
overturned in other cases that turn on the same issue. 101 Unless some 
other reason can be given for subordinating the highest courts of the 
states to the lower federal courts in this manner, the desirability of 
"dialogue" on these unequal terms is less than obvious. 
IV. REFORM OPTIONS 
The review of history and policy in the earlier sections of this report 
shows that the statutory habeas corpus remedy in its contemporary 
character is unrelated to the historical and constitutional functions of the 
Great Writ (pp. 4-7 supra). In its specific operation it is inconsistent with 
basic principles of adjudicatory procedure that are taken for granted in 
other contexts (pp. 37, 40 supra). The arguments typically offered in 
support of the current jurisdiction generally reflect partisanship for 
defense interests -- regardless of countervailing public interests and the 
actual balance of interests struck by the Constitution -- or an unjustified 
preference for aggrandizing the lower federal courts at the expense of the 
state judiciaries, or some combination of these two biases (pp. 40-53 
supra). 
At the level of terminology, it might be beneficial to adopt some 
different name for the current review jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts in relation to state judgments -- e.g. , re-styling state prisoners' 
challenges to their convictions and sentences as applications for "a writ 
of federal review" rather than petitions for "a writ of habeas corpus". 
101 
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 100, at 1036, is accordingly wrong in stating that the 
Warren Court's innovations have resulted in "a dialogue on the future of constitutional 
requirements in criminal law in which state and federal courts were required both to 
speak and listen as equals." The situation in habeas corpus would be equalized only if 
state trial judges were given the authority to overturn the judgments of the federal 
courts in federal criminal cases. 
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This would provide a characterization that accurately reflects the nature 
of the existing jurisdiction. It might help curb the confusion between that 
jurisdiction and the traditional Great Writ which chronically impedes 
clear thinking in this area and is routinely exploited by opponents of 
needed reforms. 
At the level of substantive reform, various options may be 
considered. The affirmative case for adopting such reforms to curb the 
contemporary abuse of habeas corpus has been aptly summarized by 
Attorney General William French Smith in an article published in 1983: 
First, the availability of habeas corpus to state prisoners, 
beyond the various remedies and layers of review available in 
the state courts, has little or no value in avoiding injustices or 
ensuring that the federal rights of criminal defendants are 
respected. The state prisoners who seek federal habeas corpus 
are generally among the least deserving element of the prison 
population . . . . [T]he typical habeas corpus applicant is 
challenging his imprisonment for a seriously violent crime for 
which he was convicted after trial. The typical applicant has 
already secured extensive review of his case in the state courts, 
having pursued a state appeal and also often having initiated 
collateral attacks in the state courts on one or more occasions 
. . . . There is no reason to believe that the state courts' 
consideration of the claims of defendants who subsequently 
seek federal habeas corpus is deficient in any significant 
number of cases .... 
Second, the present system of review is demeaning to the 
state courts and pointlessly disparaging to their efforts to 
comply with federal law in criminal proceedings . . . . This 
difficulty is aggravated by the particular procedures and rules 
of review that are presently employed in habeas corpus 
proceedings. A single federal judge is frequently placed in the 
position of reviewing a judgment of conviction that was 
entered by a state trial judge, reviewed and found unobjection-
able by a state appellate court, and upheld by a state supreme 
court .. .. 
Third, the current system of federal habeas corpus 
defeats the important objective of establishing at some point 
an end to litigation. A prisoner may seek federal habeas corpus 
many years after the normal conclusion of state criminal 
proceedings. The lapse of time and the resulting disappearance 
of evidence and witnesses may render response to the appli-
cant's contentions -- or re-trial in the event that he prevails on 
his claims -- difficult or impossible 
Fourth, the current system is wasteful of limited re-
sources. At a time when both state and federal courts face 
staggering criminal caseloads, we can ill afford to make large 
commitments of judicial and prosecutorial resources to proce-
dures of dubious value in furthering the ends of criminal 
justice. Such commitments are necessarily at the expense of 
the time available for the stages of the criminal process at 
which the questions of guilt and innocence and basic fairness 
are most directly addressed . . . . The time spent on habeas 
corpus applications in federal courts is a particularly question-
able indulgence. As noted earlier, the matters raised in such 
applications have, in general, already been considered and 
decided by the state courts. All too often the contentions 
raised reflect only the imaginings of idle prisoners who turn to 
"writ-writing" as a means of diversion or continued aggression 
against society . . . . 
A fifth and final criticism is that the present system of 
habeas corpus review creates particularly acute problems in 
capital cases . . . . It ... prevents correction of the practical 
nullification of all capital punishment legislation that has 
resulted from litigational delay and obstruction. 102 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, Attorney General 
Smith concluded that "the most effective response to the problems 
resulting from federal habeas corpus for state convicts would be the 
elimination of federal habeas corpus in that area." 103 We agree. This 
reform option will be discussed in the initial part of subsection A of this 
section, followed by discussions of other legislative reform options. These 
include the option of confining federal habeas corpus review to cases 
where a meaningful process for considering a petitioner's federal claims 
was denied in the state courts, and the option of enacting limited reform 
102 Smith, supra note 74, at 142-46. 
103 Id. at 149-50. 
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legislation like that passed by the Senate in 1984. Subsection B examines 
the possibility of achieving reforms through litigation. 
A. Legislative Options 
1. Abolition of Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners 
Having reviewed the history of habeas corpus from its common law 
origins to its contemporary operation, and having fully considered the 
relevant policy issues, we agree with Attorney General Smith that "the 
simple abolition of federal habeas corpus for state criminal convicts" 
would be "[t]he most straightforward solution to the tensions, burdens, 
and inefficiencies presently resulting from federal habeas corpus." 
104 
A 
provision that would have had this effect was included in title II of the 
proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (pp. 
30-31 supra). The same effect could be achieved by a simpler formulation 
along the following lines: 
No court of the United States other than the Supreme Court, 
and no judge of a court of the United States, shall have 
jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to the validity of a 
person's detention pursuant to the judgment of a state court, 
or to the execution of any other sentence imposed by a state 
court. 
For reasons discussed earlier, there can be no doubt concerning the 
constitutionality of this type of reform. It would have no effect 
whatsoever on the Great Writ whose suspension is prohibited by the 
Constitution. 105 
Eliminating federal habeas corpus for state prisoners also would 
"not upset any deep-seated tradition or historically sanctioned prac-
tice." 106 The First Judiciary Act's general restriction of federal habeas 
corpus to federal prisoners remained operative until the enactment of the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and even thereafter, the availability of 
104 Id. at 147-48. 
105 See pp. 4-7, 41 -42 supra; The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 221 6 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-07 (1982) (opinion 
of Office of Legal Counsel). 
106 smith, supra note 74, at 147-48. 
federal habeas corpus to state prisoners remained largely a theoretical 
matter prior to the past thirty years. Its elimination would be limited in 
substantial effect to practices that have emerged since the l 950's (see pp. 
7-24 supra). 
A reform of this sort would also not restrict or impair the 
traditional, constitutionally-based mechanism for maintaining the su-
premacy and uniformity of federal law through direct review of the 
judgments of the highest courts of the states by the Supreme Court. State 
convicts would retain the right to seek Supreme Court review, in addition 
to having access to the appellate and collateral review mechanisms 
provided in the state court systems. 107 
A final point in support of this approach is that Congress has 
already effectively abolished federal habeas corpus in one substantial 
jurisdiction -- the District of Columbia -- with no discernible adverse 
effect on the quality or fairness of criminal proceedings (seep. 27 supra). 
This naturally raises the question why the same approach should not be 
tried in relation to the substantially similar judicial systems of the states. 
Judge Carl McGowan has observed: 
A matter that has rankled relations between state and 
federal courts for some years now is the collateral attack on 
final state criminal convictions provided by Congress in the 
federal courts. A state prisoner who has unsuccessfully 
exhausted his avenues of state trial and appellate relief can, 
even many years later when retrial is not practically feasible, 
attack that conviction in the federal district court as violative 
of federal law, and procure his release if such a violation is 
established. Since the same claim of federal law violation can 
[be], and often is, made in the trial and appellate courts of the 
state, with certiorari review available in the Supreme Court, 
the state judges understandably have some difficulty in seeing 
why their work should be reexamined in the federal courts 
whenever a colorable claim of violation is alleged. 
107 The fact that state prisoners would not always have access to a federal forum for 
consideration of their federal claims is not objectionable either on constitutional 
grounds or as a matter of policy. Such access is frequently not available even under the 
current system of review. See pp. 41-53 supra; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 102-03 
(1980). 
._., 
The one place where this cannot be done is in the District 
of Columbia .... Some twelve years ago Congress enacted a 
comprehensive reorganization of both the local and federal 
courts in the District . . . . In doing . . . this, the Congress . . . 
provided in the D.C. Code for collateral attack upon a D.C. 
criminal conviction to be made in the new and improved D.C. 
court system. It explicitly declared, however, that no further 
collateral challenge could be made in the federal courts in the 
District of Columbia. Thus it is that for some years now, 
although a state prisoner across the Potomac in Virginia, or 
one over the line in Maryland, has a second chance for 
collateral review of his conviction in the federal courts in those 
states, a state prisoner in the District of Columbia does not. 
[T]he Supreme Court ultimately held that Congress could 
constitutionally make the choice it did, articulating that result 
in terms which would appear to give Congress the same 
latitude to end in all of the states collateral attack by state 
prisoners in the federal courts. There have been no reports, so 
far as I am aware, of egregious injustices to District of 
Columbia prisoners because of this denial of state habeas 
jurisdiction in the federal courts . . . . 
The early finality of criminal convictions is generally 
desirable, and especially so when that can be assured without 
duplication of judicial effort. The resources of the federal 
courts at the present time are strained by their own criminal 
caseloads. They should not have to exercise a supervisory 
authority over the administration of state criminal laws unless 
that is plainly necessary in the interest of justice. 
Certainly there appears to have been a steadily increasing 
sensitivity by state judges to claims of federal right -- a 
sensitivity that can only be frustrated by needless subjection to 
second-guessing by federal judges. Since Congress has in effect 
made the District of Columbia a laboratory for testing the 
need for federal collateral attack by state prisoners, the 
Congress would do well to study carefully the actual results of 
that experiment. If it turns out to be positive, then the 
opportunity exists to eliminate simultaneously a significant 
number of cases from the federal courts and a condition which 
has always roiled the waters of federal-state relations. 108 
2. Deference to Adequate State Processes 
A second reform option would be to limit the scope of review on 
federal habeas corpus to the question whether adequate processes were 
provided in the state courts for considering the petitioner's federal 
claims. While formulations of this approach could vary considerably in 
detail, the basic idea would be to treat federal habeas corpus as a 
backstop measure, which would only come into play if a state judicial 
system had failed to provide some meaningful opportunity for raising a 
federal claim and having it decided. This was, in part, the approach taken 
in the Judicial Conference's proposal that was passed twice by the House 
of Representatives in the l 950's. 109 
This approach would essentially restore habeas corpus to the 
function it fulfilled in the intermediate period of its expansion, between 
the decision in Moore v. Dempsey in 1923 and the creation of a quasi-
appellate habeas corpus jurisdiction by Brown v. Allen and related 
decisions (see pp. 15-18 supra). It would amount to a general application 
of the current approach to review of Fourth Amendment claims in 
habeas corpus proceedings under the rule of Stone v. Powell, which bars 
re-litigation so long as a "full and fair opportunity" for litigating the 
claim was provided in the state courts (see p. 39 supra). Justice O'Connor 
has advocated the general application of this type of standard: 
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I 
am sure it will be, it is clear that we should strive to make both 
the federal and the state systems strong, independent, and 
viable. State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to 
litigate federal constitutional questions. State judges in assum-
ing office take an oath to support the federal as well as the 
state constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion 
when given the responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a 
108
McGowan, The View From an Inferior Court, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 659, 667-69 
(1982). 
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The Judicial Conference proposal would have barred access to federal habeas corpus 
with respect to claims that had actually been determined in the state courts or that 
could still be raised and determined in the state courts, but otherwise would have 
· permitted access to federal habeas corpus if there had been no "fair and adequate 






step in the right direction to defer to the state courts and give 
finality to their judgments on federal constitutional questions 
where a full and fair adjudication has been given in the state 
court. 110 
Another way of looking at this reform is as an application of normal 
res judicata principles in habeas corpus proceedings. In general, a litigant 
who has unsuccessfully asserted a claim in a state proceeding is not free 
to litigate the same claim over again in federal court. This principle was 
explicitly affirmed by the Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 
90 (1980), which held that rejection of a constitutional claim in a state 
criminal proceeding estops the defendant from asserting the same claim 
in a later § 1983 suit in federal court, so long as the state proceedings 
provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. 
This approach to habeas corpus reform has sometimes been 
defended as superior to the abolition approach on the ground that it 
would ensure the existence of some means of creating an evidentiary 
record on a claim for purposes of Supreme Court review, and that it 
would preserve an incentive for state courts to provide fair procedures for 
the consideration of federal claims. 111 However, the force of the record-
for-review point is not great in the contemporary period, in light of the 
fact that state proceedings do currently provide ample means for raising 
the full range of federal claims that may be asserted by defendants. 
112 
There is also no reason to believe that the state judicial systems now 
require a special "incentive," beyond the traditional availability of direct 
review of state judgments in the Supreme Court, to provide fair processes 
for the consideration of defendants' claims. 
Conversely, preserving habeas corpus review under an adequacy-of-
state-process standard has some unattractive features. Since the enjoy-
ment of habeas corpus litigation by state prisoners is not wholly 
dependent on a realistic possibility of success, litigation would continue 
in this area by prisoners alleging that they had been denied fair state 
processes for considering their claims, and a substantial amount of work 
110o•connor, supra note 89, at 814-15. 
111 See pp. 29-30 supra (Judicial Conference reform proposal designed in part to ensure 
means of creating record for Supreme Court review). Cf Bator, supra note 17, at 
455-60 (favorable assessment of some review of adequacy of state process). 
112 C/ P. Robinson, supra note 63, at 22 (habeas corpus applications normally decided on 
basis of evidentiary record of state proceedings and submissions of parties). 
could be required in disposing of these petitions. Basic restrictions on the 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction would also predictably elicit from 
some federal courts and judges the normal resistance of government 
institutions to new constraints on their power. The preservation of review 
of the availability, "adequacy," or "fairness" of state proceedings could 
accordingly provide a basis for eroding or diluting these restrictions. 
In general, however, this approach would constitute a fundamental 
improvement over the pointless redundancy of the current system, 
though not as clean and complete a solution as the simple abolition of 
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Its optimal formulation would 
be a narrow provision preserving federal habeas review only where a state 
system provides no means by which a federal claim can be raised or could 
have been raised in the course of the state process. 113 
3. Limited Reform Legislation 
A final reform option would not attempt to make basic changes in 
the character of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, but would focus 
instead on correcting particular problems of abuse or excess that arise 
under the current system of review. Legislation containing a set of 
limited reform proposals of this type has been under consideration by 
Congress since 1982. These measures, which have the support of the 
Administration, the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National 
Association of Attorneys General, the National District Attorneys 
Association, and the National Governors Association, were passed by the 
Senate in 1984. They have recently been transmitted by the President to 
Congress again as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act 
(S. 1970 and H.R. 3777). 114 The specific reforms included in the 
proposals are as follows: 
113 Cf Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (unclear whether claim cognizable under 
any state remedy, where petitioner alleged that conviction was solely based on 
prosecution's use of perjury and that the factual basis of the claim could not have been 
discovered through reasonable diligence prior to his new trial motion and state appeal); 
Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (regarding provisions of D.C. Code 
and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limiting potential availability of habeas corpus to cases where 
other remedies are inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention). 
114See p. 31 supra; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before 
the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 226-27, 235-36, 287-88, 309-11, 1111-12 (1983). The formal resolution of the 
National Governors Association, id. at 235-36, endorsed the basic recommendations of 







First, there is currently no time limit on habeas corpus applications. 
As noted earlier (p. 40 supra), this approach reflects a failure of the 
procedures associated with federal habeas corpus to keep pace with its 
expanding scope, and constitutes a departure from normal principles of 
finality that would not be countenanced in connection with any other 
appellate mechanism. As Justice Powell has observed: 
Another cause of overload of the federal system is [28 
U.S.C.] § 2254, conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction 
to review state court criminal convictions. There is no statute 
of limitations, and no finality of federal review of state 
convictions. Thus, repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know 
of no other system of justice structured in a way that assures 
no end to the litigation of a criminal conviction. Our practice 
in this respect is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and judges in 
other countries. Nor does the Constitution require this sort of 
redundancy. 115 
j 
The specific corrective proposed in the legislation is a one-year 
limitation period on habeas corpus applications, normally running from 
exhaustion of state remedies. The start of the limitation period would be 
deferred in case a state unlawfully prevented filing, and in connection 
with newly recognized rights and newly discovered claims. 
This reform would create an important check on the interminable 
continuation of litigation that characterizes the current system of review. 
It is, however, quite generous in comparison with the time limits on other 
federal appellate remedies in its normal starting point, duration, and 
exceptions. By way of comparison, a federal defendant must normally 
decide whether to appeal within 10 days I of conviction, and a state 
defendant seeking Supreme Court review must normally apply within 60 
days of affirmance of his conviction by the highest state court. Even a 
federal defendant who seeks a new trial on grounds of newly discovered 
evidence must apply within two years of final judgment. As the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report on the reform legislation observed, "[t]he 
last-mentioned limitation has the particularly curious effect that a 
Federal prisoner who discovers proof of his innocence more than two 
Amendments Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 653 before the Subcomm. on Courts of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-8 (1981) (earlier reform bill). 
115 Address Before the American Bar Association Division of Judicial Administration, 
Aug. 9, 1982. 
h"I 
years after final judgment has no judicial remedy, but must seek 
executive clemency, while a State or Federal prisoner who asserts 
violations of Constitutional rights which may cast no real doubt on his 
guilt is afforded a Federal judicial remedy without limitation of time. 
The time limitation rule . .. would reduce this discrepancy, bringing the 
availability of [habeas corpus] into closer conformity with the approach 
taken by Federal law in other contexts to maintenance of orderly 
procedures and assurance of finality in criminal adjudication." 116 
The second major reform proposed in the legislation is a general 
narrowing and simplification of the standard of review. Under the 
current system, state court fact-finding is presumed to be correct (subject 
to potential rebuttal by "convincing evidence") if a number of conditions 
set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) are satisfied, but the federal habeas court is 
required to make an independent determination of questions of law and 
to apply the law independently to the facts (see pp. 19-22 supra). This can 
result in the overturning of a judgment -- following the passage of years 
and affirmance by the appellate courts of the state -- though the federal 
habeas court recognizes that the decision turns on close or unsettled 
questions on which courts may reasonably differ and on which the 
federal courts themselves may disagree. It can also require hair-splitting 
decisions whether a state determination is purely one of fact or reflects an 
application of law to fact, since the review standard for factual questions 
(deference allowed if several conditions are satisfied) differs from the 
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact (re-adjudication 
uniformly mandated). The legislation would correct these problems and 
others by establishing a relatively simple and uniform review standard 
under which the federal habeas court would generally defer to the state 
determination of a claim if it concluded that that determination was 
reasonable in its resolution of legal and factual issues and was arrived at 
by procedures consistent with due process. 117 
A third reform in the legislation is a codification of the caselaw 
standards for excusing procedural defaults in habeas corpus proceedings. 
This would bring greater definiteness and clarity to the law in this area 
and make it clear that the properly restrictive standards that the Supreme 
Court has developed since Wainwright v. Sykes apply to all types of 
116
S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10, 16-18 (1983). The legislation would also 
create a comparable time limit on § 2255 motions by federal prisoners. See id. at 30-3 I. 















Finally, the reform legislation incorporates two reforms of a more 
technical nature that would reduce the redundancy and inefficiency of 
habeas corpus litigation. It would provide that a federal habeas court can 
deny a petition on the merits despite the petitioner's failure to exhaust 
state remedies. This would avoid the waste of time and judicial resources 
that currently results when a prisoner presenting a hopeless petition to a 
federal court is sent back to the state courts to exhaust state remedies. 
The legislation would also vest the authority to issue certificates of 
probable cause for appeal in habeas corpus proceedings exclusively in the 
judges of the courts of appeals. This would avoid the waste of time and 
effort that now occurs when a court of appeals is required to hear an 
appeal on a district judge's certification, though it believes that the 
certificate was improvidently granted. 119 
B. Litigative Options 
j 
The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus jurisprudence, has 
shown a sensitivity to interests of finality, federalism, and effective law 
enforcement that were simply shrugged off or discounted in the caselaw 
of the 1960's. For example, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in 
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-28 (1982), observed: 
Collateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of 
trial for both society and the accused. As Justice Harlan once 
observed, "[b ]oth the individual criminal defendant and soci-
ety have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be 
the certainty that comes with a~ end to litigation, and that 
118 See id. at 7-8, 12-16, 30. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-92 (1986), the 
Supreme Court effectively endorsed the definition of the "cause and prejudice" 
standard proposed in the reform legislation, expressing confidence that this standard 
would generally be adequate to guard against injustices. However, the Court indicated 
that a procedural default should also be excused "in an extraordinary case, where a 
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 
innocent." Id. at 495-96. This additional ground for excusing defaults has been 
incorporated into the most recent version of the reform proposals, transmitted by the 
President to Congress as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act. 
119 See S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 18-19, 21-22 (1983). Following a 
recommendation of Judge Friendly, see Friendly, supra note 41, at 144 n. 9, the 
legislation would also create a certificate of probable cause requirement for appeals by 
federal prisoners in § 2255 motion proceedings. 
fu1 
attention will ultimately be focused not on whether conviction 
was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be 
restored to a useful place in the community" . . . . By 
frustrating these interests, the writ undermines the usual 
principles of finality of litigation. 
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the 
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates 
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide, 
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or 
innocence" .... Our Constitution and laws surround the trial 
with a multitude of protections for the accused. Rather than 
enhancing these safeguards, ready availability of habeas corpus 
may diminish their sanctity . . . . 
Finally, ... [t]he States possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they 
also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitution-
al rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate 
both the State's sovereign power to punish offenders and their 
good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. 
In line with these views, the Court has generally been receptive to 
limitations on the availability of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, 
to the extent that such restrictions are consistent with existing statutory 
standards and can be carried out in a principled manner (see pp. 38-39 
supra). While the potential gains through litigation are realistically more 
limited than those that might be achieved through legislation, some 
significant possibilities remain open in this area. Three examples --
relating to deference to adequate state processes, the standard for 
excusing procedural defaults, and dismissal of unreasonably delayed 
petitions -- will be discussed in the remainder of this part. 
1. Applying the Stone v. Powell Standard to Other 
Claims 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court adopted 
a rule of deference to state processes which generally precludes 
consideration of Fourth Amendment claims in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings (seep. 39 supra). The Court noted that the exclusionary rule 
for Fourth Amendment violations is not a constitutional right, but a 










the high cost to the truth-finding process of excluding reliable and 
probative evidence of guilt, and the negligible contribution that applying 
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings would make 
to its deterrent effect, the Court held that Fourth Amendment claims 
would not be subject to habeas corpus review so long as there was a "full 
and fair opportunity" to litigate the claim in state proceedings. 
However, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979), the 
Court declined to apply the same deferential standard to habeas review of 
claims of racial discrimination in grand jury selection, though such 
claims -- like Fourth Amendment claims -- do not bear on the reliability 
of the verdict reached at trial. In reaching this result, the Court 
emphasized the long-standing historical practice of regarding such claims 
as grounds for the reversal of a conviction, and the fact that state judges 
in entertaining such claims are effectively required to judge their own 
actions in administering the grand jury system. In another case, Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1979), the Court rejected the 
application of the Stone v. Powell standard t6 a claim that the evidence 
' was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
noting that "[t]he question whether a defendant has been convicted upon 
inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or inno-
cence." Finally, in Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the 
Court rejected application of the Stone v. Powell standard to a claim of 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's 
failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim in a timely manner. The 
Court relied primarily on the fact that the incompetence claim related to 
the denial of a constitutional right of the defendant rather than to the 
application of a judicially created remedy, and on the view that the 
possibility of raising or litigating such a claim in state proceedings is 
limited in light of a defendant's dependence on his attorney. 
The reasoning in these decisions indicates that the applicability of 
the Stone v. Powell standard to other types of claims does not depend on 
any single consideration, but may be influenced by various factors. They 
suggest that the following factors would weigh in favor of applying the 
Stone v. Powell standard to a claim: (1) the type of violation asserted in 
the claim generally does not implicate the factual accuracy of a 
petitioner's conviction, (2) the claim relates to alleged violations of rights 
by law enforcement officers, as opposed to violations occurring in 
proceedings under judicial control, (3) the claim relates to the applica-
tion of an evidence-exclusion sanction for such violations, (4) there is no 
deep-seated historical practice of overturning convictions on the basis of 
the type of violation asserted in the claim, and (5) there is no intrinsic 
difficulty in raising or litigating the type of violation asserted in the claim 
in state proceedings. 
Applying these factors, a strong case can be made for applying the 
Stone v. Powell standard to claims that voluntary statements obtained by 
the police from suspects should be excluded on the basis of alleged 
Miranda violations. 
120 
A good case can also be made, considering the 
same factors, for applying the Stone v. Powell standard to claims that 
voluntary statements made to undercover operatives or the police should 
be excluded on the basis of Massiah (pre-trial right to counsel) 
violations. 121 
2. Clarifying the Scope of the Procedural Default 
Standard 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the "cause and 
prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes (see p. 39 supra) generally 
applies to failures to rafse particular claims at trial or on appeal. 
However, the Court has reserved the question whether it applies to the 
120
The Miranda procedures and the related rule of evidence exclusion are not 
constitutional requirements, but prophylactic measures created in 1966 to guard 
against unconstitutional coercion by police officers in custodial interrogation. In the 
absence of actual coercion, the use at trial of a defendant's voluntary statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda would generally raise no question concerning the 
accuracy of the conviction. Miranda claims can be raised and litigated in state 
proceedings as readily as Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims. See generally 
Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 76-79, 102 (1986) 
(Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. I); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n. 11 
(1977) (applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Miranda claims not addressed). A 
number of federal circuits have declined to extend the Stone v. Powell standard to the 
review of Miranda claims. However, the refusal in each case has apparently been based 
on the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet made such an extension, and has 
involved no effort to analyze the issue. See Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 n.3 
(5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d 
69 (9th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978); see also 
Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 348-349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 
(1982) (following Patterson, supra). 
121 
See generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
under the Massiah Line of Cases (1986) (Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 3); 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (applicability 
of Stone v. Powell standard to Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims analogous to Fourth 
Amendment claims is an open question); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,450 n. 7 (1984) 
(applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Massiah-type claim not addressed). 
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the high cost to the truth-finding process of excluding reliable and 
probative evidence of guilt, and the negligible contribution that applying 
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings would make 
to its deterrent effect, the Court held that Fourth Amendment claims 
would not be subject to habeas corpus review so long as there was a "full 
and fair opportunity" to litigate the claim in state proceedings. 
However, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979), the 
Court declined to apply the same deferential standard to habeas review of 
claims of racial discrimination in grand jury selection, though such 
claims -- like Fourth Amendment claims -- do not bear on the reliability 
of the verdict reached at trial. In reaching this result, the Court 
emphasized the long-standing historical practice of regarding such claims 
as grounds for the reversal of a conviction, and the fact that state judges 
in entertaining such claims are effectively required to judge their own 
actions in administering the grand jury system. In another case, Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1979), the Court rejected the 
application of the Stone v. Powell standard to a claim that the evidence 
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was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
noting that "[t]he question whether a defendant has been convicted upon 
inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or inno-
cence." Finally, in Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the 
Court rejected application of the Stone v. Powell standard to a claim of 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's 
failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim in a timely manner. The 
Court relied primarily on the fact that the incompetence claim related to 
the denial of a constitutional right of the defendant rather than to the 
application of a judicially created remedy, and on the view that the 
possibility of raising or litigating such a claim in state proceedings is 
limited in light of a defendant's dependence on his attorney. 
The reasoning in these decisions indicates that the applicability of 
the Stone v. Powell standard to other types of claims does not depend on 
any single consideration, but may be influenced by various factors. They 
suggest that the following factors would weigh in favor of applying the 
Stone v. Powell standard to a claim: (1) the type of violation asserted in 
the claim generally does not implicate the factual accuracy of a 
petitioner's conviction, (2) the claim relates to alleged violations of rights 
by law enforcement officers, as opposed to violations occurring in 
proceedings under judicial control, (3) the claim relates to the applica-
tion of an evidence-exclusion sanction for such violations, (4) there is no 
deep-seated historical practice of overturning convictions on the basis of 
the type of violation asserted in the claim, and (5) there is no intrinsic 
difficulty in raising or litigating the type of violation asserted in the claim 
in state proceedings. 
Applying these factors, a strong case can be made for applying the 
Stone v. Powell standard to claims that voluntary statements obtained by 
the police from suspects should be excluded on the basis of alleged 
Miranda violations. 120 A good case can also be made, considering the 
same factors, for applying the Stone v. Powell standard to claims that 
voluntary statements made to undercover operatives or the police should 
be excluded on the basis of Massiah (pre-trial right to counsel) 
violations. 121 
2. Clarifying the Scope of the Procedural Default 
Standard 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the "cause and 
prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes (see p. 39 supra) generally 
applies to failures to rafse particular claims at trial or on appeal. 
However, the Court has reserved the question whether it applies to the 
120
The Miranda procedures and the related rule of evidence exclusion are not 
constitutional requirements, but prophylactic measures created in 1966 to guard 
against unconstitutional coercion by police officers in custodial interrogation. In the 
absence of actual coercion, the use at trial of a defendant's voluntary statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda would generally raise no question concerning the 
accuracy of the conviction. Miranda claims can be raised and litigated in state 
proceedings as readily as Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims. See generally 
Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 76-79, 102 (1986) 
(Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. I); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n. 11 
(1977) (applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Miranda claims not addressed). A 
number of federal circuits have declined to extend the Stone v. Powell standard to the 
review of Miranda claims. However, the refusal in each case has apparently been based 
on the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet made such an extension, and has 
involved no effort to analyze the issue. See Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 n.3 
(5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d 
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Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 348-349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 
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See generally Office of Legal Policy, Report on the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
under the Massiah Line of Cases (1986) (Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 3); 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J. , concurring) (applicability 
of Stone v. Powell standard to Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims analogous to Fourth 
Amendment claims is an open question); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,450 n. 7 (1984) 




decision to forego an appeal entirely, or whether the standard of Fay v. 
Noia continues to govern in that context. 122 If Wainwright v. Sykes 
applies, a defendant could generally raise a claim that he forfeited at the 
state level by a failure to appeal only if he could establish that the failure 
to pursue an appeal resulted from constitutionally ineffective assistance 
of counsel. If it does not, then the belated raising of such claims on 
federal habeas corpus could be barred only if the defendant "deliberately 
bypassed" a state appeal. 
A strong argument can be made that the "cause and prejudice" 
standard should apply across the board, particularly when one considers 
that even the virtually complete default of potential claims that results 
from pleading guilty is currently assessed under this type of standard 
under the rule of Mci\1ann v. Richardson and Toilet v. Henderson (see pp. 
38-39 supra). In arguing for this approach, the Committee Report on the 
reform legislation that was passed by the Senate in 1984 observed: 
The Committee believes that it is preferable to employ 
the "cause and prejudice" standard as the exclusive standard 
governing the excuse of procedural defaults in habeas corpus 
proceedings .... [I]t is sufficiently flexible to give appropriate 
weight to [relevant] distinctions ... . Insofar as decisions 
normally committed to the personal choice of the defendant 
[e.g., appeal] tend to be of basic importance to the further 
conduct of a case, poor advice by counsel in relation to such 
decisions is more likely to render his assistance Constitutional-
ly ineffective, providing "cause" . . . . 
In practical terms, decisions normally committed to the 
personal choice of the defendant that may result in the 
forfeiture of Federal claims are likely to be the decision 
whether to plead guilty and the decision whether to pursue an 
appeal. The effect of the decision to plead guilty on access to 
Federal habeas corpus is already governed by special caselaw 
rules, focusing on the effectiveness of counsel's assistance, ... 
and would not be changed by enactment of the bill. The 
decision concerning appeal can also be appropriately handled 
under this type of standard. If an "effectiveness of counsel" 
standard is adequately protective of defendants' interests in 
connection with guilty pleas -- which normally result in 
122 See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986). 
forfeiture of the possibility of raising Federal claims both at 
trial and on appeal -- such a standard would also seem 
adequately protective in connection with decisions not to 
appeal, which only result in forfeiture of the possibility of 
raising Federal claims on appeal. 123 
3. Strengthening the Interpretation of the Laches Rule 
Rule 9(a) of the habeas corpus procedural rules provides roughly 
that unreasonably delayed habeas corpus petitions may be dismissed if 
the state has been prejudiced in its ability to respond by the delay (seep. 
26 supra). Rule 9(a) is not, and by its nature cannot be, a satisfactory 
substitute for a normal time limitation rule. It differs from the limitation 
rules of other criminal law remedies (see pp. 37, 62 supra) in that: (1) it 
does not establish any definite time beyond which further litigation is 
barred, (2) its application depends on a showing that the state has been 
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in filing, (3) it 
does not apply if the petitioner raises grounds of which he could not have 
had knowledge prior to the prejudicial occurrence by the exercise of 
rea.sonable diligence, and (4) it only provides that a petition may be 
dismissed if the foregoing conditions are satisfied. Determining when the 
claim was reasonably discoverable and if and when the state was 
prejudiced can be burdensome and time-consuming, and the judgmental 
and unpredictable nature of the determination limits the Rule's utility as 
a deterrent to belated filing. On account of the Rule's limitations, it 
provides no assurance that a petition will be dismissed even in cases 
involving enormous delays in filing. 124 
Rule 9(a) is, however, all that is available in this area at the present 
time, and its potential utility has been undermined by a narrow judicial 
construction. The Rule identifies prejudice to the state's "ability to 
respond to the petition" resulting from delay as the basis for dismissal. In 
Aiken v. Spalding, 684 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1982), the court held that this 
refers only to the state's ability to respond to the particular claims raised 
in the petition. Under this interpretation, the fact that unjustified delay 
by the petitioner has made it difficult or impossible to re-try him in the 
123 S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1983). 
124See, e.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J., 
concerning denial of certiorari); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1984), 









event that a writ is granted cannot be given any weight in applying the 
Rule. The same interpretation has been reiterated in other decisions 
without any independent analysis. 125 
However, an examination of the relevant legislative history shows 
that the state's "response" to the petition can validly be understood as 
encompassing re-trial of the petitioner in the event that the petition is 
granted. The Advisory Committee Note to the substantially identical and 
concurrently promulgated Rule 9(a) for § 2255 motion proceedings 
stated explicitly that the purpose of the rule was to "prevent movants 
from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the government both in 
meeting the allegations of the motion and in any possible retrial" 
(emphasis added). 126 The same understanding was implicit in testimony 
on behalf of the Judicial Conference before the responsible Congressional 
125 See Alexander v. Maryland, 719 F.2d 1241, 1247 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1983); Strahan v. 
Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1985). In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 
264-65 (1986), the Court rejected a suggestion in Justice Powell's dissent that the 
Court should create a caselaw rule allowing dismissal of delayed grand jury 
discrimination claims where substantial prejudice to the possibility of a re-trial has 
resulted. In discussing this question the Court noted that a Rule 9(a) dismissal had 
been denied by the district court, and stated that "Congress has not seen fit ... to 
provide the State with an additional defense to habeas corpus petitions based on the 
difficulties that it will face if forced to retry the defendant." This remark assumed the 
narrower interpretation of Rule 9(a), but it was evidently based on a facial reading of 
the Rule, and constituted dictum on an issue that was not presented in the case. There 
is no reason to believe that the Court would regard it as controlling in a case that 
actually presented the question of what types of prejudice can be considered in a Rule 
9(a) dismissal motion. 
In the same context in Vasquez v. Hillery, supra, the Court noted that a Judicial 
Conference advisory committee had made a proposal, which had not been adopted, to 
amend Rule 9(a) to state explicitly that dismissal based on prejudice to re-trial was 
permitted, and that Congress had not created a time limit on habeas corpus 
applications. However, the purpose of the proposed rule change cited by the Court was 
to "make clear that the !aches principle in [Rule 9(a)] also applies when the state ... 
has been prejudiced in its ability to retry the petitioner." 52 U.S.L.W. 2145 (1983). The 
notice of this proposed clarification did not state or suggest that such prejudice could 
not be considered under a proper reading of the current Rule. See id. As discussed 
earlier, pp. 31-32, 61-64 supra, the Senate overwhelmingly passed legislation in 1984 
that would have created a definite time limit on habeas applications. The failure of the 
House of Representatives to pass comparable legislation has no apparent relevance to 
the interpretation of current Rule 9(a). 
126The Note also quoted passages from judicial opinions which emphasized the prejudice 
to the possibility of re-trial created by delay in filing. See id. 
committee. 127 
In rejecting this understanding, the court in Spalding discerned a 
general hostility on Congress's part to the purposes of Rule 9(a). In fact, 
however, Congress rejected arguments raised at the hearings on the 
proposed rules that Rule 9(a) should not be enacted, 128 and only changed 
the Rule by deleting two sentences which would have created a 
presumption of prejudice to the government in case a petition was filed 
after a five-year period which would normally run from conviction. The 
legislative history indicates that the reasons for this change were (1) a 
concern that the five-year period running from conviction could expire in 
some cases before a prisoner was able to exhaust state remedies, (2) the 
view that the state is in a better position than the petitioner to show 
whether it has been prejudiced by delay, and (3) the view that the 
formulation without a definite time period specification would be 
consistent with existing law, including the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
that "[a] motion for ... relief may be made at any time." 129 None of 
these reasons provides a basis for distinguishing between prejudice in 
meeting a petitioner's claims and prejudice to the possibility of re-trial, or 
suggest a legislative purpose to reject the interpretation presented to 
Congress in the Advisory Committee's notes. 
Thus, a good argument can be made that reading "prejudice" under 
the rule to include prejudice to the possibility of re-trial is more 
consistent with the rule's intended interpretation than the narrow facial 
reading adopted in Aiken v. Spalding, as well as that the interpretation 
adopted in that decision imposes a limitation on the type of prejudice 
that can be considered which makes no sense in principle. 130 
127 
See Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 15319 before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1976) (illustration of 
"prejudice" under the Rule by case of prisoner considering delay until unavailability of 
government witness would prevent new trial and reconviction). 
128 See id. at 20-23, 25-27, 29-40, 32-43, 36-37. 
129 See id. at 32-33, 50-52, 107-08, 111-14; 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2478, 
2481 & nn. 8-9 (House Judiciary Committee Report); 122 Cong. Rec. 30222-23 (1976); 
id. 30758. 




In characterizing the development of the current habeas corpus 
jurisdiction and the reaction to proposed reforms, Judge Friendly has 
observed: 
Legal history has many instances where a remedy 
initially serving a felt need has expanded bit by bit, without 
much thought being given to any single step, until it has 
assumed an aspect so different from its origin as to demand 
reappraisal -- agonizing or not. That, in my view, is what has 
happened with respect to collateral attack on criminal convic-
tions. After trial, conviction, sentence, appeal, affirmance, and 
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, in proceedings 
where the defendant had the assistance of counsel at every 
step, the criminal process, in Winston Churchill's phrase, has 
not reached the end, or even the beginning of the end, but only 
the end of the beginning. Any nturmur of dissatisfaction with 
this situation provokes immediate incantation of the Great 
Writ, with the inevitable initial capitals, often accompanied by 
a suggestion that the objector is the sort of person who would 
cheerfully desecrate the Ark of the Covenant. 131 
The "felt need" which habeas corpus has served in its historical and 
constitutional function is one of basic importance in any civilized system 
of justice. In its traditional character, it upholds the rule of law by 
ensuring that the government cannot ·detain a person without specifying 
the charges against him and bringing him to trial on those charges (see 
pp. 4-7 supra). L 
In contrast, the current statutory "habeas corpus" remedy by which 
lower federal courts review state judgments is simply an attenuated 
appellate mechanism by which prisoners who have already been tried and 
convicted, and who have unsuccessfully appealed their convictions (often 
repeatedly), can re-litigate in the lower federal courts the same claims 
that have been rejected at the various stages of adjudication and review 
in the state court systems. This review jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts in state criminal cases is a recent outgrowth -- based on innovative 
judicial decisions of the l 950's and 1960's -- from a narrow statutory 
remedy created for completely different purposes in the Reconstruction 
131 Friendly, supra note 41, at 142. 
era. It has no relationship in character or function to the Great Writ 
whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution. They have nothing in 
common but a name (see pp. 7-24, 41-42 supra). 
The resistance to necessary reforms based on confusion between the 
current statutory "habeas corpus" remedy and the constitutional writ of 
habeas corpus is a depressing testament to the power of terminology to 
overpower substance and stifle intelligent reflection. Calling a decoy a 
duck does not make it fly. Calling the existing review jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts over state judgments "habeas corpus" does not make 
it into the Great Writ of the Constitution and the common law. 
Putting aside the erroneous identification of the current statutory 
remedy and the traditional writ of habeas corpus, we see no reason to 
retain federal habeas corpus for state prisoners in its contemporary 
character. Mandatory review of claims that have been rejected in earlier 
appellate proceedings goes beyond any legitimate interest of fairness to 
defendants, and the absence of reasonable time limits and rules against 
repetitive application would be dismissed as absurd if suggested in 
connection with any other appellate mechanism. There is no reason to 
believe that preserving this extraordinary type of review yields any 
benefits that outweigh its very substantial costs to the interests in finality, 
federalism, and rational application of criminal justice resources (see pp. 
3.2-38, 40-53 supra). 
As suggested by Attorney General William French Smith, abolish-
ing federal habeas corpus for state prisoners would be the optimum 
reform in this area. The Constitution allows this, because the "writ of 
habeas corpus" it safeguards is unrelated to the current post-conviction 
"habeas corpus" remedy, and because its prohibition of suspension of the 
writ creates no right to a federal court remedy for persons in state 
custody. State prisoners would continue to be able to secure review of 
their cases following such a reform through the various appellate and 
collateral review mechanisms provided in the state courts, and would 
also retain the traditional right to seek direct review by the Supreme 
Court (see pp. 56-59 supra). 
Congress has enacted a number of restrictions on federal habeas 
corpus for state prisoners which are currently in effect, and has made 
substantial moves towards a more complete solution on several occa-
sions. When the first glimmerings of the expansive potential of federal 
habeas corpus appeared in the late nineteenth century, Congress reacted 
with dismay, but deferred direct corrective action in the expectation that 
restoring the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases 
might suffice to rein in the lower federal courts (see p. 25 supra). 
When the Supreme Court itself began to incline toward increasingly 
expansive habeas corpus review of state judgments in the middle part of 
this century, the Judicial Conference promoted reform legislation whose 
practical effect would have been close to abolition. Legislation that was 
arguably of this character was enacted in 1948, but the Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Allen refused to give it effect in the absence of a clearer 
expression of legislative intent. Legislation that was unmistakably of this 
character was passed by the House of Representatives in 1956 and again 
in 1958. Ten years later, legislation that would have abolished federal 
habeas corpus for state prisoners reached the Senate floor as part of the 
proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (see pp. 
28-31 supra). 
In 1970, in creating the current court system for the District of 
Columbia, Congress barred access to federal habeas corpus for D.C. 
prisoners. Thus, "although a state prisoner across the Potomac in 
Virginia, or one over the line in Maryland, has a second chance for 
collateral review of his conviction in the federal courts in those states, a 
state prisoner in the District of Columbia does not." 132 No adverse effect 
on the quality or fairness of proceedings in D.C. has been observed to 
result from this reform (see pp. 27, 57-59 supra). 
The Supreme Court as well has shown an increasing recognition in 
recent years of the costs of the existing system of habeas corpus review, 
and has adopted a number of limitations on its scope and availability. 
However, the potential for reform through litigation is limited by the 
constraints of precedent and existing statutory standards (see pp. 38-39, 
64-71 supra). 
Whether or not a general legislative solution along the lines of the 
District of Columbia reform or earlier "abolition" proposals is practical-
ly feasible at the present time, the potential exists for basic improvements 
through limited reform legislation addressed to the clearest abuses and 
excesses of the existing system of habeas corpus review. Legislation of 
this type was initially proposed by the Justice Department in 1982, and 
was passed by the Senate in 1984 by a vote of 67 to 9 (see pp. 31-32, 61-64 
132 McGowan, supra note 108, at 668. 
supra). Substantially the same reform proposals have recently been 
transmitted by the President as title II of the proposed Criminal Justice 
Reform Act (S. 1970 and H.R. 3777), and now await Congress's action. 
As Attorney General Smith observed in 1983: 
The writ of habeas corpus that currently burdens state 
officials and the federal judiciary, vexes federal-state relations, 
and defeats the ends of criminal justice is not the writ of 
habeas corpus that was esteemed by the founders of our nation 
and accorded recognition in the Constitution. The diversion of 
the Great Writ from its historic function is the source of its 
current disrepute and the problems it has engendered. Its 
availability, in particular, to state criminal convicts to chal-
lenge their convictions in federal court may well be an 
institution whose time has passed. For the immediate future 
the best prospect for meaningful reform lies with the Adminis-
tration's legislative proposals. These proposals would go far 
toward correcting'the major deficiencies of the present system 
of federal habeas corpus in terms of federalism, proper regard 
for the stature of the state courts, and the needs of criminal 
justice. 133 




Appendix: Habeas Corpus Cases 
As noted at the start of this report, the contemporary system of 
federal habeas corpus review of state judgments can convert "the process 
of review in criminal cases into a kind of interminable game, an open-
ended hunt for official error. In this attenuated process the question is 
not whether an innocent defendant, mistakenly convicted, may enlist the 
aid of an appellate court in correcting a miscarriage of justice. Rather, it 
is whether a persistent defendant, however guilty, may eventually get 
lucky and persuade some judge or court to find error, given unlimited 
opportunities to do so." 134 This appendix describes some particular cases 
that illustrate the costs of a system which permits the indefinite 
continuation of litigation in criminal cases. 
1. The Hillery Case. On the night of March 21, 1962, fifteen-year-
old Marlene Miller was at home alone, sewing a dress that she expected 
to wear on her sixteenth birthday. Marlene never got to wear the dress. 
On the following morning, her body was found in an irrigation ditch near 
her house. She had been subjected to an attempted rape, and the sewing 
scissors she had been using, monogrammed with her name, were 
embedded up to the handles in her throat. 
Booker Hillery, who was out on parole from an earlier rape 
conviction, was arrested for the crime, convicted, and sentenced to death. 
Hillery's conviction marked the start of sixteen years of litigation in the 
state courts. 
The conviction and sentence were initially upheld by the Supreme 
Court of California on appeal in 1963 (386 P.2d 477). In 1965, that court 
upheld Hillery's conviction again on re-hearing, finding all his claims to 
be without merit or non-prejudicial, and characterizing the evidence of 
guilt as "overwhelming" (401 P.2d 382, 395). 135 However, the jury that 
sentenced Hillery to death had been given instructions relating to the 
possibility of release on parole if a life term was imposed and the 
possibility of reduction of the sentence that were inconsistent with a 
California Supreme Court decision which followed Hillery's trial and 
134 Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman at a Seminar on the 
Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Mary-
land, at 1-2 (Mar. 8, 1986). 
135 Hillery applied for review of this decision by the United States Supreme Court. The 
Court denied certiorari (386 U.S. 938). 
initial appeal. The case was accordingly remanded for a new penalty trial 
(401 P.2d 384-85, 395). 
At the second penalty trial, Hillery was again sentenced to death, 
and the sentence was upheld by the California Supreme Court on appeal 
in 1967 ( 423 P .2d 208). Hillery subsequently filed a petition for state 
habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, presenting a new 
challenge to the result of the second penalty trial. A potential juror had 
been excused at that trial after she stated that she thought that she could 
not sentence anyone to death in any case or follow state law relating to 
capital punishment. The California Supreme Court believed that the trial 
judge's questioning on this point and the juror's responses were 
inadequate under the standard of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
(1968), and overturned Hillery's capital sentence again (457 P.2d 565). 
This decision in 1969 was followed by a third penalty trial, at which 
Hillery was sentenced to death for the third time. He appealed to the 
California Supreme Court, raising various claims attacking his conviction 
and sentence. In 1974, that court affirmed the conviction again, but the 
sentence was changed to life imprisonment on the basis of a 1972 
California Supreme Court decision holding capital punishment to be 
inconsistent with the state constitution. That decision had been promptly 
overturned through amendment of the state constitution by initiative, but 
this change was deemed too late to affect Hillery's case (519 P.2d 572). In 
1978, Hillery engaged in a final round of state habeas corpus litigation 
which terminated with the denial of his petition by the California 
Supreme Court. 136 
The conclusion of sixteen years of state court litigation in Hillery's 
case was, to borrow Judge Friendly's phrase, only "the end of the 
beginning." 137 Later in 1978, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in 
federal district court, alleging that blacks had been intentionally excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him in 1962. This issue had been 
raised, prior to Hillery's initial trial, before the state superior court judge 
responsible for grand jury selection (Judge Wingrove). There had been 
no blacks on the seven grand juries selected by that judge, though blacks 
constituted about 5% of the county's population in the relevant period, 
and blacks had served on trial juries. In ruling on a motion to quash the 
136 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 256 & n.2, 279 n.10 (1986); id., Brief for 
Petitioner at 5-6 and Brief for Respondent at 3. 







indictment, Judge Wingrove denied that the absence of blacks on the 
grand juries he had selected was the result of discrimination, and stated 
that he had made unsuccessful efforts to identify qualified blacks for 
grand jury service. In particular, he had previously asked Hillery's 
lawyer (who was black) to identify such persons, and had considered 
selecting a particular black resident of the county for grand jury service, 
but declined to do so after determining that it would interfere with the 
prospective juror's regular employment. Judge Wingrove's rejection of 
this discrimination claim was affirmed by the California Supreme Court 
on appeal. The discrimination claim was later rejected again in state 
habeas corpus proceedings. 138 
Hillery's federal habeas corpus petition re-presenting this claim was 
litigated over a period of five years before the district court ( 496 F. Supp. 
632; 533 F. Supp. 1189; 563 F. Supp. 1228). In 1983, the district court 
finally reached the merits of the claim and granted the writ. The evidence 
before the court included the records of state proceedings; testimony 
given in the federal proceedings by Hillery's former lawyer in support of 
the claim that he had unsuccessfully litigated in the state courts twenty 
years earlier; and a statistical analysis of grand jury selection in Kings 
County up to the time of Hillery's case. Judge Wingrove was not 
available to testify in response to the charge that he had engaged in 
intentional discrimination on the basis of race, having died many years 
before the federal proceedings. 
In granting the writ, the district court identified as supporting 
evidence the absence of blacks on grand juries although blacks constitut-
ed about 4.6% of the adult population in the county, 139 Judge 
Wingrove's knowledge that his standards for grand jury service did not 
result in any blacks being selected, 140 the subjective nature of the 
138 See 386 P.2d at 486-87; 401 P.2d at 392-93; and sources cited in note 136 supra. 
139 Much of the district court's opinion was devoted to a statistical analysis supporting the 
conclusion that the absence of blacks on grand juries "was unlikely to be due solely to 
chance or accident," assuming random selection from the general adult population 
(563 F. Supp. 1241-46). This point, however, was of slight relevance to the ultimate 
issue in the case, since the grand jury selection process was not random. The question 
presented was whether the statistical disparity resulted from non-racial conditions on 
service in an obviously non-random selection process, as opposed to the deliberate 
exclusion of potential grand jurors on the basis of race. 
140The district court made the stronger assertion that Judge Wingrove continued to select 
only persons meeting his standards "with full knowledge that such action would mean 
selection process, 141 and the fact that Judge Wingrove did select a black 
person to serve on a grand jury in the year following Hillery's 
indictment. 142 The court refused to credit Judge Wingrove's explanation 
of his actions in the state record and also discounted the state's 
explanation that the county's black residents were largely engaged in 
itinerant farmwork and would have suffered economic hardship from 
grand jury service. 143 The district court's decision was affirmed by the 
Ninth Circuit on appeal in 1984 (733 F.2d 644). 
that no blacks would serve" (563 F. Supp. 1247). However, the basis for this assertion 
was not explained, and Judge Wingrove did select a black grand juror in the following 
year (563 F. Supp. 1248). 
141 The district court dismissed as irrelevant Judge Wingrove's explanation in the state 
record that grand juries in Kings County rarely considered criminal matters, and 
primarily performed a watchdog function with respect to the operations of county 
government (563 F. Supp. 1233, 1250). However, this point was relevant as support for 
a non-discriminatory purpose behind a practice of using certain judgmental standards 
in selecting grand jurors. In relation to a body whose essential function was oversight 
of county government, it was not unreasonable to want to choose "people who are 
interested in the community, civic minded, the better type of our citizens" and 
"someone who has some substance, some interest in government, some interest in 
community activities, civil activities, people that take an interest that way." 563 F. 
Supp. 1232 (quoting Judge Wingrove's explanation of selection standards). See 
generally JA-33 and Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 
(1986) (description of grand jury functions and statutory conditions on service). 
142 Judge Wingrove's selection of a black grand juror was cited by the district court as 
evidence that he had intentionally excluded blacks from grand juries on the ground 
that it evidenced a change from prior practice after the discrimination issue was raised 
in Hillery's case (563 F. Supp. 1248-49). One wonders what would have happened if 
Judge Wingrove had not subsequently selected any black grand jurors. Presumably 
that would also have been cited as additional evidence supporting the discrimination 
claim. 
143 Cf Los Angeles Times, Jan. 20, 1986 ("Raymond Niday, 63, a Lemoore insurance man 
who was foreman of the grand jury that indicted Hillery . . . said .. . that economics, 
not race, was the governing factor in selecting grand jury members: 'Three classes of 
people served on the grand juries, a businessman able to sustain his family whether he 
worked on a day-to-day basis or not, a retired person or a housewife. Farm laborers, 
wage earners, blue collar people could not afford to serve on grand juries. You would 
have created a hell of an imposition on any person in those categories. They had to be 
out earning their living .... Blacks at that time in this county were at the lower end of 
the economic scale, just as many whites were. If a person had the ability to 
[participate], he or she would never have been excluded . .. . The evidence was totally 
overwhelming against Hillery. We had no other alternative but to indict him .... The 
court's decision [overturning Hillery's conviction] is a travesty, transposing an incident 
that happened nearly a quarter of a century ago into the present day . . .. The futility of 









The state applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the Court 
granted review (474 U.S. 254). The Court upheld the granting of the writ, 
emphasizing that a finding of racial discrimination in grand jury 
selection has traditionally been grounds for reversing a conviction, and 
rejecting the idea of creating a limitation on the raising of such claims on 
review in light of prejudice to the state's ability to re-try the petitioner. 
Justice Powell, joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice 
Burger, stated: 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury having 
no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-year-old 
girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of which is 
unchallenged here. Twenty-three years later, we are asked to 
grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus -- and 
thereby require a new trial if that is still feasible -- on the 
ground that blacks were purposefully excluded from the grand 
jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that race discrimina-
tion has long since disappeared from the grand jury selection 
process in Kings County, California. It is undisputed that a 
grand jury that perfectly represented Kings County's popula-
tion at the time of respondent's indictment would have 
contained only one black member. Yet the Court holds that 
respondent's petition must be granted, and that respondent 
must be freed unless the State is able to reconvict, more than 
two decades after the murder that led to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational 
system of justice. 
The dissent went on to argue that the establishment of Hillery's 
guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt at a fair trial demonstrated that 
he had not been prejudiced in any legally relevant sense by discrimina-
tion in the selection of the grand jury, and that permitting such a non-
guilt-related claim to be litigated indefinitely -- despite substantial 
prejudice to the possibility of re-trial -- goes beyond what is reasonably 
warranted for deterring discriminatory practices. 144 
144 C/ Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) and Advisory Committee Note (challenges to grand jury 
selection waived if not raised before trial); Remarks of Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen J. Markman at a Seminar on the Administration of Justice sponsored by the 
Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland, at 4 (Mar. 8, 1986) ("[I]n Vasquez v. 
The Supreme Court's decision entailed that the state would either 
have to release Hillery or give him a new trial, although there was no 
reason to doubt the accuracy of his conviction in 1963 for murdering 
Marlene Miller. The impact of the Court's decision on the victim's 
community and family were described as follows in a Time Magazine 
article entitled "Seeing Justice Never Done": 
Hanford, California, is a farm community, the kind of 
place where people know each other by name and trust each 
other by nature. "You can go downtown without a dime in 
your pocket, do your shopping and come back to pay later," 
says City Councilman J. Brent Madill .... In any town, the 
brutal killing of a teenage girl leaves a deep mark, but in 
Hanford the wound remains, 24 years after the crime. And 
now the U.S. Supreme Court has rubbed the wound open 
again all these years later. . . . 
"Where's the justice?" asks Councilman Madill. "Is there 
any justice?" Most of Hanford believes little attention was 
given to deterring the larger evil. . . . 
Neighbors say that Marlene's parents, now in their 70's, 
dread the possible reopening of the case. They still reside in 
Hanford, though the house they lived in at the time of their 
daughter's death has long since been torn down. The memories 
have been harder to demolish. "The sad thing is that it keeps 
coming back," says Marlene's brother Walter Jr. "We have 
not been allowed the time to heal." And the end is still not in 
sight. 145 
Hillery . . . the conviction of the defendant for murdering a fifteen-year-old girl was 
reversed after twenty-three years of .. . litigation on grounds of discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury ... despite the absence of any unfairness in the defendant's 
trial. . . . As the dissenting Justices noted, '[i]t is difficult to reconcile this result with a 
rational system of justice.' No purpose of affording justice to the individual defendant 
can explain it, since there is no reason to believe that his conviction was anything other 
than accurate and just. Nor can it be explained in terms of providing a systemic 
deterrent to the specific evil for which relief was granted. Allowing defendants to 
challenge the grand jury selection process for some reasonable time would suffice to 
deter such wrongs. Allowing them to do so forever is irrational and absurd."). 
145 Time Magazine, Feb. 17, 1986; see Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17, 1986 ("A trial that 
takes place so many years after the original crime only 'causes the victims more 
suffering,' said Bernard Miller, the uncle of the slain girl. The family spent a lifetime 




The state authorities resolved to re-try Hillery, though doing so 
presented extraordinary difficulties after the lapse of a quarter of a 
century. Six thousand pages of transcripts from earlier proceedings had 
to be reviewed. A number of key witnesses from the original trial were 
dead; locating surviving witnesses and other persons with relevant 
knowledge involved tracking down about 115 people throughout the 
country. At the original trial, Hillery was discredited through the 
admission of false alibi statements that he made to the police following 
his arrest; these statements were ruled inadmissible at the re-trial because 
the police had not observed restrictions on custodial questioning which 
emerged in subsequent judicial decisions. 146 Hillery's testimony from the 
1963 trial was also excluded. 147 However, physical evidence had been 
retained from the original trial on account of Hillery's reputation as a 
persistent litigator, and additional evidence was generated from this 
material through the use of contemporary forensic technology. The loss 
of witnesses was partially offset in some instances by having proxies read 
transcripts of their testimony from earlier proceedings at the second trial. 
On December 18, 1986, Hillery was again convicted of murdering 
Marlene Miller in 1962, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Re-trying 
brother and his wife were terribly traumatized,' he said. 'They've tried to live with it 
and get on with their lives. But how can they when the courts keep tossing it back at 
them? They're going to have to go back in that courtroom and relive the thing all over 
again.'"). 
146 1n Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), the Supreme Court held that 
statements obtained from a suspect in custodial interrogation could not be used at trial 
if the suspect had requested and been denied counsel and had not been told that he had 
a right to remain silent. The Supreme Court of California, in addressing one of 
Hillery's appeals in 1965, had held that the questioning of Hillery violated Escobedo 
and a related state decision because the police had not told Hillery that he had a right 
to counsel and a right to remain silent (401 P.2d 382, 384, 394). Of course no such 
requirement existed when Hillery was questioned in 1962, see Office of Legal Policy, 
Report on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 25-32, 38-39, 55-56 (Feb. 12, 1986) (Truth 
in Criminal Justice Report No. 1), and the California Supreme Court found in its 1965 
decision that the admission of Hillery's pre-trial statements at his trial was harmless 
error "in light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt" (401 P.2d 394-95). 
However, the 1965 finding that the admission of Hillery's statements was improper 
was deemed to be "the law of the case" and sufficient to require their exclusion at his 
second trial in 1986. 
147 Hillery's testimony at the original trial included a reiteration of his pre-trial alibi story 
-- which was shown to be false by other evidence -- and also brought out the fact that 
he had a prior rape conviction (386 P.2d 481-82; 401 P.2d 395). These facts were 
concealed from the jury at the re-trial in 1986. 
Hillery had cost the county over $250,000. Within hours of the 
conviction, a notice of appeal was filed with the California Court of 
Appeal; Hillery's appeal is now pending before that court. And the end is 
still not in sight. 148 
2. The Aiken Case. Arthur Aiken and Antonio Wheat robbed gas 
stations and killed the attendants. Following their third robbery and 
murder within a single month in 1965, they were apprehended by the 
police. 
Aiken was advised of his rights after being taken into custody. He 
was initially unwilling to talk to the police when questioned, and stated 
repeatedly during a brief portion of the interrogation that he wanted a 
lawyer and did not want to say anything. However, after Aiken was 
confronted with his accomplice Wheat's refusal to retract statements 
which imputed primary responsibility for one of the killings to Aiken, he 
became eager to give his version of the crimes, and provided detailed 
confessions which inculpated him in two of the murders. At trial, Aiken 
was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death ( 434 
P.2d 10, 14-15, 27-29). 
The conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, 
which remanded the case for additional fact-finding concerning the 
propriety of admitting Aiken's confessions. The trial court concluded 
that the confessions had been properly admitted, and the state supreme 
court, agreeing, upheld the judgment. 149 
In reaching this result, the court noted that continued questioning 
following a request for counsel or an expression of unwillingness to talk is 
inconsistent with the restrictions on custodial questioning created by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, in light of Johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), Miranda did not apply retroactively to 
cases, like Aiken's, in which the trial preceded the Miranda decision (434 
P.2d 21-22). 
148 See Los Angeles Times, Dec. 19, Dec. 3, Nov. 25, and Nov. 17, 1986. Additional 
information concerning the re-trial and subsequent proceedings was provided by 
Robert Maline, the Kings County District Attorney who prosecuted the re-trial, 
Ronald Fahey, who served as special prosecutor in connection with the re-trial, and the 
Kings County Auditor's office. 
149 The court also rejected various other claims raised by Aiken, including claims relating 
to pre-trial publicity, denial of severance, admission of evidence, and jury instructions 
(434 P.2d 35-40). 
The court also rejected arguments (434 P.2d 22-24, 31-34) that 
Aiken's confession was involuntary or inconsistent with the more limited 
restrictions on interrogation announced by the Supreme Court in the 
decision of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The trial court had 
found that Aiken did not confess because of overreaching by the police, 
but out of a desire to rebut his accomplice's statements portraying Aiken 
as the main actor in one of the killings. The trial court also found that the 
officers conducting the interrogation -- which was taperecorded -- did not 
hear Aiken's remarks about wanting a lawyer or being unwilling to talk. 
The grounds for this conclusion included the denial of all officers 
involved that they had heard such statements; the fact that Aiken "held 
his head down ... spoke softly, slurred his words, and ... let his voice 
trail off''; interference by numerous noises from outside with audibility in 
the interview room; the distance of the interviewing officers from Aiken; 
and the great difficulty of hearing on the tape many of Aiken's answers --
including the disputed statements -- as a result of which the trial court 
did "not believe that the interrogating officers heard, nor could possibly 
... have heard, any request for an attorney or desire to remain silent" 
(434 P.2d 27-33). 
Following the affirmance of Aiken's conviction by the Washington 
Supreme Court in 1967, he applied to the United States Supreme Court 
for review. The Court granted certiorari (392 U.S. 652), vacated the 
judgment, and remanded the case to the state courts for reconsideration 
in light of the decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), 
regarding exclusion of potential jurors who oppose the death penalty, 
and the decision in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), 
regarding the admission in a joint trial of a co-defendant's confession 
which implicates the defendant. 
On remand, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the convic-
tion and sentence in 1969, finding that the state procedures followed in 
Aiken's trial had been consistent with the new constitutional rules that 
were subsequently announced in Witherspoon and Bruton (452 P.2d 232). 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed on the Witherspoon issue, 
and overturned Aiken's death sentence in 1971 (403 U.S. 946). On 
remand, Aiken was re-sentenced to three consecutive life terms. 
Aiken's case was then quiet for eight years. In 1979, however, he 
filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district 
court dismissed the petition on grounds of delay in filing under Rule 9(a) 
of the habeas corpus procedural rules. A panel of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for 
findings on the issue of whether the state had been prejudiced by Aiken's 
delay. The district court found prejudice to the possibility of re-trying 
Aiken and dismissed the petition a second time under Rule 9(a). The 
court of appeals, in 1982, then reversed the second dismissal, holding 
that prejudice to the possibility of re-trial can never be grounds for a 
Rule 9(a) dismissal (684 F.2d 632; pp. 69-71 supra). 
The state applied to the Supreme Court for review, and the Court 
denied certiorari in 1983. In a statement concerning the denial of 
certiorari, Chief Justice Burger observed (460 U.S. 1093): 
The time has come to consider limitations on the 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts, 
especially for prisoners pressing stale claims that were fully 
ventilated in state courts .... The astonishing facts underlying 
this petition are illustrative and instructive. 
On October 14, 1965, a jury ... found Arthur Aiken and 
his codefendant guilty of murder in the first degree for the 
robbery and slayings of three gas station attendants .... On 
direct appeal, Aiken advanced numerous challenges to his 
conviction. Following a remand to the trial court, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sen-
tence. . . . On petition for certiorari to this court, the 
conviction was vacated and the case remanded for reconsidera-
tion .... After a second petition for certiorari, the conviction 
was again vacated and remanded .... The state trial court then 
resentenced Aiken to three consecutive life prison terms. 
On July 26, 1979, fourteen years after his original 
conviction and eight years after his resentencing, Aiken filed 
this [habeas corpus] petition .... He raised claims concerning 
pretrial publicity, the voluntariness of his confession, and the 
trial court's failure to grant severance -- all claims that had 
been raised and decided . . . in his first appeal to the 
Washington Supreme Court. 
On February 22, 1980, the District Court denied the 
habeas petition ... [under] ... Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a). The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 
prejudice may not be presumed. On remand, the state 
presented evidence that it could locate only 30 of the 87 
witnesses who testified at trial and that 136 of the State's 138 
exhibits were lost or destroyed. Finding that the evidence 
demonstrated that it would be difficult to retry Aiken ... the 
District Court again dismissed the petition . ... The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that 
Rule 9(a) allows consideration only of the State's difficulty in 
"respond[ing] to the [habeas] petition," and not consideration 
of the difficulty in retrying the petitioner. 
Following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 1983, the case 
was returned to the district court, which reached a decision on Aiken's 
petition in 1985. That court observed: 
Aiken's conviction, which will soon reach its twentieth 
anniversary, has been before the [state] trial court twice, the 
Supreme Court of Washington four times, the Supreme Court 
of the United States three times, the United States Court of 
Appeals twice, and is before this court for the third time. 150 
The district court rejected all of Aiken's claims on the merits 
including the claim that admission of his confessions violated his rights 
under the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
On the Sixth Amendment issue, the district court deferred to the 
state trial court's determination that the interviewing officers had not 
heard Aiken's requests for counsel, finding it to be fairly supported by 
the record. While the result reached on this claim was correct, the 
district court's reliance on the state court's findings and rationale was 
unnecessary. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot attach 
before a defendant is formally charged with a crime or initially brought 
into court. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-32 (1986). Since 
these events had not occurred at the time of Aiken's interrogation (434 
P.2d 14-15, 27-29, 54), his rights under the Sixth Amendment were not 
violated even if the officers did hear his requests for counsel. 151 
150The opinion generated in the district court was a magistrate's report that was approved 
and adopted by the court. Aiken v. Spalding, Report and Recommendation in Case No. 
C79-892R (W.D. Wash., June 14, 1985); Judgment of District Court in Case No. 
C79-892R (W.D . Wash., Sept. 5, 1985). References to the statements and reasoning of 
the "district court" refer to the magistrate's report. 
isi The principal case establishing that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot 
On the question of the voluntariness of Aiken's confession (the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment issue), the district court found -- like the 
state courts almost twenty years earlier -- that Aiken had not confessed 
because of police coercion, but in order to respond to his accomplice 
Wheat's effort to shift most of the blame to Aiken. The district court also 
found the case to be indistinguishable from Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 
(1969) -- another case involving a post-Escobedo but pre-Miranda 
interrogation -- in which the Supreme Court upheld the admission of a 
confession obtained through continued questioning after the defendant 
had expressed a desire to talk to a lawyer. 
Aiken appealed the district court's denial of the writ to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel of the Ninth Circuit, in 1988, then 
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, although 
Aiken had previously litigated all of his claims in state court and the state 
had conceded before the district court that state remedies were ex-
hausted. 152 In the district court proceedings, Aiken had presented new 
evidence in support of his confession claim -- specifically, a sound 
expert's enhancement and analysis of the taperecording -- which had not 
been presented to the state courts. The panel believed that this evidence 
"substantially improves the evidentiary basis for Aiken's right-to-counsel 
and voluntariness arguments," and accordingly should be considered in 
the first instance in the state courts. 153 
Thus, nine years of federal habeas corpus litigation -- following six 
years of state and federal litigation on direct review and eight years of 
attach prior to formal accusation, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), came after 
the district court's decision. The Supreme Court had previously taken the same 
position in different factual settings in United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984), 
and the plurality opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
1s2Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1988). 
IS3 For reasons suggested in the textual discussion of the district court's decision (pp. 
86-87 supra), this conclusion was unwarranted. Even if the "new evidence" did 
establish that the officers heard Aiken's requests for counsel, there could be no Sixth 
Amendment violation, since adversarial judicial proceedings had not commenced at 
the time of his interrogation. Both the district court and the state courts also made 
determinations that rebutted Aiken's involuntariness claim and that were independent 
of the question whether the officers had heard his statements (specifically, the finding 
that Aiken's confession resulted from a desire to refute his accomplice's accusation 
rather than from any misconduct by the police). Prior assessment of the "new 
evidence" by the state courts is unnecessary because -- even taken for all it might be 
worth -- it would not entitle Aiken to relief on his confession claim. 
pure delay -- failed to produce a federal court resolution of the merits of 
the claims raised in Aiken's petition. If his claims are again presented to 
and rejected by the state courts, he will then be free to commence 
another round of habeas corpus litigation in the lower federal courts. 
3. The Witt Case. On October 28, 1973, Johnny Witt was out bow 
and arrow hunting with a younger friend, Gary Tillman. The two men 
had spoken on other occasions about killing a human, and had stalked 
persons like animal prey. On that day, they waylaid 11 year old Jonathan 
Kushner as he rode his bicycle along a path through a wooded area. 
Tillman struck Jonathan on the head with a star bit from a drill. Witt 
and Tillman then wrestled the struggling boy to the ground, bound and 
gagged him, and placed him in the trunk of Witt's car. They drove to a 
deserted grove and discovered when they opened the trunk that the 
victim had died by suffocating from the gag. They then "dug a grave for 
the Kushner boy and . . . slit his stomach so it would not bloat. Before 
burying the victim, Witt and Tillman performed various acts of sexual 
perversion and violence to Kushner's body." 154 
Witt was turned in to the sheriffs department by his wife, and gave 
a detailed confession to the crime following his arrest. At trial, he was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of 
Florida upheld the conviction and sentence on appeal in 1977 (342 So.2d 
497). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (434 U.S. 935; 
434 U.S. 1026). 
Witt then applied for post-conviction relief in the state trial court. 
The application was denied, and the Florida Supreme court affirmed the 
denial in 1980. The court noted that "Witt raises essentially six issues, all 
of which he admits either were raised in the direct appeal from his 
conviction and sentence, or could have been raised at that time." The 
court went on to find that alleged changes in caselaw subsequent to 
Witt's initial appeal were insufficient to justify the relitigation or belated 
raising of these claims (387 So.2d 922). The United States Supreme Court 
again denied certiorari (449 U.S. 1067). 
In 1980, Witt applied for habeas corpus in federal district court. 
The district court denied the writ. On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the rejection of most of Witt's claims, 
154 Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1983); Wainwright v. Witt , 469 U.S. 
412, 414 (1985); Witt v. State, 342 So.2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1977). 
but concluded that the writ should be granted on the basis of improper 
exclusion of a potential juror. 
The specific claim was that three prospective jurors who opposed 
capital punishment had been excused on inadequate grounds. The 
defense had raised no objection to excusing these individuals during jury 
selection in 1974, and the same type of claim had been rejected by the 
Supreme Court of Florida in Witt's initial appeal. Nevertheless, the 
Eleventh Circuit focused on one prospective juror who was excused after 
she indicated that she was opposed to capital punishment and that her 
death penalty beliefs would interfere with her sitting as a juror and 
judging the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This was deemed 
improper under the standards of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
( 1968), and resulted in the overturning of Witt's sentence by the federal 
appellate panel in 1983 (714 F.2d 1069). 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the granting of 
the writ in 1985 (469 U.S. 412). The Court held that excusing a potential 
juror is proper if his views on capital punishment would substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror, and that a state court 
determination that a potential juror is so biased is entitled to a 
presumption of correctness under the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
The Supreme Court's decision on January 21, 1985, reinstating 
Witt's capital sentence was followed by the usual last-minute flurry of 
applications seeking to prevent or delay the execution of the sentence. 
Witt unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction relief in the state trial 
court, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and re-presenting on 
a different theory his earlier objection to the exclusion of certain 
prospective jurors who opposed capital punishment. The Supreme Court 
of Florida affirmed the denial of relief (465 So.2d 510). The court found 
that the belated raising of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 
an abuse of procedure in light of the decision of Witt's attorney not to 
raise such a claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, and also 
rejected the claim on the merits. The court similarly found that the 
belated raising of the revised juror-exclusion claim was unjustified and 
also noted that the theory underlying the claim had been rejected in 
earlier decisions. 
Witt applied for habeas corpus and a stay of execution in federal 
district court, presenting the same ineffectiveness of counsel and juror-
exclusion claims. The district court dismissed the petition as an abuse of 
the writ and denied a certificate of probable cause for appeal on March 1, 
1985. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a stay 
and a certificate of probable cause on March 4, 1985, agreeing that the 
petition was an abuse of the writ and finding that it presented no 
substantial ground upon which relief might be granted (755 F.2d 1396). 
The Supreme Court denied an application for a stay of execution, denied 
certiorari, and denied a petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari 
and a stay of execution on March 5, 1985 (470 U.S. 1039, 1046). 
On March 6, 1985, after eleven years of litigation, Witt's death 
sentence for murdering Jonathan Kushner was finally carried out. 
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Senate 
(Legislative day of Wedne.,day, April 18, 1990) 
The Senate met at 9:30 a.m., on the 
expiration of the recess, and was 
called to order by the Presluent pro 
tempore [Mr. BYRD]. 
PRAYl:ll 
The Chaplain, the Reverend Rich-
ard C. Halverson, D.D., offered the fol-
lowlna prayer: 
Let us pray: 
Owe no man a.ny thtng, but to love 
one another: for he that loveth another 
hath Jul.filled the law.• • • Love wor-
keth no Ul to hu neighbour: therefore 
love t, the fuJ,/Ultng of the law.-
Romans 13:8,10. 
Eternal God. 1n the pragmatic world 
1n which we live, 1n the culture 1n 
which we are immersed, these words 
of the Apostle Paul sound totally irrel-
evant. Yet we know 1n our hearts 
. that. thla ls the wisdom of the ages-
the opposite of violence, hate, indiffer-
ence, and all the destructive forces 1n 
life. Somehow, Father 1n Heaven. 
quicken us to thla ultimate reality-
the way of reconclllatlon, heallng, and 
fulflllment. Help us to see the world ls 
starved for love, wives for love of hus-
bands, husbands for love of wives, chil-
dren tor love of parent.a, parents for 
love of children. Help ua to under-
stand. Father 1n Heaven, like oil ellml-
nates friction, love brings peace. Help 
us to love one another aa Thou dost 
love us. 
In Jesus• name whose love ls uncon-
ditional, universal and eternal. Amen. 
RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. 
Under the previous order, the leader-
ship time ls reserved. 
OMNIBUS CRIME BILL 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. 
Under the previous order, the Senate 
will now resume consideration of S. 
1970, which the clerk will report. 
The legislative clerk read as follows: 
A blll CS. 1970) to establish COlllltltutlon&l 
procedures for the Imposition of the sen-
tence of death, and for other purposes. 
The Senate resumed consideration 
of the bill. 
Pending: 
Hatch amendment No. 1681, to strike pro-
vis1ona that would prohibit the manufac-
ture, sale, and pos.sesslon· of certain semi-
automatic <assault) weapons. 
All1!1f'DXENT !fO. 1111 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. 
There will now be 45 minutes debate 
on the Hatch amendment, amendment 
No. 1681, with 30 minutes under the 
control of the Sena.tor from Arizona 
[Mr. DECOKCIM] and 15 minutes 
under the control of the Senator from 
Utah, [Mr. HATCH]. 
Who seeks recognition? The Senator 
from Ut.ah. [Mr. HATCH]. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr •. President, I ask 
unanimous consent we put 1n a 
quorum call with the time charged 
against neither Senator. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The 
Chair did not understand the request. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent we put 1n a 
quorum call with the time charged 
against neither Senator DEC0NCINI 
nor myself. He is coming and he will, I 
think, speak first. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. 
Without objection, It is so ordered. 
The absence of the quorum has been 
suggested. The clerk will call the rolL 
The legislative clerk proceeded to 
call the rolL 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDENT pro temPore. 
Without objection, It ls so ordered. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, before 
we vote on my amendment to strike 
the assault weapons language from 
this bill, I would like to list one last 
time the reasons I oppose the assault 
weapons provisions. 
This bill would, for the first time, 
ban semiautomatic firearms. There ls 
no functional difference between the 
weapons listed 1n this bill and any 
other semiautomatic weapon. They all 
employ a firing action that has been 
commonly used 1n firearms for over 
100 years. The only difference be-
. tween these weapons and other semi-
automatic firearms ls their appear-
ance. 
Despite some of the arguments we 
heard during earlier debate on this 
amendment, these weapons are not 
the weapons of choice of criminals 
Statistics tell us that handguns and 
shotguns are still the most likely 
weapons to be used 1n the comm1ssion 
of a crime. For example, of all of the 
guns seized by police 1n Los Angeles 
and San Franclsco tn 1988, less than 3 
percent were the assault style weapons 
listed In thla and other bills. In New 
York City, police recovered more than 
16,300 guns In 1988--only 25 were 
semiautomatic military-style rifles ·· -
now banned from Importation by the 
admlnlstratlon. And here 1n Washing-
ton, DC, police report that none of the 
assault weapons banned from Importa-
tion were recovered 1n 1988. The fact 
that the Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco 
and Firearms ls tracing more assault 
weapons does not lend support to this 
language. BA TF only traces firearms 
which It Is asked to trace. They do not 
trace every crime weapon. And the 
Bureau has stated that they do not 
necessarily agree with those who cite 
their trace findings as Indicative of the 
percentage of these weapons used 1n 
the commission of crimes. 
The vast majority of the hundreds 
of thousands of the listed weapons al-
ready possessed around the country, 
are used for legitimate lawful activi-
ties such as self-defense 1n the home, 
target shooting, and collecting. Some 
for hunting, but mainly for legitimate 
lawful activities of self-defense in the 
home, target shooting, and collecting. 
There may be some who use these for 
hunting, but not very many. 
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While ther may not be used by . 
many people for huntlng purposes, I 
would simply note that the second 
amendment says nothing about limit-
ing the use or ownership of firearms 
to hunting. 
Even if the provisions of S. 1970 
achieved the impossible and kept all 
the listed guns out of the hands of 
crlm1nals, all the guns that remain 
lawful for purchase under this bill 
would be readily available. These pro-
visions cannot possibly, even on their 
face, keep so-called assault weapons 
out of the hands of hardened crimi-
nals. 
This language focuses not on crime 
or criminals, it focuses on the second 
amendment rights of law-abiding citi-
zens. It will not prevent hardened 
criminals or deranged psychopaths 
from obtaining a weapon l! that is 
what they want to do. These people 
will find their weapons of choice no 
matter how many guns we ban. Since 
the majority of crime weapons are ob-
tained through illegal channels, this 
assault weapons ban will simply make 
no difference at all. 
This assault weapons language im-
poses self-registration requirements on 
current owners of restricted firearms. 
These requirements impose a compli-
cated, cumbersome, unworkable, and 
unfair imposition on honest, law-abid-
ing gun owners. The criminals will not 
comply with these requirements. And 
we do not know if the administration 
even believes that this registration 
system will work. We do know, howev-
er, that the administration is opposed 
to this portion of the bill. 
Current owners of these firearms 
may find themselves in violation of 
the registration requirements, 
through no fault of their own, if they 
cannot obtain copies of the 4473 forms 
that result from future sales of the 
weapons unknown to the current 
owner. 
Anyone who violates the record-
keeping registration requirements im-
posed by this bill will be ln violation of 
Federal law, and could be charged 
with a felony. Even technical mistakes 
that result in a violation of these con-
fusing requirements can result in a 
felony charie which, under firearms 
statutes already a part of the Criminal 
Code, would prohibit that person from 
ever owning another firearm. 
This would mean all firearms, not 
Just assault weapons. As I already 
mentioned, some will find that they 
have violated the law long after they 
may have sold the weapon involved 
simply because the new owner chose 
to transfer the firearm without provid-
ing any type of notification to the 
original owner. 
If these assault weapons, which the 
bill would ban, are so bad, then why 
are these provisions effective for only 
3 years? Indeed, these particular provi-
sions in S. 1970 are even stranger yet. 
The Senate just yesterday tabled by 
an overwhelming 82-to-17 vote the 
Metzenbaum amendment which would 
have banned all so-called assault weap-
ons. In my oplnJon, such a ban would 
not have prevented criminals from ob-
taining any of these firearms or any 
other firearms. The criminal always 
finds a way to get the weapon he 
wants. 
The provisions of S. 1970 ban fewer 
so-called ~ault weapons than the 
Metzenbaum amendment banned. 
Mr. President, these provisions 
strike at the heart of our constitution-
ally protected right to keep and bear 
arms. Other than their appearance, 
these weapons are not different from 
millions of other weapons that are 
always considered legitimate. There 
are legitimate, lawful purposes for 
owning these weapons, and I do not 
believe that we should be opening the 
door to banning new classes of weap-
ons simply because the media chooses 
to single them out. The facts do not 
support the need to ban these weap-
ons. 
Mr. President, I just have to say in 
closing that the only people who are 
going to be hurt by the DeConclnJ lan-
guage in this bill are going to be the 
honest, law-abiding citizens who want 
to collect; own, target shoot, and, yes, 
sometimes hunt with these guns. 
There are legitimate rights of these 
people to collect these weapons. They 
are not going to misuse them. The fact 
of the matter is we are always going to 
have criminals get what they want and 
they are not going to register pursuant 
to the onerous burdens in this bill 
within the underlying bill. 
Mr. President, I am tired of the 
honest, law-abiding gun owners of this 
country being assaulted all the time 
by those who really have as their own 
purpose the desire of getting rid of all 
guns. I am not speaking in this regard 
of the Senator from Arizona. I know 
he feels differently on that. But most 
of the impetus for this type of legisla-
tion comes from those wpo really want 
to ban all weapons. 
Mr. President, there Is no real, logi-
cal, Justifiable reason for doing ft in 
this case and taking away the rights of 
decent, law-abiding owners of guns. 
The fact of the matter is, I hope our 
colleagues will support this amend-
ment and strike these provisions from 
the bill so we can then get about doing 
the rest of the criminal bill itself. 
I reserve the remainder of my time. 
I suggest the absence of a quorum, 
and I ask unanimous consent that the 
time not be charged against either 
side. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. 
Without objection, the Senator's re-
quest will be granted. The clerk will 
call the roll. 
The bill clerk proceeded to call the 
roll. 
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. 
Without objection, further proceed-
ings under the quorum call will be re-
scinded. 
The Senator from Arizona (Mr. 
DECONCINI) is recognized. 
Mr. DECONCINI. I thank the Chair. 
Mr. President, we have heard the ar-
guments that these weapons . that 
criminals use are stolen and that they 
are lllegally obtained. Last night, I in-
troduced the information from the 
Oakland report that showed only 12 
percent of close to the 400 guns that 
were confiscated over a 3-year period 
in Oakland were fllegal guns. They 
were not purchased over the counter. 
So these weapons are available today 
over the counter in any gun store that 
you go to. The people who use these 
guns for criminal activity go in and 
buy them. Why should they steal 
them when all they have to do ls send 
in a straw man, if they are a felon? In 
Arizona, we have evidence that for 
$100 they get a straw man to go in and 
buy these guns. Why should they in-
vol\•e themselves with any kind of 
criminal activity when it is very easy 
to buy them? 
Mr. McCLURE. Will the Senator 
yield on that point? 
Mr. DECONCINI. On the Senator's 
time, I will be glad to yield. 
Mr. HATCH. I yield to the Senator 
from Idaho. 
Mr. McCLURE. I want the record to 
reflect immediately after the co~-
ments of the Senator from Arizona 
that if, indeed, a straw man was sent 
in, that is an illegal purchase and, 
therefore, if you are depending on sta-
tistics that show an illegal purchase 
but based on a straw man purchase 
that is, by law, illegal today. · 
Mr. DECONCINI. Let me Just re-
spond to the Senator, I said in Ar!zo. 
na. 
Mr. HATCH. Is this on the Senator's 
time? 
Mr. DECONCINI. This is my time if 
the Chair would so rule that I am back 
on my time. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The 
Sena.tor from Arizona is recognized. 
Mr. DECONCINI. I said in Arizona 
there was evidence of a straw man. 
The report I cited last night, the Oak-
land report, indicated that 12 per-
cent-Oakland, CA, did a survey-of 
the 383 assault weapons confiscated 
between 1986 and 1988 were illegally . 
obtained. The remaining 88 percent . 
were purchased legally, over .the 
counter. I think ft is important to 
note, this gun costs less than $300 so 
why would you want to steal it? Good 
Lord, drug dealers can certainly afford 
$300 for a gun. 
Mr. HATCH. I say to the Senator on 
thatpoint-
Mr. DECONCINI. On the Senator's 
time. 
Mr. HATCH. The testimony before. 
the committee was 80 percent. 
Mr. DECONCINI. Pardon? 
Mr. HATCH. That 80 percent of all 1 
these guns were illegally obtained. I ·-
agree there are aberrations in the 
country, that may be true, although I 
do not think they can show whether 
j 
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st raw men purchased the guns or not, 
Eighty percent is the testimony before 
the committee. 
Mr. Dr:CONCINI. Mr. President, all I 
can cite is the most current survey 
taken 1n Oakland, CA. by the law en-
forcement people there of the confis-
cated weapons that they confl.scated 
during arrest of criminal activity. Only 
12 percent of the 383 assault weapons 
confiscated between that time were il-
legally obtained. 
Mr. President, I would like to go 
through some of these guns drug deal-
ers use that the opponents want us to 
believe are the guns law-abiding citi-
zens v.ant to use to hunt and to shoot 
tArgets. 
We first have the MAC-11. This gun 
happens to already be banned. BATF 
banned the production of the MAC-10 
u, 1982 because it was too easily con-
verted to fully automatic. The compa-
ny continues to make this gun, howev-
er, and it is, based on the design, only 
changed enough to not fall into the 
category of the MAC-10. It is equ.ipped 
with a 32-round magazine, a favorite 
of surveillance and soldiers of fortune. 
This gun is for military purposes. It is 
cheap. It is from $200 to $300. It is ad-
vertised by Its manufacturer as "the 
gun that made the eighties roar." 
Next we have the AK-47, which is so 
familiar to so many people. It is manu- -
tactured by Poly Technologies. It Is a 
chilian model of the full~· automatic 
AK-47 designed by the Soviets and 
currenUy produced by the Chinese for 
United States import. It is equipped 
with a 30-round magazine but It can 
handle a 5-, 20- or 40-round magazine 
as well as a 75-round magazine. As fast 
as you ca.n pull the trigger, that gun 
wm discharge, so you can shoot easily 
75 rounds 1n 1 minute. This Is the gun 
used by PUrdy 1n Stockton, CA. The 
price b about $370. But recently the 
gun price has gone up, since the shoot-
ing tn Stockton, to about $1,500. We 
have a number of examples of this gun 
being used 1n Arizona against law en-
forcement. 
Then we have the Colt AR-15. It Is a 
civilian model of the military M-16 
that was widely used 1n Vietnam, not 
for hunting of deer but hunting of the 
Vietcong. It is equipped with a 5-round 
magaz1ne but ft can hold a 20- or 30-
round magazine. Its list price Is $750. 
In 1988 and 1989 It was ranked third 
among all a55ault guns used 1n crime 
according to the BATF trace statistics. 
Of 591 weapons traced 1n 1988 and 1n 
Just the first quarter of 1989, the only 
records I have here, they had 128 of 
those confiscated. 
The next one Is the TEC-9. It Is a 9-
rnlllimeter Lugar pistol, automatic 
pistol It Is domestically produced 1n 
Florida. as I have said before. It Is fa. 
vored as an intimidation factor, adver-
tised as an Intimidation factor. A 
Miami manufacturer manufactures 
&bout 3,000 of these a month. It is 
equipped with a 36-round magazine. It 
can take more. But that is I.his part 
here. Those rounds can be fired 1n 
about 45 secor.ds. It Is favored by drJg 
dealers because the TEC-9 Is Inexpen-
sive and It Is ea.51ly conceal&ble wi thin 
a coat. The list price is $380, some• 
times less than that. 
Ten assault gun models account for 
90 percent of the crimes Involving as-
sault guns. One out of every five as-
sault weapons traded Is a TEC-9. 
The next one I want to show you Is 
called the Steyr-Aug. Th.ls is manufac-
tured in Austria. It is a civilian version 
of the Austrian assault weapon origi-
nally designed to be converted to dif-
ferent models. It accepts a variety of 
military hardware, 30 rounds stand-
ard, detachable magazine. It can take 
up to 42 rounds. 
Mr. President, this Is a gun that you 
do not see hunters using a& they 
tromp through the woods shooting 
wild turkey or deer, or even on the 
shooting range. 
The next one is the Uzi Galil. This Is 
a civilian version of the newest combat 
weapon produced by Israel military in-
dustries. It has been ba.'1?led by the 
President, as have all of these foreign 
imports. We do not know how long 
that will last. This will make it perma-
nent for 3 years. It 1s equipped with a 
telescopic lens. It has a muzzle veloci-
ty of 860 millimeters per second. It has 
not shown up in the tracing statistics 
yet. 
There Is also the Uzi carbine. It is a 
rifle and pistol combined, a civilian 
model of the fully automated Uzi in-
troduced by the Israel military indus-
try for import. This is the gun the I&-
n.ell military use when they go to war. 
It Is equipped with 10- or 25-round 
magazine. 
We have the Beretta AR-70 manu-
factured in Beretta., Italy. This is how 
this gun Is advertised: 
When the name of the p.me Is firepower. 
Ultimate rifle for shooters who demand op-
timum firepower. Oilers heavy !irep<,wer, 
yet weighs aboutll pound&._ 
This Is a weapon that is being used 
against our police today. 
Then we have the FN-FAL manufac-
tured in Belgium. It Is the NATO call· 
ber semiautomatic rifle. This is a 
combat weapon used by NATO in 
Europe today if, God forbid, there was 
military action. This has a detachable 
magazine. Twenty rounds ls standard. 
It can take 10 rounds. It is ranked 13 
among assault weapons traced in· the 
first quarter of 1989. 
Then we have what is known as the 
Streetsweeper, the Striker 12. This Is 
domestically produced after the 
import ban by the President. It ts a 12-
round, drum fed with 12-gauge ammu-
nition. It fires 12 rounds of 12 gauge in 
less than 3 seconds. Yesterday I said it 
would take 15 seconds. In less than 3 
seconds this chamber can be emptied. 
It is not going to be emptied on deer 
because it would absolutely blow the 
deer away. It is going to be emptied on 
people and Is used for spraying human 
beings. That was the reason it was de-
veloped by the South Alrlcans as an 
apartheid control weapon. It is for the 
mili tary, !Lild this Is the law enforce• 
rr.er.t version. It is advertised as the 
perfect pollce entry weapon, born in 
Rhodesia, improved in South Africa. 
and then patented and perfected and 
totally manufactured in the United 
States. It ranks 17 among all assault 
weapons traced in the first quarter of 
1989. 
Mr. President, it is clear to me that 
the time has come I.hat these guns 
should not be available on the street, 
at least for a trial period of time. We 
are not infringing on anybody's second 
amendment rights. We bar people 
from having bazookas today or Stinger 
mis.siles and machineg,.ms because ft 
has been upheld that Congress can 
put on those restrictions without bar-
ring and infringing on the second 
amendment rights of anybody. 
So, Mr. President, I am hopeful that 
my colleagues in this Chamber will 
make the tough decision. I know the 
Political ramifications of even talking 
about this. Believe me, I have had tbis 
bill up around here for more than a 
year. I had a recall petition attempted 
against me because I dared to offer 
something to fight drugs in what I 
thought was a constructive way that 
would not infringe on the second 
amendment rights. 
Mr. President, I am going to a.st 
ur.animous consent that the vote on 
the Hatch amendment occur at 10:30, 
and that any excess time under the 
Hatch amendment be divided between 
both Senator HATCH and myself. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is 
there objection to the request? 
Mr. DECONCINI. Excuse me, Mr. 
President. That the vote be set for 
10:35. I ask unanimous consent thU 
the request be changed to 10:35. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is 
there objection to the request? The 
Chair hears no obJectlon. It Is so or-
dered. 
Mr. DECONCINI. I thank the Chair. 
I understand there are a couple of 
Senators who do want to speak In 
favor of this amendment and are on 
their way. I only say, Mr. President, lt 
Is really whether or not we want to 
support law enforcement finally v.it.h 
a modest approach to thi.3 particular 
problem that they are facing on a day-
to-day basis. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a letter from the Arizona /sJJ.. 
sociatfon of Chiefs of Police, the 
Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order 
o! Police, National Hes.dquarters, and 
several other letters of support from 
law enforcement agencies be printed 
in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the letters 
were ordered to be printed ln the 
RECORD, as follows: 
AlUZOllA AssOCIATlO:W 
OP CJ1n:n OF PoUCE, 
Phoenix, ·,4z, .4.uqu&t ,. 1981. 
Hon. 0!:Jf!fIS D!:CoNCllfI, 
U.S. Senate, Wcuhinvt<m, DC. 
Dear SENATOa D!:CollCIJIX: On behalf of 
the Arizona Aa!ociatlon of Chiefs of PoUc:e. 
I would like to commend your IIUPP<>rt of 
I ,. 
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le~islatlon bannL'1g certain specified assault 
rifles . As ) "OU a.re a ware, In J anunry of this 
year a deput y sheriff was shot to death near 
Flagstaff by criminals using assault rifles. 
This lllustn.Les the nationwide problem 
law enforcement officers are !acing today 
from the un.restrlcted availability of assault 
weapons to criminals and person., who are 
mentally unstable. 
It Is clear that the National Rifle Assocla• 
tlon leaders.hip has chosen to take an unre-
alistic a.nd Inflexible stance evidenced by 
their continued opposition to any legislation 
attempting to regulate assault weapons. 
Theae weapons have absolutely no huntln1 
or legitlma.te sporting purpose. It Is time 
that all Americans display your type of 
courage a.nd conviction to take a stand 
against I.he :t,,."RA and their unreasonable 
and uncompromising policies. 
I ha\'e personally talked to many members 
of the NRA who do not support the stance 
their leaders.hip Is taking. These people feel 
the NRA leadership Is entirely out of touch 
with the membership. While we all agree 
banning certain rifles will not be the overall 
cure for the problem. It Is a step In the right 
direction. Legislation such as you are spon-
soring givea law enforcement officers a tool 
which enables us to deal with people who Il-
legally possess these da.ngeroUB weapons. 
Once again. you have displayed your cour-
age, Initiative and Integrity to support law 
enforcement officers and protect innocent 
citizens from slaughter. It does not go unno-
ticed you do this In I.he !ace of strong oppo-
sition from the powerful NRA lobby. Rest 
assured the Chiefs Association will stand 
behind you and assslst In any way possible 
to overrome this strong opposition. 
Thank :,,ou again !or your courageous ef-
forts to combat violence a.nd drug traffick-
ing In th1a country. 
Sincerely, 
0.utT D. LATHAM. 
ChW of Police. 
F'aATERNAL Ot»n OP Poucs, 
Louinnlle, 1fY, Juli/ 16, 1989. 
Hon. DDOna DECo1'Cllfl, 
U.S. Senate. E. Broadwa11 Blvd., Tuc.,on, AZ. 
D!:.U SlcfATOll DECoNcnrr. Congratula• 
tlona from the more than 4,000 law en!orce-
ment officers In Arizona who support your 
efforts In SB747. At a recent state confer-
ence In Prescott. the assault weapons. bills 
were d.lacussed. We support your effort to 
limit these types of weapons. Many of ua are 
sport.men and members of the NRA. and 
we are concerned with the Impact of your 
bill. But more Importantly, we are mindful 
of the ever increasing da.lly u.u.ults on our-
selves and the Innocent victims In America. 
We are fed up with the mindless argument 
that sportsmen and every day citizens have 
a r!irht to own any type of weapon available. 
If your bill waa unconstitutional, the NRA 
would not be putting mllllons Into the lob-
bying e.!fort. They would simply win the 
battle In court. Common sense tells us that 
gun legislation ls not new and must keep 
pace with growing technology. 
We u:rire you not to withdraw your bill In 
favor of the Thurmond Crime Package. We 
are not In favor of a watered down version 
that will not solve anything. 
Very truly yours, 
PATRICK ln.JONGIU. 
- \ 
FltATEJUrAL ORDER or POLICE, 
LouuvUle, KY. 
D11:il MR. McCor. I would also like to 
extend the opportunity to the Senator to 
write an article In our newsletter. We mall 
to over 8,000 members 1n Arizona !our times 
a year. You can send any communication di-




M!:TROPOLITAN POLICE DE:PARntefT, 
SL Louts, MO, Februarv 1, 1989. 
Senator PAUL SIMON, 
Subcommtttee on the Co,utitutton. of the 
Senate Judicia1'1/ Commttt.ee, Wa.shing-
ton. DC. 
DEAR SENATOR SIMOK: I regret that I will 
not be able to attend the Senate Hearings 
concerning Semi-Automatic Assault Weap. 
ons being conducted on Friday, February 10, 
1989, but my schedule will not allow me to 
leave my duties to the Department at this 
time. 
AB a law en!orcement official I a.m tr:>u-
bled by the Increasing misuse of these types 
of weapons. I have always supported and 
will continue to support any legislation I.hat 
will protect the public from the sale of 
weapons which have no sporting value. The 
public and law en!orcement community are 
facing an ever Increasing danger from those 
persons who have used the current laws to 
purchase these type weapons which more 
and more are being modified and used to 
commit crimes of horrible proportion. The 
Brady Amendment and the ban on Teflon 
coated bullet.11 are steps In the right direc-
tion. but even tighter controls are needed 1n 
the areas of seml-automatlc and automatic 
weapons being made acceaslble to Just 
anyone who wishes to purchase one. 
I will continue to fight any legislation 
which will allow semi-automatic assault 
weapons to nourish unchecked and out of 
control, and give my whole-hearted endorse-
ment to legislation prohibiting unquall!led 
access to any weapons which have no sport-
Ing value or leeitlmate need for anyone to 
possesa. 
I! I can be of any future help to you con-
cemlng this or similar matters. please do 
not fall to call upon me. 
Slnce!'!!.!Y, 
ROBERTE.ScHUTZ, 
Colonel. Ch.kl of Police. 
Poucs OmCERS AssOCUTI01', 
JOLIET POLICE DEPARntE1'T, 
Joliet. IL. April 1, 1989. 
Hon. PAUL SIM01', 
Diriaen senau Building, U.S. senc..u. 
Wa.shtngton, DC. 
Dv.11 SDATOJI SDl01': I have been a Joliet 
police officer for over twenty-one yeara. 
During that time, I have seen first hand the 
t~edies caused by I.he proll!eratlon of fire-
arms In our nation. 
When I first became a police o!!lcer, a 
"man wlt.h a gun" or "&hots fired" call in 
Joliet waa unusual. Now these types of calls 
have become common. This city has been 
!aced with an escalating gang problem. The 
crlmlnal used to be poorly armed. Now we 
are t&kl.na well-made 9mm seml-automatlc 
pistols of! the street. It Is Just a matter of 
time before we are opposed by automatic 
weapons with superior !Ire-power. · 
It Is !or this reason that I am urging you 
to vote In favor of "The Assault Weapon 
Control Act of 1989," S. 386. I believe the 
survival of police o!flcers In the future may 
literally depend on the ellmlnatlon o! AK-
-t7's, UZI's and slm.llar weapons. 
Please vote In favor of this bill in order to 
take these military weapons of! the market. 
I would appreciate hearing your position on 
thJs matter. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
LT. NICHOLAS W. WEISI, 
Chairman. 
Cin· or SAM Josi., CA. 
Mav z. 1989. 
Senator HOWARD MrrzEMDAUN, 
Ru.ucU Senat.e Office Building, 
Wa.shington. DC. 
DEAR SElfATOll Mrrz!:NBAIJ1': The San Jose 
Polfce Department strongly supports your 
effort to outlaw military type assault rifles. 
The mayor and city council of San Jose 
have also passed a resolution urglnir the 
State Legislature to outlaw assault rifles. 
We view these weapons as having no place 
1n a cMllzed society. Last year, within the 
boundaries of San Jose alone we seized 15-t 
such weapons; tragically, each and every 
weapon Is capable of causing a Stockton 
type massacre. 
The following organizations al8o want as-
sault rifles outlawed: the National Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Polfce, the MaJor City 
Police Chief's Association. the CalUornla 
Police Chief's Association. the CalUomla 
Peace O!flcers Association. the San Jose 
Peace Officers Association <the collective 
bargalnl.ng agency for all San Jose police of. 
flcersl, the Federation of Police, the State 
Troopers Association. the Police Executive 
Research Forum and Just about every legiti-
mate law en!orcement agency In the United 
States. 
Hopefully your committee will not be dis· 
tracted by the National Rifle Association's 
frantic efforts to contuse the public about 
the overwhelming desire of law enforcement 
to have these weapons of war outlawed. The 
NRA has searched throughout the country 
to !Ind a few Individual police officers op-
posed to the overwhelming majority opinion 
of law en!orcement. These lndivlduala have 
every r!irht to I.heir own opinion but your 
committee should realize that I.hey are a 
very small minority. I urge you In the Inter-
est of the safety of police officers and cit!• 
zens all.ke to pass th.II lerlslation. 
Sincerely, 
JOSEPH D. McNAllAJlA, 
Chk/ of Poli«. 
NATI01'Al. 8Bnun' AssOCIATI01', 
- .4kza!l(trla,. V .A. 
Rl:SOLtJ'rt01'-NATI01'AL SBDun' 
Asaoc1ATI01' SUPPORT OP TD 8. 388 
Whereas, America's Sheriffs have major 
responsiblllUes !or local law en!orcement in 
the United States; and 
Whereu, Sheriffs. I.heir o!!lcers and depu-
ties are being con!ronted with criminals. In-
cluding narcotics violators and other violent 
crim.lna1s; and . 
Whereaa, narcotics violators and ot.her 
violent crlmlnall frequently arm themselves 
with assault type semi-automatic weapons 
and misule these weapona In the pursu!t of 
their criminal activity against law entorce-
ment; and 
Whereas,- I.he continued use of these ·._. 
sault weapons has contributed to the ~ .: .. 
number of murders of law enforcement o!ff• · 
cers and Innocent civilian victims ,· 
Therefore, be It resolved that the Nation-
al Sheriffs' Association goes on record u ;.; 
strongly 11Jpportlng the CO!l&Te&I of the J~> 
United States passage of Senate Blll-386 or ~ 
almllar leg1glatlon at the Federal level · · 
lLulfOJS A.ssOCIATI01' 
OP CHIEFS OP POLICZ. 
Wtnnetka, IL, March ZZ, 1981. · 
The PJUtSll>IC!CT, 
Tiu Whtte H0tue, 
Wa.shtnglotl, DC. 
DtAlt ·Mil. PRl:smEXT: You are to be •P- ~: 
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ot mili tary-style semi-automatic 
weapons. 
assault our cities today. The "drug war" we ha1·e tell you. They are frightened. They 
want some support. They want some 
help. It Ls my understanding that First Lady Barbara Bush and the country's newly ln· 
sUllled Drug Czar Will iam Bennett provided 
measurable support for your heightened 
concern about the mentality that says these 
assault weapons have some kind of useful 
purpose !or the civilian population. · 
Now you must work to focus the attention 
of Congress on the passage of laws to ban 
the sale, possession, and manufacture of 
para-mlll tary assault rifles like the Chinese-
m.&de AK47. Both houses of the legislature 
In Calilomla have recently passed such laws 
and even theu: conservative Governor 
George DeukmeJlan has said he will sl.gn 
such a law. 
Addltlonally, Colt Industry's decision to 
suspend sales of such assault weapons ls ad-
min.ble. We would like to see other gun 
manufacturers In the United States take a 
similar lead. 
For the safety and welfare of all of our 
citizens, there really Is no choice but to try 
to eliminate these assault weapons while 
clearly separating this Issue from all the 
other gun control debates rending this 
country. 
You have the ability to influence legisla-
tion which could make access to these as-
sault weapans more dilflcult. It seems a 
small price to pay and we sincerely believe 
that the true hunter/flshertnan/rifleman 
will not suffer as a result of such a sane, 
limited, freedom-respecting method of llmlt-
ing gun violence. 
Sincerely, 
CHiu CARL DoBBS, 
Presi.dent. 
[Vanguard, San Jose Police Officer's 
Association, March 19891 
J>J:l(l)mo LEGISLATI01' 01' " AssAULT TYPE" 
W&AP01'S 
<By Carro J. Grande, President> 
Members of the San Jose Police Officers 
Association have voted overwhelmingly to 
support California State Attorney General 
John Van de Kamp in his endorsement of 
Senate Bill 292 and Assembly Bill 357. Both 
pieces of legislation address a level of re-
spon.slblllty avoided by elected bodies over · 
the years because of well organized lobbies 
threate~ an erosion of our constitutional 
rights. 
San Jose's Police officers have very recent-
ly experienced a serious loss of life associat-
ed with the possession of a deadly weapan 
by a careless and deranged person. Slmllar 
tragedies have also recently occurred in 
Stockton and Los Angeles, California, in-
flicted by persons po.ssessing the assault 
type weapons addressed in the proposed le&-
lslatlon. We believe It ls time the majority 
of our society be protected and shielded 
from the trauma inflicted by the reek.less 
ownership and discharging of such weapons. 
The propased legislation protects the law-
abiding rations! cltluns in their desire to 
pos.,egs assault t ype weapons, but blanketly 
removes the guns access by the unstable in-
dividual who feels a need to vent thelr per-
sonal Image of low self-esteem on unsuspect-
ing victlms. We applaud the authors of AB 
292 and AB 357 as this legislation ls socially 
necessary and long overdue. 
Office of tM Mavor, 
Boston, MA, FebruaT'JI 10, 1989. 
Hon. PAUL SI.1101', 
Chair, ~ate JudiclaT'JI Commtttee•, Sul>-
commtttu on tM Con.,tttutton, Dirksen 
Sffl4U Office But.ldtng, Wa.!htngton, DC. 
DEA.a SDATOR S1.11oir. As you well know, 
the escalating use of high pcwered weapons 
ls one of the most Important Issues facin& 
_ been referring to for years ha.s become a 
real wa.r on the st reets of our cities with real 
weapons now the rule, not the exception. 
The firepower of the drug lords a.rmed with 
assault weapons has overpowered that of 
our nation's police departments and put the 
lives of police officers and Innocent people 
in danger every day. I commend you for 
moving Quickly to hold hearings on propas-
als to ban the sale of these assault weapons. 
Your leadership on this critical lscue in the 
101st Congress will be invaluable. 
Attached Is a statement which I delivered 
at the U.S. Conference of Mayor's Second 
Annual Conference on Crime and Drugs on 
Monday, February 6, 1989. The message was 
well received and led to passage of a resolu-
tion by the Mayors and Police Chief's in at-
tendance calling for a ban on the manufac-
ture and Importation of semi-automatic as-
sault weapons. Conference participants also 
called on Congress to reverse Its position on 
the Brady Amendment " in view of the mass 
murders of children and other Innocent 
people that have taken place in this country 
since its defeat." 
While I applaud locll.l lnltlatlves to ban 
the sale of assault weapons and/or to 
Impose a waiting period on the purchase of 
firearms, this Is not a problem which can be 
solved city by city or even state by state. It 
Is a national problem which cries out for a 
national solution, which Is why your leader-
ship Is so lmpartant. 
Unlike many of the other pressing prob-
lems you and I confront each day, the solu-
tion to the gun Issue ha.s virtually no price 
tag. The only price tag to be paid Is If Con-
gress falls to act. It ls the increased social 
costs of fear and death in our neighbor-
hoods. It ls the price paid when a policeman 
ls gunned down or when a child kills a child 
over a vial of crack. 
I respectfully request that my attached 
statement along with editorials which ap-
peared in the Boston Herald and Boston 
Globe be submitted for the record at today's 
hearing. I urge Immediate consideration of 
le&islntlon such as S. 386 introduced by Sen-
ator Metzenbaum, and Quick passage of a 
final bill. 
A.gain, thank you for your leadership on 
this very critical Issue. 
Sincerely, 
RA Yll01'D L. PL YlOf, 
- Mavor of Bo,tcn. 
Mr. DECONCINl. Mr. President. I 
want to refer to one letter from the 
Fraternal Order of Police in Louisville, 
KY. It Is to myself, and it says: 
DEAR SE1'ATOR DECONCUfl: Congratula-
tions from the more than 4,000 law enforce-
ment officers in Arizona who support your 
efforts in SB747. At a recent state confer-
ence in Prescott, the assault weapons bills 
were discussed. We support your effort to 
llmlt these types of weapons. Many of-us are 
sportsmen and members of the NRA. and 
we a.re concerned with the Impact .of your 
bllL But more Importantly, we are mindful 
of the ever increasing dally assaults on our-
selves and the Innocent vlctlms in America. 
We are fed up with the mindless argument 
that sportsmen and every day cltluns have 
a right to own any type of weapons avail-
able. U your bill wu unconstitutional, the 
NRA wou,ld not be putting m.llllons into the 
lobbying effort. They would simply win the 
battle in court. Common sense tells us that 
run legislation Is not new and must keep 
pace with gro~ technology. 
Mr. President, I yield the floor. 
I suggest the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk v.ill call the roll. 
The legislative clerk proceeded to 
call the roll. 
Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous con-
sent that the order for the quorum 
call be dispensed with. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
ROBB). Without objection, It Is so or• 
dered. 
Mr. HATCH. I yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from Idaho. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Idaho Is recognized for 5 
minutes. 
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator 
for yielding. 
Mr. President, In the limited time 
that l.e have available to us this morn-
ing, I certainly do not want to prolong 
the debate because I suspect most 
Members have made up their minds, 
but It ts a little puzzling to note which 
p0rtions of the evidence that Is before 
the body should be brought forward 
now. 
I want to call attention to Just one 
misleading aspect of the comments 
made by the Senator from Arizona. I 
do not accuse him of attempting to 
mislead. but I think the statistics 
themselves are misleading because the 
Senator from Arizona was referring to 
what percentage of guns traced or 
what percentage of these kinds of 
guns seized in crimes were of a par-
ticular kind of gun that- ts banned by 
his provision in this bllL 
- The point ls that a very, very small 
prop0rtion of guns used in crimes are 
the so-ailled assault rifles; a very, very 
small number. And if you only have 10 
and one of them Is one of the banned 
11st, that means 10 percent of all those 
that are seized. 
I would like to call attention to the 
rep0rt of the Florida Assault Weapons 
Commission. The interim report-be-
cause they did not complete their 
study In the time assigned to them-
was filed on March 1, 1990. Anyone 
who Is really Interested In how many 
times these so-called assault rifles are 
used In crime should look at the Flori-
da Assault Weapons Commission Inter-
im repcrt. You will suddenly find that 
very, very few of the crimes committed 
in the State of Florida were commit-
ted with the so-called assault rifles. 
I would like to read a statement 
made by Detective Jimmy L. Trahin of 
the Los Angeles Police Department, 
Firearms-Ballistics Unit, who testified 
on May 5, 1989, before a subcommittee 
of this body. 
I will not read the entire statement, 
but I will start after the first para-
graph and see how far I can go. 
Mr. President, I think it says to all. 
the law enforcement people are 
scared. That ls the word we do not like 
to use, but that is the word they will 
With 18 years as a law enforcement offi-
cer with the Loi Angeles Police Depart-
ment, 12 of those years have been spent as a 
Detective Train1n& Officer 88Sl&ned to the 
- -----·- - - - - -- - - ~--------------- --------------------
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Flrea.ma-Ba.lllstlcs Unit. My vocatlon &nd 
exper!ence ln firearms Identification has 
put me In a unique position to witness first 
hand the realistic, and I repeat, the realistic 
magnltude of the problem., relating to fire-
arms In crtminal acUY1t1. Although my tes-
timony here ls not u an offlCUIJ spokesman 
for the Los Angeles Police Deput.ment, It 
wUI be !ac.tual, not conjecture, and bSBed on 
my person.al experience and training in the 
field of nearly two decades. 
There being no objection. the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the 
Rr;cORD, as follows.: 
The National Firearms Act of 193-i <55 years 
old ) prohibits fabrication and possession o! 
unregistered machlne guns, sllencen. and 
sawed-off &hotgun£. The threat of prison 
d~-, not seem to have deterred the criminal 
In fact, we seize more sawed--0!! sportina 
ahotguna than we do assault weapons. Even 
common 22 caliber rifles have been convert-
ed. An Interesting note 11 that we ha.¥e 
never had an AK-47S converted, a TEC-9 
converted. &nd H&K IH or 93 converted, a 
Val.met M76 converted and so on. An at-
tempted oonversion wa.s attempted on one 
Since I Vi1Il endeavor to be realistic, let's 
address the facts and not myths, 
Do we have a lar,re quantity of violent 
crime lnvoh1ng flreanns? The answer la yes. 
Do we lave a larger quanttty or violent 
crime without firearms involved? The 
answerla)"eS. 
Have we had an Increase In so-called as-
sault weapons being involved in violent 
eel.mes? The answer is yes. 
I use the term "so-called" assault weapons 
because somewhere In this recent hysteria 
these mlllt..a.ry-style semi-automatic firearms 
have been mislabeled with the term "a.s-
sault". The actual definition relates to a se-
lective fire gun capable of semJ and full 
autom&tlc fire utilizing an lntermedlate car-
tridge. 
We have deflnltely seen an ln.crease In the 
crlmlnal use of these firearms durina the 
past 8 year,;. We have &lso seen an Increase 
In quality semi-automatic pistols, shotguns, 
and other weapons durini the same time 
period. 
Are these assault weapons the cr1m.l.nahl 
'"weapom of choice"? The answer Is no. 
We take Into custody more handguns, or 
ahotcuns. or 22 caliber rifles than any quan-
Uty ot a.ss&ult weapons that are seized. 
From an lnlormal survey that we took on 
over 4.000 l'\ll1S that were taken Into custo-
dy ~ a 1 year period. slightly mart! 
than 120 would be clusified under this defi-
nition o! assawt weapon. That's approxi-
mately 3~ not the 20-50% embellished fig-
ures I'n been hearing nunored. 
Are the maJor1t::, of these !JrearmJ beina 
illegally C01Jvert.ed to full automatk: ma-
c:llJne a:un st&tus? The aZJSWer 1a no. Our 
Unit receives about a dozen auns a yea.r that 
have been modified or attempted to be 
modlfled. Approximately half are faflures or 
completely unreliable. Why? The vut ma-
Jor1t:, ot aucb firearms are dl!flcult to con-
vert and require extensive mod1!1cation. In 
the put. the three most common f1reann.a 
that hue been utilized !or conversions con-
sisted of.: The MAC-10/11 variants manulac-
tured by RPB and SWD; t.he U:rJ carbine 
and the Colt AR-15. 
Why Tere t.hese the most popular conver-
1flons? Rot necessarily that the conversion 
was~. bat the simple availability of aub-
atttution machine gun part&. This loophole 
bu now been closed with the passage of the 
McClure-Volkmer Act of 1~ regarding ac-
ceuibwt:, of parts. . 
On the other hand, U any crlminal has 
the Intense desire to create a machine ,-un, 
any semi-automatic !lreann can be used. 
The Nat.loru.l Firearms Act of 1934 (55 years 
old> prohibt ts fabrlca.tlon and P<>,SSe$Slon -0! 
unrel1£iered mach1ne runs. aflencera, and 
sawed-cl! shotguns. The threat of prlaon 
does not seem to have deten-ed the crlmlnal. 
In fact, we seize more aawed-of! sport.ma 
shotguns than we do assault weapons. Even 
common 22 caliber rifles bave been convert-
ed. An tntttesttnir note 1s that we have 
neYcr had an AK-47 con,oerted. a TEC-9 
converted, and BG&K 91 <>r 93 converted. 
Mr. President, I !U!k una.nfmous con-
sent that that testimony be printed in 
the REco.a.n. 
CoNCRESSIONAL TEsn!IONY Ofi AsSAULT 
WEAJ'OIIS, MAY 5, 1989 
(By Detective Jimmy L. Trahin, Los Angeles 
Police Department F'lreanns-Balllstlcs Unit> 
Lad.le. and GenUemen: I'm honored with 
the l)I'lv!lege of belng asked to testify before 
thiJ. Subcommittee hearing regarding the 
pendlni legislation dealing v.it.h the .so-
called assault weapons Issue. 
With 18 yeani as a la.w enforcement offi-
cer with the Lo6 Allgeles Police Depart-
ment, 12 of those yeara ha.ve been spent u a 
DetecUve Training Officer asslilled to the 
Ftreanna-Ba.lllst.lcs Unit. My vocation and 
experience in firearms idenU!ication has 
put me 1n a u.n.!Que position to wltnesa flrst 
hand the reallstlc. and I repeat, the realisUc 
magnitude of the problems rela.Una to 1ire-
&nna 1n crl.mlnal acUv1ty. Although my tea-
Umony here Is not as an official spokesman 
for the Loa Angeles Police Department, it 
will be factual, not conjecture, and based on 
my pe?"SOnal experience and tralning in the 
field for nearly two decades. 
Since I will endeavor to be realistic, let's 
address the facts and not myths. 
Do we have a large quantity of violent 
crime involving firearms? The answer la yes. 
Do we have a larger qua.nUty of violent 
crime without fl.re&rms Involved? The 
answer Is yes. 
Have we had an Increase 1n ao-called as-
sault weapons being Involved in violent 
crlmea? The answer 11 ye.s.. 
I use the term "so-called" assault weapons 
because somewhere 1n this recent hysteria 
these milltary-style semi-automatic firearma 
have been m.lslabeled with the term "&S-
ault". The actual definition relates to a se-
lective !lre lf\lil capable of semi- and 1u1l 
automa.Uc fire utWzJ.ng an lntermedia.te car-
tridge. 
We have definitely seen an increase 1n the 
crlm1nal use of these !lrearms durina the 
put 8 years. We have also seen an Increase 
1n qualJty seml-automaUc pistols, shotguns, 
and other weBDOllS d~ the same time 
period. 
Are th~e assault weapons the cr1m.l.na1s 
Rweapon of choice"? The answer 1s n o. 
We take into custody more hand~. or 
shotguns. or 22 caliber rifles than any quan-
tity of assault weapons that are seized. 
From an tnformal survey that we took on 
over 4000 guns that were taken Into custody 
~ a 1 :rear period. Blightly more than 
120 would be clas&Uled under this dellnJtion 
of assault weapon. That'a •~oxlmately 
3%; not the 20-50% embellished !~ I've 
been h~ rmnored. 
Are the maJortty of t hese firearms being 
fileirali1 converted to full automatic ma-
chine 1l1I?1 status? The -answer ts no. Our 
Unit received about a dozen runs a year · 
that have been modified or attempted to be 
modffled. Approximately half are fll.llures or 
completely unreliable. Why? The TMt ma-
jority of such firearms are dlfncoJt to con-
vert and reqntre extensive modification. In 
the past, the three most common flreanmi 
that have been utilized for conversions con-
lllsted of: The MAC-10/11 variants manufac-
tured by RPB and SWD; the ~ carbine 
and the Colt AR-15. 
Why were these the most popular conver-
ll!ons? Not =-r!ly that the conversion 
was easy, but the ~lmple &Ya11Abillt1 of sub-
lltltutton machine gun pa.rt,. nm loophole 
has now been elosed with the ~ire of the 
McClure-Volkmer Act of 1988 regarding to-
ceaibillty o1 parta. 
On the other hand, l1 UJ7 crtmJnal ha.a 
the intense deaire to create a machine sun. 
any aemJsautomaUc llrearm .can be Wied. 
Ru,er Miru-H In the pa.st 12 yeara I have 
been in the unit and tt dJdn't work. Why? 
t94'I, of these so-called assault weapons a.re 
not easily converted. 
Who owns the majority of these mllitarJ-
atyle !lrearms? Tbe law a.bl~ c1tlzen. I 
can also categorically state that U you took 
a suney of police ol!lcen 1n this country, 
1ou would find that the va.st majority would 
own at least one of these guns for o!f-dut:, 
personal use. 
When a law Is passed for societies protec-
tion, It must do two things. 
(1) It must solve the problem or ahow real-
istically that It will accompllsb something to 
curb the problem; and 
(2) The people must have respect for the 
law knowing It Is 1n their best Interest. 
Considering number 1, does anrone firmly 
believe that banning assault weapons will 
curtail the crime problem? Hu rest.cictive 
f\111 laws worked here 1n Washington or 
N'ew York City? ls there any correlation 
with strict gun control and a decrease JD 
crime? The answer Is no. I've talked to hun-
dreds of fellow pollce officers and the over-
whelming majority agree that banning so-
called assault weapons ts not rolng to realis-
tically decrease violent crime, gang activity, 
or narcotics trafficking. 
There's no question that the dtb:ena of 
this country are 1rustnted and outraged 
with tbe ever lncreasmc crime problem. The 
reaction by aome ls to do anythln£ whether 
or not It works. and wit.bout careful consid-
eration of the conseQUencea. It'a ll'1llhful 
thlnklng and hope that If we control some 
o! these guns, crime wDl decre.ue. 
Restrictive laws on these so-called assaun 
firea.nna will be &ivlna the <:oneemed dtlz.e.n 
a false senae o1 security In the belle! that 
crime will supposedly diminish That's not 
rotng to happen. Although It's too early to 
reach any de!inl,tlve conclusion, I bave ob-
served aooolutely no positive effect whatso-
ever on the crime problem 1n Los Angeles 
since the local assault weapon ban was en• 
a.cted 3 months ~o. 
Let'• consider the second reQulrement o! a 
law: "TI1e people must respect It". 
U a law Is PllSSed with the muston of hope 
that It wm do something, t.he people muat 
be behind IL Restrictive run control direct-
ed ai. as.sault weai,ons will not st.rlk.e fear lI1 
the hearts of the crl.minal.1 finn1Y beDeve. 
however, that Jt wm have a dettlmental 
Impact on the respect Ior the law by the 
hundreds of thousands of av~ -cltlzena 
who possess these mill.t.ar.Y-style nrearma. 
Law enforcement requires the peoples .sup-
porL We do not need to create a new clasa 
ol crlm1nal&. 
It's unfortunate that we cannot enforce 
th~ thousands of aun laws presentlY exist-
lnJ, We do not have enough pollce, prosecu-
tors. courts. Judge,, jalls, prisons, or money. 
The entire cr1mlnal JUlltlce .syatem Is totally 
Inundated. A crlmlnal 11 lucky to do one 
third of his sentence in Jail ~nt gun 
laws are not belnr ~ While testl!y-
~ In exceaa o! 400 Umea kl .firearms related 
cases during the D&St 1.2 ,eu,. I have !ailed 
to $U any ~cant. \lie of the enhance-
ment law1 to .auna ln\JO!ved ID 
" 
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crimes. The majority of the time th ey are 
not even filed. If filed on. they are reduced 
or plea b~l\lned away. Fact: there ls no de-
terrent to using a gun In a crime. 
In conclusion. I accept the fact that Jump-
Ing on the assault weapon ban ls the 
"trendy" thing to do, whether or not It ac-
complishes something productive. It should 
be of utmost Importance that the conse-
quences of slowly deteriorating the 2nd 
Amendment to our Constitution be exam-
ined. 
The problem Is not bad guns versus good 
guns . .. It 's the bad guys using any gun 1n 
a crlm1nal act with the knowledge that pun-
ishment for his actions will not be pursued. 
It ls ludicrous to believe that the pending 
legislation regarding assault weapons will 
decrease crime. Based on my experience, I 
personally feel It will create more problems 
for law enforcement than It will solve, espe-
cially for the law abiding citizen. I urge you 
to consider my testimony here today. 
Thank you. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who 
yields time? 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I reserve 
the remainder of my time. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who 
yields time? 
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I 
want to leave the record very clear 
about the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment that has been cited here a couple 
of times. I want to read into the 
RECORD a letter from the Los Angeles 
Police Protective League, compose of 
police officers of the city of Los Ange-
les. 
This letter happens to be to Senator 
HOWARD ME'rzENBAUM. I will ask unani-
mous consent that it appear in the 
RECORD at a later time. 
It says: 
DEAR SENATOR METz!:NBAUK: In response to 
your Inquiry, the Los Angeles Police Protec-
tive Le114rUe supports leglslatlon that would 
control sales and possession of assault type 
semi-automatic weapons not only In Califor-
nia but on the federal level as well. 
As active members of the National Asso-
ciation of Police Organizations CNAPO>. we 
have supported S. 386 through our NAPO 
representative and Vice President William 
Pattison who has testlfled before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on the Constitution. 
Our Chief of Police, Daryl F. Gates, has 
also testlfied as to the need for federal con-
trol of semi-automatic assault weapons 
before the same committee. 
We appreciate your effort8 to de-escalate 
the level of violence In our country and to 
provide law enforcement officers the sup-
port they need In providing a safer America 
for all of our people. 
So if he supports that one, he cer-
tainly supports this. 
Also, Chief of Police Gates testified 
before the Judiciary Committee. He 
said: 
These weapons, In my Judgment. have to 
go. And I do not have any problem In defin-
ing those that are assault weapons. I can 
tell you because I have had two police offi-
cers .kllled with assault weapons, one very 
slmUar to the one that was held up here, an 
AR-15. 
Officer Dan Pratt was killed by an Individ-
ual In a d.,ve-by shooting who shot at him 
15 times. hit him once. That officer would 
be alive today had he not been confronted 
with an assault rifle. 
Another officer, another drive-by shoot-
ing. A MAC-10, an automatic pistol; he was 
shot at 17 times and hit seven times as he 
was picking up his little boy from the 
..church school. 
What they do ls that they Just spray and 
then they have got the firepower to do that 
spraying, and when they spray, they hit 
anyone who happens to be there, and they 
don't really care. We had 240 gang killings 
last year, 240 In the city of Los Angeles; 60 
percent of those that were kllled were not 
gang members. 
Mr. President. I do nut know any-
body that has a stronger support for 
the second amendment and a stronger 
political philosophy, quite frankly, in 
law enforcement than Chief of Police 
Daryl Gates. He ls a strong supporter 
of this legislation. 
Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to 
the Senator from Massachusetts. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. 
KENNEDY] ls recognized for 5 minutes. 
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President. I 
join those that have spoken last 
evening and earlier today in commend-
ing the Senator from Arizona for the 
amendment which he has seen incor-
porated into this Democratic crime 
legislation and for the courage which 
he has demonstrated in standing by it. 
Despite the statement.s that have been 
made by opponent.s of this particular 
provision, I think it ls an important 
provision. and I am very hopeful that 
it will remain in the bill. 
Mr. President, the argument.s that 
have been made against the DeConclni 
amendment, both last evening and 
today, go to a number of different ar-
guments. First of all, there are those 
that say that this kind of amendment 
violates their notion of a constitution-
al right to bear arms. We heard that 
argument yesterday, and we ·heard it 
again this morning. 
Mr. President, if we are to follow 
that particular argument to it.s logical 
conclusion, then we would permit the 
sale of machineguns, bazookas and 
grenade launchers. No one ls possibly 
suggesting that .the legislation which 
is on the books at the present time 
prohibiting American from owning ba-
zookas and grenade launchers or re-
stricting the sale of machlneguns ls 
unconstitutional. We do not hear that. 
We just hear, if you go after these 
kinds of assault weapans, it ls interfer-
ing with gun collectors and with their 
so-called constitutional right.s. 
That is hogwash, Mr. President. We 
have seen, over the last 25 years, 
where steps have been taken, very 
modest steps, indeed, in terms of the 
regulation of certain pistols and rifles. 
Those statutes have not been struck 
down by the court.s of this country as 
violating the consitut!onal right to 
bear arms. If you go back as far as the 
1968 legislation, they have not been 
struck down. So there ls a legitimate 
mandate for the Congress of the 
United States to enact legislation to 
try to protect law enforcement offi-
cials and the public . 
This amendment has been crafted 
skillfully, I believe, by the Senator 
from Arizona, to target the most dan-
gerous types of assault weapons. We 
hear those who say we want to s~rlke 
those modest restrictions down be-
cause it interferes with the rights of 
hunters. 
What are these characteristics that 
these so-called hunters want to be able 
to use? One principal characteristic is 
that the assault weapon tends to be 
held at the hip. That makes for a 
great sporting weapon. I have had the 
opportunity to hunt in a very limited 
way, and I have been out there with 
some hunters. I have not seen those 
hunters hold their weapons at their 
hip and spray dozens of rounds of am-
munition in a matter of seconds. That 
says something about a hunter; they 
are going to brandish an assault 
weapon and hold it at the hip and 
spray out the ammunition in seconds. 
Shorter barrels sacrifice accuracy. 
Users of assault weapons are not inter-
ested in the accuracy. One of these 
weapons ls called the "Street.sweeper." 
They want to spray their ammunition. 
Who ls kidding who, that these are 
sporting weapons, held at the hip, 
spraying their ammunition out there? 
They are trying to defend this as a 
sporting weapon. This ls a sporting 
weapon? In many instances they are 
readily concealable assault pistols. 
That ls one of the characteristics. How 
many of those hunting rifles that 
sportsmen use are readily concealable? 
This amendment does not apply to 
popular hunting rifles, but it applies 
to some of the most dangerous of the 
pistols. Some of these assault weapons 
employ barrel shrouds to cool the 
weapon during rapid fire. That is 
really a hunting weapan. I suppase the 
typical hunter wants to be able to cool 
that barrel after spraying ammunition 
across the countryside while hunting. 
You want to have that barrel shroud 
out there to cool the weapon during 
rapid fire. Then you have threaded 
barrels, which are fitted for silencers. 
Who in the world is thinking that that 
ls a spartlng weapon. Mr. President? 
That ls basically what we are dealing 
with. 
The argument.s can be ma.de here 
that we have to get the criminal off 
the street.s. and all of us are for that. 
This ls why we support the entire 
Democratic crime package. But we 
heard that argument a number of 
years ago, and since that time, we 
have seen hundreds of thousands and 
millions of additional weapons out 
there. Well, they say these gun restric-
tions do not stop crime. Mr. President, 
in my own State of Massachusett.s 
that had additional kinds of restric-
tions on small concealable weapons, 
some 85 percent of all the weapons 
that were used in crimes of violence 
were obtained out.side the State. We 
are defenseless because individuals are 
able to go across the borders. 
Mr. President, as I said, the kinds of 
weapans that I Just mentioned here 
are the kind that are included in the 
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U10se indi\idua.ls who say th&t these 
are sporting wea.pona. They a.re not 
sporting wea.pona; they a.re used in 
crimes of violence, and they are used 
in the drug trade. They pose a. very 
substantial thre&t to the ille and the 
well-being of the police officers of this 
cow1try. l hope the Senate will not 
vote to strike this particular amend-
ment. I commend the Senator !rom 
Arizona for seel.ni that it 1s included 
in the le&is}.a.tion. 
I support the assault weapons provi-
siona in the .Democratic crime pack-
age. Frankly, I am convinced that we 
must do more. This proposal in no way 
restricts the rights o! law-abldini citi-
zens to possess or obtain other, legiti-
mate semiautomatic firearms. 
But this legislation will reduce the 
number of deaths and inJurie3 from 
semiautomatic assault weapons by 
drug traffickers and other violent 
crlminals. 
This proposal would ban a specific 
list of semiautomatic assault weapons 
identified by law enforcement as a 
danger to the community. 
The weapons are listed by name, 
model, and manufacturer. This legisla.-
tlon does not apply to conventional 
setniautoma.Uc rifles, shotguns, hand-
guns, or popular semia.utomatic hunt-
ing rilles. 
Drug Director William Bennett long 
ago undelstood the connection be-
tween narcotics and firearms. He wa.s 
tnstrwnen1&1 in the a.dm.tnistration's 
ban on a specific list of foreign-ma.de 
assault weapona, complied after thor-
ough exarniJl1l.t.fon of the issue by 
BATF ex.perts. 
The import ba.n is a significant step, 
but lt only encompasses 25 percent of 
the a.:;sault weapons in the United 
States. The remaJ.nlng 75 percent are 
made right here and they are Just as 
deadly. 
ThJa legislatl~n takes the next step. 
I would take one additional step and 
a.uthorize a careful review by BATF of 
the r~rn&lnlng 75 percent, applylng the 
same exacting standards to those guns 
that it a.pplied in determlning which 
imports to ba.n. 
Assault weapons put awesome killing 
power in the hands of drug runners, 
hate groups. and other c.r:lrolnals. The 
ease with which these weapons can be 
obtained la fuelJng the a.nm race on 
the streets of every community in 
America. Study a.fter study by Cox 
Newspapers. BATF and others docu-
ment the growing preference for as-
sault We'1)()ns amolli organized crime 
and drug traffickers. 
The time Is long past for Congress to 
enact legisla.tion to ban the sale and 
tca.nsfer of ASSAult weapons, while pro-
tect.Ing the interests ot law-abiding 
citizena. 
Thl.i legisla.Uon has the overwhelm-
ing support of our Nation'• police, in-
cluding the 90,000-member Na.tional 
Association of Police Orpnlzatlons, 
the International Assoc:latJon of 
Chle.Ca of Police, the 200,000-member 
Fraternal Order of Police, &Dd the 
other leading law enforcement orga.nl- used for collection, for pl!nldng, for 
zations across thJs country share those target practice, and for Just plain good 
views. sportsman a.ctlvitles. 
Thia ts literally a matter of life a.nd Frankly, I.he hone3t people who buy 
death for law enforcement. these do not use them In criminal ac-
In Escondido, CA, in December 1987, Uvlty. U we banned all o! those. and 
a diagnosed schlzophrenic lied on h1a all that Sena.tor :t.lrrZEHKAUK called 
Federal i\lll purchase form about hi.I for yesterday, and another 40 that 
&rrest record. mental condition. and probably would look Just u bad a, 
drug use, a.nd purchased &n AK-47- these, you still would not stop the dis-
type assault rifle. The next day, under honest criminals from using weapODB 
the lnfluence of methamphetamines, because they can get them overseas 
he used the AK-47 to kill a San Diego even though they are now banned by 
County deputy sheriff, wound two the President of the United Sta.tes, 
other deputies and hold police off five of these nine. You can still get 
dur1ng a 12-hour shootout. · them overseas. 
In December 1988, a Dallas police of- They can still get them in a variety 
fleer was killed while ma.king an \lll· of ways. They can still steal them. I 
dercover narcotics purchase. The 1n1ess you can say if they are not sold, :r:f n used was a TEC-9 assault you cannot steal them. The fact is, 
Last year, a MAC-ll assault pistol why do we pa.ss Jeg!slati?.n that affects 
was used by a ma.n in Louviers, co, to only the decent, hone-,t people, be-
kill hlmseU, but not before he used it cause the crooks, crimJnals, a.nd vi-
to kill a woman and her mother and cious people are going to be able to get 
wound a police officer. these, regardless. 
Last August, a New Jersey State I have to take a. llWe 1.ssue with 
trooper wa.s shot four times in the Chief Gates. Chief Gates is not one of 
chest and abdomen by drug traffickers the great police people who_ stand up 
wielding a MAC-11 assault pistol for second amendment rights, to keep 
Mr. President, we should not short• and be&r arms. Chief Gates ls one of 
change the law enforcement comm.uni- the la.w enforcement leaders In this 
ty on this issue. They are on the front country who has always, as far as I 
Jines of the war on crime. They Jcnow know, called for gun control He has 
best. always been on the side of gun control. 
They know what is needed, they I am not criticizing his sincerity on 
asked for this and tougher measures that but do not lump him with the 
over 1 year ago when a Jone gunman vast majority of police officers In this 
opened tire on unsuspect1ng school- country who do not wa.nt gun control, 
chlldren in Stockton. CA. sports people who themselves apprecl-
Mr. D1:CONCINI. I thank the Sena- ate ha.vtng the right to keep and bear 
tor from Massachusetts. He baa been whatever arms they want to within 
out on this floor for the 14 yea.rs that the law. 
I have been here, working on this type The fact rema.lns that Officer Tra-
of legislation. I have not always been hin'.s testimony shows that Ule fire- · 
supportJve of his efforts, because I arms that the distinguished 8eoa.tor 
thought they went too far. But I from Arlmna is criticizing here todaY 
thank the Senator for speaking today in his bill are not the weapons of 
as eloquently as he always does, in get- choice by crlmtnals. The fact ts that 
Ung to the point niht away. I thank the statl.!tfcs show this. So do not use 
him for the kind remarks. I also thank Chief Gates for us. Chief Oate.s 1a 
the Junior Senator !rom Nebraska for always going to be for eun co.ntrol We 
his remarks last night and the senior are talking about decent. honest, law-
Senator from lliinois, who spoke on a.bid.in&' citizens who want to collect 
behalf of this legislation. . these. 
I ask the Chair how much time I I have to say, on the rifles, If you 
ha.ve rematnlne. take the metal parts off and replace 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The them with wood parts, you have a 
Senator ha.a 11 minutes, 17 seconds re- sporting rttle. It Is exactly t he same 
matning. gun. 
Mr. Dl:CONCINI. Mr. President, I · With regard to the machine pistols, 
yield the floor. they are not used for hunting; they 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who are used for target practice and for 
yields time? collecttng. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I have The honest people a.re not misus1ng 
to say that I enjoyed the remarks of their weapons. It is the criminals who 
the distinguished Senator from Massa- are. We should go after crfmlnals and 
chusetts, as I always do. He is a very not honest people. This bill will make 
energetJc spokesperson for his parttcu- it absolutely burdensome to honest 
lar side. · people, to be persecuted as they were 
We are not talking &bout automatic before the .Firearms Owners Proteo-
weapons here tha.t you spray the tion Act passed. 
forest with. They a.re banned al.ready Mr. Presk!ent, l reserve the remain· 
by the law. We have agreed to that der of my Ume. 
long ago. We are not talking about The PRESIDING OFF!CER. Who 
hunting weapons necessarily. There yields time? . 
may be some of thoee that are used far Mr. HATCH. Mr. Prealdent.. how 
hunting. Most of these wea.poo.s are mYcll remaina? 
1 
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. T\rn 
minutes and 47 seconds. 
Mr. HATCH. Let me yield 2 minutes 
to the distinguished Sena.tor !rom 
Idaho. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Idaho is recognized for 2 
minutes. 
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Sena.tor 
for yielding. 
Mr. Prt!Sident. It Is dilficult to sum-
marlze in a short period of time what 
the basic arguments are. 
Mr. President, the perswtent growth 
of violent crime in this country has 
given rise to increasingly emoUonal at-
tacks on the ownership of certain flre-
arms. The response to the scourge of 
drug cnme reminds me of a rem.ark 
made around the turn of the century 
when the Nation was embroiled in a 
railroad strike. Henry Cabot Lodge 
said to Teddy Roosevelt, .. Isn't there 
something we can appear to be 
doing?" 
Time does not change politicians 
much, and there are a number of my 
colleagues who are bent on appearing 
to do something. By placing restric-
tions on some firearms, so-called as-
sault weapons, they propose to halt 
. the violence that Invariably accompa-
nies Ulegal drug trade. Now, if we are 
dealing with appearances, It ls easy to 
frighten the public with lurid visions 
of superguns, gum that turn Sunday 
School teachers into maniacal drug 
lords. 
Mr. President, we are dealing here 
with a perception so superficial that it 
amazes me that any tho:ughtful person 
can accept it. We have a DlYoPic pur-
suit of the public perception of legisla-
tive responsiveness-even if the re-
sponse is misguided or misinformed. 
Any firearm bu the potential for 
misuse. Any firearm can be safely and 
lawfully used. Are we to assume that 
if. say, the Senator from Arizona or 
the Senator from Ohio, or the Senator 
from Massachusetts came to possess a 
MAC-10. none of us in this body would 
be safe? Would actually touching and 
holding this sinister looking firearm 
tum these gentlemen into dangerous 
criminals? Of course not. The very 
notion Is absurd. On the other hand, 
there are many violent criminals who 
are & danaer whether armed or un-
armed. Semiautomatic technology ha.s 
nothing whatever to do with the 
human psyche, which is where crime 
and violence truly have their source. 
As I understand, Cain did not. shoot 
Abel with an 8$lW}t rifle. 
It ls appearance, Mr. President. that 
make a MAC-IO different from many 
hunting rifles. And based on that ap-
pearance alone, some of my colleagues 
are prepared to impose senseless re-
strictions on the mlllions of American 
firearms ownen who use semiautoma-
tics ror hunting, target shooting, col-
leetlna and home protect.Ion. I have 
heard it said that none of us need this 
type of firearm. How peculiar tbat 
honest· people should be reqwred Lo 
jt11tify the practice of a constltuUonal 
right! Whal kind of a country would 
this be if we were obliged to prove the 
necessity to practice our reJh:ion. or 
st.ate our vie11·s? 
No. I believe, like Thomas Je!Cerson, 
that: 
Our Jeglsla.tors are not sufflcienUy ap• 
prised or the rightful Hmlts or their power: 
that their true office Is to declare and en-
force only our natural rights and duties. 1.nd 
to t.alle none of them from ua. 
And: 
No freeman shall be debarred the use of 
arms within his own 1andl. 
The very first shot of the Revolution 
was fired because the Government was 
sending its troops to disarm the coloni-
al citizenry and render them helpless 
against the excesses of Parliament. 
The criminals, especially the street 
criminals and dope dealers that the 
police fear, obtain their weapons Ule-
gally in the first place. Many fully 
automatic assault-type weaPons used 
in crime are smuggled in from Central 
America with the dope. We have been 
unable to prevent mlll!ons of illegal 
aliens and tons of illegal narcotics 
from entering our country each year. 
How would a new law which pwlishes 
honest people for the crimes of others 
do anything but set up a more vigor-
ous black market in guns, and further 
enrich the underworld kingpins in our 
country. 
It la particularly ironic that convict-
ed felons would not be a.ffected by the 
reglstrnt.ion scheme set forth in this 
bill. The Supreme Court ha.s ruled 
that convicted felons are exempt from 
registering their cuns. even machine-
111ns. Ha'f/ne8 Y. U.S., 309 U.S. 85. 
Mr. President, the requirements for 
obtaining a 44'13 for all semiautomatic 
firearms listed in th.is bill are a bu-
reaucrat's dream. The pra.ct.lcal imPo&-
sibllity to complying with these stand-
ards ought to be Immediately evJdenL 
Thia bill also would require anyone 
who sold such a. firearm to maintain 
records concerning every subsequent 
sale. ThJs ls absurd. This has nothing 
to do with public safety. It is nothing 
more or less tha.n unwarranted h~ 
ment of honest firearms owners. 
And a.fter all this flurry of paper-
work, we are not one step closer to 
solving real. violent crime. We have 
simply created a new, nonviolent 
crime. Leglsla.tlon produced under 
emotional pressure is rarely effective 
and frequently does more harm than 
good. The answer lies not in a.ppearinc 
to do something about semiautomatic 
firearms." but. In doing somet.hlng 
about crlminallt7 and criminal behav-
ior. 
Mr. President, what we are really 
dealing wit.h is the appearances rather 
than the facts. I do not know whether 
the assault rifle which I own ia illegal 
or not. or immoral or not. It happens 
to be my favorite hunting rifle. lt Is a 
19-03 A-3 .30-06, which I bought a 
number of years ago in a. military con-
formation. It ts suggested ii it holds a 
bayonet It Is unacceptable. Thia mill-
Lary rifle I ha.ve still has a bayonel lug 
on iL I assume it makes me half guilty. 
I own more than one semiautomatic. 
The first rifle I bought as a young 
man ~•as a .22 semiautomatic. I hope 
that does not make me a criminal. 
I own a semiautomatic pistol that 
my father canied when he was pros-
ecuting attorney back In the prohibi-
tion days. When out raiding stills. lt 
was thought necessary to have a fire-
arm to protect yourself. He carried 
that semiautomatic pistol which I still 
have. I take some pride In it. I hope 
that does not make me immoral or a 
criminal. 
The whole thrust of this legislation 
that we seek to strike from the bill 
today is against law-abiding citizens 
like myself. It does not a.ffeet criminal 
acUvity. it has almost no rele\'allce to 
the incidence of crime and will have 
almost no impact on drug-related 
crime at all, as the statistics show, and 
as has been said over and over ag:i.in 
on the floor of the Senate and in the 
committee hearings before this body 
and the other body. We are talking 
about a myth, not a fa.ct. 
I hope the Hatch amendment is 
adopted and that we again refocus our 
attention as we had to do earlier 
against violent crime, not against the 
means which some people believe 
might be used in violent crime. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator's time haa expired. 
Mr. HATCH. I reserve the remainder 
of my time. 
I ask the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona if he could yield ~ minutes to 
me. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Arizona ha., 11 minutes 
and 10 seeonds remaininc. 
Mr. 01:CONCINJ. I am glad to yield. 
Mr. HATCH. Frankly, unless lhe dis-
tinguished Senator has an,yth~ to 
add, I am happy to let. that time run. 
Mr. DECONCINL Mr. President, for 
purposes of someone getting here at 
10-.30 &.m. or being able to get here to 
the vote. I will only say I have to take 
exception with the distinguished Sena· 
tor and friend from Idaho that there 
is no evidence that these gum are 
owned Just by law-abiding citizens. 
These guns are found In criminals' 
hands. They are used by drug deale~ 
and there is no question about it. 
The Senator raises a good point. He 
says, number one. ft is a myth that 
this legislation is going to do a.nythlnc 
a.bout stopping criminal . activity. 
When asked the question. la this legis-
lation going to stop the drug dealers 
from killing our police and innocent 
peaple, I do not know. J do not know. 
What It does do ta put a ba.n on these 
selective guns now that are continu-
ously coming forward when the police 
make arrests on ~ cases and it says 
during that period of Um~ that that 
ban ls there, for the first 1& months 
the Justice- Department will do &. com-
prehensive study of all crime through-
out the country de~ with where 
" 
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guns arc in\'ol\·ed and sec whether or 
not there are less of these guns confis-
cated. 
If it does not work, what have we 
Jost? We have lost 3 years and the Joss 
of this gun. And if it does not work, It 
automatically goes back on the shelf. 
If that study is overwhelming, then 
this body will have to face this issue 
again. It is not going to go away. It is 
not permanent law. It has a sunset 
provision. How much more protection 
can you give to the law-abiding citi-
zens, to the hunter, to the target 
shooter? I do not know what else we 
can do If we really want to attack this 
problem of these guns In the danger-
ous hands of drug dealers. I think this 
bill does it without Infringing on those 
second amendment rights. 
I yield the floor. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Utah controls no addi-
tional time. 
Mr. DECONCINI. I yield 5 minutes 
to the Senator. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Utah Is recognized for 5 
minutes chargeable to the Senator 
from Arizona. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate my esteemed colleague from Ari-
zona yielding to me. I know he ls sin-
cere in making his arguments. I have 
to admit these weapons have appear-
ances that look as if they could cause 
great difficulty. If you can change the 
stocks on those weapons and hand 
grips, you basically have sporting 
rifles. It ls the same action, same ap-
proach that the semiautomatic weap-
ons use. We are not dealing with auto-
matic weapons. 
Second, I think a point we really 
have not emphasized enough is this 
bill is another bureaucratic nightmare 
for the wrong people. The only people 
that this bill Is going to affect will be 
decent, law-abiding, honest collectors, 
plinkers, target shooters, sports 
people. Frankly, they are not out 
there spraying the countryside with 
bullets, except In target practice. They 
love these guns and they love to· own 
them and they love to show them. 
They lO\'e to exchange them among le-
gitimate sporting people. 
I happen to not own any of these. 
The fact of the matter Is, I would not 
mind owning some of them because 
they are nice weapons. But, I do own 
guns that would fit in the category of 
assault weapons that are legitimate 
hunting guns. 
This Is a bureaucratic nightmare 
that comes down on the wrong people. 
It ls not going to do a doggone thing 
about criminal activity in this society, 
not going to do a doggone thing about 
stopping guns going to criminals. They 
are going to get them anyway, and 
they are not going to comply with the 
registration requirements of this par-
ticular bill. · They are not going to 
comply with them. 
al crimes, have to hire attorneys, have Mr. HATCH. Mr. Presiden t, I ask 
to defends themselves, and if they get unanimous consent that the order for 
convicted can never own a gun again. the quorum call be rescinded. 
And they are going to be fined at a The PRESIDING OFFICER. With• 
$1,000 rate, plus 6 months in Jail. out objection. it ls so ordered. 
Why? Because they failed to file a Mr. HATCH. Mr. Pres ident, I ask for 
form or, In some cases, failed to get the yeas and nays. 
the form from somebody who will not The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
give it to them. there a sufficient second? 
It is not simply going down to a gun There is a sufficient second. 
shop and asking them for a form to fill The yeas and nays were ordered. 
out. It ls under certain circumstances Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I 
but not under others. suggest the absence of a Quorum. 
So, Mr. President, if it did something The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
to the criminals, maybe there would clerk will call the roll. 
be an argument here. It only does bad The assistant legislati\·e clerk pro-
things to the hones_t sports people. ceeded to call the roll. 
When ,we came up with the Firearms Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I 
Owners ~rotection Act, the whole Im- ask unanimous consent that the order 
petus driving that act was we were for the quorum call be rescinded. 
tired of sports people being abused by The PRESIDING OFFICER. Wilh-
the Federal . Gov_er1_1ment, under the out objection, it is so ordered. 
most techmcal, ridiculous circum- Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, 
stances. h h t· · ? 
That ls what this does. And it is of- ow muc ime remams. 
fensive to sporting people around this The PRESIDING . OFFICER. The 
country. Frankly, if you really ask the Senator controls 2 mmutes and 8 sec-
law enforcement officers, the rank and 0nds· 
file around this country, the vast ma- Mr. DECONCINI. I. want to thank 
jorlty of them would disagree with Of- Karen Robb, ~enms Burke, and 
ficer Gates, who was always for gun others In my office for the effort and 
control. . work they have given here, and also I 
He has a right to be for that. I am want to thank a n~mber _of Senators 
not going to criticize him for that. cer- who have worked with their colleagues 
tainly the distinguished senator from here to make ~he arguments _the_ las_t 
Massachusetts has a right to feel the couple of days m support of this bill. 
way he does more than almost any- Mr. President, I think we are very 
body. The fa~t of the matter Is, It still close to winning this victory today. I 
does not Justify picking on the decent, hope Members who hav_e not decided, 
law-abiding citizens of this country as they walk in here, will take a look 
who want to collect, target shoot, at these weapons, take a look at these 
plink, and, yes, use these guns for organizations. 
hunting if they want to. It is legiti- The statement has been made the 
mate to hunt. line police officer does not support 
I Just get tired of the Federal Gov- this. I take exception that these orga-
emment, with these types of rules and nizations do not represent the vast 
regulations coming in, making it diffl- majority of their members. These are 
cult for everybody. That is what this law enforcement organizations, for the 
bill does. That is the problem. most part. These are the police and 
More than that, 1f this happens to the cops on the street. These are the 
stay In this bill and it does happen to ones who say we have to have some 
become law, I guarantee that is Just support from you legislators in Wash-
step No. 1, and everybody knows it. !ngton, DC. Many of them are mem-
That Is why these are fought so hard. bers of the NRA, and other second 
Because every time they get one little amendment rights organizations. 
Inch, they will try to take another Mr. President, it is a tough vote for 
yard the next time you tum around. some. I understand that. I have been 
So that is why we have to stand up down that road, believe me, on this 
as sports people and say: Hey, no more issue as well. But it is a safe vote be-
of this. Let us not pick on those who cause It Is the right vote. 
are honest, decent people. Let us go ·. Mr. President, ·I suggest the absence 
after the criminals, and let us do It of a quorum. 
with tough, criminal laws, which, by The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
the way, S. 1970 Is not. That is why we clerk will call the roll. 
are going to debate that plus habeas The assistant legislative clerk pro-
corpus reform right after this vote ceeded to call the roll. 
takes place, and we will show it Is not Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask 
a tough law. unanimous consent that the order for 
Let us go after the real criminals, the quorum call be rescinded. 
the people who are wrecking our socle- The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. With-
ty, and let us not pick on the honest out objection, it is so ordered. 
sports people. . Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise 
Mr. President, I suggest the absence today in opposition to Senate bill 1970 
of a quorum. and In support of the Hatch amend-
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. The ment. We have all heard arguments on • 
The fact of the matter is decent, 
law-abiding citizens are going to be 
hauled Into court, charged with Feder-
·clerk will call the roll. both sides of this issue and the pre-
The assistant legislative clerk pro- ponderance of evidence demands that 
ceeded to call the roll. we reject this kind of firearms law. 
J.9.9D 
I ask 
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\\"e've had testimony from the Justice 
a..~j Tr<>asury Departments, as well as 
;,.n expert at the Smithsonian Inslltu-
t:on. to the effect that military-style 
s.Er.1iautomatic rifles are different only 
in appearance from mlllions of other 
semiautomatic rifles, shotguns, and 
h ~ndgW1S. We har e seen the record of 
gun control and It Is a record of crime 
fighting failure. Assuming that crimi-
nals will abide by gun restrictions Is 
da.'1.gerou:;!y naive. The District of Co-
lum bia Is the best example of the 
eff ec t of gun ban laws. The District 
r...a.s some of the strictest gun control 
la;;;·s In the Nation, yet today our Na-
tion's Capital is known as the "Murder 
Ca;,ita.l." . 
V.' e have also heard from our con-
stituents and their message, at least to 
me. is clear: they oppose unworkable, 
ineffective gun bans and Instead are 
demanding reform of a woefully Inad-
equate criminal Justice system. 
I am going to vote against this gun 
ban proposal, and I encourage my col-
le~es to do so as well. Before you 
cast your votes, I ask you to- remember 
the Constitution and the bill of rights. 
That truly remarkable document has 
stood as our guide for more than 200 
years and must continue to do so. 
While debating anticrlme bills, the 
Senate has discussed at length the 
fourth amendment right against un-
reasonable search and seizure, the 
sixth amendment right to counsel, and 
the eighth amendment right against 
cruel and unusual punishment. It Is 
time that we discuss the second 
amendment as we debate another gun 
control proposal. 
It is clear from the speeches and let-
ters of the day and the Constitution 
itself that the Founding Fathers In• 
eluded the right to freely choose to 
own and use arms In the bill of 
rights-a document guaranteeing indi-
vidual liberties and freedoms. Men like 
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson. 
and Patrick Henry recognized the po-
litical Importance of the citizenry's 
ability to bear arms, a premise which 
has carried on Into the 20th century. 
In the early yea.rs of World War II 
thousands of private citizens, the mili-
tia if you will, brought their own arms 
when they volunteered for service. 
Thousands more rifles. shotguns, and 
handguns were sent to England to arm 
the ci tizenry In prepara tion for a Nazi 
invasion. Yes, \he Founding Fathers 
were remarkably farsighted when It 
came to the political right of private 
citizens to ov:n arms. One need only 
look to the Soviet's desire to dlsann 
the freedom seeking Baltic populace 
to understand this. 
It is also _clear that those who helped 
build this country recognized sport, 
recreation, hunting, collection, and 
self-protection as legitimate reasons 
for possessing arms. What we must ac-
knowledge ts that today's semfauto-
matfe firearms are Just as protected as 
their forebears-muskets and plstoJs...-
were in 1789. Constitutional rights do 
not change because of technological 
ad\'ancements-radio and t.e!cv!slon 
are protec ted by til e first. am<>ndm<'nt 
t hough neither existed 200 years ago. 
S imilarly, semiautomatic fi rearms are 
pro tected by the second amendment, 
and 20 million Americans have exer-
cised their rights and pcssess such a 
firearm. 
A vote for S . 1970 or other restrictive 
proposals w!ll not affect criminals or 
reduce the violent crime rate. A vote 
for S. 1970, however, will deny millions 
of Americans choice and in doing so 
will \'iolate the bill of rights that so 
many Americans have fought to pre-
serve. 
Finally, another point should be 
made. No citizen has the right to 
abuse their second amendment right 
to bear arms. Anyone who breaks the 
!aw, anyone who uses a firearm in a 
crime, can be and should be fully pun-
ished under the law. Law abiding gun 
owners should not be asked, hov.-ever. 
to give up their rights because of 
criminals-criminals who would ignore 
gun control laws anyway. I hope that 
the advocates of these restrlcti'.le gun 
control amendments would advocate 
victim's rights and stronger criminal 
law-enforcement against the perpetra-
tors of crime, rather than bills tha,t re-
strict the constitutional rights of law-
abiding citizens. For unless we crack 
down on criminals and get them off 
the streets, we cannot solve the prob-
lem that legitimately concerns Ameri-
can society. 
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President. a. crime 
epidemic ts sweeping acro.ss our coun-
try today. This epidemic has become 
so common and so pervasive that 
many Americans cannot remember the 
days when families could sit on their 
front porches without fea.r of harass• 
ment by drug dealers. when one could 
walk down public streets at night 
without fear of being robbed or 
mugged, and even killed. In those 
days, young mothers allowed children 
to play freelyin public parks, and one 
could drive down a. street at night 
without the fear of geU.lng lost and 
wondering how safe it was to step and 
ask directions. I remember when 
seeing a policeman patrol a local 
school was strange; now it ls a 
common, dally occurrence. 
Crime and adjusting to the fear of 
crime have become a. way of life for 
many. I am saddened to listen to. the 
n ightly news and hear of criminals 
snuffing out innocent lives. I reul of 
young men being viciously murdered 
for a pair of Nike sneakers, a leather 
Jacket, or $20. 
The statistics that support. the grow-
Ing crime rate are a.ppaJllng. For ex-
ample, fn 1951, New Yorlt tallied 244 
homicides. In 1989, that. n umber 
reached nearly 1,900. Here In th0 Dis-
trict of Columbia., murders average 
cl01re to one a day. Nationally, In 1951, 
there 'll'ere 3..2' policemen for every 
felony committed In the United States; 
this year nearly 3.2 felonies will be 
committed per every police officer. 
I k :1011.·. Mr. President, that some 
th ing 11:i.s to change. We have t.o rto1 
the crimes that are distorting and d is 
ru pting the way of life for so many in 
nocen t, law-respecting Americans. 
The bi!I that we are debating t.odaJ 
attempts to do just that. The anti-
crime measure before us attempts t«l 
provide a comprehensive appro:u:h t(l 
fi ghting the crime epidemic so preva-
lent In America today. By expa.ndfng 
death penalty offenses, limiting the 
number of Federal appeals, and per-
mitting the use of illegally seized m-
dence under certain circumstances, we 
are upping the price of criminal acts. 
What Is especially Important In thfs 
measure, however, Is the provision 
that would make It more difficult for 
criminals to obtain the weapons t.llat 
are wreaking the havoc across our 
country today. The antia.ssault 
v.eapon language contained In S. 1970, 
'll·ould prohibit the transfer, shippiDg. 
receiving, transport, or possession of 
nine specific assault weapons. On July 
7, 1989, by Executive Order, the Presi-
dent permanently prohibited the im-
portation of 43 types of semlautomatJc 
"·eapons .. Even though these weapon& 
are banned from being Imported, man-
uf acturers here In the United Stat.es 
have turned to producing and sellinf 
virtual copies of the banned weapons. 
The language In this bill would ban 
that practice by prohibiting the ~ 
ping, receiving. poss~ion, or transfer 
of nine of the most. common types at 
a.ssa.ult weapons. 
Thls weapon ban ls desperately 
needed. Such a ban will make it lss 
convenient for crlminals to dh;toru, 
~ and assault innocent families 
and tndlviduals. The Judl:cla.r:, ~ 
committee on the Conatitution heard 
oral testimony on the merits of ba& 
ning assault weapons In May Ul89. 
Toe committee was told that assault 
weapons are involved ln virtually even 
drug seizure taking place today alone 
the Southwest border of the United 
States. A study condocted by the At-
lanta. Journal concluded that an u-
sault weapon Is 20 tfmes more like)'y to 
be used in a crime than Is a conven- · 
tional firearm. The same study Indi-
cates that even though assault we~ 
ons account for Jess than 1 percent ot 
the total number of firearms privately 
ovmed, these weapom surfaced in ap-
proximately 30 percent of all firearms 
t.raeed to organized crime, lncludlng 
drug cartel activity, gun traffickinw. 
and crimes committed by terrorbu in 
the UnitetJ States during 1988 and the 
first quarter of 1989. 
Mr. President, l want everybody to 
grasp a distinction here. The nine as-
sa ult weapons listed that would be 
tuumed by this legislation are not 
rifles for sportsmen, nor are they 
hunting rifles or weapons commonly 
useci by Jaw-abiding cltf'Ae~ to protect 
their lives or property. These- guns are 
semiautomatic assault weaPons. They 
have names like .. streetswceper, • 
•bushmaster," and "commando ... In a 
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ci\'ilizcd society, nobody needs to own 
suc h an assault weapon. The only indi-
viduals who need t hese weapons are 
criminals, especially drug dealers. 
These are the weapons that allow the 
criminals to be better armed than our 
police officers. The a\'erage citizen 
does not keep a streetsweeper or a 
MAC-11 by his bedside to protect his 
life or property. 
Now, I have always opposed any 
measure that would lead to the confis-
cation of guns used for sports or hunt-
ing purposes, or the confiscation of 
guns used by law-abiding citizens for 
the protection of life and property, 
and I will continue to oppose such 
measures. However, there is no need 
for private citizens to own assault 
weapons. 
Contrary to the assert ions of some, 
the vote on t his measure is not a vote 
on gun control- it ls a vote on crime 
control. T he law enforcement commu-
nity including the National Associa-
tion of Police Organizations, Inc., rep-
resenting well over 100,000 rank-and-
file State and local police officers vig-
orously support this language. It is 
time for us to stop support ing our 
criminals and start supporting the law 
enforcement community. To win the 
war on crime, they need our help. I 
hope that my colleagues will Join me 
in supparting the fight against crime 
and remain firm on keeping the as-
sault weapon language In S. 1970. . 
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I rise in 
strong support of the Hatch motion to 
strike the DeConcinl gun ban Included 
In the pending legislation. With only 
technical changes, title IV of S. 1970 ls 
the p.me language offered by the 
senior Senator from Arizona and ap-
proved last year by the Judiciary Com-
mittee on a 7-6 vote with one member 
absent. It bans 14 spectflc semiauto-
matic firearms and would make crimi-
nals of American citizens who seek to 
purchase or t ransfer any of the more 
than 600,000 of those guns currently 
owned In the United States. It ls not 
crime control; lt ls gun control, pure 
and simple, and It would not be includ-
ed in any true crime control package. 
All of us, Mr. President, are shocked 
and outraged when horrible crimes 
like the Stockton and Louisville trage-
dies occur. Our hearts go out to the 
victims and our anger toward the vio-
lent perpetrators who commit such 
acts runs deep. We all feel a need to do 
something in hopes of preventing such 
acts In the future. S. 1970 ls not the 
answer, and even if the Senate strikes 
the gun ban lanaguage, as I expect we 
will do shortly, the remaining bill will 
require serious revision before lt will 
truly be useful ln getting criminals off 
the streets. 
mate ch annels. Instead, they acqu ire 
firearms and other contraband 
th rough the black markets which exist 
across t he country. Moreo,·er, law en-
forcement statistics show tha t mili-
tary-style semiautomatic firearms are 
rarely featured in crime. In fact, evi-
dence from cities like New York, Los 
Angeles, Washington, DC, and San 
Francisco indicates that semiautomat-
ic military-style firearms play a minis-
cule role in overall violent crime. 
Some have said the semiautomatic 
mechanism is the problem and it 
should be banned. I can assure my col-
leagues such a proposal would not be 
accepted lightly by the 20 million 
Americans who own a semiauto rifle, 
shotgun, or handgun. Why do so many 
Americans own these guns? Sport, 
recreation, collection, and self-defense. 
And approximately 3 million semiauto 
mili tary-style r ifles are owned by law-
abiding cit izens for exactly the same 
reasons. 
• This legislation by its very nature 
can only affect honest citizens. The 
DeConcinl language In this bill re-
quires private citizens to keep records 
of the firearms they own- and any 
subsequent transfer of a listed gun-
for the Government for the first time 
ln U.S. history. The enforcement 
nightmare created by this provision ls 
truly mind-boggling. Does anyone en-
vision local law enforcement officers 
checking gun owners at target ranges 
or gun clubs for their 4473 forms? Are 
BATF or Treasury agents going to 
attend rifle competitions like the na-
tional matches at Camp Perry to In· 
spect the records of the competitors? I 
hope not; the law enforcement com-
munity has far greater concerns to 
deal with. 
On the other hand, does anyone 
expect criminals who may passess a 
prohibited firearm to keep the records 
required using 4473 forms? If the pur-
pose of the bill.Js to punish criminals, 
why then ls the penalty. a misdemean-
or? Is that to make S. 1970 less objec-
tionable to our constltutents as we try 
to explain our position and vote? One 
fact I can attest to is that whatever 
the penalty for not keeping records, 
criminals will not comply or be de-
terred from acquiring guns illegally. 
Only swift, sure, severe punishment 
for using a firearm will help reduce 
gun use in crime; and those laws are 
already on the books. What we have to 
do is enforce them. 
I strongly encourage my colleagues 
to vote for the Hatch motion to strike, 
and let us get on with the demanding 
work necessary to shape S. 1970 into a 
true crime control package. 
· Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
will vote against the effort to strike 
the firearms provision from the crime 
bill. 
I have had an opportunity to review 
yesterday's debate on the gun ban, 
and one question sticks ln my mind-
who will be affected by this bill? That 
Is the crux of this debate. The Justice 
Department tells . us that criminals, 
the very persons we want to control, 
do not acquire guns through legit!-
I do so, not because It is the entire 
answer to violent crime In our Nation, 
but because it ls a reasonable, moder-
ate and feasible recognition that our 
Nation can accept some limits on fire-
arms ownership when the firearms in 
question hare no rn lid h unt ing or 
sporting purpose. 
We already limit the ownership of 
mach ineguns, because they ha,·e no 
\'&lid hunting or sporting purposes. We 
should also do so with the firearms 
specified In this legislation, because 
they too have no valid hunting or 
sporting purpose. 
President Bush endorsed this \'iew 
last year when he barred the importa• 
tlon of 43 types of assault weapons 
which were determined to have no 
valid hunting or sporting purpose. 
The effect of the language in the bill 
before us is to conform U.S. domestic 
law to the action President Bush took 
with respect to Imported weapons. 
The bill goes directly to and is limit-
ed to only the firearms specifically 
named in the law. 
These are listed by name: Norinco, 
Mitchell, and Poly Technologies Avto-
mat Kalashnlkovs, all models; Action 
Arms Israeli Military Industries UZI 
and Galil; Beretta AR-70 [SC-70]; 
Colt AR-15, and CAR-15; Fabrlque 
Natlonale FN/FAL, FN/LAR, and 
FNC, MAC-10 and MAC-11; Steyr 
AUG; Intratec TEC-9; and Streets-
weeper /Striker 12. 
The claim that this law would limit 
ovmership or use of regular hunting 
rifles is entirely false. By Its specific 
language, It does not affect any weap-
ons other than those listed by name. . 
The claim that this specific list 
somehow reaches to all long-arms Is an 
example of the use of misleading rhet-
oric and overstatement. It is false. The 
law would reach precisely what is 
listed and nothing more. 
The legislation further requires that 
an 18-month study be undertaken to 
determine if the reduction in supply of 
these weapons has an effect on the 
firepower that our police face on the 
streets every day. 
What the opponents of this 1eglsla-
tlon do not like to acknowledge is that 
they are · helping make our streets 
unsafe for our police. · 
Despite their law-and-order rhetoric, 
the opponents of this legislation are 
making sure that our police continue 
to be outgunned as they try to protect 
all of us from criminals. 
The facts are simple: These weap-
ons-not. hunting rifles or target 
rifles- but these military-style semi-
automatic weapons make up less than 
one-half of 1 percent of the firearms' 
currently owned in our Nation. ' ' 
Fewer than 1 gunowner In 200 even 
owns one of these weapons; 199 gun-
owners out of every 200 do not own 
them, have seen no need to buy them, 
and do not use them. That is the fact. 
But the . aspect of that fact which 
disturbs our police ls that although 
the actual number of these l!;Uns In cir-
culation now ls minimal, they account 
for almost a third of all the weapons 
traced to organized crime, terrorism, 
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The test imony of American police 
officers from \·irtually every State of 
the Union supports this point. 
Police officers use and respect fire-
arms. Many of them are hunters and 
sportsmen in their free time. Yet the 
vast majority of police officers support 
efforts to limit the availability of 
these weapons. 
There is a simple reason for that. 
The difference to a policeman facing a 
suspect with a handgun or a suspect 
armed with the equivalent of a mili-
tary weapon is the difference between 
police work and guerrilla warfare. 
We should not be tolerating a situa-
tion in which our police fear for their 
lives because the weapons wielded by 
drug gangs are more powerful than 
the weapons the police themselves are 
allowed to use. Those who are so loud 
in their protestations of support for 
our police need to think about that. 
We are sending dedicated police men 
and women into the streets of our 
· cities to face the equivalent of warfare 
because a very vocal special interest 
wants to exert an extreme position on 
the ownership of firearms. 
I am aware of the concenis that 
some have raised about the precedent 
of interfering with the legitimate 
rights of law-abiding Americans to 
own and use firearms legally. I am also 
aware that some have sought to ex-
ploit those concerns by claiming, in-
correctly, that this legislation threat-
ens the ownership of semiautomatic 
hunting weapons. 
Efforts to misinform hunters and 
sportsmen are nothing new in this 
field, unfortunately. We saw the same 
disinformation efforts launched 
against the penetrating ammunition 
that made police body armor useless. 
We saw the same misinformation 
when we began the effort to prevent 
the widespread development of fire-
arms that could defeat detection by 
metal detectors at airports and other 
public places vulnerable to armed ter-
rorists. 
So in order to counteract the misin-
formation. let me clearly state now: 
This bill will have no effect on any le-
gitimate sportsman in the State of 
Maine or elsewhere. It will not prevent 
the purchase, ownership or legal use 
of any semiautomatic hunting weapon. 
Those whose fears have been raised 
by the misinformation campaign 
about this legislation should ask them-
selves If their rights have been in-
fringed by the ban on cop-killer bul-
lets or plastic guns. Have Americans 
become less free since those laws took 
effect? The answer; obviously, is no. 
We have simply recognized that cur-
rent-day threats demand laws that re-
flect current realities. 
Our Nation has accepted restrictions 
on the private ownership of machine-
guns with no apparent loss of Individ-
ual liberty. Most of our States require 
permits for concealed weapons. 
Most of our States have firearms 
laws of various kinds on the books. 
And most Americans who own and use 
firearms legally find those changes in 
our society acceptable. 
In Maine, for example. possession or 
use for sporting purposes of semiauto-
matic firearms with magazine capac-
ities of more than five cartridges ls 
barred by State law. I have never met 
a Maine sportsman who believes that a 
hunter needs. more firepower than 
that. Maine's law enforcement officers 
have never had to prosecute a person 
for using such equipment in hunting. 
The Maine law and Maine experi-
ence reflect the overwhelming truth 
about semiautomatic assault-style 
weapons. They are not weapons used 
by sportsmen or hunters. They are not 
firearms for hunting. And in Maine, 
their use for such a purpose Is illegal. 
So the question remains: What value 
do we serve by retaining the ready 
availability of such firearms? 
I am also aware that this legislation, 
by itself, will not solve the problem of 
violent crime or halt the criminal 
misuse of firearms in our society. 
But no action, by itself, w!ll solve 
that problem. And if we subject every 
proposal to the test of perfection, we 
would do nothing at all in the face of 
crime and the misuse of firearms. 
The legislation is moderate, limited, 
and specific in its reach and its intent. 
It does not do more or promise more 
than a modest reduction in the fire-
power that our police must face on the 
streets each day. 
Accordingly, I will support its reten-
tion in the bill. 
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, earlier in 
this debate, I voted against the Metz-
enbaum amendment on assault weap-
ons. That amendment would have ex-
panded on the provisions of the 
DeConcini assault weapons bill by 
adding 12 more types of guns to the 
list of banned weapons, among other 
provisions. I voted against that amend-
ment because I was concerned that 
some of the guns on that expanded list 
could have legitimate uses in sports 
and recreation. I do not believe in ban-
ning guns that are used legally and re-
sponsibly by hunters and other sports-
men. 
I do favor the DeConcini bill, howev-
er. It achieves a reasonable balance be-
tween the legitimate interests Of hun-
ters and sportsmen and the compelling 
need to protect the public and law en-
forcement officers from dangerous as-
sault weapons with no legitimate pur-
pose except mayhem. I will, therefore 
vote against the Hatch amendment to 
strike the DeConcini language from 
the bill. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All 
time has expired. Under the previous 
order, the question now is on agreeing 
to the amendment of the Senator 
from Utah. The yeas and nays have 
been ordered. The clerk will call the 
roll. 
The assistant legislative clerk called 
the roll. 
The result was announced-yeas 48, 
nays 52, as follows: 
It will not take from any legal owner 
of these weapons the right to own 
them. It does not prohibit the legal 
transfer of these weapons between 
law-abiding collectors. Its paperwork [Rollcall Vote No. 103 Leg.J 
requirements are not onerous. YEAS-48 
And unlike the slogans of its oppo- Arnutronr Garn 
nents-which provide no answer to Baucus Gorton 
any of the real-world problems-this Blneaman Gramm 
I . I t' t i li t' Bond Gras&Jey egIS a 10n con a ns a se -correc mg Boschwitz Hatch 
feature. Breaux Hefltn 
If it cannot be shown to have re- Bryan Heinz 
duced the criminal circulation of these ~~~ :~:~ 
guns in 3 years, it will automatically Cochran Humphrey 
cease to have effect. Cohen Johnston 
If it does show a reduction in the Danforth Kasten 
· Domenic! Lott 
criminal circulation of these weapons, ourenberger Lurar 
Congress and the public will have the Exon Mack 
opportunity to debate again the value Ford McCain 
of allowing them to be readily avail- NAYS-52 
able. Adams Fowler 
Maine is the home of more hunters Ataka OleM 
per capita than virtually any other ·. Bentsen Gore 
State In the Union. Maine's hunters Biden Graham 
Boren Ha.rl<ln and sportsmen know my voting record Bradley Hatfield 
in strong support of the constitutional Bumpers Inouye 
right to bear arms. Maine's hunters Burdick Jerrordl 
d ts disti · h b Byrd Kaasebaum an spor men can nguIS e- Cha!ee Kennedy 
tween reasonable laws and unreason- Conrad Kerrey 
able restrictions on their rights. cramton Kerry 
If I thought this measure would in- D'Amat.o Kohl 
f i b De.schle Lautenberr r nge unreasona ly on any Maine oeconclnl Leahy 
hunter, I would not support it. But Dixon Levin 
careful examination of the law-not Dodd Lieberman 

































not the hysterical rhetoric about what So, the amendment <No. 1681) was 
might happen-careful examination of rejected. 
the law Itself persuades me it will not Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair. 
harm the interests of any law-abiding Mr. DECONCINI addressed thf' 
hunter in Maine or any other State. Chair. 
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Republ ican leader. 
Mr. DOLE. I suggest the absence of 
a quorum . 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
absence of a quorum has been suggest-
ed. The clerk will call the roll. 
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. 
DrxoK). Without objection, ft 1s so or-
dered. 
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I move to 
reconsider the vote on the Hatch 
amendment, No. 1681. I ask for the 
yeas and nays. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there a sufficient second? 
There 1s a sufficient second. 
The yeas and nays were ordered. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
majority leader. 
UlfAJfU(OUS~NSENTAGREDalff 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that the vote 
on the motion to reconsider the Hatch 
amendment occur at 1:30 p.m. today; 
that under the previous order the 
Sena.te now proceed to consideration 
of the Graham amendment and that 
the agreement go..-erning debate and 
disposition of that amendment be 
modified to permit the Interruption 
thereof at 1:30 for the vote on the 
motion to reconsider made by the Sen-
a.tor from Kansas. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ia 
there objection? 
The majority leader. 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I 
modify my request. Under the previ-
ous order, the Graham amendment 
will be accepted by voice vote and then 
the Senate will be on the Thurmond 
amendment. So I modify It to state 
that the Senate will be considering the 
Thurmond amendment. and the previ-
ous order be modified to permit Inter-
ruption of the debate on that amend-
ment a.t 1:30 for the vote on the 
motion to reconsider. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there objection to the unanimous re-
quest of the majority leader? 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Reserving the 
right to object, and I ru.ve no Inten-
tion or objecting, 1s It my understand-
Ing that no quorum call could be put 
In prior, in order to preclude the vote 
occurring at 1:30, and that no quorum 
call could be put In at 1:30? 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. we 
have an understanding that the vote 
will occur at 1:30. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. I thank the 
majority and minority leader. 
Mr. DOLE. I ask one additional re-
quest; U In fact the motion to recon- · 
sider prevails, that there be an imme-
diate vote on the amendment? 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
suggest the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The legis lati\·e clerk proceeded to 
call the roll. 
" 2257. Mmdat ory stays of execution: dura-
tion: limits on stay& of execu-
tion: successive peUtiona Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that the order 
for lhe quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With• 
out objection, It Is so ordered. 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
renew my request. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. ls 
there obJectlon to the unanimous-con-
sent request o! the majority leader? 
Without objection, It ts so ordered. 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
thank my colleagues and th~ distin-
guished Republl.ea.n leader, the manag-
ers, and other Senators. 
Mr. President, 1 yield the floor and 
suggest the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The legislative clerk proceeded to 
call the roll. 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. 
LlEBERMA.l'f}. Without objection. it is so 
ordered. 
Mr. BIDEN. I yield the floor. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Florida. 
Under the previous order the Sena-
tor from Florida {Mr. GRAHAKJ is now 
recognized to offer an amendmenL 
AMENDMENT NO. 16U 
<Purpose: To reform habeas corp\Jll 
procedures> 
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I send 
an amendment to the desk, which wfil 
be tn the form of a modification to 
title II of the bill now pending. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
amendment wm be stated. 
The assistant legislative clerk read 
as follows: 
The Senator from Florida [Mr. GltAHAM), 
for himself, Mr. DECONCIJU, and Mr. BRTAN, 
proposes an amendment numbered 1688.. 
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the reading or 
the amendment be dispensed with. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, It ls so ordered. 
The amendment ls as follows: 
Strike title II of the bill and Insert the fol-
lowing: 
TITLE II-HABEAS CORPUS REFORM 
SBC. 2tl . SIIORT TlTLlt. 
This Utle may be cited a.s &.he "Habeu 
Corpus Reform Act of 1990". 
SIU:. :0:. SPECIAL HABEAS CORPCS PROCEDURES 
IN CAPITAL ('ASES. 
Ca) llf GENEitAL-Part IV of t!Ue 28, 
United States Code, is amended by inserUng 
Immediately following chapter 153 the fol-
lowing new title: 
"CHAPTER 154-SPECIAL HABEAS 
CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL 
CASES 
"Sec. 
"2256. Prisoners in State CU$tody subject lo 
capital sentence; appointment 
of coumel; reQUtrement of rule 
of court or statute; procedu~ 
fOl' appointment 
··2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time 
requirement; tolling rules 
"225.9. Certl(icat.e of probable cause Inappli-
cable 
"2260. Co\lru;el In capital cases; trial &Dd 
post-conviction; st.a.nd&rds 
"§ t2:i6. Prlsonen Jn Stsu custody aubJect lo rap, 
ital aewnce: appolnnnent of counael: reqllirr-
fflffll of rate ef court or statute: prottdUta f« 
appoint~t 
"<a> This ctt.pter shall apply to cases aru-
lng undef' eecUon 2254 of this ti.tie brought 
by pri.sonen in State cusLody who are aub-
Jeci, to a caplt.al sentence. It shall apply only 
If 3Ubsection Cb> ls satisfied. 
~cb> This chapter Is applicable If a State 
establishes by rule of Its court of last resort 
or by statute a mechanism for the appoint-
ment, compensation, and payment or rea-
sonable fees and litigation expenses of com• 
petent counsel consistent wJth sect.ion 2260 
of this title. 
''(cl No counsel appointed pursuant to 
subsection Cb) to represent a St.ate prisoner 
under capital sentence shall have pre\•iously 
represented the prisoner at trial or on direct 
appeal In the case for which the appoint-
ment Is made unless the prisoner and coun-
sel exl)T'eSSly request eontlnued representa-
tion. 
"(dl The ineffectiveness or Incompetence 
of counsel appointed under this chapter 
durtng State of Federal collateral post-coo-
v!ctlon proceedings shall not be a ground 
for relief 1n a proceeding arising under thJa 
chapter or section 2254 of this UUe. This . 
llmlt.atiop shall not preclude the appoint-
ment of different counsel at any phase of 
State or Federal post-conviction proceed-
ings. 
"§ %257. Mandatory ataya or uecatlo11; duratioa: 
limits on stays or u«utlo11: 1111ttm1ive peti-
tions 
~ca> UPoll the entry In a court of record of 
an order pursuant to aectton 2260 or thls 
title. a warrant or order setting an eneu-
Uon date for a State prisoner shall be stand 
upon application to any court that wowd 
have JurisdlcUon over any proceedings filed 
punuant to section 2254 ol thia title. The 
application shall recite that the State has 
Invoked the post-conviction review proce-
dures of th1s chapter and that the sched· 
u!ed execution Is subject to stay. 
"Cbl A llta:, of execution granted l)Uffuant 
to subsection Ca) shall expire !I-
.. (1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas 
corpus peUUon under section 22M of t.hll 
UUe within the turu! required m section 
2258 of this tlUe; or 
.. <2> UPon completion of district court and 
court of appeal$ review under section 2%54 
or thls title the petition for relief bl denied 
and-
"{A) the thne for .filing a petition for certi-
ora.rl ms expired a.nd no petition ha.s been 
ftJed; 
· "(B) & Umely pet.!Uon for certiorari waa 
filed and I.be Supreme Court denied the pe-
tition; or 
"'1:Cl a timely petition for eertlon.rf was 
flied and upon consideration of the case. the 
Supreme Court disposed of It In a manner 
that left the capita.I ~ntence undlsturbed; 
O!' 
"<31 & State prbooer unde.r captt.aJ sen-
tence waJves Ute eight to pursue habeas 
corpus review unde.r section 2254 ol this 
title- . 
"tAl before a court of competent Jurisdic-
tion: 
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--c c > af t<'r ha1 in ~ bcrn ad l' isrd of the con-
M'Qucnc,-s of h is decision. 
--lc-1 If one of the cond it ions prol'ided In 
subs~t:on <bl is satisfied, no Federal court 
thrrea ft C' r shall hal'e the authority lo enter 
a s tay of execution or grant relief In a cap-
Ital case unless-
.. < I> the basis for the stay and request fOr 
reli ef is a claim not previously presented by 
the prisoner in State or Federal courts, and 
the fa ilure to raise the claim is-
.. <A > t he result of Slate action in violation 
of the Constit ution or laws of the United 
States; 
"(BJ the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new Federal right that is retro-
acti\·el}· applicable; or 
"!Cl based on a factual predicate that 
could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence; and 
"(2> the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient, if proven, to undermine the 
court's confidence In the jury's determina-
tion of guilt on the offense or offenses for 
which the death penalty was imposed, or In 
the rnJidity of the sentence of death. 
"Ii Zt.'>11. Filing of habea~ corpus petition; time re-
qui~ment; tolling rule~ 
"Ca> Any petition for habeas corpus relief 
under section 2254 of this title must be filed 
In the a.pproprlate district court not later 
than 365 days after the date of filing In the 
State court of last resort of an order Issued 
in compliance with section 2260<aH2> of this 
title. 
"(b> The time requirements established by 
this section shall be tolled-
"(}> from the date that a petition for cer-
tiorari is filed In the Supreme Court until 
the date of flnal disposition of the petition 
if a State prisoner seeks review of a capital 
sentence that has been affirmed on direct 
appeal by the court of last resort of the 
State or has otherwise become final for 
State law pruposes; 
"<2> during any periods In which a State 
prisoner under capital sentence has proper-
ly filed request for post-conviction review 
pending before 11, State court of competent 
jurisdiction which period shall, lf all State 
fil ing rules are met In a timely manner, run 
continuously from the date that the State 
prisoner initially files for post-conviction 
re\•iew until final disposition of the case by 
the State court of last resort, and further 
until final disposition of the matter by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, If a 
timely petition for review Is filed; and 
"13> du.Ing an additional period not to 
exceed 90 days, if counsel for the State pris-
oner-
"CA> moves for an extension of time in the 
United States district court that would have 
proper jurisdiction over the case upon the 
filing of a habeas corpus petition under sec-
tion 225-4 of this title; and 
"CB) makes a showing of good cause for 
counsel's inabilty to file the habeas corpus 
petition within the 365-day period estab• 
lished by this section. 
"Ii tt:;9. urtificate of probable cause inapplicable 
"The requtrement of a cerificate of proba-
ble cause In order to appeal from the dis• 
trlct court to the court of appeals does not 
apply to habeas corpus cases subject to this 
chapter except when a second or successive 
petition is filed. 
~11 2260. (.,unsel in capital cases; trial and post-
C'om·irt.ion; •landard• 
"Cal A mechanism for the provision of 
counsel services to Indigents sufficient to 
invoke the provisions of this chapter shall-
"< 1 > provide for counsel to-
"CA> indigents charged with offenses for 
which capital punishment Is sought; 
--c s > ind igent s who hal'e been sent r nced to 
death and who seek appellate or collateral 
rc1·iew in State court; and 
"{C) indigents who have been sentenced to 
death and who seek certiorari review in the 
United States Supreme Court; and 
"( 2) provide for the entry of an order of a 
court of record appointing one or more 
counsel to represent the prisoner except 
upon a Judicial determination <after a hear-
ing, If necessary> that-
"(AJ the prisoner Is not Indigent; or 
"CB> the prisoner knowingly and Intelli-
gently waives the appointment of counsel. 
"(bHlHA> Except as provided In para-
graph <2>. at least one attorney appointed 
pursuant to this chapter before trial, if ap-
plicable, and at least one attorney appointed 
pursuant to this chapter after trial, if appli• 
cable, shall have been certified by a state-
wide certification authority. The States may 
elect to create one or more certification au-
thorities (but not more than three such cer-
lfication authorities> to perform the respon-
sibilities set forth In sub-paragraph <Bl. 
"CB> The certification authority for coun-
sel at any stage of a capital case shall be-
"(il a special committee, constituted by 
the State court of last resort or by State 
statute, relying on staff attorneys of a de• 
fender organization, members of the private 
bar, or both; _ 
"(ii) a capital litigation resource center. 
relying on staff attorneys, members of the 
private bar, or both; or 
"(iii> a statewide defender organization, 
relying on staff attorneys, members of the 
private bar, or both. 
"(Cl The certification authority shall-
"Ci> certify attorneys qualified to repre-
sent persons charged with capltaJ offenses 
or sentenced to death; 
"(ii) draft and annually publish proce-
dures and standards by which attorneys are 
certified and rosters of certified attorneys; 
and 
"!Iii> periodically review the roster of cer• 
tlfied attorneys, monitor the performance 
of all attorneys certified, and withdraw cer-
tification from any attorney who falls to 
meet high performance standards In a case 
to which the attorney Is appointed, or falls 
otherwise to demonstrate continuing compe-
tence to represent prisoners in capital litiga-
tion. 
"(2) In a State that has a publicly-funded 
public defender system that Is not organized 
on a statewide basis, the requirements of 
paragraph (1) shall have been deemed to 
have been satisfied If at least one attorney 
appointed pursuant to this chapter before 
trial shall be employed by a State funded 
public defender organization, and If the 
highest court of the State finds on an 
annual basis that the standards and proce-
dures established and maintaJned by such 
organization <which have been filed by such 
organization and reviewed by such court on 
an annual basis> Insure that the attorneys 
working for such organization demonstrate 
continuing competence to represent lndi• 
gents in capital litigation. 
"(cl If a State has not elected to comply 
with the provisions of subsection <b>, In the 
case of an appointment made before trial, at 
least one attorney appointed under this 
chapter must have been admitted to prac-
tice In the court In which the prosecution Is 
to be tried for not less than 5 years, and 
must have not less than 3 years' experience 
In the trial of felony prosecutions in that 
court. 
"(dl If a State has not elected to comply 
with the provisions of subsection <b>, In the 
case of an appointment made after trial, at 
least one attorney appointed under this 
chapter must have been admitted to prac-
tice In the court of last resort of the State 
for not less than 5 years. and mus t har r had 
not less than 3 years · experi ence In the han • 
dling of appeals In · that State courts in 
felony cases. 
--c e> Notwithstanding any other prorision 
of this section, a court, for good cause, may 
appoint another attorney whose back-
ground, knowledge or experience would oth• 
erwise enable the attorney to properly rep-
resent the defendant, with due consider-
ation of the seriousness of the possible pen-
alty and the unique and complex nature of 
the litigation. 
" Cf> Upon a finding In ex parte proceed-
ings that Investigative, expert or other serv-
ices are reasonably necessary for the repre-
sentation of the defendant, whether In con-
nection with Issues relating to guilt or tssues 
relating to sentence, the court shall author-
ize the defendant's attorney to obtain such 
services on behalf of the defendant and 
shall order the payment of fees and ex-
penses therefor, under subsection <g>. Upon 
finding that timely procurement of such 
services could not practically await prior au-
thorization. the court may authorize the 
pro\·isfon of any payment of services nunc 
pro tune. 
"Cg> Notwithstanding the rates and maxi• 
mum limits generally applicable to criminal 
cases and any other provision of law to the 
contrary, the court shall fix the compensa-
tion to be paid to an attorney appointed 
under this subsection Cother than State em• 
ployeesl and the fees and expenses to be 
paid for Investigative, expert, and other rea-
sonably necessary services authorized under 
subsection <cl, at such rates or amounts as 
the court determines to be reasonably nec-
essary to carry out the requirements of this 
subsection.". 
(b) AMENDMENTS TO TABLI!: OJ' CHAPTERS.-
The table of chapters for part IV of title 28, 
United States Code, Is amended by lnsertln& 
after the Item for chapter 153 the following: 
"154. Special habeas corpus proce-
dures In capital cases...................... 2256" 
SEC. 303. LAW C'OSTROLI.ING IN FEDERAL HABEAS 
PROCEEDINGS. 
<a> IN GENERAL.-Chapter 153 of title 28, 
United States Code, Is amended by Inserting 
a.fter section 2255 the following: 
" § 225SA. Law controllinr Frderal habeas corpu8 
procttdinp 
"All claims In habeas corpus petitions 
brought by State prisoners In State custody 
who are subject to a capital sentence shall 
be governed by the law as It was when the 
petitioner's sentence became final, supple-
mented by any Interim change In the law 
promulgated by the Supreme Court, lf the 
Supreme Court determines, In light of the 
purpose to be served by the change, the 
extent of the reliance on previous Jaw by 
law enforcement authorities, and the effect 
on the administration of Justice, that It 
would be Just to give prisoners the benefit 
of the Interim change In law.". 
(b) .AMENDMENT TO TABLI!: OF S£CTIONS.-
The table of sections for chapter 153 of title 
28, United States Code, Is amended by In-
serting afLer the Item for section 2255 the 
following: 
"2255A. , Law controlling Federal habeas 
corpus proceedings.". 
(c) APPLICABILITY . OJ' SECTIO!t.-The 
amendments made by this section shall 
apply only to prisoners whose sentences 
have become final after the date of enact-
ment of this Act. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under 
the previous order, the Graham 
amendment is agreed to and shall be 
considered as original text for the pur-
pose of further 1Unendment. 
C')~P.Ntl\oA\ Te~~ '" ~11 -r-.t•.C.. ;~ 
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agreed to. 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Presidenl, I suggest 
the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeoed to call the rolL 
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the Quorum eaH be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER CMr. 
CONRAD). Without obJecUon. it ls so or-
dered. 
Mr. KOHL Mr. President. I ask 
unanimous consent to speak as if in 
morning business for 5 minutes. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. 
· The Senator from Wisconsin is rec-
ognized. 
Mr. KOHL. I thank the Chair. 
(The remarks of Mr. KOHL perta.in-
ing to the introduction of S. 2675 are 
located in today's RECORD under 
"Statements on Introduced Bills and 
Joint Resolutions."> 
YOTK 
The PRE.SIDING OFFICER. The 
hour of 1:30 having arrived, under the 
previous order the question ls on 
agreeing to the motion to reconsider 
the vote by which amendment No. 
1681 was rejected. 
The _yeas and nays ba\•e been · or-
dered. The clerk will call the roll. 
The legislatl\'e clerk called the rolL 
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, on 
this vote I have a pair with the Sena-
tor from Rhode Island [Mr. CHAFE!:] . 
If he were present and voting, he 
would vote ""nay." If I were at liberty 
to vote, I would vote "yea." 
I therefore withhold my vote. 
(During the course of this vote. Mr. 
BINGAMAN withdrew hJs live pair with 
the Senator from Rhode Island {Mr. 
ClunE] and voted in the affirmative. 
The following tally, No. 104. reflects 
such vote.> 
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the 
Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. 
CRAnzJ Is necessarily absent. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are 
there any other Senators 1n the Cham-
ber ~·ho desire to vote? 
The result was announced, yeas 49, 
nays 50, as follows: 
CRollca.11 Vote No. 104 Leg.] 
YEAS-49 
ArrA.SU"onc G&rn McConnell 
Baucus Gorton Murkowsl<I 
Bingaman Gnunm Nlckte. 
Bond OMISS!q ~~ 
Bo«hlf<it& Ht.Lett Reid 
Breaux H e rlln Roth 
Bryan H eim Rudman 
Bums Helma Sanford 
Coats Hollings Shelby 
Oochrtn HumphreJ Simpson 
~ Johnstow Specter 
O&n(ort.11 Kas~ Stevens 
Dole LoU 6>-nuna 
Domenlcl Lugar Thurmond 
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So the motion was rejected 
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President. 
today. I voted to retain the a.ntldrug 
assault weapons limitation provisions 
in the pending legislation, the omni-
bus crime package. My vote came after 
weighing heavily the views and argu-
ments of my constituents, law enforce-
ment oUlcials, experts, and my col-
leagues. It is extremely important that 
my res.sons are clear, especially to the 
people of West Virginia whom I am 
deeply privileged to represent in the 
Senate. 
To put It most simply, this \1;as a 
vote to protect the citizens of West 
Virginia and throughout this land 
from senseless crimes and violence. I 
am still a strong, fervent supporter of 
the second amendment and the consti-
tutional right to bear arms. My vote 
does not represent any uncertainty 
about this position. 
I came to the conclusion that the 
proposed ban on nine types of semi-
automatic assault weapons is a neces-
sary, warranted step in our country's 
war on drugs and crime. Violent' and 
drug-related crimes have soared by 30 
percent In the last decade. Every 20 
seconds, a violent crime is committed 
In America. Police and law enforce-
ment officials-along our borders, in 
our cities, and in every corner of 
America- are being _,gunned down by 
drug traffickers, gang leaders. and 
other violent criminals. 
Underneath these trends of tragedy 
and horror is. the emergence of assault 
weapons. A3 we have heard from the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Al-
cohol. Tobacco and firearms, "it is the 
general consensus of law enforcement 
of!lcials that the ever-increasing pres-
ence of assault-type rifles in the illicit 
drug trade and tn other types of crime 
places the safety and the very lives of 
the American pubUc Jn immediate 
peril." 
It ts abundantly clear from official 
surveys, news accounts. and the docu-
mented experiences of law enforce-
ment officials throughout the country 
that semi.automatic assault weapons 
have become the favored weapon-the 
weapon of choice-among a growing 
number of criminals, especially the 
drug gangs plaguing America's cities. 
For example. an intensive study per-
formed by Cox Newspapers found that 
an assault gun is 20 times more likely 
to be used in a crime than a conven-
tional firearm. After lookinc at 43,000 
gun traces sent br police throughout 
the country, to a central Froeral store-
house. researchers found that I\SSault 
v.-eapons showed up In 10 percent of 
these traces. Assault weapons made up 
almost one-third of all firearms traced 
to ocganlzed crime. gun traUlcking, 
·and crimes commltted by terrorists tn 
the United States in a period of 1 year, 
1989, and the first. quarter of 1989. 
These 11.re the reasons that the coun-
try's law enforcement organizations 
have come to the President, this ad-
mlnistraUon. and the Congress !or 
help, and more importanUy, for pro-
tection. They have told us that they 
cannot keep our streets safe, protect 
our children from drugs and violence, 
and maintain order when they, them-
selves, are in constant danger of being 
maimed or killed by the destrucU~·e 
weapons of criminals. Our law enforce-
ment officers are being outgunned and 
overpowered by the spread of assault 
weapons throughout the criminal and 
drug underworld 
As I have always said, there is no 
single solution or method for winninc 
the war on drugs. I still firmly believe 
that we must mobilize the resources 
and exerelse the legal tools to combine 
effective drug education. drug treat-
ment, Interdiction. eradication. and 
law enforcement in the intensive, all-
out assault on drug use and drug dis-
tribution. The Antidrug .Assault Weap. 
ons Limitation Act is a carefully de-
signed, highly targeted step to help 
carry out this assault successfully. It 
responds to the desperate cries for 
help from police officers. sheriffs, and 
drug enforcement. a.gents in West Vir-
ginia and throughout America. It 
seeks solely to isolate the <lestruettve 
weapons of erimlnals, not to limit or 
impinge on the weapons and guns tlrat 
citizens such as hunters. sportsmen. or 
collectors wish and have the right to 
own. 
The bill proposes to bar the new 
manufacture or Import of nine very 
specific types of assault weapons, five 
which are foreign-made and four 
which are domestically produced . . In 
fact, it's crucial to point out that 
President Bush initiated the Idea of 
curbing semJautomatic assault weap-· 
ons, by taking the bold step last year, 
or July 7, 1989, of Imposing an Execu-
tive order to ban the Importation of 43 
types of semiautomatic -weapons. As 
our Presldent said in an Oval Office 
address, drugs are a "grave threat sap-
ping our strength a.s a nation" that re-
quires us to wage an attack on every 
front. 
The bill pending before us today 
does not ban legal ownership of · the · 
nine listed weapons. And It imposes 
harsh penalties on future criminals 
who are caught using an assault 
weapon to combat a violent or drug-re-
lated crime. A new mandatory penalty 
of an extra 10 years of prison. would 
be slapped on the criminal on top of 
any punishment imposed. for the com-
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It ls Important to point out that the 
bill is designed to sunset the assault 
weapon ban in 3 years after its effec-
th·c date. An Intensive 18-month study 
of the Impact of the ban ls to be un-
dertaken as soon as the ban goes Into 
effect, In order to provide thorough In-
formation and answers. The propo-
nents of the ban openly acknowledge 
that v.-e do not and cannot know the 
precise effects that a curb on these 
deadly weapons will have on protect-
Ing our citizens and controlling crime 
ln the way that law enforcement offi-
cials at every level believe It will. But 
In my view, we have a moral and social 
obligation to wage a relentless battle 
against crime and drugs, and to take 
decisive action to protect Innocent and 
law-abiding citizens. Through the 
study, and when the bill must be con-
sidered for renewal, we will have the 
opportunity to thoroughly assess 
whether a ban on these specific weap-
ons of choice for criminals was effec-
tive or 'il"hether It should expire. 
In conclusion, I wish to underscore 
my hope that this section of the anti-
crime bill will be recognized and re-
spected for what It is- it Is an anti-
crime, antidrug, antlterrorlst, and an-
tlviolenee Initiative. The ceaseless 
wave of drugs that has poured Into 
America will not be stemmed unless 
we mobilize as a country and take ex-
traordinary measures to eliminate this 
extraordinary threat. Our citizens' 
right to bear anns Is not in peril. but I 
certainly hope that the abillty of 
cr1mlnals &nd drug criminals to prey 
on the people and law enforcement of-
ficials In my State and throughout 
America ls ln grave and immediate 
danger. 
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. Under 
the previous order, the Senator from 
South carouna [Mr. Tm7RllOND] ls 
recognized to offer a perfecting 
amendment regarding title II of the 
bill. There will be 6 hours of debate on. 
the Thurmond amendment equally ·di-
vided and controlled by the Senator 
from South Carolina CMr. THURMOND], 
and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. 
Brno] or their deslgnees. 
The Senator from Delaware. 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as the 
Chair Indicated, there Is a 6-hour time 
limitation on this amendment. What Is 
at stake here Is the bill before us now 
contains a provision relating to habeas 
corpus. the so-called Biden bill that ls 
sitting at the desk. It has been amend-
ed by Senator GRAHAM so that there is 
now a habeas corpus provision In the 
legislation sitting before us that will 
be better known from this point as the 
Oraha.m-Blden habeas corpus provi-
sion. 
By unanimous consent, we agreed 
with our Republlca.n colleagues and 
the distinguished Senator from South 
Carolina that he would offer a substi-
tute to that portion of the blll before 
us. let me explain this to my col-
leagues. the h_abeas corpus provision. 
This v, ill be the only vote on habeas 
corpus we will have In the entirety of 
our debate on this crime bill. That 
means from now until the time we end 
this debate on crime, this will be the 
debate. 
There will be no amendments to the 
substitute about to be offered by my 
friend from South Carolina. So at 
some point, hopefully well before 6 
hours are up-but that Is the time 
that has been allotted-we will have 
one vote on whether or not the 
Graham habeas corpus provision that 
is In the bill now or the Thurmond-
Specter provision which Is about to be 
sent to the desk will prevail. I Just 
wanted to set that out. I now wlll be 
delighted to yield the floor to my dis-
tinguished friend· from South Caroli-
na. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 
while Senators a.re here, and before 
they will be moving out, I just want to 
say If they want to end these long ap-
peals, if they really want habeas 
corpus, t hey better adopt this a.>nend-
mcnt. 
AJU:Nl)!llENT NO. 1617 
(Purpose: To amend -title 28 of the United 
States Code to provide special habeas 
corpus procedures In capital cases> 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, t 
send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for Its Immediate consideration. 
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will report. 
The assistant legislative clerk read 
as follows: 
The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. 
THURMOND], for himself, Mr. Sncn:R, Mr. 
HATCH, and Mr. SIKPSOIJ, proposes an 
amendment numbered 1687. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that readlng of 
the amendment be dispensed with. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With• 
out objection, ft ls so ordered. 
The amendment Is as follows: 
Strike T!Ue Two and Insert In lieu thereof 
the following: ''TITLE TWO-HABEAS 
CORPUS REFORM" . 
SEC. • SP.-:CIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN 
. CAPITAL CASES. 
(a) b GDERAL-Part IV of title 28, 
United States Code, Is amended by Inserting 
Immediately follow!~ chfir 153 the fol• 
lowlna new chapter: O I~ JttL,. 
"CHAPTD 154-SPECIAL W Cruus 
PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASIS 
"Sec. 
"2261. Defendan~ subject to capital punish-
ment and prisoners In State 
custody subject to capital sen-
tence: appointment of counsel: 
requirement of rule of court or 
st..atute: procedure. for ap-
pointment. 
'"2262. Mandatory stay of execution; dura-
tion; limit.a on staya of execu-
tion; successive petitions. 
" 2263. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time 
requirements; tolling rules. 
'"2264. Evldentlary hearings; scope of Feder-
al review; district court adJudl• 
cation. 
'"2265. Certl!l.cate of probable cause Inappli-
cable. 
•·2266. Counsel In capital cases: trial and 
post-<:onvlctlon standuda. 
'"226'7. Law controlling In Federal habeas 
corpus proceedln1r; retroactlv-
lty. 
""2266. Habc&.s corpus lime req ui rements. 
I %!61. !Hfendanls •ubJut to capllal pun lsh,n.,nt 
and prisontl""I In S ta~ cuslocly 1ubjttt to cap-
ital ~ nttnce: appolnt .. ent of counael: r<'(luirt• 
a-ient of rule of court or ~tatute: procNlurn for 
appoint=nt 
'"( al This chapter shall apply-
'"(l l to-
""< A> cases In wh ich the defendant is tried 
for a capital offense; or 
""(Bl cases aris ing under section 2254 of 
this title brought by prisoners In State cus-
tody v.·ho are subject to a capital sentence; 
and 
'"(2> only If subsections Cb> and <c> are sat• 
lsfled. 
'"Cb> This chapter Is applicable If a Stale 
est..abllshes by rule of Its court of last resort 
or by statute a mechanism for the appoint-
ment. compensation. and payment of rea-
sonable fees and litigation expenses of com• 
petent counsel consistent with sect.Ion 2266 
of this title. 
'"<cl Any mechanism for the a·ppolnt.ment. 
compensation, and reimbursement of coun-
sel as pro\"lded In subsection <bl must offer 
counsel to all St.ate defendants tried for a 
capital offense and all State prisoners under 
capital sentence and must provide for the 
entry of an order b)• a court of record-
'"< 1 > appointing one or more counsel to 
represent the defendant or prisoner upon a 
finding that the defendant or prisoner-
'"(A> Is Indigent and has accepted the 
offer; or 
"<B> ls unable competently to decide 
whether to accept or reject the offer; 
'"<2> find!~. after a hearlnit, If necessary. 
that the defendant or prisoner has rejected 
the offer of counsel and made the decision 
v.•lth an. understanding of Its legal conse-
quences; or 
'"(3l denyinit the appointment of counsel 
upon a findlni that the defendant or prison-
er Is not Indigent. 
"Cd> No counsel appointed pursuant to 
aubsections Cb> and Cc> to represent-
'"( l l a State defendant beini tried for a 
capital offense; or 
'"(2l prisoner under ca.pltal sentence 
during direct appeals In the State courts, 
shall ha\·e previously represented the de-
fendant or prisoner at t rtal or on direct 
appeal In the case for which the appoint• 
ment 1s made unless the defendant or pris-
oner and counsel expressly request contin-
ued representation. 
'"(el The Ineffectiveness or Incompetence 
of counsel during State or Federal collateral 
post-<X>nvlctlon proceedings In a capital case 
shall not be a ground for relief In a proceed-
lni arising under this chapter of this title. 
Thill subsection shall not preclude the ap-
pointment of different counsel at any phase 
of Federal post-conviction proceedings. 
I %262. Mandator7 ata7 or execution: duration: 
limila on •ta.t·• ol execution: a11crush·t peti-
Uont . 
•·ca> Upon the entry In the appropriate 
State court of rerord of an order pursuant 
to section 2261<cl of this title for a prisoner 
under caplt..al sentence, a warrant or order 
setting an execution date for a St.ate prison-
er shall be stayed upon application to any 
court that would have Jurisdiction over any 
procee<llnp filed pursuant to this chapter. 
The application must recite that the State 
has Invoked the procedures of this chapter 
and that the scheduled execution b subject 
to stay. 
"<b> A st..ay of e xecution 1rranted pursuant 
to 1ubsectlon <al shall expire If-
"( l> a State prisoner faila to file a habeas 
corpua petition under this chapter within 
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··<2> upon completion of district court and 
cou rt of appeals review under this chapter, 
the petition for relief Is denied and-
"( Al the time for fil ing a petition for certi-
ora ri has expi red and no petition has been 
filed; 
"< B> a t ime ly petit ion for certiorari was 
fil ed and the Supreme Court denied the pe-
tition : or 
"( Cl a timely peti tion for certiorari was 
filed and upon consideration of the case. the 
Supreme Court disposed of It !n a manner 
that left the capita! sentence undistu rbed; 
or 
"(3> before a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, a S tate prisoner under capital sentence 
wai\'es t he right to pursue habeas corpus 
review under section 2254 of this title, In the 
presence of counsel and after having been 
advised of the consequences of making the 
waiver. 
"Ccl If one of the conditions !n subsection 
Cbl has occurred, no Federal court thereaf-
ter shall have the authority to enter a stay 
of execution or grant relief !n a capital case 
unless-
"( 1) the basis for the stay and request for 
relief is a claim not previously presented !n 
the State or Federal courts: 
"C 2l the failure to raise the claim-
"<A> was the result of State action in vio-
lation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; 
"CB> was the result of a recognition by the 
Supreme Court of a new fundamental right 
that is retroactively applicable: or 
"C C> is due to the fact the claim is based 
on facts that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diltgence 
in time to present the claim for State or 
Federal post-conviction review: and 
"C3> the filing of any successive petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus Is authorized by 
the appropriate court of appeals !n accord-
ance with section 2264<c> and the facts un-
derlying the claim would be sufficient, if 
proven. to undermine the court's confidence 
in the Jury's determination of guilt on the 
offense or offenses for which the death pen-
alty was Imposed, or newly discovered facts, 
which are not based upon or Include opinion 
evidence. expert or otherwise, which would 
be sufficient to undermine the court's confi-
dence In the validity of the death sentence. 
"§ 2263. Filinr of habeas corpus ~tition; lim~ re-
qui~~nts; tolling rules 
"Cal Any petition filed under this chapter 
for habeas corpus relief must be filed In the 
appropriate district court not later than 60 
days after the filing In the appropriate 
State court of record of an order Issued in 
compliance with section 2261Cc) of this title. 
The time requirements established by this 
section shall be tolled-
"( 1 > from the date that a petition for cer-
tiorari Is filed In the Supreme Court until 
the date of final disposition of the petition 
if a State prisoner seeks review of a capital 
sentence that has been affirmed on direct 
appeal by the court of last resort of the 
State or has otherwise become final for 
State law purposes; and 
"C2l during an addltional period not to 
exceed 60 days, If counsel for the State pris-
oner-
"CA> mo\·es for an extension of time In 
Federal d istrict court that would have Juris-
diction over the case upon the filing of a 
habeas corpus petition under section 2254 of 
this title; and 
"C BJ makes a showing of good cause for 
counsel's lnabtltty to ftle the habeas corpus 
petition within the 60 day period estab-
lished by this section. A court that finds 
that good cause has been shown shall ex-
plain In writing the basis for such a finding. 
<bl A notice.- : 1;,pcal from a Judgment of 
the district coi;..--: :n a claim under this chap-
ter shall be fil1-.: ·• 1t h in 20 days of the entry 
of judgment. 
<c> A peti tlo,. '. : r a writ of certiorari to the 
S upreme Cour. ,,[ the United Stat es In a 
claim under :~ .; chapter shall be fil ed 
within 20 da;-5 : ! the issuance of th e man-
date by the cm::-: of appeals. 
"§ 2264. E.-identiic:- hearings; scope or Federal 
rnlew; distrlc1 NUrl adjudication 
"C al Whenen·~ a State prisoner under a 
capital sentenN" !ties a petition for habeas 
corpus relief to .~ich this chapter applies. 
the district COU:1-
"( 1 > shall dete:-::iine the sufficiency of the 
evidentlary reco.-:! for habeas corpus review; 
and 
"C 2) May conc.;ct an ev!dentiary hearing 
when the court.. b its discretion, determines 
that such hear--+ is necessary to complete 
the record for hs.~as corpus review. 
"Cb) Upon the d<'velopment of a complete 
evidentiary rec..'\.--d. the district court shall 
rule on the me:.:s of the claims properly 
before It within ~~e time limits established 
In section 2268 o! this title. 
"C cHll except s.s provided In paragraph 
C2l, a district co:;rt may not consider a suc-
cessive claim un&r this chapter. 
"CcH2> A distr;,:: court may only consider 
a successive clai:-:. under this chapter if the 
petitioner seeks lt'!l\'e to file a successive pe-
tition in the app:-;:,priate court of appeals." 
"CcH3l In a c&S<" in which the appropriate 
court of appeals ~rants leave to file a succes-
sive petition, the time limits established by 
this chapter shall be applicable to all fur-
ther proceedings under the successive peti-
t ion. 
§ 2265. Certificat~ of probable cause Inapplicable 
"The requirement of a certificate of prob-
able cause In oroer to appeal from the dis-
trict court to the court of appeals does not 
apply to habeas corpus cases subject to this 
chapter. 
"§ 2266. Counsel in capital CB.Rs; trial and post-
conviction standards 
"Cal A mechanism for the provision of 
counsel services to Indigents sufficient to 
invoke the provisions of this chapter shall: 
"Cl) provide for counsel to Indigents 
charges with offenses for which capital pun-
ishment Is sought, to Indigents who have 
been sentenced to death and who seek · ap. 
pellate or collateral review In state court, 
and to Indigents who have been sentenced 
to death and who seek certiorari review in 
the United States Su°J'>reme Court; collateral 
review In State court. and to indigents who 
have been sentenced to death and who seek 
certiorari review In the United States Su-
preme Court. 
"C2l provide for the entry of an order of a 
court of record appointing one or more 
counsel to represent the prisoner except 
upon a Judicial determination <after a hear-
ing, If necessary) that CA> the prisoner is 
not Indigent; or CB> the prisoner knowingly 
and lntelltgently waives the appointment of 
counsel. 
"Cbl<l) Except as provided below. at least 
one attorney appointed pursuant to this 
chapter before trial, If applicable, and at 
least one attorney appointed pursuant to 
this chapter after trial, If applicable, shall 
have been certified by a statewide certifica-
tion authority. The States may elect to 
create one or more certification authorities 
<but not more than three such certification 
authorities> to perform the responsibilities 
set forth below. The certification authority 
for counsel at any stage of a capital case 
shall be: 
"Cl) a special committee, constituted by 
the State court of last resort or by State 
law, relring on staff attornC'ys of a defender ., 
organization, members of the private bar, or 
bot h: or 
<ii> a capital lilig;ition n 'source center, re-
l)·ir.g on staff attorneys, members of the Prl-
\·ate bar. or both: or · 
<iiil a sta tewide defender organization, re-
lying on staff attorneys, members of the prj. 
rnte bar. or both. 
The certification authority shall: 
< i1•> CE"rtify attorneys qualified to repre. ~-
sent persons charged with capital offensel ':f 
or sentenced to death; and / ,. 
<v> draft and annually publish procedures \ 
and st andards by which attorneys are cert!-, "! 
fied and rosters of certified attorneys; and . ·, 
(\'il periodically review the roster of cerU- "' 
fi ed attorneys, monitor the performance or-
all att<>rneys certified, and withdraw certlfr: 
cation from any attorney who falls to m~ 
high performance standards In a case to' 
which the attorne Is appointed; or falls otli-,, 
erwise to demonstrate continuing compe., 
tence to represent prisoners in capital lltlaa ' 
tion. 
"C 2l In a State that has a publicly fund, 
public defender system that !s not organized 
on a statewide basis. the requirementa of 
section 2261Cbl shall have been deemed to: 
ha\'e been satisfied If at least one attorney .. 
appointed pursuant to this chapter before · 
trial shall be employed by a state funded 
public defender organization, if the highest 
court of the State finds on an annual basis 
that the standards and procedures estab-
lished and maintained by such organization 
<which have been filed by such organization 
and re\iewed by such court on an annual 
basis) ensure that the attorneys working for 
such organization demonstrate continulnc· 
competence to represent Indigents in capital .:'" 
litigation. . 
"Cc) If a State has not elected to establish . 
one or more statewide certification authorl• , 
ties to certify counsel eligible to be appoint-
ed before trial to represent Indigents, In the 
case of an appointment made before trial; 1.t-
least one attorney appointed under tW. 
chapter must have been admitted to prao-
tice In the court In which the prosecution II 
to be tried for not less than S ye&111, a.nd , 
must have not less than 3 years' experience · 
In the trial of felony prosecutions In thal' 
court. 
Cd> If a State has not elected to establlsb 
one or more statewide certification authori• 
ties to certify counsel eligible to be appoln~ 
ed after trial to represent Indigents, In th« 
case of an appointment made after trial, at" 
least one attorney appointed under th1a 
chapter must have been admitted to pn 
tlce in the court of last resort of the Sta 
for not less than S years, and must have I 
not less than 3 years' experience in the h . . 
dling of appeals in that State courts In{, 
felony cases. · 
.. <el Notwithstanding this subsection. 
court, for good cause. may appoint anothi 
attorney whose background, knowledge or.. 
experience would otherwise enable the 1,1 
torney to properly represent the defenctani 
with due consideration of the seriousness 
the possible penalty and the unique 
complex nature of the litigation. 
"C fl Upon a finding In ex parte pr 
!ngs that Investigative. expert or other . 
ices are reasonably necessary for the re1 
sentation of the defendant, whether In co 
nection with Issues relating to guilt or lssU 
relating to sentence, the court shall auth 
lze the defendant's attorney to obtain s 
services on behalf of the defendant ~ •. 
shall oroer the payment of fees and 
penses therfor, under subsection (gl. U 
finding that timely procurement of ~111 
services could not pn...;t!cally await prior a, 
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provision of any payment of services nunc 
pro tune. 
··(gl The court shall fix the compensation 
to be paid to an attorney appointed under 
this subsection /other than State cmploy.-
e-es> and the fees and expenses to be paid 
for Investigative. expert. a.nd other reason• 
ably necessary services authorized under 
subsection <c>. at such rates or amounts as 
the court determines to be reasonably nee• 
essary to carry out the requirements of this 
subsection. 
Although I have Introduced another 
habeas proposal which the Attorney 
General and I believe to be preferabl e, 
S. 88, I have decided to offer this 
amendment which will effectively end 
abuse of the habeas procedure. The 
Issue of habeas corpus reform has lin-
gered In Congress for several years 
and we must act. After conferring with 
a number of Senators and experts in 
this area, I am convinced that this 
proposal warrants adoption by this 
body and Is vastly superior to the pro-
posal pending in S. 1970. 
·D %267. Law rontrolllnr In Federal habeas corpus 
proceedings; retroactl•lty 
"In case11 subject to this chapter, all 
claims shall be governed by the law as It was 
when the petitioner's sentence became final. 
A court considering a cl&lm under this chap-
ter shall consider Intervening decisions by 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
1rhlch establish fundamental constitutional 
rights. 
-0 2268. Habeas corpus time requirements 
"(al A Federal district court shall deter• 
mine any petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus brought under this chapter within 
110 days of filing. 
"(b) The court of appeals shall hear and 
determine any appeal of the granting, 
denial, or partial denial of a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus brought under this 
chapter within 90 days alter the notice of 
appeal Is flied. 
"(cl The Supreme Court shall act on any 
petition for a writ of certiorari In a case 
brought under this chapter within 90 days 
after the petition Is filed. 
"(d> The Administrative Office of United 
States Courts shall report annually to Con-
gress on the compliance by the courts with 
the time limits established 1n this section.", 
Cb) AJamlMENT TO TAJIU: or CHAPTERS.-
The table chapt,ers for part IV of title 28, 
United States Code, Is amended by inserting 
after the Item for chapter 153 the following: 
"154. Special habeas corpus proce-
dures In capital cases .............. ·-····· 2261". 
(C) A!o:NDKENT TO SECTIOII 2254 01' TITLS 
28.-Bectlon 2254<c> of title 28, United 
States Code, Is amended by-
<l > striking "An applicant" and inserting 
"(l > Except as provided In paragraph <2>, an 
applicant"; and 
<2> adding at the end thereof the follow-
ing: 
"(2) An applicant In a capital case shall be 
deemed to have· exhausted the remedies 
available 1n the courts of the State when he 
has exhausted any right to direct appeal In 
the State.". 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
rise today to offer, along with Senator 
SPECTER, a tough habeas corpus 
reform proposal which strikes at the 
heart of our Nation's habeas corpus 
problem-<ielay. Delay, delay, that is 
1,irhat is taking place. This amendment, 
which is cosponsored by Senator 
HATCH and Senator SI?tlPSON, would 
strike the habeas reform proposal con-
tained in the Blden bill, which ex-
pands death row inmates rights, and 
replace It with a new proposal which 
appropriately addresses the need to es-
tablish a definite timeframe for Feder-
al conslderatlon of death penalty 
cases. This proposal was arrived at 
after consultation with several mem-
bers of the Judiciary Committee and 
emboJies !LfQnsolldatlon of the Powell 
habeas corpus prOPt)Sa:l 6'mtllhM 'In 
~ e and an amendment 
drafted by Senator SPECTER. 
This Nation is facing a crisis in its 
criminal Justice system. Federal 
habeas corpus and collateral attack 
procedures are In dire need of reform. 
This is evidenced by the glut of habeas 
petitions In the Federal system. In ad-
dition, Federal courts have proven to 
be slow ln their action on and, In some 
cases, willingness to act upon habeas 
petitions. The large Increases In the 
number of habeas corpus filings, many 
of which are frivolous and used as a 
delaying tactic, and the Inordinate 
length of time death row unmates 
spend litigating In the Federal system. 
require that legislation be enacted to 
reform habeas corpus. 
Habeas petitions have grown by vast 
numbers in recent years. In 1941, 
State prisoners filed 127 habeas corpus 
petitions ln the Federal district courts. 
By 1961, that figure had risen to 1,020. 
Over the years, that number has con-
tinued to rise with Federal district 
courts receiving an incredible 9,880 
habeas petitions In 1988. The problem 
of these numerous filings is com-
pounded by the extraordinary delay in 
habeas corpus filings and court action. 
With respect to delay on the part of 
our Federal courts, a witness who tes-
tified at a recent Judiciary Committee 
cited a habeas corpus case he was In-
volved with where the Federal court 
took 3 years to decide on one habeas 
petition. The result of these related 
problems Is years of delay between 
sentencing and a final Judicial resolu-
tion and imposition of the death sen-
tence. -
The Thurmond-Specter amendment 
is based, In substantial part, upon the 
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus in 
Capital Cases chaired by former As.50-
clate Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
Powell. This committee, commonly re-
ferred to as the Powell Committee, 
was· formed by Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist In June 1988. The Powell 
committee was charged with Inquiring 
into the necessity and desirability of 
legislation directed toward avoiding 
delay and the lack of finality in capital 
cases In which the prisoner had been 
offered counsel. Pursuant to the Chief 
Justice's request, the Powell commit-
tee made Its recommendations and 
proposed a legislative remedy to the 
problem of habeas corpus review In 
capital cases. 
Mr. President, this amendment In-
corporates the Powell committee rec-
ommendations and proposes new stat-
utory proce;lurcs for Federal habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences. It l.:i 
aimed at achieving the followi ng goal : 
death penalty cases should be subject 
to one complete and fair course of col• 
lateral review In the State and Federal 
syst,em, free from the time pressure of 
Impending exceutlon, and with the as• 
slstance of competent counsel for the 
defendant. Once this appropriate, fair 
review is completed, the criminal proc• 
ess should be brought to a conclusion. 
This proposal allows a State to bring 
death penalty litigation by its prison• 
ers within the new statute by provld• 
ing competent counsel for Inmates at 
trial and on State and Federal habeas 
corpus review. Participation In the 
new procedures Is optional with the 
States. This legislation also provides 
for a 60-day period within which a 
Federal habeas petition must be filed. 
This 60-day period begins to run on 
the appointment of counsel. In addi-
tion, this legislation provides for an 
automatic stay of execution, which is 
to remain in place until Federal 
habeas proceedings are completed. 
This provision ensures that habeas 
claims not be considered by a court 
under the time pressure of an impend-
Ing execution. Every claim raised by a 
death row inmate will be subject to 
one full and complete review. 
Mr. President, where this amend-
ment mostly differs from the underly-
Ing bill, S. 1970, and provides effective. 
true reform Is that It establishes a 
timetable for completion .of Federal 
habeas corpus appeals. The delay In 
carrying out our Nation's death sen-
tences has brought our Judicial system 
into disrepute. Families of victims are 
forced to suffer, year after year, while 
murders sit on death row. Cases In-
volving capital punishment have 
dragged through the courts for as long 
as 18 years. The vast majority of this 
delay is spent In Federal court. This 
amendment would, for the first time, 
establish a definite timetable for com-
pletion of Federal habeas corpus cases 
within 1 year from the time the death 
sentence becomes final in State court. 
It would bypass State habeas corpus 
proceedings which currently involve so 
much delay. Yet, prisoners would still 
be permitted to pursue State habeas 
while proceeding through the Federal 
system. The essential aspects of the 
timetable are that: 
First, Federal habeas petitions must 
be filed within 60 days of the final 
action in the State court proceeding 
resulting in the death penalty. 
Second, a final decision must be 
made on the claim by the U.S. district 
court within 110 days from the filing 
of the habeas corpus petition. 
Third, a final decision must be made 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals within 90 
days after, the final Judgment of the 
U.S. district court. 
Fourth, final action on a grant or 
denial of certiorari. by the Supreme 
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made within 90 days from the final 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Fifth. continuances would be prohib-
ited except on the showing of good 
cause. 
Sixth, no subsequent Federal habeas 
corpus petition may be entertained 
unless specific permission for the 
filing of such a claim is granted by the 
court of appeals for that circuit. 
This expedited timeframe is both 
just and practical because it bypasses 
the long delays inherent In State 
habeas corpus proceedings, without 
eliminating a State prisoner's right to 
pursue State review while his Federal 
case is proceeding. In addition, it es-
tablishes State habeas corpus proceed-
ings as the highest priority in the Fed-
eral Judicial system. 
Mr. President, In other areas this 
amendment is similar to the underly-
Ing bill, S. 1970, since it addresses the 
concerns regarding the issue of stand-
ards for qualified counsel and the 
issue of retroactlvity. The Thurmond-
Specter amendment adopts the compe-
tency of counsel standards contained 
in the Eiden-Graham bill. The counsel 
provision provides that a State su-
preme court can establish its own 
standards for counsel or the State can 
choose to adopt the competency re-
quirements already required under 
Federal habeas law. In addition, this 
amendment permits Federal courts to 
consider a successive claim which is 
based upon intervening decisions by 
the Supreme Court which establishes 
fundamental rights which are retroac-
tively applicable. Under the original 
Powell proposal, these claims could 
not be heard. The effect of this 
change would be to permit a Federal 
court to hear a claim, whether or not 
the death row inmate has been 
through the Federal system, if the Su-
preme Court were to hand down a de-
cision which is retroactive and estab-
lishes a fundamental right. 
Mr. President, where our amend-
ment differs from the underlying 
Eiden-Graham proposal is the effect 
the change on retroactivity, which 
both proposals contain, will have on 
the ability to carry out death sen-
tences. Without the timetable con-
tained in my amendment, death row 
inmates will be able to continue to liti-
gate new claims over and over again in 
Federal court. This Biden-Graham ap-
proach, would permit claims to be 
raised several years after the sentence 
was imposed. This difference is a criti-
cal difference in the two competing 
proposals. Our bill protects the right 
of a death row inmate to habeas 
corpus. However, unlike Blden-
Graham habeas, it puts specific time-
tables in place so that death penalty 
cases do not drag on endlessly for 
years. 
In addition, the underlying Blden-
Graham bill has broad rights to suc-
cessive petitions which would further 
expand death row inmates rights. I 
find this approach unacceptable and 
unreasonable. The Biden-Graham pro-
posal would permit any Federal court 
to grant a second, third, or fourth 
habeas petition if the court did not be-
lie.ye the sentence was appropria te. By 
contrast, the Thurmond-Specter 
amendment would only permit U.S. 
Courts of Appeals to grant the right to 
have a second petition heard. Clearly, 
I believe the underlying bill would 
vastly expand the rights of death row 
inmates. It makes no sense for Con-
gress to pass a death penalty bill in 
one title of a crime package, while in 
another title, enact a habeas corpus 
proposal which make the death penal-
ty virtually impossible to Impose. 
Mr. President, finally, it is important 
to remember that both of these pro-
posals are voluntary to the States. 
States can choose to opt into the alter-
native procedures or choose to remain 
subject to current habeas law. The 
Thurmond-Specter amendment offers 
the States, in exchange for the ap-
pointment of qualified counsel, a defi-
nite timetable for review in Federal 
court. The E iden-Graham proposal re-
quires that the State appoint qualified 
counsel in exchange for nothing but 
continued Federal intervention and 
more litigation. No State-not one-
will choose to opt into the Biden-
Graham proposal. Biden-Graham is 
not a viable proposal which States will 
find acceptable. 
It is clear that the Biden-Graham 
proposal Is still very similar to the 
original Biden bill. It contains a 
habeas corpus provision which would 
h ave the effect of increasing both the 
number of cases In Federal court and 
t he cost of litigation to the Govern-
ment. According to Justice Lewis 
Powell, the Blden-Graham proposal 
would increase-I repeat that accord-
ing to Justices Lewis Powell, a member 
of the United States Supreme Court, 
who Is chairman of the committee, 
who brought up the Powell proposal, 
and who was appointed by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and this is what Jus-
tice Powell says-it would increa.se, not 
decrease the number· of habeas corpus 
cases. In fact, the Department of Jus-
tice referred to the the original pro-
posal contained In the underlying bill, 
S. 1970, as a "step in the wrong direc-
tion." The Blden-Graham proposal 
weakens and qualifies the time limita-
tions and finality provisions of the 
Powell Committee proposal as to 
ensure that no State would opt into Its 
coverage. Simply put, the Blden pro-
posal would expand the rights of 
criminal defendants. 
By contrast, our amendment truly 
balances the need for finality ln death 
penalty cases with the requirements 
that a defendant have a fair and 
timely examination of all his claims. 
Thereafter, if the conviction and sen-
tence are found to be appropriate, Ju-
dicial proceedings will be at an end, 
absent any exceptional developments 
In the defendant's case. 
Mr. President, finality-I repeat, fi-
nality-of litigation and the elimina-
tion of the habeas abuse which cur-
rently surrounds State death penalty 
con\'ict ions is cr itical. Law abid ing citi-
zens are justif iably fed up with death 
row inmates using procedural loop-
holrs and unwarranted Judicial delay 
to their benef it. It Is time we acted. 
Legislation wh ic h reforms the current 
habeas process must be meaningful 
reform which effectively addresses 
this problem. I believe this legislation 
is the most effective and tough pro-
posal before the Senate. 
In summary, the glut of habeas peti-
tions in the Federal system and the 
unacceptable delay In execution of 
capital sentences are all evidence of 
the dire need for real reform-not 
reform legislation which will lead to 
more litigation and abuse. The func-
tion of the criminal Justice system Is 
to seek the truth. Once established, 
procedures such as habeas corpus 
must not go on endlessly to prevent 
the imposition of appropriate and Just 
punishment. Additionally, prisoners 
must not be allowed to file frivolous 
claims which do not warrant the time 
and energy of those charged with the 
responsibility of handling them. As 
Justice Powell stated during his testi-
mony before the committee, the cur-
rent situation brings our Judicial 
system into disrepute. Justice Powell, 
who is, incidentally, opposed the death 
penalty, nevertheless respects the 
right of the majority to see to it that 
constitutionally imposed sentences of 
death are carried out. It is the duty of 
this Congress to do the same. Criminal 
cases must be brought to a close. End-
less consideration of issues in criminal 
cases that have no merit and are filed 
only for purposes of delay must be 
eliminated from our judicial system. 
Federal courts must act upon habeas 
corpus petitions so that the States can 
carry out an appropriate and just sen-
tence. The principles of Justice, upon 
which our criminal Justice system is 
based, demand that we take action. It -
is imperative that we pass this much 
needed reform measure. 
In closing, the Members of this body 
have a clear choice-a vote for the 
Biden-Graham proposal is a vote to 
allow death penalty cases to drag on 
year after year, while a vote for the 
Thurmond-Specter proposal is a vote 
to bring endless death penalty appeals 
to a close. 
For these reasons, I strongly urge 
my colleagues to support this amend-
ment. 
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
BURDICK). Senator SPECTER is recog-
nized. 
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I 
thank the Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who 
yields time? 
. Mr. T}!URMOND. Mr. President, I 
yield the distinguished Senator such 
time as he requires. 
Mr. SPECTER. I thank my dlstln• 
gulshed colleague, Senator THURMOND. 
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I will start by congratulal ing Sena-
tor TH t: RMOND for an excellent presen-
tation and congratulate him further 
on the outstanding work he has done, 
not only on the current legislation, 
but in the 10 years that I have been 
here on the Judiciary Committee, in 
his capacity as chairman and as rank-
Ing member. I, similarly, congratulate 
the distinguished chairman, Senator 
BIDEN, for the work which he has done 
on this legislation and his work as 
chairman of the committee. And it ls 
my thought, even my hope, that as 
this debate proceeds, It might be possi-
ble to work out some of the underlying 
disagreements and even to find a con-
sensus as we discuss this important 
Issue. 
Mr. President, the amendment 
which has been offered, captioned the 
Thurmond-Specter amendment, co-
sponsored principally by the distin-
guished Senator from Utah [Mr. 
HATCH] and the distinguished Senator 
from Wyoming [Mr. SIMPSON] has 
been the product of very extensive 
work and, in accordance with the gen-
eral legislative approach, very substan-
tial modifications and revisions, even 
in the course of the past 24 hours. So 
that my submission to my colleagues Is 
that the gaps have been narrowed on 
the way important Issues, on the con-
sideration on second or subsequent pe-
titions as to the penalty aspect, as well 
as innocence or quilt, under an appro-
priate standard; and also there has 
been an appropriate consideration for 
what we call Intervening Supreme 
Court decisions, not to use the term 
retroactive but, substantively, it In-
volves the same matter. 
This amendment also provides for 
appropriate appointment of counsel, 
Investigators and experts, where nec-
essary, In the trial process and In the 
Federal habeas corpus appeals. As this 
Issue ls presented, it ts a carefully 
crafted approach which would satisfy 
the two critical Interests: First, soci-
ety's interest in having the death pen-
alty carried out in a fair, timely, and 
judicious manner; second, appropriate 
protection for the defendant so that 
the defendant has adequate counsel at 
all stages of the proceedings and that 
the defendant has an adequate oppor-
tunity to litigate the relvant Issues 
when he challenges the appropriate-
ness of the Imposition of the death 
penalty. 
Mr. President, there is general agree-
ment that the American judicial 
system has broken down with the long 
delays on appeals in death penalty 
cases. That has become apparent, as 
noted by the distinguished Senator 
from South Carolina, when some cases 
take as long as 17 or 18 years and 
when the average ls 8 years before the 
Federal courts have concluded the ap-
pellate process on death penalty cases. 
What happens, Mr. President, is 
that the public has lost confidence in 
the system. The 2,500 inmates on 
death row are subjected to Russian 
roulette with stays and delays, a 
system which takes a hea\'y toll on ev-
eryone, Including the defendants. It Is 
not very fair to defendants. although 
doubtless those on death row would 
prefer the long delays to the alterna-
tives of execution. But it ls a system 
that makes no sense either for the 
public. The lengthy delay directly un-
dercuts, vitiates, and eliminates the 
basic purpose of punishment, which is 
deterrence. 
Deterrence is necessarily based on 
two factors: swiftness and certainty. 
Obviously, there can be no swiftness if 
the appellate process takes 8 years or 
18 years, and there is no certainty be-
cause of the vagaries of being caught, 
the vagaries of being convicted: If con-
victed, the vagaries of having the 
death penalty; and where the death 
penalty is imposed, the uncertainty of 
having that penalty carried out in a 
system where 125 people have been ex-
ecuted since 1976 of the some 2,600 
plus who have been placed under the 
death penalty. 
Mr. President, defendants are enti-
tled to a thorough, fair review in the 
Federal courts of the State criminal 
trial process which· results in convic-
tion and the imposition of the death 
penalty. But the kind of procedure 
which we have should not be used to 
defeat capital punishment. Capital 
punishment is obviously a very diffi• 
cult Issue, and there are strong differ-
ences of opinon. However, 37 States 
have established the death penalty. 
The Federal Government virtually has 
no death penalty and has had none 
since Furman versus Georgia in 1972, 
because the Federal laws have not 
been recodified to take into account 
the requirements of the Supreme 
Court on aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. 
So at the present time under the 
Federal system we have only the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice and we 
have the 1988 legislation on drug king-
pins. -
My own view is that capital punish-
ment is a deterrent. I base that on ex-
perience as an assistant district attor-
ney and district attorney of Philadel-
phia, where I have seen many, many 
cases where professional robbers, and 
burglars would not carry a weapon 'Ip 
the course of a robbery or burglary be-
cause they were afraid of the death 
penalty. 
rery cardully administered and It ha~ 
to be appropriately limited both in the 
interest of fair Imposition on defend-
ants and also in the interest of retain-
ing the dea th penalty In the arsenal of 
weapons, because if we o\·eruse the 
death penalty, I believe that we will 
lose It, that It will not be retained in 
our srstem of criminal justice. 
When I was district attorney of 
Philadelphia, I personally reriewed all 
the cases, which had been the stand-
ard for the DA's in that city for many 
years and still ls the standard, and I 
believe the standard which prevails 
generally, so that the ranking author-
ity, duly elected prosecuting attorneys, 
make that decision at the highest 
level. 
When I was district attorney, my 
office established very rigid standards 
for calling for the death penalty. Long 
before the law precluded the use of a 
peremptory challenge to exclude Afro-
Americans In my district attorney·s 
office, we did not exercise peremptory 
challenges to exclude Afro-Americans 
from Juries. 
Under Pennsylvania law, as It was 
under the laws of the States generally. 
a peremptory challenge may be exer-
cised without any cause shown. The 
number varies from State to State. In 
Pennsylvania you have 20 challenges, 
and there had been a practice in the 
past to strike Afro-Americans from the 
jury. 
When I became district attorney, I 
stopped that practice because I 
thought It was unfair. Later the courts 
in this country have precluded the 
prosecutor from striking Afro-Ameri-
cans peremptorily because of Its inher-
ent unfairness. 
Mr. President, since coming to the 
Judiciary Committee, early on I voted 
against Federal legislation which 
would impose the death penalty on 16-
~·ear-olds and 17-years-olds because of 
my view that we ought to apply the 
death penalty carefully and not to use 
ft on those under 18. Certainly there 
are many 16- and 17-year-olds who are 
hardened criminals, who have bad 
records, and have committed vicious 
crimes, but I believe that societal re-
straint is warranted in not imposing 
the death penalty In these cass. 
Similarly, I disagreed with the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the 
United States ln upholding the appli-
cation of the death penalty for those 
The cases are numerous where Jt has 
been established that defendants are 
apprehensive about the death penalty. 
So in my Judgment there is a very 
solid evldentlary base to establish a 
judgment, and it is a judgment call 
that the death penalty is a deterrent. 
Perhaps ln the course of this discus-
sion, if this Issue becomes relevant or 
debated, I will move to some of the ci-
tations of the evidentiary base to con-
clude that capital punishment is a de-
terrent. 
· who were retarded. I think that is a 
bad judgment. I think you have to 
have societal restraint as a matter of 
fairness to the _individual and societal 
restraint if we are to maintain the ap-
plicability of the death penalty. 
Mr. President, beyond my own view 
that capital punishment ls appropri-
ate, I have consistently maintained 
the position that it has to be very, 
Mr. President, In this context then, 
what we have before the Senate today 
is the determination of what standards 
are appropriate In Federal court 
review. Bear In mind that before a 
case gets to the Federal court a de: 
fendant has been indicted, tried with a 
jury, convicted of murder in the first 
degree, had the death penalty lm: 
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posed, and taken the case to the su-
preme court in the State where the ln-
cident occ ~rred. If lhe death penal! y 
is upheld, then t he mat ter may go to 
lhe S t:preme Court of the United 
S tat.es on a pe tition for a writ of certi-
orari which. as a pr~tical matter, are 
rarely heard by the Supreme Court. 
Then comes the issue of what is 
called collateral attack or habeas 
corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus Is a 
Latin phrase U'hich means have the 
body, and it means that the body must 
be produced to determine the legality 
of the deten~ion or legatlty of carrying 
out the penality, which. of course, ln 
this case, is the death penalty. 
Mr. President, the new features 
which are ·present in the legislation we 
are presenti.:lg here today, added to 
the amendment filed by the distin-
guished Sena.tor from South Cn.rolina, 
are the pro,l.zions to eliminate State 
habeas corpus proceedings as a prelim-
inary or prerequisite to filing a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus in the 
Federal court. 
The States will still retain the au-
thority to have habeas corpus proceed-
ings as they may choose, but under 
the Thurmond-Specter amendment 
that is not a prerequisite. The reason 
that it ls not a prerequisite and the 
reason that there Is a change in this 
law is because of the relative meaning-
lessness of State habeas corpus pro-
ceedings v.-Wch can take yea.,_ 
What happens on a State habeas 
corpus action Is that after the su-
preme court of the State, say the 
State of Pennsylvania. has decided 
that the conviction was proper, the 
death penalty was proper, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court has declined to 
review the case, then it goes back to 
the trial court and a Petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus la filed alleging 
errors that haYe already been decided 
by the Stat~·s highest court Vlith the 
possiole addition of incompetency of 
counsel. 
But when a State lower court, in a 
State like Pennsylvania,. hears the 
habeas corpus challenge which has al· 
ready been ruled on by the supreme 
court of t.lle State, then invariably the 
lower court dk.,nisses It; It goes to the 
State supr~e court; they have al-
ready heard it, and there is a dismissal 
there pretty much in a perfunctory 
way. 
The net effect is that State habeas 
corpus proceedings do not amount to 
much, but they are perfunctory, and 
all of the functions which are per-
formed by State habeas corpus are du-
plicated then when the case goes for 
Federal habeas corpus. But in the Fed-
eral system there is a fresh court, a 
different court, not the court where 
the de!endant v.•as tried, but the U.S. 
district court. There Is a dl!ferent ap-
pellate court. So you have a different 
court system and you have a tradition 
for an independent review~ 
This Is not to say that you cannot 
have State habeas corpus proceedings, 
but if you \\'.ant to go to the Federal 
court this amendment eliminates the 
prior requirement that you first ex-
haust State remedi es before go ing to 
the Federal court . It also establ!shes a 
t im"etable which requires the defend-
ant to move promptly. 
One of the really critical aspects of 
the pending legislation, and this ls leg-
islation advocated by both Senator 
BrnEN and by Senator THURMOND and 
myself, relate to the pro\·isions for the 
appointment of counsel. This has 
always been a very difficult matter in 
many of the States. It is not possible 
to have a criminal Justice system func-
tion fairly unless adquate counsel is 
provided. If a person does not have a 
lawyer-a good lawyer and an experi-
enced lau·yer-to go through the com-
plexities of a criminal trial, Justice 
cannot be obtalned. From the vantage 
point of 1990, it is frankly surprising 
that it took so long in our system of 
crlminal Justice to have the require-
ments that someone who ls on trial 
even for a capital case have consel ap-
pointed. 
That was decided by the Supreme 
Court of the United States ln the mid-
forties ln Betts versus Brady and ex-
tended in Gideon versus Wainwright 
In 1963 to all criminal cases where the 
sen tences are longer than 6 months. 
This legislation requires that U a 
State wishes to have the advantage of 
these new speedy habeas corpus pro-
ceedlngs, the State must provide ade-
quate counsel, adequate investigative 
service and adequate witnesses, as de-
fined ln some detail under this bllL 
Bear in mind, Mr. President, that 
this legislation does not impose upon 
the State a requirement that it under-
take this course. 
But. It offers the State the avail;l.bll-
lty of these speedy processes in the 
Federal court, U the State complies 
with these requirements. The Con-
gress does not seek to impose its direc-
tion on the States, out of respect for 
federalism. But, as is customary in 
many similar lines, we say to the 
States that U you want an advantage-
as, for example, in the case of Federal 
highway funds-U you want Federal 
highway funds, you have to limit the 
drinklng age t-0 21. We are not saylng 
the States have to have the legal drink 
age of 21, but if they want Federal 
fundlng on high ways, they have to 
have it. 
That is what is required here. If the 
States want the advantage of this 
speedy habeas corpus proceeding 
which wlll enable them to carry on 
their criminal Justice system with rea-
sonable promptness, Instead of in 8, or 
18 years, then they have to undertake 
the requirements set forth in this leg-
islation. 
The requirements are detailed as to 
the procedures for the establ!shment 
of panels of qualified lawyers or, ln 
the absence of that, to have a lawyer 
with either 5 year's practice, plus 3 
year's litigating felony cases, which Is 
the requirement which the Congress 
set forth In the 1988 drug laws. Then 
the court has the authority to appoint 
investigators, expert witnesses, and 
the court shall fix the compensation 
to be paid. 
Of course. in the administration and 
carrying out of all these laws, there Is 
necessarily the requirement of a good-
faith effort to see to it that the fees 
are fa ir and reasonable. We cannot mi-
cromanage the court systems and es-
tablish an hourly rate for every State 
in the United States or every county. 
That depends upon local circum-
stances. 
But it ls the obligation of the trial 
Judges, ln the State courts where these 
capital cases are tried, to see that that 
is done. It is the obligation of the Fed-
eral Judges, the U.S. district court 
Judges, when they have a lawyer ap-
pointed for the habeas corpus proceed-
ings, to see to it that adequate counsel 
is provided so that fairness is main-
tained. That kind of Judicial supervi-
sion Is necessary. 
Mr. President, once there is the as-
sur:mce that adequate counsel is 
present, and that there are funds t-0 
pay for investigators, and there are 
funds to pay for expert witnesses, then 
there is no reason why we should not 
establish a timetable which would con-
clude these cases in a reasonable 
period of time. This amendment re-
quires the Federal courts to give them 
expedited treatment. The first and 
highest priority in the Federal courts 
will be the habeas corpus appeals from 
the death sentence. 
Congress legislated many years ago 
on the subject of speedy trials in Fed-
eral courts, so it Is a logical adjunct for 
the Congress now to address the time-
frame on the hand.ling of habeas 
corpus proceedings in the Federal 
courts. 
Mr. President, the Thurmond.Spec-
ter amendment requires that the peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus be 
filed ln the Federal court within 60 
days from the final action by the SU· 
preme Court of the United States In 
denylng certiorari. But the reality Is 
that the 60-day requirement comes on 
top of approximately 4 to 6 months, 
which the system has, to see to it that 
counsel is appainted after the State 
supreme court has upheld the death 
penalty. That is the activating date. 
When the State supreme court has 
upheld the imposition. of the death 
penalty, everyone is on notice that the 
process should begin at that time to 
appaint counsel, and that counsel 
should at that Point begin to prepare 
for the Federal habeas corpus proceed-
lng because It is apparent from our ex-
perience that such a small number of 
cases are ever taken by the Supreme 
Court of the United States on certiora-
ri that lt is a certainty, a virtual cer-
tainty, that the case is golng lnto Fed~ 
era.I habeas corpus and that ls the 
moment for action. 
The whole range of the death penal-
ty cases are of sufficient fmparta.nce ln 
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Mr. President, that th esc> cases cannot 
be busi ness as usual. You s imply 
cannot let the files lie around for 6 
months or a year until the petition is 
filed . Under the existing practices, the 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus 
are not filed until an execution date 
has been set, and they languish for 
months or years before they reach 
that point with the legal processes 
taking their toll, after the final deci-
sion on the judicial appellate process. 
Mr. President, after the petition for 
a V.Tit of habeas corpus is filed, the 
State would have the customary 20 
days to file a responsi\'e pleading. At 
that Juncture the U.S. district court 
which has Jurisdiction would have the 
respcnslbility to give this case expedit• 
ed treatment. And, under the statute, 
it would have 110 days in total: 20 days 
filing time, plus 90 days for disposition 
of the case. 
If the case is complicated and re-
quires more time, discretion would be 
vested in the district court to extend 
the time for the filing of the petition 
so that the 60 days has that latitude 
and flexibility. The court could extend 
the time for the decLsion within 110 
days total, but only on a showing of 
good cause. to be specified by the 
court. 
Mr. President, I have handled 
habeas corpus cases In the State court 
and that Is the basis for my represen-
tation and argument that they are du-
plicative and meaningless. Similarly, I 
have handled cases in the Federal 
court. This timeframe Is realistic, espe-
cially given priority attention for 
these cases to be so resolved. 
Mr. President, there would not be 
any undue burden on the · Federal 
courts. If we take Philadelphia, for ex-
ample, there are approximately 10 to 
12 death cases coming out of the 
Philadelphia court system each year . . 
Interestingly, of the 110 people on 
death row in Pennsylvania, 70 come 
from Philadelphia, 40 from the re-
mainder of the State. Considering 10 
to 12 death cases a year, that would be 
less than 1 case per judge on the Fed-
eral court. In Philadelphia, there are 
18 permanent judgeships and 10 senior 
judges, so a judge would have a case 
once every 2½ or 3 years. 
Similarly, in the case of Florida I am 
advised by the State attorney gener-
. al's office there that there are ap-
proximately 25 death sentences Im-
posed each year. Florida has 27 dis-
trict judges. So It would be less than 
one a year in the State of Florida. 
Texas has. again according to the 
State attorney general's office, ap-
proximately 25 to 30 death sentences 
each year. In Texas. there are 36 dis-
trict judges and 10 senior judges. So 
on the average it would be one every 
18 to 20 months In the State of Texas. 
. So the burden Is not excessive for the 
district court to give priority attention 
to these cases. 
• If more Judges are necessary, . Mr. 
President. the Congress has to provide 
them, as we are currently with the bill 
introduced last week to provide 86 ad-
ditional Federal judges. We must pro-
vide the necessary judicial manpower 
to carry out the administration of 
criminal justice and have adequate 
Judges to give the appropriate atten-
tion which these cases require. 
Mr. President, beyond the district 
court, the case would then go to the 
court of appeals under a timetable, 
again, of 110 days. This Is about the 
same timetable now utilized in most 
circuit courts of appeal: 20 days for 
the pleadings, and a briefing and argu-
ment schedule to encompass 110 days, 
Again, If more time Is necessary, the 
statute provides for the flexibility on 
the showing of good cause with the 
specific reasons being cited. 
Once the case is concluded by the 
court of appeals, then there Is again a 
requirement that the Supreme Court 
of the United States conclude the case 
within llO days. If cert Is denied, that 
would be not too far from the current 
standards. 
CMr. LAUTENBERG assumed the 
chair.> 
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at 
every stage of the proceeding, the 
Congress would be asking or directing 
the courts to give these cases priority 
attention. We ask for the priority at-
tention because in the absence of this 
priority attention, the death penalty, 
as a weapon in the arsenal of society's 
means to protect Itself, Is rendered vir-
tually meaningless. So that this time-
table In the Federal court would pro-
vide for review in approximately 1 
year from the initial decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States In 
denying certiorari on the appeal from 
the decision by the State's highest 
court. 
Realistically, as noted before, It Is 4 
to 6 months in addition to that be• 
cause after the State's highest court 
has upheld the Imposition of the 
death penalty and we know It Is going 
to the Federal courts, it takes that 
much time to go to the Supreme Court 
of the United States on a petition for 
certiorari. 
Mr. President, on the two items 
which have been in contention-and 
there are only two Issues which have 
been hotly contested-It Is my submis-
sion that this amendment establishes 
a realistic and workable procedure as 
the amendment has finally been draft-
e~ , 
One of the arguments has been 
whether there should be consideration 
on subsequent petitions of only Inno-
cence of guilt or also on the penalty 
Itself. One of the very difficult factors 
In the administration of Justice where 
the death penalty Is Imposed Is that 
after you establish a system where a 
man or woman Is tried before a Jury 
and can produce all sorts of mitigating 
circumstances, and that case Is then 
heard by the State supreme court 
which upholds it, then there Is a 
habeas corpus petition filed in the 
Federal court. There Is no limit on 
-what the Federal court can hear at 
that ti me in an e\·idcntiary procPcdir.g 
to gl\·e full and fair review to what !ms 
happened In the State court. But after 
the dist rict court has decided it and it 
has been reviewed by the court of ap-
peals and certainly applied for at the 
Supreme Court, then there is invari-
ably the situation which would arise 
when the death penalty application is 
imminent for another petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus to be applied 
for. It is this repetition which has re-
sulted in the long delays of up to 18 
years, and it Is this repetition that has 
to be dealt with but dealt with in a 
fair manner. 
The Thurmond-Specter amendment 
provides that a subsequent petition 
may be filed only if leave is granted by 
the court of appeals. So that it Is not a 
matter of going back to the district 
judge who may be tough or may be le-
nient. It goes on the second petition, 
or subsequent petition, to the court of 
appeals-three judges-and if the de-
fendant is to have the opportunity to 
have another hearing, he has to per-
suade, or she has to persuade, two of 
three of those court of appeals judges 
that there Is some merit In having an-
other appeal. That is a fair test which 
has a balance on a gatekeeper with 
discretion, a standing-the court of ap-
peals-and always a gatekeeper which 
will exercise, as best we can In any 
system of Justice, the appropriate dis-
cretion. 
This Is a novel approach, candidly, 
suggested to me by a very distin-
guished judge In the court of appeals. 
The controversy has arisen as to 
what should be the standard applied 
when someone goes in for Federal 
habeas corpus after they have had the 
full State review and the full first Fed-
eral review. 
The Powell Commission took the po-
sition that the scope of review ought 
to be limited only to the question of 
Innocence. The judicial conference, a 
group of circuit Judges and other Fed• 
eral Judges, took the position that 
there ought to be review not only as to 
Innocence or guilt, but also a review as 
to the propriety of the penalty. 
The earlier approach, In this amend-
ment, was to limit lt to what the 
Powell Commission said, but that has 
-since been changed. So now there is an 
inclusion of consideration on a subse-
quent appeal to the penalty aspect if 
there Is a showing of fact on newly dis-
covered materials. 
So that now the pro\'lsion reads as 
follows, Mr. President. I read It be-
cause this Is a very Important provi-
sion: 
The filing of any successive petition for a 
\Hit of habeas corpus Is authorized by the 
appropriate Court of Appeals In accordance 
v.·tth section 2264<c>. 
I might explain that that Is the gate-
keeper leave granted by the court of 
appeals. The text goes on: 
And the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient, tr proved, to undermine the 
court·s confidence In the Jury's detcrmina-
· -- -. 
I 
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lion of guilt on the offense or off<' nses for 
which the death penalty was Imposed. or 
newly disco\'C:red facts which a.re not based 
upon or Include opinion evidence. ex pC' rt or 
ot herwise. 11,hich 11:ould be su ffi cient to un-
dermine the coun ·s confidence In tht> validi-
ty or the death ~ ntence. 
So that In this standard, we have the 
essence of wha.t has been urged by the 
Judicial conference. We have a subse-
quent petition allowed If there is a 
contention of innocence or If there are 
newly d!scO\·ered facts which bear 
upon the validity of the death sen-
tence; 
It appropriat ely, Mr. President, does 
not allow a second round of Federal 
habeas corpus, a second bite of the 
apple, so to speak, If you get a new 
opinion from a new psychiatrist which 
could have been obtained at any tfme. 
So there is the allowance, lf there ls a 
newly disco\·ered fact which bears 
upon the question of death penalty, as 
well as on the question of innocence. 
Mr. President, I believe that that is 
nn appropriate determination because 
I do not believe that it ls wise or con-
scionable to exclude an Individual on 
his or her way to the death penalty if 
there is a fact of this nature which 
bears either on the question of inno• 
cence, guilt. or on the question of the 
propriety of the sentence. 
This comes in significant measure, 
Mr. President. from the testimony of 
Justice Powell himself when he ap-
peared before the Judiciary CornmJt-
tee in a very lengthy session and made 
this comment which appears at page 
359 of the RECORD from November 8 of 
last year, where Justice Powell testi-
fies: -
I repeat whal I said earlier. that. for the 
m06t part, lnnocence Is not an Issue In this 
cue. The question Is whether or not a death 
sentence was appropriate, and whether or 
not the trial v.-as f&ir: 
Focus in on that, Mr. President. 
When Justice Powell comes to grips 
with the application of an appropriate 
standard. Justice Powell moves beyond 
what the Powell Commission said on 
seeking to limit subsequent petitions 
only to the question of innocence or 
C"Uilt when he says. and again I quote: 
The question b whether or not a death 
sentence was appropriate. 
So that Is what ls comprehended 
within the modification of the amend-
ment which ls now pending before the 
Senate. 
Mr. President. the other principal 
bone of contention between the two 
positions has been the question on 
whether lat.er decisions by the Su-
preme; Court of the United States 
would be available to someone whose 
appellate process had already nm its 
course, the so-called retroactively 
issue. 
After a good deal of effort, the 
Thurmond-Specter amendment I 
think strikes the right balance on this 
difficult Issue. Again, it ls in accord• 
ance with societal constraint and in ac-
cordance with the basic approach that 
the defendant ought to be accorded 
appropria te breadt h before the death 
penalty Is imposed. The substance of 
the -Thurmond-Specter amendment 
provides as follows: 
A court considering a claim under this 
chapter ahall consider ln tcrvei1 ing decisions 
by the Supreme Court of the United States 
which establish fundament.al riahts. 
What Chief Justice Rehnquist had 
been arguing for was to allow a death 
row defendant the benefit of decisions 
on fundamental rights and decisions 
which were intervening after he had 
run the appellate process intitlally. 
But, Mr. President, the most impor-
tant aspect of the thrust of the Thur-
mond-Specter amendment ls that we 
establish a timetable where there will 
be relatively few intervening appellate 
court-Supreme Court rights granted. 
That happens when It takes 18 years 
for a case to be decided. U you took a 
span of even 8 years, which ls the av-
erage, in the 1960's, you would have an 
Escobedo, Miranda, and lineups, and 
search and seizure. You would have a 
whole panoply of new righ ts which 
would arise. So that when a defendant 
wes tried, before a case would run 
through the Federal habeas corpus 
system, he would go through the State 
system and in that intervening time 
there would be a new right on confes-
sion. That case would go up and come 
back down. and by that time there 
would be a new right up on lineups. 
That case would go up, and before it 
was finished there would be a new 
right on search and seizure. That case 
would go up, and before It was fin-
ished there would be a new right on 
the selection of Juries. It is a fact that 
in the evolving system of criminal Jus-
tice in this country we have added sub-
stantial new rights to defendants. 
Mr. President, If you want to read a 
shocking declsoin, even though you 
may be a nonlawyer, pick up the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Brown versus M.Lssis-
sippi, a case which was handed down 
in 1936. Although it was not so long 
ago, there was a time when the Su-
preme Court of the United States did 
not have anything to say about any 
case tried in the State courts because 
under our concept of federalism, when 
a State court had decided the criminal 
case, that was that; the Supreme 
Court would not touch the criminal 
case, notwithstanding the fact that 
the 14th amendment was passed Im• 
med.lately after the Clvll War. But it 
took until 1936 for the Supreme Court 
of the United States to say that the 
provisions of due process of law placed 
a Federa.l limitation on what a State 
could do. 
The defendant in Brown versus Mis• 
sissippl was an African-American man 
who was brutalized virtually beyond 
description. He was ta.ken to a neigh-
boring State, beaten, a noose around 
his neck, and hanged to obtain a co-
erced confession. Finally In 1936 the 
Supreme Court of the United States 
said, enough; States cannot undertake 
those kinds of practices in the United 
States of America without having the 
Federal court step in and stop that 
ki nd of a practice. 
I think no one would begin to dis-
agree with that kind of a decision 
today Just a.s we do not disagree at all 
with the decision in Brown versus 
Board of Education or many of the de• 
clslons of the Supreme Court which 
have brought a sense of decency and 
Justice to this country. 
But then the rights have continued. 
And I am not going to engage In an ex-
tensive discussion as to how those 
rights have evolved, but many of them 
have been very tough on law enforce-
ment. 
I recall when Miranda versus Arizo-
na came down imposing a new stand-
ard for policy interrogation which ap-
plied from the date of the decision on 
June 13 of 1966, so that in cases which 
had been investigated a week before, a 
month before, when confessions had 
been appropriately obtained under ex-
isting standards- we had a case In 
Philadelphia, Commonwealth versus 
Hickey, where a man robbed a cab 
driver and murdered him and the 
police went to his apartment and 
found the gun and materials that 
proved to be from the body of the cab 
driver. They questioned the defendant 
In accordance with the existing rights 
under Escobedo versus Illinois, but 
they did not give the Miranda warn-
ings: you have a right to remain silent, 
and everything you say can and will be 
used against you; that you have a 
right to a lawyer, and If you do not 
have a lawyer the State will provide 
one, and If you start to talk and 
change your mind, you can stop at any 
time. Who, in May 1968, would have 
predicted that a month later the Su-
preme Court would come down with . 
that ruling? But the Supreme Court 
dld. and many cases were wiped out, 
and I think inappropriately wiped out 
after there had been an evolving 
standard under Mapp versus Ohio in 
search and seizure and lineups, and so 
forth. So as these cases have moved 
through the State habeas corpus pro-
ceedings and Federal habeas corpus, 
before they are finally decided, new 
rights have been created. 
This amendment takes a realistic 
look at the criminal justice system, 
and we say for the first time that the 
emperor has no clothes, when you re-
quire a State habeas corpus proceed-
ing which takes several years to be a 
jurisdictional requirement before 
going into Federal habeas corpus, be-
cause in a Federal habeas corpus you 
get all of the rights. 
For the first time the Congress wfll 
have spoken in · this bill to establish 
meaningful requirements for appoint-
ment and payment of counsel, Investi-
gators, and expert witnesses If the 
State wants the advantage of this ex-
pedited habeas corpus proceedings. It 
wlll do Justice to the defendants, and 
It wlll do Justice to society by allowina 
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allow the lmpositlon of the dl'ath pen-
alty in appropriate cases. 
I thank the Chair and yield the 
floor. 
Mr. President, may I lnquire as to 
how much time remains? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There 
is approximately 2 hours remaining 
for the Senator from South Carollna 
and a full 3 hours remain for the Sen-
ator from Delaware. 
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. 
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I 
thank the Chair. 
Earlier today, I proposed, and the 
Senate accepted, a modification of the 
underlying bill which substituted a 
new title II as It relates to habeas 
corpus. While that process was under-
way on the amendment that was co-
sponsored by Senator DECONCINI and 
Senator BRYAN, a similar effort was 
underway with Senator TuuRMOND 
and Senator SPECTER. It is reminiscent 
of some experiences in science. It was 
at the end of the 19th century that a 
scientist ln India and another scientist 
in Cuba, halfway around the world, 
were both attempting to understand 
the cause of yellow fever. 
And independently they both 
reached the determination that the 
cause was a particular form of mosqui-
to which had in a period of its maturi-
ty served as the carrier for what at 
that time was one of the world's most 
dreaded diseases. These two scientists, 
thousands of miles apart, ended up 
with the same diagnosis and the same 
prescription for the resolution of this 
dreaded disease. 
In some ways, that process has been 
occurring with this legislation. We 
started off Independently, Senator 
TmrRMoND, Senator SPECTER, Senator 
DECoNCINI, Senator BRYAN, and 
-myself, and attempted to understand 
and arrive at a reasonable resolution 
of this Issue. 
I believe that the result Is an under-
lying amendment, which Is now part 
of the bill, and an amendment which 
has been offered by the Senators from 
South Carolina and Pennsylvania, 
\\'hlch is very simllar. 
The good news with that is I believe 
· there is every reason to believe that 
this Senate will pass by a strong vote a 
very considerable reform in the cur-
rent habeas corpus law, and that the 
result of that will be a greater sense of 
real Justice, real Justice in the sense 
that decisions will be made on evi-
dence which is relevant, which is rela-
tively fresh; decisions will be made on 
a timely basis; the public's confidence 
that the judicial process has some ca-
pability of reaching flnality will be re-
stored. 
·I am very pleased with that, and I 
wish to commend all of my colleagues 
who have participated in the effort 
that has brought us so close. I also 
wish to commend former Supreme 
Court Justice Lewis Powell and the 
members of this committee, whose ef-
forts contributed so substantially to 
the result that we have reached today. 
Their distingu ished committee, 
which was made up of five Federal or 
former Federal Judges. pooled thei r 
practical experience and sou ght out-
side counsel on options for ha.beas 
corpus reform. 
The consensus that reform is needed 
was quickly formed. That recognition 
of the need for reform is now held 
broadly within this Chamber. The rea-
sons for that recognition and need for 
reform are obvious. 
Mr. President, from 1961 to 1986, 
State prisoners filing habeas corpus 
petitions In Federal district courts In· 
creased by 786 percent, a 786-percent 
lncrease between 1961 and 1986. The 
number of State prisoners' habeas 
corpus petitions filed In Federal courts 
has Jumped from 497 cases in 1987, 
and 438 cases In 1988. This brings us to 
an all-time high number of 9,880 
habeas corpus petitions in the last 4-
quarter year. 
Mr. President, Senator SPECTER has 
had the opportunity to deal with these 
cases from the perspective of a Feder-
al prosecutor. I had the responsibility 
of dealing with it from the perspective 
of a Governor of a State with a large 
number, over 300 persons, on death 
row. 
I would like to review what actually 
happens in these cases under the cur-
rent law. The case I am going to cite is 
hypothetical in that It ls an amalga-
mation of a number of cases with very 
similar factual circumstances. 
An individual commits a heinous 
crime, a multiple murder, in our State. 
It has to be under circumstances that 
shock the consciousness of the citizen-
ry. That murder results in a trial.. a 
conviction by a jury, a recommenda-
tion by that Jury, and then finally a 
Judicially imposed sentence of death. 
Let us assume that that occurred in 
1978. There is then a period of direct 
appeals, first to the Florida Supreme 
Court, and then a request. and if 
granted, an appeal before the U.S. Su-
preme Court, a direct appeal. That 
process takes until 1981. 
Then there is a period of habeu 
corpus review In the State courts be-
cause under the current law there is 
the principle of exhaustion of State 
remedies before access to the Federal 
court ls available. 
In our State we have now adopted a 
provision very similar to what this bill 
would provide, and that is a statute of 
limitations. You have to brlng your 
case before the State court within a 
period of time, or you suffer the po-
tential sanction of loslng access to the 
court. It is my understanding that 
there are approximately five other 
States that have adopted a similar 
statute of limitations. 
Let us assume that process requires 
2 years to run. We are now up to 1983. 
Then the person walt.s. What they 
wait for is the signing of a death "Q.'ar• 
rant. In Florida, that occurs after 
there has been a clemency hearing in 
which the Individual has an opportuni-
ty to present the widest possible range 
of evidence on the specific facts of the 
case, personal circumstances, issues 
that would go beyond what we would 
consider the law I\Ild go to the issue of 
mercy. 
H that case Is rejected-If clemency 
is not granted-then it becomes the re-
spanslblllty of the Governor to sign a 
death warrant. Typically, that warrant 
is signed for a date 30 days subse-
quent. Twenty days of that period 
pass. At the end of that 20 days, a pe-
tition Is filed ln the Federal court for a 
Federal collateral appeal review. 
The Federal court, now faced with a 
complicated case, only 10 days or less 
left until an execution is going to 
occur, is requested to enter a stay of 
execution which is almost automati-
cally granted. 
Then a long process of Federal col-
lateral review commences. That proc-
ess will typically end again at the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Assuming that that 
claim has been denied, then there is a 
review to determine whether another 
clemency process ts appropriate, 
whether there has been any change of 
circumstances that would indicate 
clemency, not previously granted, 
might be considered. 
Assuming that is not the case, an-
other death warrant is signed for a 
date approximately 30 days in the 
future. Twenty days into that death 
warrant, another Federal collateral 
appeal petition Is filed, raising a 
second Issue, an issue different from 
that which had been raised in the first 
instance. 
That process rolls forward until now 
we are ln the late spring of 1990. That 
individual, 12 years after the incident, 
12 years after the original convicUon. 
still awaits a final determination as to 
punishment. 
That is a typical consequence of the 
way in which the current law operates. 
in reality. 
I believe that we need to move to-
wards reform. which will have goals of 
finality, of certainty, of assurlng that 
all ~ues are raised at one time, that 
they are raised sufficiently close to 
the events so that if the issue is, for 
instance, did this person have a com-
petent lawyer at the time of trial, you 
would have_ some people with recollec-
tions sufficiently fresh, with memories 
of the incidents at trial to be able to 
advise appellate courts as to what ac-
tually happened so that we would not 
be dealing with a sense of fantasy, but 
with reality In our quest . for real Jus• 
tice. 
Both the bill as modified by the 
amendment that has now been adopt-
ed. and the amendment offered by 
Senators THURMOND and SPECTER, have 
simllar objectives. 
I would like to lay out at this time, 
Mr. President, what I think are the 
principal issues within this common 
objective, and then discuss some of the 
differences. 
I will state that It wa.s only approxi-
mately an hour ago, wh.en the Senator 
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from South Carolina offered his final 
amendment. that we had an opportu-
nity to review It. And it may be at a 
later point in this debate that I will 
return for a more thorough analysis of 
some of the areas of difference. 
But I will attempt to lay out what 
appear to be the principal Issues and 
areas of disagreement at this time. 
I suggest that there are six basic 
Issues within the question of reform of 
the Federal collateral appeals process. 
First, there is the issue of a statute of 
limitations for filing Federal habeas 
corpus claims; second, the right to 
competent counsel for indigent in-
mates in these . collateral appeals of 
capital cases; third, a review of the 
procedural default rules; under what 
circumstances can a defendant raise 
issues during the collateral appeals 
process that had not been raised 
during the direct appeal or during the 
trial itself. Next, what are the limits 
on the filing of successive petitions? 
Finally, the rules that relate to the 
retroactivity, the application of new 
law as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court to a case that occurred years in 
the past. 
We can look at these issues one at a 
time. First, the imposition of a new 
statute of limitations on filing Federal 
habeas corpus claims. This is not a 
new idea. In 1983, the Senate passed a 
1-year time limit for the filing of Fed-
eral habeas corpus petitions. Under 
the current law, as I indicated in my 
hypothetical example, there is rela-
tively little or no incentive for State 
inmates to file petitions for Federal 
habeas corpus relief until an exception 
date is set. 
In most instances, the defendant 
who is incarcerated, but feels that he 
has some legitimate claim to raise in a 
habeas corpus proceeding, has every 
incentive to want to expedite that. If 
they are able to receive relief, based 
on their petition, they might get a new 
trial, or they might be outright re-
leased. If they fail, they are in no 
worse condition than they were on the 
day they filed the petition. 
What is unusual about capital cases 
is that the incentives are reversed. 
The defendant is reluctant to file that 
last petition, knowing that if that is 
denied, then that is the ultimate 
result, and they are going to face the 
ultimate punishment. 
So the fundamental purpose of all of 
these proposals is to create some sense 
of timeliness In bringing these appeals. 
Justice is not well served under the 
current scenario. There is a flurry of 
activity of almost chaotic nature 
which surrounds the signing of the 
death warrant In the days leading up 
to execution, as attorneys move from 
court to court trying to find a friendly 
forum that will grant them some delay 
or relief. This disparages the public's 
opinion, attitude, and perception of 
the Justice system. 
This amendment would allow In-
mates 1 year to file a Federal habeas 
petition from the time the sentence 
has-been affirmed in the direct appeal 
of the State court of last resort. This 
1-year period can be stayed during a 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
based on a request petition for certio-
rari or during any period In which the 
petitioner is seeking relief under State 
habeas corpus procedures. 
This 1-year time limit, as I Indicated, 
Is consistent with legislation that the 
Senate passed in 1983. It is also the 
same time limit which is contained In 
legislation offered earlier this year by 
both Senator BIDEN and Senator 
THURMOND and legislation which I 
have offered. 
The second issue Is the accessibility 
to competent counsel for Indigent de-
fendants facing capital sentences. Mr. 
President, I particularly applaud the 
Powell Committee for Identifying this 
critical element of habeas corpus 
reform. In adequate representation at 
trial and on appeal Is often the under-
lying cause for the plurality of claims 
which slow the finality of State court 
judgment. That is not to say that 
there is not a pool of very fine, highly 
qualified lawyers to handle capital 
cases. However, most witnesses who 
appeared before the Judiciary Com-
mittee on this topic lamented the ac-
cessibility of good lawye·rs for indigent 
inmates. In my State, the State of 
Florida, by statute, we have created a 
public defender office to provide com-
petent counsel at the trial level and an 
office of capital collateral representa-
tives to provide competent counsel for 
collateral appeals in capital cases. 
The Powell Committee recommend-
ed that should inmates be limited in 
the time of filing an appeal-if the 
statute of limitation concept is adopt-
ed-representation should be available 
for such collateral appeals. 
Senator BIDEN, in his original pro-
posal, had provided a similar ap. 
proach, and I am pleased to say that, 
in the amendment ·that has. been of-
fered by Senator THURMOND and Sena-
tor SPECTER, almost a verbatim adop. 
tlon of the competency of counsel and 
the procedures for their selection and 
compensation has been secured. This 
is not an issue which ls In controversy. 
The third issue involved in debate on 
habeas corpus reform relates to the so-
called procedural default rules. Proce-
dural default rules determine under 
what circumstances an issue which 
was not raised in a defendant's origi-
nal trial can be raised In a collateral 
proceeding. 
In the 1977 case of Wainwright 
versus Sykes, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its opinion that claims not 
previously raised may be heard only 
under three conditions: First, when 
the failure to raise them was a result 
of illegal State action; second, when 
the Supreme Court recognizes a new 
law that It then retroactively applies; 
and third when the failure to raise the 
claim was because certain facts could 
not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence. This 
test, as the Senator referred to, Is the 
"cause" and "prejudice" test. That ls. 
you ha \·e to show that there Is a just 
cause for raising this. a reason to bring 
to the court's attention a matter not 
previously raised, and that cause has 
to have caused real prejudice. This 
rule affords an adequate guarantee 
that the Federal habeas corpus courts 
will not be barred from hearing appro-
priate claims. 
The Powell Committee did not rec-
ommend any changes in the rules on 
procedural default. Again, Mr. Presi-
dent, I am pleased to observe that this 
is an area in which there Is no dis-
agreement. Both the amendment of-
fered by the Senator from South 
Carolina and the Senator from Penn-
sylvania and what is now the underly-
ing amendment to the bill itself essen-
tially adopts the Powell Committee's 
position in the previous law relating to 
procedural default. 
The fourth Issue has to do with the 
concept of successive petitions. This is 
a very important issue. The question 
is, after the 1-year filing limit is 
passed, under what conditions can an 
inmate raise an unheard claim in the 
Federal court? To use a hypothetical · 
example: Having gone to Federal court 
once v.'ith a petition for habeas corpus 
and having been unsuccessful, can one 
go back a second, third, fourth time, 
raising additional claims? Successive 
petitions should, in my opinion, and in 
the opinion of the Powell Committee, 
be limited to only the most extenuat-
ing circumstances. The Powell Com-
mittee would allow successive petitions 
only in extenuating circumstances and 
only when the claim went to the guilt 
or innocence of the prisoner. 
In this area, both the Senator from -
South Carolina, the Senator from 
Pennsylvania and our underlying 
amendment have digressed slightly 
from the Powell recommendation, in 
that we have also recognized the ap-
propriateness under extenuating cir-
cumstances of bringing petitions 
where the validity of the sentence, as 
well as guilt or innocence, is at Issue. 
That is to say-
Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator 
yield for a question? 
Mr. GRAHAM. The Senator would · 
like to yield after he finishes about 10 
minutes of explaining the issues and 
·attempting to articulate what I sense 
to be areas of agreement and remain-
ing areas of disagreement. 
To return to the hypothetical, if the 
issue is whether the judge or the Jury, 
depending on which institution has 
the responsibility for determining the 
Imposition of death, had properly 
taken into account aggravating cir-
cumstances, if there were extenuating 
reasons why certain Information was 
not brought to the attention of the 
court in the first _habeas corpus peti-
tion, we would recognize the fact that 
that is a legitimate area as ls the basic 
Issue of guilt or innocence. 
I might say that It has been suggest-
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cr.scs which get to the United Stat,es some of the rationale for that. This ls the Federal procedures, then you 
s uprt-me Court through the Federal from a statement by Justice Lewis would have the prisoner going Into the 
11:i!Jeas corpus procedure as applled to Powell, the chairman of the Powell State system second. 
c:i;:ii tal cases go to the issue of sen tenc- Committee, wh ich states: I do not agree with th e argument 
;ng and the validity of that sentenc.e Federal law now requires that before that what will happen is that you v,ill 
rat he r than to the issue of guilt or in- cl aims may be asserted In a Federal habeas have parallel procedures, that ls proce-
noccnce itself. But I underscore that corpus petition they must fi rs t be presented dures in the Federal court and the 
tile ab ili ty to bring a successive peti- Lo State courts. This represents appropriate State court proceeding on the same 
tio n. whether for guilt or innocence, or respect for federalism. A State court system clock. It is not In the interest of the 
for the validity of the sentence, should should have the opportunity to address any riso t h . th t It Is I th errors on Its own before intrusion by the P ner o a\ e a occur. n e 
be only_ available under the narrowest Federal system. Interest of the prisoner to determine 
of conditions hat d · ·11 d 1 f ' al J d 
Th t t ·t h Jd t t l The provision that ls contained in w or ermg w1 e ay m u g-e s a u e s ou no con a n ment as long as possible 
r ague standards such as miscarriage of the amendment by the Senators from · 
Justice or other words that would tend South Carolina and Pennsylvania So 9'.'hat is going to happen ls you 
to encourage future litigation. The would essentially say thats the ex- are gom? to ha,·e the State proceeding 
amendment which we have proposed. haustion of State remedies require- not avoided, but Just shifted to the 
which ts now the underlying amend- ment would be walved, and by setting end of the process which will result if 
ment 1n this blll, would allow review of a 60-day time limit In which to bring there ~as. in f~t. some State defecL 
successh·e petitions only when the Federal cases It would virtually neces- You will not fmd that out until the 
facts underlying the claim undermine sltate that the prisoner move In the very end rath~r than as Is the case 
the confidence of the court in the Federal system first. today, and I thmk appropriately so, to 
jury's determination of guilt or t he va- The argument, as I understand it. make that determination at the begin• 
Iidity of the sentence, a standard for that is the a rgument of expedition, ning of the collateral appeal process. 
which is very similar to the standard t hat the State habeas corpus proceed- Mr. President. a second area of dif. 
which has been proposed by the Sena- ing ls essentially meaningless, that it ference between the approach that Is 
tors from South Carolina and Pennsyl- should be preempted and the defend- now in the bill and that offered b:, 
van ia. ant directed to the forum that really Senators THuRMOND and SPECTER has 
Finally, the issue of retroactivity: No counts, the Federal system. to do with the Judicial time limits. 
State will be able to have an effective First, I disagree with that statement They would set a 60-day period in 
death penalty statute unless that stat- of federalism. The fact is that each which to bring that first Federal 
ute is considered to be fair. One of the State has its own State criminal law. appeal. We would set a 1-year period. I 
mcst difficult issues of fairness Is All of these people by definition are believe that the 1-year period Is more 
where an Individual was found guilty State prisoners. They have been pros- orderly and appropriate. These are 
under a certain State law and then, at ecute: they have been tried; they have complicated cases. Typically the col-
sometime in the future, the law is been found guilty under State law. lateral appeal Is not handled by the 
changed. And the question Is, Should My State, in some areas, has provi- same attorney who handled the appeal 
they get the benefit of that new law slons that are significantly different at trial and direct appeal 
which might avoid their being execut- than the Federal law, one being, the The reason for that is. very obvious. 
ed. giving them some reasonable basis taking of depositions during a criminal One of the standard issues raised in 
to pursue a habeas corpus claim, or proceeding. the collateral appeal fs the competen-
should they be exec~ted under the law Therefore, it is appropriate that the cy of that counsel. so it ts not yer, 
as_lt existed at the tune that they were collateral review process start In the likely that you are going to have the 
originally sentenced? . State courts which have the Jurlsdic- same attorney who tried the case and 
The 1989 Supreme Court case of tion of looking at both allegations of appealed the case doing the collateral 
Teague versus Lane established a basic misapplication of State law and also appeal where in that collatenl 
rule that new !aw arising after a sen- have the responsibility to review for appeal' they a~ raising the Issue of 
tence became final may not be applied compliance with Federal law. their own professional competence. So 
In a habeas corpus proceeding. Once that process Is completed, and in 
We have suggested a modi!ic.atlon if the State court has made the deter- there needs to be a period of time 
which, again, I believe ls very close to mlnatlon that all State procedures order for that transition to new coun-
that which has been proposed by the were properly abided by, and In their sel to occur. 
Senators from South Carolina and Judgment Federal procedures, then The 1-year period is the period that 
Pennsylvania, and that 1s we would the state collateral appeal process is this Senate, in 1983, felt to be appro-
pro\ide that law cannot be applied ret- exhausted. At that point, the prisoner prlate. The I-year period was the 
roactively unless the U.S. Supreme has an opportunity to go into the Fed- period that Senator THtnwoND, when 
Court has promulgated that new law. eral court, which will only be look.Ing he Introduced his original habeas 
That Is to say, it could not have been at the issue of compliance with Feder- corpus blll, felt was appropriate. It ls 
promulgated by a court in the Federal al law. the period t hat Senator BIDEN had in-
system below the Supreme Court and So I believe there 1.s, as Justice eluded in his original blll. And It was 
specifically made that law retroactive Powell Indicates, a very basic rationale the period that myself and several co-
in its application. of federalism for the exhaustion of sponsors had included in our bill. 
Mr. President, this slUilDlary indi- State remedies. Most States, those of which have set 
cates that on the major issues there Is The argument Is made that It will a statute -of limitations for State pro-
wide area of agreement. result In expedition, that you will save ceedings, h ave set a limit of more than 
Let me Just turn in closing to our all this time that now Is taken up in 1 year. In the State of Florida It Is 2 
preliminary analysis of the amend- the State collateral review process. I years tha.t Is given as the stat ute of 
ment as offered by the Senators from disagree with that. What Is going to limitations to file in the S tate court. 
South Carolina and Pennsylvania as to · happen ls not a termination of the So I believe the period that is suggest-
where we think there are some areas State procedure but rather a reorder- ed. that Is the period of 1 year, is an 
of difference. One area of difference Is Ing. appropriate one. · 
In the application of State habeas In the hypothetical I cited, the State A second issue tha.t concerns me la 
corpus. habeas corpus process was availed of the time limits that occur aiter the pe-
The tradition has been that the Fed- and exhausted first before the Feder- tltlon is filed. The amendment by the 
eral courts would not intervene until al. If the amendment, as offered by Senators from South Carolina and 
the individual had had a full hearing the Senators from South Carolina and Pennsylvania would set various time-
of his collateral claims in the State Pennsylvania, would be adopted, what frames In which the Federal court.a 
court. And I might quote at this time would happen is that you would have must act. 
.., 
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We have similar provisions in other 
areas of Federal criminal procedure. 
There is what is called the speedy trial 
rule , which essen t ia ll y says tha t , if 
yo u are charged with a cri minal of-
fense, the prosecution has to bring 
your trial with in a certain number of 
days. If they fall to do so, if they fail 
to meet that speedy trial rule, you can 
go to the court and ask for a dismissal 
of the charges. That Is a basic part of 
our sense of fair play, that you cannot 
be accused of a crime and then just 
left In limbo Indefini tely awaiting your 
trial. 
So the sanction for nonperformance 
on a timely basis is essentially against 
the public. The public loses Its right to 
try an Individual for violation of law, 
if that trial does not take place on a 
timely basis. 
The question I have is what are the 
sanctions, and against whom, If the 
Federal courts do not comply with the 
time periods contained in this amend-
ment? If we say the Federal court 
within 120 days has to hear the peti-
tion and 125 days elapse and they have 
not done so and there is no acceptable 
excuse for that delay, what happens? 
Does the same thing happen that 
occurs at the trial level, and that is 
that the charges are dismissed, the 
prison door is opened, the defendant is 
released? 
I think that is a very serious issue, of 
us, through the legislative process, at-
tempting to set a whole new set of 
rights for a State prisoner in the col-
lateral appeal process, and that is the 
right to be heard within a certain 
number of days. What happens if that 
r ight of the State prisoner to be heard 
within that number of days is not in 
fact accomplished? That is a signifi-
cant second difference, which on first 
analysis exists between the underlying 
amendment and the amendment of-
fered by the Senators from South 
Carolina and from Pennsylvania. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH) is rec-
ognized. 
Mr. HATCH . Mr. Presiden t, h abeas 
corpus reform is probably the most 
important issue in t he debate so far , 
although all of t he issues involved in 
this ma tter a re very, very important 
Issues. And, to that extent, I want to 
compliment the distinguished Senator 
from Florida. Although I do not think 
h is is the better proposal, It is so much 
better than what the original Biden 
proposal was in the bill, and I know he 
has a profound imprint on it. It is basi-
cally a movement In the right direc-
tion. He deserves an awful lot of 
credit, because I understand the con-
flict and the difficult ies on his side of 
the aisle. We ha\·e some of that over 
here, but nothing like what the distin-
guished Senator from Florida has to 
contend with on his side of the aisle. 
What he has done is singularly very, 
very important. 
What the distinguished Senator 
from Delaware has done is also very 
important. At the beginning of this 
debate, I raised almost all of the issues 
that the · distinguished Senator from 
Florida has tried to addr ess in the 
technical amendments be h as filed. 
They are not so technical. They are 
very substantive amendments. And I 
think regardless of what the Senate 
does, we have a chance here of really 
having a least a step forward in habeas 
corpus reform. something that many 
of us felt could not occur except for 
what has been done by the distin-
guished Senator from Florida. 
But, having said that, let me Just 
point out some of the disadvantages of 
his approach vis-a-vis the Thurmond-
Specter-Hatcb approach- and it is no 
secret I helped work on the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch approach. I 
would list the following. No. 1, the dis-
tinguished Senator from Florida, in 
the changes he has brought about, 
waits until all State proceedings are 
exhausted before allowing Federal 
habeas to proceed. We need to know 
that that can be 3 to 5 years to 10 
years and maybe even more. But some-
where between 3 and 10 years before 
that matter is resolved. 
No. 2, he does not set any time limits 
on the courts to require them to dis-
Mr. President, in conclusion, I am 
very pleased to be here today, when I 
think that we are within a short 
period of time of adopting a very fun-
damental, balanced, and I hope soon 
to become law, reform in habeas 
corpus. There are few things we could 
do which would have a more salutary 
effect on the criminal Justice system. 
There are few things we could do that 
would more help to restore the pub-
lic's confidence in our basic sense of 
justice than to reform this process 
which has been t rivialized, which has 
been the subject of delay, the subject 
of obfuscation, and increasingly the 
subject of ridicule by the public, di-
rected at our justice system. 
. pose of these habeas corpus cases. So 
they can go on, on either side of that 
tree-for the State habeas approach 
through the Federal habeas ap-
proach-for very lengthy periods of 
time. 
So, Mr. President, I applaud all of 
those who have brought us to this 
point today. The amendment we have 
offered demonstrates the seriousness 
of our effort to achieve reform in this 
area. We are serious about protecting 
the constitutional rights of defend-
ants. We are serious about securing 
order and finality in capital cases. 
No. 3. and I think one of the most 
critical differences is, he allows succes-
sive petitions and stays of execution 
by a single Federal district trial Judge. 
That is a very significant difference 
between the two approaches. There 
are almost 700 district judges. certain-
ly more than 600 in this country. In 
every district court in this country, in 
every jurisdiction, there are always 
one or more Judges who, the minute 
you file a habeas corpus petition, 
grant it. It does not make any differ-
ence whether it ls fri volous or not , it is 
granted. We t:ave at least one, and in 
many cases more than one. who would 
grant a Federal petition for habeas 
corpus for almost any reason no 
matter how fr ivolous. T hat is what is 
rui ning th is system. 
There are other reasons why I th ink 
the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch ap-
proach is better. Even so, I pay tre-
mendous tribute and homage to the 
distinguished Senator from Florida for 
the efforts he has made. 
Frankly, I do not think the Congress 
should be in the business of telling the 
Supreme Court what is the effect of 
their decisions, and I think that, 
again, is what happens with the 
Graham-Biden amendment. 
What are the advantages of the 
Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amend-
ment? I would like to appeal to my 
good friend because I think he has 
given thoughtful reflection to this. He 
has been a Governor of a major State 
in this Union. He has seen the abuse 
of habeas corpus, time after time, es-
pecially in his jurisdiction, but all Ju-
risdictions have seen abuses of habeas 
corpus petitions. He has seen the tre-
mendous costs to taxpayers that really 
are Just running out of control. And 
he knows that this is a serious prob-
lem. 
I would like to appeal to him to look 
at some of the provisions of the Thur-
mond amendment. No. 1, the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment re-
quires a death row inmate to file his 
Federal habeas corpus petition within 
60 days after the death sentence be-
comes final, that is, after appointment 
of postconviction counsel. So there is a 
t imeframe. They have to move. They 
are not going to be waiting until the 
last second so they can keep the 
person alive for that much longer. 
They have to move and they have to 
do so in a good-faith, legitimate effort 
with legitimate arguments. 
No. 2, it prohibits any Federal dis-
trict court judge from thereafter 
granting any other habeas petition or 
stay of execution. This is what the 
Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendment 
does. You get around these Judges for 
whom it does not make any difference 
what the law is, they are going to 
grant that petition no matter what it 
means because of their own personal 
ideology or philosophy. It is easier for 
a trial judge to do that. It is almost 
impossible for an appellate panel of 
Judges to do that. 
No. 3, the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendment gets around that process 
and that problem by requiring the pe-
tition to be authorized by circuit court 
of appeals authorization before any 
successive petition may be brought. So 
you have to go straight to the circuit 
court of appeals. It is much more 
likely that you are going to have, not 
only a more sophisticated look at the 
petition, but also that they are not 
going to put up with the frivolity of 
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No. 4. th e Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendmen t forces the courts, both 
trial and appellate courts, to act expe-
ditious! ;- . 
The district court has to decide the 
case v,ithin 110 days. That is in the in-
terest of everybody, to be frank . The 
circuit court has to decide the case 
within 90 days, and then the Supreme 
Court v.i~hin a 90-day period thereaf• 
ter. So ,;i.·e have speedy, quick, effi-
cient, honest, just approaches to this. 
But it is still a timely approach. That 
saves the taxpayers millions of dollars 
while still protecting the rights of the 
accused. the rights of the defendant. 
No. 5, the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
approach does not postpone consider• 
atlon of the State's claim at all. That 
is a State matter. State habeas corpus 
can proceed at exactly the same time, 
or subsequently, as the State deter-
mines best. It can go on at the same 
time the Federal habeas petition is 
filed. Nothing prevents the State. We 
do not interfere with the State ap-
proach toward habeas corpus at all. 
They can do whatever they want to 
do, and they can take whatever time 
they want. But we all know that 
States are much less likely to grant 
· habeas corpus petitions than the Fed-
eral courts. The reason that is so is be-
cause there are some Federal district 
judges you can absolutely count on to 
grant a Federal habeas corpus petition 
regardless of what the merits are, re-
gardless of how frivolous or inconse-
quential tt may be, because of ideology 
and because of a different belief. 
I brought up on Monday, the An-
drews case in Utah. I spoke at some 
length about that Utah case, State 
versus William Andrews. I complained 
about the 26 separate appeals or re-
views of Judgment that this 1 death 
row prisoner has obtained. Fifteen of 
those twenty-six appeals or reviews 
have been in Federal court. They have 
been in the Federal system. His other 
11 appeals have been in the State 
system. 
I just learned that one of these ap-
peals whkh I had shown on my chart 
as pending· was, in fact, decided 
against Mr. Andrews on May 12 of this 
year. 
Guess 1ohat else has occurred in this 
case? While I was speaking on the 
floor of the Senate on Monday, An-
drews filed another appeal, No. 27, 16 
years after he committed his crime. 
What was his crime? Everybody 
knows. There is no question of guilt. 
The evidence is so overwhelming and 
compelling that even Andrews does 
not deny it. He and another friend 
went into a hi-fi shop. They tortured 
the people there. They drove pencils 
into the ear of at least one, poured 
Drano down their throats, tortured 
them, beat them up, and then shot 
them in cold blood. Everybody knows · 
that. 
There 1s no question they did it. 
There is no question of guilt. There is 
no question it was a heinous crime. 
There is no question that William An• 
drews deserved the death penalty. And 
that Is what he got. But 17 years later, 
he was, as of the time I was speaking 
on the floor decrying this type of a sit• 
uation and this type of a procedural 
system, flling his 27th appeal. 
All I can say Is this has cost the 
State of Utah millions of dollars. 
There are legitimate reasons for the 
petition of habeas corpus-I am a 
great believer in the petition of habeas 
corpus-I believe it Is a way of rectify. 
ing wrongs, but not like this. 
That is why the Thurmond-Specter• 
Hatch approach really is a good ap-
proach. If we can get enough col• 
leagues to vote for that, we will send 
one heck of a beautiful message. I will 
tell my colleagues something, I will be 
for this bill regardless of what hap-
pened on the gun issue. I am not 
happy about that, as a person from 
the West, as someone who made the 
principal arguments against it. I will 
be for this bill assuming we can cor-
rect some of the other things that are 
wrong with it and assuming that we 
can have decent resolution of the cap. 
ital punishment sections of the bill. 
But It will go a long way toward caus-
ing me to want to support this bill. 
That is a pretty big concession on 
my part, if you stop and think about 
it, because I feel very deeply about the 
assault weapcns issue that we were 
talking about. I think many people in 
my State feel very deeply, and the 
people all across this country. That 
was a serious, significant issue. 
But this ls so important, this is such 
an important criminal issue, such an 
important constitutional set of issues, 
such an important criminal Justice 
issue that I would feel very, very good 
about it if we agreed to the Thur• 
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment. 
· I think the distinguished Senator 
from Florida would feel good about It. 
He knows this ls a better approach be-
cause he has thoughtfully looked at 
this. That is not taking a thing away 
from him because his approach ls a 
step in the right direction. I never 
thought It would happen on that side 
of the floor. I am not being critical. I 
know there are sincere people who 
love these appeals-who hate the 
death penalty so much that they are 
willing to do anything, no matter what 
the cost. That is not good law, not a 
good approach. 
I do not blame them for fighting. 
against the death penalty if they feel 
that way. That ls their right. Some of 
these views are very legitimate from 
their viewpoint; not from mine, but 
from their viewpoint. I do not see how 
any of us can allow this system to go 
on: Multiple appeals, the right to come 
up with any frivolous reason to get an 
appeal and to cost the taxpayers and 
everybody else In the process. 
William Andrews flied this 27th 
appeal on Monday, while I was talking 
about and criticizing the fact he had 
26 up to then. He objected In this 
appeal to the Federal magistrate who 
had denied him relief. This judge had 
actually conducted a new e\·ldent :ary 
hearing, 16 years after the original 
crime, to determine if Andrews· r ight 
to an impartial jury had been s9. tis-
fled. In a thorough, 62-page opinion. 
the judge concluded that no evidence 
of any constitutional violation or 
other Irregularity in the Andrews trial 
existed. Instead, he concluded that the 
prisoner's conduct was "an abuse of 
the writ." 
Andrews had filed another plea to 
have a thorough review of his latest 
frivolous complaint reexamined by a 
Federal court. I presume this will be 
taken right on up to the Supreme 
Court of the United States of Amrrica 
with all of those consequent delays, 
with all of the costs involved, all from 
a person who literally deserves the 
judgment that he has received. 
Mr. President, I would like to speak 
v.ith a little more specificity on the 
issue of habeas corpus reform because 
I think this is such an important issue. 
I have to say that I naturally am in 
support of the Thurmond-Specter. 
Hatch amendment on habeas corpus. I 
believe it is one of the most imagina-
tive and effective answers to a difficult 
legislative issue that I have seen in the 
time I have been here. 
In all honesty, we did not have this 
put together as of last night. We tried 
very, very hard. We worked hard all 
last night and most of the day today. 
Frankly, I did not expect that the 
Senate would today be considering a 
habeas corpus bill that would really 
reform the system. I did not think 
that we would see a bill that would 
truly limit the number of cases that 
could be brought and that would limit 
the amount of time that those cases 
would take. Under the Thurmond• 
Specter-Hatch amendment, this ac• 
complishes both of those goals. 
It is clear, the Graham amendment 
constitutes, represents a good faith 
effort to address the habeas corpus in 
death penalty cases. But it Is equally 
clear that that amendment does not 
do enough. It is likely, I believe, that 
this approach to our habeas problems 
will result in the filing of not fewer 
but more cases. It will thus have the 
effect of delaying death sentences, not 
allowing them to be carried out. 
The Graham amendment would in-
t roduce new avenues of delay and 
postponement to be exercised by Pris• 
oners on death row. Unlike the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment, this 
amendment sets no limit on the 
number of habeas petitions that can 
be flied by a death row Inmate. Even 
more important, the Graham amend-
ment does not even try to set a time 
limit on the filing and trying of the 
habeas corpus petition. 
That ls the great Innovation of the 
Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendment, 
that It sets an absolute watertight 
tlmeframe, within which a death row 
inmate's Federal review remedies will 
be exhausted. After that time, all fur• 
ther proceedings, with one limited ex-
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ceptlon, shall be In the State courts or 
in clemency proceedings before the 
State's Governor or board of pardons. 
That Is where the serious ca.ses of hei-
noll5 crimes belong, not In the Federal 
courts. 
Let me explain. Under the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment. Fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings come 
first, not second, as the~· do under cur-
rent practlce. State habeas review can 
be provided by any State, of course, 
but If a prisoner wants a Federal court 
to review his death sentence for con-
stitutional defects, he must seek such 
review \\1thin 60 d:lys of his case be-
coming final. The State post.conviction 
review, i! any, will still be available 
after the Federal habeas process Is 
complete, or it can go on at the same 
time. 
The great ad\•ar.tage of the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment Is 
that this Federal habeas process will 
reach an end, and It will be quick. 
First, a State seeking the benefits of 
the new h:,.bea.s procedures must pro-
vide apPolnted counsel In pcstcomic-
tion proceedings. The Thurmond-
Specter-Hatch amendment requires 
that. 
I personally would not have gone 
that far, but I am not agalr..st it. I Just 
say tha.t it does require appointed 
counsel. 
Then within GO days after the ap-
pointment, the habeas petition must 
be filed in the appropriate Federal dla-
trict court. 
Next. the trial court must determine 
the habeas petition within 110 days of 
fillna. Any appeal of the district court 
determination must be filed in the 
Federal court of appeals within an-
other 110 days. If further appeal to 
t.be Supreme Court ls sought. it must 
be filed within 20 days of t.be issuance 
of the mandate by the court of ap-
peals. Then the Supreme Court must 
in tum render its decision within 90 
days of the filing of the petJtlon. 
Now, that is a remarkably tight 
schedule for any case to follow, but it 
is appropriate for these death penaJty 
appeals. They deserve the priority at-
tention of our courts and the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment en-
sures they will receive it. 
The Graham amendment. Why ha.ve 
I concluded that the Graham amend-
ment, despite its expressed intent to 
reform habeas, ha..s failed? First, be-
cause prol)OSed section 2257<c>, which 
purports to withdraw Federal district 
court jurisdiction over successive 
habeas petitions, contains an excep. 
tlon so broad t-hat It entirely swallows 
the purported habeas limit and ren-
ders it. useles5. 
That exception would allow succes-
sive petitions in Federal district court, 
where the prisoner was raising a new 
issue that had not previously been pre-
sented in State or Federal court and 
"the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient. lf proven, to undermine 
the court's confidence in the Jury's de-
termlnaUon of cunt on the offense or 
o!fcnses for which the dea th penalty 
wa.s imposed, or the validity of U1e 
sentcnc-.e of death." 
The Graham amendment provides 
an avenue for the prisoners to reliti• 
gate and relitic-ate the appropriateness 
of the death sentence that was re-
turned. The only practical llm1tation Is 
that the prisoner has to th.ink of a 
new issue not raised before. 
Well. that should not be ha.rd. There 
are plenty of attorneys out there 
ready to volunteer thelr services, and 
they are very creative in these mat-
ters. All they have to do Is keep creat-
ing one new Issue after another and 
they can take multiple successive 
habeas appeals. 
The Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendment, on the other hand, has 
something very different to say about 
a Federal district Judge's ability . to en-
tertain a second habeas petition for a 
death row inmate. He or she has none. 
No Federal trial Judge, not one of the 
'more than 600 nov.· serving ~111 have 
Jurisdiction to consider a successive 
habeas petition under the Tburmond-
SPecter-Hatcb amendment. Now, that 
Is habeas reform. 
They have their role to play in the 
original a.ppeal, but no successive 
appeal will be granted in the first in-
stance by a Peder&l district .t'Jdge, 110 
there is not going to be this automatic 
granting of a successive petitioIL 
Instead., the Thunnond-Specter-
H&tch amendment would only allow 
Federal court review of the second pe-
tition where a Federal court of appeals 
has specifically authorized the filing 
of such a case. 
In other words, the circuit court Is 
going to have to make that determina-
tion and, let me tell you. they are 
going to be much more speclfie on 
what the law ls than these district 
Judges. Thus, the ability of a single 
Federal district judge to derail the 
entire appellate process, which is now 
so often seen 1n the death - penalty 
area, will end il the Tbunnond-Spec-
ter-Hatcb amendment is adopted. 
That ls a revolutionary change in our 
law. It is as welcome as It is overdue. 
What that says Is, purely and 
£imply, that after the first petition for 
habeas starts in the district court and 
goes all the way up to the Supreme 
Court, if there Is a successive petition 
filed, it goes ·straight to the appellate 
court. the circuit court of appeals, and 
they have to grant the right for It to 
go on from there. 
I can tell you they a.re not going to 
do that very often unless there Is le-
gitimate reason for doing so. And if 
there is, then they should and they 
will That is the way it should work. 
But it puts a finality to this that 
really ought to be there to stop the 27 
different, frivolous. fru!Ue.ss, awful ap-
peals by William Andrews and others 
in similarly situated circumstances. 
Once a successive petition Is filed 
under the Graham amendment, the 
district court., the court of appeals, 
and the Supreme Court can each take 
their own lime in decidi:,g the ca.se. 
There Is no Incentive for quick action 
whatsoever. And with all the pres3ures 
of the courts, they are not going to be 
quick any more than they are today. 
Under the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendment. each of those courts is 
placed under careful deadl!nes to 
ensure their quick attention to these 
Important cases. The entire Federal 
portion of their appeal should be over 
v.·ithin a year. Contrast that to the 17 
years that the death row Inmates such 
as Utah prisoner William Andrev:s has 
been able to tie up the Federal courts 
and the State with their appeals under 
the current system. And the average 
of these habeas petitions Is years. It 
amounts to years and yea.n; and years. 
The Graham amendment also ex-
pands the right of appeal from adverse 
rulings on habeas petitions. Under 
present law, most unsuccessful habeas 
petitioners may only appeal the dis-
missal of their petitions where the dis-
trict Judge issues a certificate of prob-
a'!>le cause asserting that the Legal 
Issues presented by the case are not 
entirely frivolous. The Graham 
amendment creates, for the first time, 
an absolute right to have habeas deci-
sions reviewed on appeal, and that Is 
in his proposed section 2259. 
I want to tell my colleagues it Is ab-
solutely guaranteed that this wm fur-
ther aggTavate the current overload 
being experienced by the Federal 
courts of appeals. Moreover, the new 
appeals allowed by the Graham 
amendment will by definition be frfvo-
lous cases which would not pre\1ousl)' 
have been Htigated beyond the trial 
level. Those who a.re experts in this 
fie ld know that, and I know It. 
I acknowledge that the Thurmond-
Specter-Hatch amendment makes a 
simflar change In the law, but there 1s 
little or no Potential for delay result-
Ing frc.n this change in the overall 
framework of the strict limits that 
Thurmond-Specter-Hatch would estab-
lish. In other words, we set time limits. 
Yes, we protect their right to have a 
successive appeal, but we set time 
limits in the process, and In succe.ssive 
appeals we reQuire them to go straight 
to the circuit courts which will decide 
these matters fairly, equitably, and 
quickly. 
These are the prlnclpafreasons why 
any Senator who truly favors re!orm 
of the habeas corpus system should 
oppose the habea., corpus provlsiom of 
the Graham amendment. That bill, 
while a step in the right direction, 
..-bile clearly intended and far superior 
to the proposal I crlticlred last 
Monday, is not. I am afraid. true 
hl\beas corpus reform. It wouid result 
in habeas even further out of control 
Th.e habeas provtstons of the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hau-h amendment by 
contrast are designed to establish a 
new time limitation. generally 1 year, 
alter the death aentence becomes final 
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Now, I urge my colleagues, this 
should be a bipartisan issue; this 
should not be a Democrat \·ersus Re-
publican issue as the assult weapons 
issue became. Yes, there were a few 
Republicans who voted with the \'ast 
majority of Democrats on that par-
ticular issue. That was certainly a par-
tisan vote. There Is no question about 
It. We all know which way It went. 
There Is no question that it came 
dov.-n to partisan politics, but this one 
should not. 
E,·ery one of us has to live with this 
system. Every one of our States are 
crying for help. Every one of our 
criminal law enforcement people who 
have any sense about this are crying 
for help. Everybody admits the system 
is breaking down. Everybody looks at 
the Andrews case and just sighs and 
wonders how this great country can 
allow this situation to continue. 
So I urge my colleagues to support 
· the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amend-
ment and oppose that of Senator 
GP..ARAM. I recognize that there are 
some in this body, a small minority, 
who favor the abolition of the death 
penalty in all circumstances. I do not 
expect them to vote for the Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment-
they should not; their personal beliefs 
are that way-because, I have to tell 
you, the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendment will certainly, beyond 
doubt, ensure that death sentences are 
carried out. 
So as to those who are against It, I 
cannot blame them. I cannot blame 
them for voting against Thurmond-
Specter-Hatch. But those who are for 
it, those who are really tired of the 
criminal elements in our society, who 
really want to do something about it, 
this is now the best chance we have 
ever had in the history of Congress to 
do something about this out-of-whack 
situation. 
After 1 year has passed, the death 
sentences, by Thurmond-Specter-
Hatch, will be Imposed in the various 
States. and they will be carried out 
unless the States themselves or the 
U.S. Supreme Court stays the execu-
tion. All rights are protected, but 
there will be no frivolity, that is, no 
successive appeals that are frivolous. 
There will not be any more abuse of 
the s~rstem; there will not be any more 
of this tremendous cost to society. 
Finally, we will have an effective 
death penalty in this country that is 
certaln, that is reasonably swift, and 
one which at the same time protects 
every conceivable constitutional right 
of the defendant. 
The Chief Justice of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, William Rehnquist, 
spoke on the subject of habeas corpus 
just last week. He made an Important 
point when he noted that no other 
country In the world allows final 
criminal convictions to be reopened 
and reexamined in the courts. Only 
Pardon and executive clemency are 
generally available. No other country 
In the world does what we do. 
Compare that to tile American situa-
tion, where we regularly allow not one 
but two complete postconvlction re-
views of criminal sentences. Foreign 
lawyers and Judges cannot understand 
why we do that. Do we have so little 
faith In our criminal Justice system? 
We have one review In the State 
courts. Then we have one In the Fed-
eral courts. We come back, back, back, 
again and again; 27 In the case of Wil-
liam Andrews. 
I have to say-maybe it is an appro-
priate place to put this In the 
REcono-that I myself do not like cap-
Ital punishment. I myself would only 
use It under the most heinous criminal 
circumstances. I would not allow It to 
be -used indiscriminately, If I had my 
way. But I have no doubt' there is an 
appropriate criminal sanction under 
certain circumstances, and it ought to 
be one that can be opted for by socie-
ty. 
I do not have any desire to put 
people to death. Nobody does that 
who thinks It through. I will tell you, 
we have to get tough in this country. 
Our kids are beset with drugs and 
criminal activity. They are beset with 
all kinds of other activity; beset with 
bad examples all over this country. 
We have to get tough, and one of 
the best deterrents I know of is to let 
them know there is punishment If you 
are going to maliciously, in a heinous 
way, k1ll somebody, and willfully. You 
are going to face the possibility of the 
death sentence. 
I have to say, from that standpoint, 
I am one of the most vociferous advo-
cates of the death penalty. As Judge 
Henry Friendly, of the Second Circuit, 
once remarked: · 
The proverbial man from Mars would 
surely thlnlt we must consider our system of 
criminal Justice terribly bad 1! we are willing 
to tolerate such efforts at undolnr Judg-
ments o! conviction. • • • His astonishment 
would 1row when we told him that the one 
thing almost never suggested on collateral 
attack Is that the ·prisoner was Innocent of 
the crime. 
Judge Friendly summed it all up. 
Almost anybody has to wonder about a 
system where nobody really questions 
the guilt of the defendant, the crimi-
nal or the prisoner, if you want to use 
that term. It is almost never even con-
sidered, because everybody knows that 
the criminal committed the crime. 
What we have here is an attempt . to 
try under any circumstances to vindi-
cate that criminal's rights over the 
rights of the victims that he killed. 
Mr. President, lawyers, Judges, and 
laymen are astonished that the Ameri-
can criminal justice system allows 
postconvlctlon review of sentence, and 
It allows It twice, not only in the State, 
but in the Federal courts, and many 
times thereafter. 
I concede, regrettably, it may be too 
late In the day to abolish habeas 
corpus across the board, rm action that 
this body debated in 1968. But it Is 
even probably too late to abolish Fed-
eral habeas in a particular Jurisdiction, 
as we did In 1970 when Congress abol-
ished Federal habeas In the District of 
Columbia. Thal despite the fact that 
every critic I am aware of concedes 
that the experiment of abolishing 
habeas in the District of Columbia has 
worked remarkably well. No criminal 
defendant's rights have been abused 
because of it. 
No, we cannot enact those sweeping 
changes today, even though the two 
previous Attorneys General of the 
United States called for the total abo-
lltlon of habeas corpus. But we can 
ensure that the postconvictlon pro-
ceedings that we keep In place are not 
abused. The Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendment gives us that assurance. 
The Graham amendment, despite all 
Its good intentions, simply does not. 
We know where we will be if the 
Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amendment 
becomes law. One year after a death 
sentence becomes final, Federal court 
review, in all but the most extraordi-
nary cases, will be over. Petitions seek-
Ing a stay of execution from a single 
Federal district Judge will simply be 
turned away as beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court to grant. 
There will be no question about it. 
There will be nothing on which the 
court need rule. 
We do not know where we will be if 
the Graham amendment becomes law. 
First, Its Federal habeas provisions 
will not come into effect Immediately 
after the death sentence becomes 
final. It would wait until all available 
State remedies are exhausted. The 
process usually takes several years, 
and again, in some Instances, It takes 
as long as a decade. or even more. 
The notorious Illinois case of John 
Wayne Gacy 111ustrates these points 
very welL That individual stands con-
victed of the murder of 33 young men. 
No one In American history has been 
convicted in connection with so many 
deaths. 
Gacy has received 12 separate death 
sentences for his crimes. The murders 
were committed between 1975 and 
1978, and Gacy was sentenced to death 
way back in 1980. But It took 9 years 
for Gacy's death sentences to be final-
ly affirmed on direct appeal. You talk 
about protections of a defendant; 9 
years, just on the issues of his death 
sentence. That is a not surprising 
amount of tune, given the thorough-
ness of direct appeal and the nature of 
these crimes. 
So the death sentences became final 
in May of 1989. What happens next? 
Onder current law, which would not 
be changed by the Graham amend-
ment, Gacy must exhaust every 
avenue of postconvlctlon relief avail-
able to him in the Illinois courts. That 
could take another 3 to 5 years. We 
are up to 13 to 15 years, or even more. 
Then and only then would he be 
able for the first tune to turn to the 
Federal courts and begin the process 
of filing what wll1 surely be a series of 
habeas corpus petitions. All that the 
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Graham amendment requires basically 
Is that each new habeas petition that 
Ga.cy files assert some new ground !or 
relief. You have to be a pretty poor _11-t-
tomey not to come up with dozens of 
new grounds for relief on multiple oc-
casions and on successive petitions for 
habeas. 
How does the Thurmond-Specter-
Ha.tch amendment handle this case? 
Today, habeas corpus would almost 
certainly be over and whatever further 
remedies thnt he might have, he 
would have to seek from the nunois 
courts. 
Had Thurmond-Specter-Hatch been 
law last May when Oacy's death sen-
tence became final, the state of Illi-
nois could have immediately appointed 
competent pastconvlction counsel. 
That would have started the strict 
habeas deadlines under Thurmond-
Specter-Hatch. Gacy would have had 
60 days to file the Federal habeas peti-
tion or lose It forever. Once fi1ed, the 
case would be finally decided, all the 
way through the Supreme Court of 
the United States, within a year. 
U Thurmond-Specter-Hatch were 
the law last year, he would be unable 
today to seek a stay of his death sen-
tence 1n any Federal district court in 
America. The final resolution of his 12 
death sentences would be in the hands 
of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
where lt should be, and ln he hands of 
the Governor of Illinois, where it 
should be, or, if a fundamental consti-
tutional claim arises and he can show 
it, which I am sure he cannot, then hla 
case could be in the hands of the Su-
preme Court of the United States of 
America. He would still have all those 
protections. U that were the case, we 
would not. have t.o wonder, and neither 
would he, about the ultima.te disPo&-
tion of that case. 
U the Graham amendment had 
become law last May, how would that 
have affected the Gacy case? Basical-
ly, not at all. The prisoner would be in 
exactiy the same PoSition he ls in 
today, going through the slow, deliber-
ate process of exhausting the State 
court remedies, even though he has 
been in court for 10 years on appeal al-
ready. At some point In the future, 
years from now, we can expect that 
Gacy would file his first habeas peti-
tion in Federal Court. How long would 
It take that court to rule on the case? 
We can be sure that without the dead-
lines of the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendment, It would be a very, very 
long time. 
It ls true that, under the Thunnond-
Specter-Hatch amendment, & prisoner 
can bring a successive petition under 
extraordinary circumstances. That is 
one of Its strengths. It is not Inflexible. 
But notice how the successive petitions 
must be handled. First, a.nd most im-
portant, no Federal district court can 
hear a successive petition until the rel-
evant Federal court of appeals first 
grants authorization for the new 
habeas filing. That Is a significant 
change in the law, which I guarantee 
-.,Ill result In suoota.ntial cut.backs on 
the !illng of fri volous cases. 
In order for the appellate court to 
grant authority for the district court 
to hear a successive petition, the pris-
oner Is going to have to make some 
very specUlc allegations showing his or 
her entitlement to relJef. First, relief 
may be granted If there la newly dis-
covered evidence relating to guilt or 
innocence. Everyone agrees on the im-
portance of allowing unllmited review 
In such a case. I do not think any of us 
would deny that . 
Second, the claims relating to the 
appropriateness of the sentence of 
death may be considered, but only If 
based on new factual evidence. To 
clarify this point, the amendment lan-
guage specifies that the factual evi-
dence necessary to establish a succes-
sive petition cannot be opinion evi-
dence, but must be factual. That 
means we are not going to have the 
phony approach of every psychiatrist 
In the world coming up with some new 
reason to overturn the death sentence. 
Habeas corpus sounds complicated, 
but lt 13 not. It is about justice, and 
most people have a strong, accurate, 
innate sense of what is Just and what 
Is not. It ls simply not just, by any 
standard, that a murderer such as 
Gacy 1n Illinois, or William Andrews 
in Utah should be allowed to delay his 
death sentence lnde!lnltely. 
Death sentences are unique. A pri.&-
oner sentenced to life in prison ts at 
least serving his sentence whlle ap-
pealing. But in capital cases, every 
year that goes by without the execu-
tion of sentence ls a year in which Jus-
tice has .been denied, denied to the vic--
tlms of these horrible crimes and 
denied to IOciety. Every year that goes 
by, Justice ls denied, especially when 
there ls really no rea.I reason to do 
what they are doing. That Is what ls 
happening all over America today. 
.Again, I point out that habeas 
corpus reform is all about Justice. Ask 
the people of Illinois whether they 
would prefer a system of Justice In 
which John Wayne Gacy's Federal ap-
pea.l.a would now be over, or one in 
which they would still not have start-
ed, and would have the prospect of 
stretching as far into the future dec-
ades as any of us can see. What do you 
think their answer will be? If you can 
answer that Question, I think you can 
decide between the Thurmond-Spec-· 
ter-Hatch amendment and the 
Graham amendment. Only Ute Thur-
mond-Specter-Hatch amendment 
really deals with the crisis in death 
penalty litigation. 
I am hoping that our colleagues will 
put aside partisan feelings, winning or 
losing here, and do what ls right for 
America. I guarantee that your law en-
forcement people will be very happy lf 
you adopt the Thurmond-Spect.er-
Ha.tch amendment here today. I hope 
we will, because lt ls the greatest op-
portunity that I have ever seen in the 
history of the Congress to do some-
thing worthwhile and substantial 
:i.bout this problem. 
Senator GRAHAM has done a terrific 
job wi th the Graham amendment, and 
he has brought people further than I 
thought some could be brought, but It 
Is not far enough 11 you want to make 
real inroads on this problem and do It 
In an Intelligent way, a constitutional 
way, a protection-of-the-defendant 
way, but also In a conslderation-o!-the-
vtctlm.s way. This Is the way to go. 
This Is our chance. This Is a chance tG 
help every State In this Union to stop 
these frivolous appeals and the tre-
mendous millions and billions of doJ. 
Jars that they cost. This is a chance to 
really do It right. 
Keep in mind that at the same time. 
although we set time llmits, we gift 
them the right to competent counseL 
That Is something that really I do not 
think we have to do, because there 
have been competent counsel handline 
this anyway. But this Is a guaranteed 
right that the Th•..umond-Specter-
Hatch amendment would do. 
I hope our colleagues will look at 
this and vote for It. This Is the last 
chance to do something substantive on 
this Issue. If you do not want to do 
that, Graham Is certainly an Improve-
ment over what the original Blden 
amendment was in this bill, S. 19'10. 
But it does not go far enough and does 
not solve the problem. John Wayne 
Gacy, William Andrews, and all like 
them will continue to file successive 
petitions as long as their attorneys 
think up new ideas to keep them alive. 
Frankly, there has to be a finality 
about these things. There has t.o be a 
tJme when we say, "You know you did 
IL We know we did It." We know that 
there ls a price to be paid for dome 
things like this, and we want people in 
this country to know it so that leas of 
this criminal type of actlvity, heinoua 
ct1minal activity, will occur. 
That is why the dealth penalty i., a 
deterrent. I know a number of priaon 
gu&rds who would be &live today had 
the death penalty been carried out on 
time. They were killed by people oo 
death row. The fact of the matter is. 
we have to stop this. We have to stop 
this lnsanlty of costing unnecessary 
billions of dollars Just because some 
people do not want to see the death 
penalty enforced, when 85 percent of 
the American people are fed up with 
tee criminal s.ctivitles of certain ele-
ments of our society a.nd want the 
death penalty to be an option, so we 
can deter some of this offensive crimi-
nal activity. 
I hope our colleagues will support 
the Thurmond-specter-Hatch amend-
ment. It is the best OPPortunity we 
will ever have, and I do not think we 
will see thls opportunity for a Jone 
time to come. M good as Graham 
moved us forward, it is not far enough. 
because John Wayne Gacy and others 
like him will be alive for many, many 
years after Graham is enacted Into 
law, assuming that It la. 



































































11 ~e pass the Thunnond-Specter-
Hatch amendment. It will go a long 
v.ay toward making me a supparter of 
thio bill, a long way, regardless of the 
prior vote on the assault weapons. I 
ha\·e to say that this ls one of toe 
most important issues that this body 
has e\'~r seen, and It ls time to do 
something about It. With that, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Ma. 
MIICULSKI). The clerk wlll call the roll. 
The legislative clerk proceeded to 
call the roll. 
Mr. THURMOND. I ask unanimous 
consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With• 
out objection, it ls so ordered. 
Mr. THURMOND. Madam Presi• 
dent. I want to express my commenda-
tion for the remarks made by the able 
Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH]. Sena-
tor HATCH is a valuable member of the 
Judiciary CommJttee. He is a profound 
lawyer, and he has expanded on this 
matter, I think, in a way that ought to 
convince anybody that the proposal 
we have offered ls preferable and 
should be adopted by the Senate. 
There is no use to pass any habeas 
corpu.. at all unless ft means some• 
thing, unles it is going to prevent this 
dalay that has been going on for yea.rs 
and yea.rs.. 
In my State, only 3 weeks ago a man 
went to the electric chair. They took 
11 years to send him there. He killed 
four people and he killed a fifth one, a 
women; he disfigured her for life. He 
went through all the courts. It went to 
the Supreme Court on four dif!erent 
occasions. 
Madam President, ft Is just inexcus-
able that it would take that long. We 
have to shortem these things. We 
have a bill here that will shorten ft to 
about 1 year and that will take care of 
ft. U people really want a habeas 
corpus bill, now is the chance to get it. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER; The 
Senatv, from Delaware, the chairman 
of the Judicie.ry Committee. 
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I 
have refrained from speaking on my 
legislation to this point because I do 
think th.at the proposal offered by my 
friend !rorn South Caroli.n9., the rank-
ing member of the commJttee, ls solid 
improvement over that from where we 
started.. 
Let me s:iy at the outset that both of 
these proposals are significant 
changes in the great writ; both. of 
these propcsals are significantly dif. 
ferent than what the law is at tbi.s 
rnomenL 
R eference was ma.de earlier by my 
friend f:-om South Carolina. who was, 
along -g,i, h me, the subject of discus-
sion by i he Chief Justice, with regard 
to proposed changes in habeas corpus 
law. We have also been the subject of 
oth'er discussions. a.nd I believe the 
ranki.n& member, Senator THURMOND, 
said that 10r1ncr Jw;tice Powell bad 
commented on the Graham proposal. 
u VOi.l 
Blden as amended by Graham, or how-
e\'er you want to phrase It. 
I provldrd spN:i!lc standards to ensure 
U1at counsel would be competent: Five 
years litli;ating experience and 3 years 
of trying felony cases, some measure 
by which we know that In the most. 
complicated and import.ant caBes of all 
1n the criminal justice system an lndi-
gent person was, ln fact, being provid-
ed 11rith competent counsel. 
But the fact la that former J ustice 
Powell never commented on G raham, 
only on Diden and specific items abcut 
wh ich Powell said Biden would add 
delay; that ls, the miscarriage of Jus-
t ice rule tha t had been in my orlginai 
legislation has been delet£-d. It he..s 
been deleted by Graham. So let ua 
start off with the facts. 
Let me say that there have been few 
legal actions that have been more ven-
erated In our legal system than the 
great writ of habeas corpus. When we 
tamper with that, we touch the very 
roots of our system of justice. 
For some time now complaints have 
been raised that habeas corpus la 
being abused to gain delay, not to gain 
Justice. As a result, last year's drug bill 
set up a timetable for consideration of 
habeas corpus reform. Consistent with 
that timetable, I introduced legislation 
on habeas corpus reform in October of 
last year. 
Despite some of the charges that 
have been leveled against ft. I believe 
my bill is truly balanced reform. It re-
formed and streamlined the habeas 
corpus system without in any way for-
saking anyone's constitutional right.CJ. 
My bill would have limited prisoners 
to one habeas corpus petition, and 
that would be the first time ever that 
the prisoners were so limlted. Now 
they can file as many habeas corpus 
petitions, from 2 to 2,000, as they 
want. 
My bill would have limited the time 
in which prisoners may file a habeas 
corpus petition, not Just how many, to 
1 year. Again, this would have been 
the first time ever that a limlt was 
·placed on the time in which & habeas 
petition could be filed. Now, a petition 
can be filed any time, from 2 t.o 20 
years after the conviction. 
Having said all that in support of 
the Biden bill, I must now add that I 
have come to the conclusion. some-
what reluctanUy, to support the more 
conservative amendments offered by 
Senator GJLUIAM and have agreed to 
their beinii attached to my amend-
ment. 
While I would prefer to leave my bill 
as it was, I am more interested In get-
ting a bill that will, in fact, reform 
habeas corpus, than no bill at all. 
Senatcr GRAHAu:'s amendment, in· 
my view, makes this a. more conserva-
tive and tougher bill, but overall pro-
vides the kind of balanced reform tha.t 
I e2n support. 
Senator GRAHAM'S amend.merit 11.niit.s 
prisoners to one habeas corpus peti-
tion in a 1-year time period, and tt nar-
rows the reach of my bill on four spe-
cUic is:.ues. 
First. Senator GRAHA111's amendment 
offers more flexibility to the Sta~ to. 
comply with the counsel provisions of 
the act. 
One of the key elements- of any 
habeas corpus reform, in my mind. ls 
providing competent counsel to death 
row prisoners. In my original proposal. 
Senator GRAHAM has persuaded, me 
t.hat the States are entitled to a great-
er role in the standard-setting process. 
His amendment added to the bill 
,1.-ould permit the States either to 
adopt the standards in my orl.g_inai bill 
or set their own standards through an 
1ndependent certification authority. 
I believe t.h&t allowing the States to 
adopt their own standards 13 likely to 
achieve wider acceptance of these. 
habeas corpus reform measures Md. 
therefore, I supported the change· in 
my original proposal. 
The second difference between Sen&-
tor GRAlLUl'.s amendment and. my 
orfglnal bill is in the area of second pe-
titions. Senator GRAHAM's alternative 
is a much more stringent rule than the-
rule in my bill Reluctantly. I have 
been persuaded this is a necessary 
compromise. 
Under my original proposal, a death 
row prisoner could, in certain limited 
circumstances, file a second petition i1 
he could show that it would result in a 
"miscarriage of justice" i! he did, not; 
have an opportunity to file a second 
petition. 
I continue to believe, based on the 
Supreme Court cases from which that 
term was taken-I Just did not piclr. 
the term "ml.sca.rrfage a! Justice!' 4\It. 
of the air-that a "miscarriage ot .iua--
tfce" exception ts not the "loophole" 
that it.a opponents claim ft to be~ 
Nevertheless, in the interest of cl&l'--
ity and to avoid any appearance that 
this reform does not mean- what. it 
says, that pruoners ~.II be- limlted- to 
one, and only one, habeas corpus peti.-
ticn, I have reluctantly decided- that, 
the best alternative ls to drop the 
phrase in the exception of "m.fscu,. 
riage of Justice," in the second peti-
tion. Thus, the Graham amendment. 
limit., the- possibilities of any second 
habeas corpus petition. 
At the same ti.me, the amendment. 
makes clear that innocence b not the 
on.y extra.ordinary case Justifying a.o-
exception to the one petition rule, and 
obviously no one would want to sug-
gest th.at a second habeas corpu.s peti-
tion would not be filed ff in the intei:-
im It was determined that there was 
evidence to pro..-e that the person was 
innocenL I hope-no one would think o1 
suggesting t.hat, although• there. has 
been a suggestion some may haave. 
But beyond that, not only- in th!& ex.-
traordinary ability to file second: peti-
tions going to be avail.able- in-the- ca.sea. 
where there- is evidence suggest.Ina: 
that there Ls innocence buUhe-amend-
ment makes it clear that innocence is, 
not the only extraordinary case just!,.. 
fytng an exception to the- one-petit.Jcc 
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rule. An attack on the sentence. for 
example, where there has been perju-
ry, is equally Justified. 
So. not only could you ha\'e someone 
who was, in fact. guilty, but the sen-
tence not just ified. if you could show 
t hat perj ury as it related and Impacted 
upon the imposition of the sentence. 
It seems to me that should be able to 
be shown. 
The third difference between my 
original bill and the Powell Committee 
blU concerns so-called procedural de-
fault. Under that doctrine, a claim not 
raised by a defendant at the proper 
time in State court cannot be raised In 
the Federal habeas petition. 
My bill would have made specific 
changes to the law In that area, 
changes I continue to believe have 
substantial merit. Prisoners should not 
be the victims of their appointed coun-
sel's failure to bring claims In the 
State court, particularly where the 
cost may be their lives. It is a heck of 
a trade-off. Having an attorney who Is 
not so bright not stating the claim 
that may have prevented you from 
being sentenced to death in the first 
place, to say, Just because that not-so-
bright attorney failed to understand 
the law and raise that claim- and we 
now know that they did not raise that 
claim-tough, we are going to hang 
you anyway. That does not seem to me 
to be particularly fair, as I said, par-
ticularly where the cost ls one's life. 
The Graham amendment ls silent on 
th.ls point, and I chose to accept that 
silence. In accepting that silence, I am 
making what I believe to be a major 
change in my bill, a change I hope will 
convince everyone that I am serious 
about tough habeas corpus reform. I 
have only come to accept the change 
because It ls the price, I believe, that 
haa t-0 be given in order to achieve 
true habeas corpus reform and not 
some unusual proposal that does not 
warrant consideration and effectively 
obliterates the great writ. 
Flnally, the fourth difference be-
tween my original bill and the 
Graham amendment is on the topic of 
retroactlvity. Until last year, prisoners 
generally got the benefit of changes in 
the law that were handed down after 
their sentence became final but before 
they had a chance to file a habeas 
corpus petition. Last year, however, 
the Supreme Court changed that rule, 
barring prisoners from the benefit of 
changes in the law that occurred after 
they were sentenced. 
Now a prisoner sentenced 1 day after 
a major Supreme Court case cannot 
claim any benefit from that case, 
while a prisoner sentenced 1 day 
before can. That seems to me, where 
someone's life ls at stake, not Just nor 
sound. The mere fact that the Court 
did not recognize a right the day a 
person was sentenced, after they had 
filed their petition, seems to me to be 
overly technical. It seems to me to be 
overly technical to suggest they 
should not be able to have the benefit 
of that. as one who maybe did not file 
until the day after the decision. 
My bill would ha\'e made a rather 
signifi cant change in th e law to cor-
rect that problem. The Graham 
amendment corrects it. but is consider-
ably more consen ·ative. It limits my 
original provision In two ways. First, 
changes In the law will not apply to 
prisoners currently on death row. 
Second, changes in the law will only 
apply when the Supreme Court has 
explicitly said they will apply. 
Although this amendment does not 
express all of my wishes for reform In 
this area, it does satisfy my most seri-
ous concern. For the sake of compro-
mise and for the sake of habeas corpus 
reform, I lent my support to the 
changes Senator GRAHAM has pro-
posed. 
Now we are coming very, very close. 
The differences, although real, are not 
nearly as broad nor as deep nor as 
wide as they were before this process 
began. And I hope there is a possibili-
ty of one of two things happening. 
One, us agreeing to compromise the 
true differences that are left, and do 
that as expeditiously as possible. Or, if 
we cannot do that, then for us to 
quickly yield back our time and vote 
on this matter rather than take all 6 
hours. I do not want to cut off any-
body's rights. I am not suggesting to 
do that at the moment. I am making a 
broad statement. 
Let us either compromise the three 
or four differences that are left, and 
there are not many more than that, 
maybe five, and they do not go to the 
heart of habeas corpus reform, or get 
on with the business of voting on this 
amendment. 
I see my colleague from South Caro-
lina rising. I might note ,he has made 
significant compromise to this point. I 
might add, although he ~ a man with 
whom I have worked for years and 
with whom I have often compro-
mised- hopefully we both believe for 
the benefit of the country and the in-
terests of Justice-I suggested a 
number of these compromises to him 
last night but I was not nearly as per-
suasive, nor nearly as incisive, nor 
nearly as effective as, apparently, the 
Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SPEC· 
TERl was. 
There have been a number of com-
promises made. I am not suggesting 
that compromise has not been made. 
It has. And there 1s real compromise. 
But there are only a few outstanding 
issues that separate the two bills and I 
suggest we either resolve them by 
compromise or we, as soon as ls rea-
sonable to check on either of our sides 
who else would like to speak, prepare 
to yield back a lot of the time, to get 
on with the vote, to get on with some 
other Issues in the bill. 
I yield the floor. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from South Carolina 
Mr. THURMOND. Madam Presi-
dent, my original bill was a much 
tougher bill but .I decided I would 
accept the prov1s1on that Justlc 
Powell, a former member or the U.f 
Supreme Court. rrcommcnded. The~ 
was a commi t tee or judges se t up an 
they studied th is question and the 
made recor:1m endations. That w 
going to be in my bill. to lntrodu 
here. But after talking to a number o 
Senators. Including Senator HATC!i 
and Including Senator SIMPS01', an' 
the Senator from Pennsyh•anla, I de 
clded we may even go further an' 
make some modifications to that. I 
We cannot go any fur ther. There L 
no use to pass this bill If you are goini 
to compromise where It will not ac 
complish anything. These appeals IJ: 
some cases have gone on for years. lr 
my State, I Just recited the case i 
years ago where a man killed fow 
people, thought he killed anothei 
woman, and it was 11 years from th1 
time he was sentenced to death unti 
the time he was finally executed. 
Senator HATCH said in his State ! 
case went for 16 years. I understand Ir 
Oklahoma, one went for 18 years. 
The public is disgusted with that. 
The public wants action. The public 
wants delay .no longer. The bill that 
has been offered here by my dlstin• 
guished fr iend will not get the resul~ 
it should. 
The bill we have offered here, we 
weakened it a lot, but it will get re-
sults. We cannot go any further. I ap-
preciate my friend's suggestion. I 
worked with him all I could. I have 
gone, gone, gone as far as I can go. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Delaware. 
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I am 
sure the Senator did not mean to 
imply the bill of the Senator from 
Delaware would allow anyone to file 
petitions for lll years. Either bill will 
correct the aberrations he has suggest-
ed. There is no question about thaL 
I have a little bit of surprise, frank· 
ly, at one thing. After serving at the 
elbow of my friend from South Caroli-
na for so many years now, I know of 
his great respect for the State courts. I 
know of his great respect for Justice 
Lewis F. Powell. 
Justice Powell, a former Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court, now re-
tired, will, in testimony tomorrow 
before the Committee on the Judici-
ary, say the following with regard to a 
little thing that has always been of 
great interest to my friend from South 
Carolina, States rights. 
I might add, the bill put forward by 
my friend from South Carolina cut.I 
out the State courts at the front end 
It says we are not going to WO?TY 
about whether or not t here ls any 
movement through the State courts. 
We are going to go straight to the Fed-
eral courts, eliminate the State courts, 
and we are going to go to Judges in the 
Federal court and set time limits. 5o· 
far so good, but what about federalism 
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Federal l:,.w now n.>Qu !r es that before 
cl aims ma..,· be as.,1'rLed in a Fedenl habeas 
corp1: :; i;: erition. Ll-i r! Y must first be pre.•Kn!Pd 
tn 1:o tc·e rntJrt.s. S c•~ Rose,·. Lu.ndv. 455 U.S. 
509, , i'l62l. This r<'presents r.ppro~riat,e ·re• 
sµ:"C": for federall : m- a St a'.e court system 
shoi; :d have an oµportuni t y to address any 
errors on i:.S own before Intrusion by the 
1-'edt'Thl system. 
That Is the fundamental remaining 
difference between the bill offered by 
my friends from South Carolina and 
from Pennsylvania. 
They do it in the name of expediting 
the process, and it does expedite tne 
process arguably. It does because If 
you do not have t.abeas corpl!.S going 
throueh the State courts, then you 
can cut off the difference between the 
Powell Committee repc,rt on this point 
and the position taken by the Thur-
mond-Specter blll. You could argu::i.bly 
save up to 2 years potentially, argu-
ably. But I say on!y arguably becasue 
e.Iter you go through the federal 
sy.,t.e:n, they can still go back to the 
St.ate courts for coliater~ review. It 
d'.'les not cut them out. 
So t.he point that I am making is 
this: That in the name of being tough-
er, the distinguished Senator from 
South Carolina has cut out the right 
o! the State of South Carolina to 
make its own judgments, at lea.,t at 
the front end, to correct it.s own errors 
if the::-e are any at the front end. And 
he has not in fact saved any time be-
cause what will happen is that at the 
end of the Federal process, they will 
then be able to go back to State court 
and file a habeas corpus petition. 
So the differences we have here are 
not fundamental in terms of time. The 
most significant difference fs in terms 
of whether the State should be cut in 
or not. U the State does not want to 
have habeas corpus review, they can 
make that judgment. But I- do not 
know how many times r have hes.rd 
· my friend from South Caronna say, Jet 
the States make those decisions. But 
do not say, as we are saying here; 
'(State court, we're going to start with-
. out you; ,,.e do not want to know what 
you think about this; we're going to 
take care of it." 
There are se,·eral other differences. 
Again, I do not mean to imply that my 
friend from South Carolina has not 
compro!':1!.,ed. P.:e has, and I appreciate 
that F!:-y much. I just think with a 
little :::::;.:-e focus on the rights of the 
States r.nd a lit.t.le more focus on each 
of us gi,;ing a little bit more-because I 
ha,·e gj\·en a great deal a.s well from 
where I was -we could close this thing 
down ,ery quickly and get on to other-
important Lssues. But I understand if 
we care}ot do ttiat, I am ready to vote 
on this . 
I seE: one of my colleagues, Senator 
KEr.-1~ .::,.,.-. who bas not spoken on the 
issue a::d wanu, t,o speak on the issue. 
I assun1e he is s.eE:king recognition. I 
am prepared to yield the floor . , 
The PRESIDL--«i OFFICER. . The· 
Senator from PennsylvanlL 
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Pl:'esident, I seek: 
recognition to make a. brief comment 
or two as t.o what Sent.or BIDKl'f had to 
say. I shall not be Jong. I th ink it or-
derly if I make a comment at this 
point. 
Wl:C'n the disting11bhcd Sen:;.tor 
from Delaware says t.h?t appropriate 
recognition is not being given to States 
rii;hts, I will forcefuly dlsagn.,e with 
him on two counts: O:le Is that the 
State has been given a full opPortuni-
ty to correct its errors. The .State is 
being given a full opportunity to do 
justice because it has that opportunity 
on the direct appeal. 
When the Thurmond•Sp.ecter bill 
permits going into Federal court with-
out going through State habeas corpus 
procee-:!ir:gs, we are not .saying R t.hing 
about the States rights !.o have habt!as 
corpus. We are dealing solely and ex-
clusively '1.·lth delineatir.g when the 
Federal court will entertain jm1sdic-
tion. That is the prerc.gative of the 
Congress of the United States to say 
and define when you may go Into the 
Federal courts on habeas corpus. It 
has always been the Federal Jaw, a.s es-
tablished by the Congress, that the Ju• 
risdiction of the Federal court was not 
extended in habeas corpus until there 
had been a collateral at.tack in State 
h~beas corpus proceedings. 
So our responsibility, simply stated, 
is to see to it that Federal habeas. 
corpus does not take 8 years or 18 
years. 
When the distinguished Senat-0r 
from Delaware says you cru, go back to 
the State courts under the Thurmond-
Specter bill, he is exact!:, right. &it It 
is also true that you can go back to the 
state courts, under the C1..1Tent system 
where you have direct appeal~ State 
habeas corpus, Federal habeas corpus. 
You can always go back to the State 
court at that stage. There ill nothing 
at all to prevent going back to the-
State courts as Jong as the State 
courts will entertain that claim. 
But the very significant adva."lce 
from the legislation which Senator 
THURMorm and I are offering is that 
you do not have to .exhaust meaning• 
less State habeas corpus in order to 
get into the Federal courts. That is for 
the Congress to determine when rou 
can get into the Federal courts. 
Those who have pract..iced in the 
State courts and who have handled 
these State habeas corpus proceedings 
know that they are pro fonna; that 
after- the State supreme court has 
upheld the conviction of the death 
penalty and you go b~k to a lower 
court and re~rt the same claims, 
the lower court is not going- to disagree 
with the State supreme court, nor is 
the State supreme court going to dis· 
agree with itself. 
When you go to the Federal ccurt 
for habeas corpus, then for the first 
time you have an independent review. 
The only issue which the State court 
can litigate differently · in habeas 
corpus than. on direct. appeal is .the 
question of competency or counsel, 
and that it can do. But there is ad.-
~uate opportunity in dealing wltti the 
defendant's su~ta.ntlve rights to tak~ 
that up in the Federal court habeas 
corpus. 
HI might have the attention of the 
s ~nator from Delaware, what I just 
said he has heard before and I think 
he might agree with It If we were in 
the Cloakroom. I believe we can deal 
with the Etate habeas corpus lsme and 
I believe we can agree with the time 
parameters. I am not in concrete on 
160 days or some other t ime!rame. I 
think we can work out that timeframe. 
although I think we do it in a way 
that does not a.now unr1cessaril:y large 
blocks of tL-ne. 
The two critic3.l issues which I think 
have to be resolved are the Lssues on 
innocence or penalty. I want to com• 
pliment in the most eloquent terms 
the willingness of the disLinguished 
Senator from South Carolina to a.gree 
to the more expansive view. beyond 
what the Powell Committee said. Tbe 
distinguished Senator from South 
Carolina had moved f.Fom his bill in 
the first instance to the Powell Com,-
mittee and then made a meaningful 
move from the Powell Committee 
when we had extensive dlscW1Siona. 
The distinguished Senator from 
Utah, Senator HATCH, Wa.9 very elo-
quent in articulating the importance 
of considering in a subsequent petition 
the issue of death penalty beyond In• 
nocence, the issue of pen.a.lty if there 
are new facts-not opinions, not. psy-
chiatric Judgments which can be ob-
tained in a different fashion, but a.fac-
tual matter. When the distinguislled 
Senator from South Carolina heanf 
that contention. and thought this 
might bridge the gap, he WU willlng to 
accommodate his-own preferen¢e. 
In discussions in Ute €loakr.oom wlU. 
some of the distinguished Senaton on 
the other side of the aisle; r think that 
ta something which-SenatoP Tiroa· 
JllOM>'S view-as modified, I think, 
would be acceptable. 
The last issue which, candidly, Ls the 
toughest issue ls the issue on fnrerven• 
ing rights. There, a-gain, concessions 
were- made in the final analysis not to 
have additions made to the sentence 
which reads, on the issue of interven-
ing rights: 
A , court considering- a claim under · this 
chapter shall consider interveni11g decisio~ 
by the Supreme Court of the United States 
w.hich est.al>llshed fundamental constitu-
tional right... 
It is my view that this language rs a 
good accommcdatfon of some very 
tough positions on that matter. Ji be-
lieve that if we cannot come out with 
an agreement, it wm have much more 
force on this issue when we talce it to 
conference, much more force and 
·weight with the American people than 
if we decide this ls.sue within a IO-vote 
margin. I think the most we are going 
to have here- Is 55 to 45', and we may 
well prevail on thi•side of the-aisle. 
. But however we prevail, the force of 
our position wnr have so -mum. more 
acceptance by the publlc, .not · ~ 
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analogous but sort of like talking 
about the desegregation decision 
where the Court came to a unanimous 
opinion on a very Important matter in 
orde r to have that kind of public con-
fidence. I submit that we are really-
right down to that one sentence on in-
te,vening rlghts which is the crux of 
reaching an agreement. 
less delay. Responding to thls growing · clogging up the criminal Justice 
concern, the Chief Justice of the Su- system with excessive delays. 
preme Court created the Ad Hoc Com- This amendment would limit succes-
mi t tec on Federal Habeas Corpus in si\'e or second petitions for re view of 
Capital Cases, chaired by former Jus- original con\'lctions and of sen tencing 
tice Lewis Powell. The Powell Commit- where rel ief is based on a claim not 
tee, formed In June 1988, lssued Its pre,·iously presented in the State and 
report to the Judicial Conference in Federal courts. In other words, only 
September 1989. on very extraordinary conditions 
I thank the Chair and yield the 
floor. 
Mr. BIDEN. I am not sure that I dis-
agree. The Senator may be correct, 
that It Is the most Important distinc-
tion and difference. I am happy to 
continue while others seek the floor to 
see if ther·e is anything we can do to 
bridge that gap. But In the meantime, 
when we started this little bit of dis-
cussion. Senator KENNEDY, who was 
seeking recognition. must have 
thought that both of us were Inclined 
to go beyond our inclination to go In 
this debate at this moment. and he 
has left the floor. So unless someone 
else is seeking recognition at the 
moment. I suggest the absence of a 
quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRF.SIDING OFFICER. (Mr. 
BIDEN). Without objection, It is so or-
dered. 
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I thank 
. the Chair. 
Mr. President, I am proud to be a co-
sponsor of S. 271. Introduced by our 
distinguished colleague, the senior 
Senator from Florida, at the beginning 
of. the 101st Congress. I know, having 
worked with him, that he has labored 
mightily over the last year or so on 
habeas corpus reform. . 
I know It ts an Interest that the 
President shares, and that you have 
worked with him on. 
I applaud both his leadership and 
your o\\"ll, Mr. President, In bringing 
us to the position where we now con-
sider t.he essence of the Graham 
amendment . 
Mr. President, this is not a debate 
about whether habeas corpus reform 
is necessary. I think all would agree 
that it Is. Current habeas corpus pro-
cedures allow multiple postconviction 
challenges to State criminal convic-
tions In Federal court. Although not 
mandated in the Constitution, they 
have In fact been In practice !or more 
than a century, datjng back to 1867, 
and have In my Judgment been abused 
by many prisoners to continue to chal-
lenge their conviction In the Federal 
courts. 
In 1945, the Federal courts were con-
fronted with petitions for habeas 
corpus In 535 cases. 
Forty-five years later that number 
had grovm to. Indeed exploded to, 
some 10.389. That is an Increase . of 
l,800· percent, . 1,logglng the crl.m.lnal 
J.U:itlce .. l!Yitem .an~ pro1,1dlng for encl-
I had the privilege last evening, Mr. would successh·e petitions be allowed. 
President, to have a chance to vlsit The Graham amendment embodies 
with Justice Powell about habeas the essence of the guidance suggested 
corpus reform, and he r~marked that. by the Powell committee, Mr. Presl-
although there we~e different views dent, and provides for sensible and es-
aired by the committee, there was a sential reform of the Federal habeas 
universal agreement by all who made process. 
presentations that reform in habeas I commend Senator BIDEN for his 
corpus procedures were necessary. leadership In processing the omnibus 
The committee foun~l. after delibera- crime bill and that of our colleague, 
tlon, that only a fraction of the worst Senator GRAHAM, In Initiating the 
murdt:rers convicted and sentenced to amendment which ls before us today. 
a capital sentence actually had that 1 yield the noor. 
sentence carried out. Today there are Mr SIMPSON Mr President this is 
2,200 convicted murderers on death . · · · · . 
row awaiting execution, 52 in my own a ~ery l~portant part of this leg16l&-
State of Nevada. Justice Powell also tlon. I _think the American people have 
stated that the average length of time made •~ very clear that they are just 
between conviction and execution has plain sick s.nd tired of the endless 
been more than s years. delars on ~ppeals of murder convic-
Mr. President, J submit to you that tlons. <?<?nv1ctions that are for espe-
this delay between conviction and the _ clally v1c10us and f~ml murders. That Is 
carrying out of the death sentence Is what we are talkmg about. Also, re-
unacceptable. The criminal . Justice member that the death penalty Is lm-
system, while designed to protect con- posed by a Jury. 
stltutional and procedural safeguards I am convinced that the Thurmond-
should be swift and fair, protecting Specter legislation is an excellent re-
the public at large, and providing Jus- sponse to the demands of Americans 
tlce for the victim, as well as Justice to curtail these numbing efforts t~at 
for the accused, and finality as part of Just continually drag on In our Judicial : 
the Judicial process. It has often been system. Unlike the Graham-Blden al-
said that Justice delayed ls Justice tematlve, the Thurmond-Specter 
denied. That adage has been most fre- package applies to both Federal cap-
quently applied to the litigants them- ital cases and to State capital cases. I 
selves. Mr. President, I suggest that cannot understand why the Graham-
the public Is also entitled to Justice, Blden proposal does not specifically 
and when Justice Is not carried out recognize a Federal death penalty. I 
swiftly, the public is deprived of Jus- cannot understand that. . 
tlce as well With respect to the appointment of 
The Powell committee .reported that counsel !or Indigent defendants, the 
a major problem with the current Thurmond-Specter substitute is 
system Is the need for qualified coun- tougher. It requires that In cases 
sel to represent Indigent prisoners at where a defendant does not want 
all stages. Justice Powell also recom- court-appointed counsel, the court 
mended that a time limit on the filing then makes a specific order In the 
of habeas corpus petitions would record which reflects that the defend-
reduce unnecessary delay in the crimi- ant made his choice "knowingly and 
nal Justice system. willfully." 
Mr. President, the amendment of- This section also recognizes that the 
fered by the distinguished Senator petitioner might not be Indigent . 
from Florida, accepted by you, pro- These people are not all Just poor beg-
vides for a statute of limitations for gers running around, being duped by 
filing of Federal habeas claims, a right the system Just so they can be salted 
to competent counsel for indigent in- away 6 feet deep. That Is not what is 
mates, IL-nits In the filing of successive happening here. There are petitioners 
petitions, and rules for retroactivity. who have learned to milk this system 
Many of these reforms were recom- In spades. That is who we are talklne 
mended by the Powell committee. about. There Is a possibility that a pe-
The amendment, which has been ac- tltloner may not be Indigent and. 
cepted, provides for a longer time limit therefore, Is not entitled to appointed 
. on the filing of Federal habeas claims counsel at the Government's expense. 
than that recommended by Justice This finding would be made part of 
Powell. The limit of 1 year would, In the record as well. . 
my Judgment, provide ample time for The Graham-Biden propooal appar-
.counsel to be changed and thoroughly ently does not think It should be nee-
briefed throughout the trail . and the essary to make defendants pay their 
appeals process. It does not-I empha- own.way whenever they can. That ls a 
slze .tbls--allow the clock . to continue puzzling .Part.of this. By follo~1ng the 
to. tic~ . endlessly Jor ye.a.rs at a. :time, Thurmond-Specter . propooal, . $11 , de-
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fcndants are ensured that they have Graham proposal has written another 
representation by competent counsel. I -year and 3-month delay into the pro-
Arguments by convicted murderers cedure. during which the convict and 
that th ei r orig inal attorneys were In- his attorney can dream up a magnifi-
compctent have been so much over- -cent good excuse for filing late. 
u.:;ed. and abused. in habeas petitions Since there ts supposedly, under thls 
to a degree that ts almost beyond com- legislation, a competent attorney on 
prehensi on. Both of these proposals hand beginning at the trial- that ls 
have st rong provisions that ensure what everyone would want to see-
that attorneys representing these there ls no reason at all that the pa-
murder defendants are very compe- perwork cannot be ready In time to 
tent. This will eliminate a great many file within 2 months, as the Thur-
frivolous arguments on that issue. mond-Specter proposal states. So here 
I th ink a major difference to share it ls. the Biden-Graham with still an-
with my colleagues is in the area of other I-year and 3-month delay, or 
successive petitions. The problem with Thurmond-Specter with a 2-month 
the Graham-Blden proPoSal Is that d~lay. Take your pick. 
their language creates a giant loophole The Thurmond-Specter proposal Is a 
In the law, the kind of loophole that very tough reform bill. Again, as I 
has already generated 8- to IS-year read these proposals, we get down to 
delays in these matters. The Graham- two really big differences. In the 
Biden proposal overturns retroactivfty Biden-Graham proposal there are 
across the board, which allows many some giant loopholes, big encugh to 
appeals to a Jury decision to impose drive a "Wyoming cattle truck" 
t:-ie death penalty. That has nothing through. There are built -in delays, at 
to do with guilt, only whether the least 2 years of delays, as opposed to a 
death sentence Is appropriate the maximum of I-year in the Thurmond-
s1>cond time around. The Thurmond Specter bill. 
proposal imposes. significant restrfc- Which version do our constituents 
ti6ns on how a convicted murderer can want? We are going to find out soon. I 
challenge the Jury decision to impose read my mail, not Just all the mail 
death in a second habeas petition. from Wyoming but some from around 
The Thurmond-Specter proposal the country. The American people are 
says that a second habeas petition can . sick and tired of watching these vi-
only be raised if the defendant gets cious, brutal animals, drag the same 
approval from the appropriate Federal old nonsense through the courts over 
circuit court of appeals. This proce- and over again for years and years. 
dure does away with the need to get a Senator WILSON Just referred to a 
certificate of probable cause, which Is man on death row for 11 years, who is 
current practice. This practice Is also appealing again, as I speak. He Is one 
greatly a.bused. Some district courts of the most active locker-room lawyers 
issue these certificates very casually. in America, and that is 'A"hat we have 
The Biden-Graham proposal creates here. These are people who get into 
a presumption that the defendant's the State library, get into the state 
position has merit.·What an absurdity. law libraries or the Federal libraries 
This all but assures that the convicted and are just bright enough, and clever 
murderer will be allowed to file succes- enough, to just crank it out. Somebody 
sive petitions. It 1s this precise practice Is always there to protect them. They 
which we are trying to reform. · are smug, arrogant, cynical and twist-
The Thurmond-Specter proposal ed. I do not know why our system 
corrects the problem; the Blden- should have to break down under their 
Graham proposal perpetuates the prowess. 
problem. perhaps makes matters even -So let us certainly be more than fair 
worse. But both proPoSals allow the to the defendants. We really do that In 
petitioner to challenge the guilt phase -America. Anyone who says we do not 
of the trial. The proponents take great ta..._.e care of criminal defendants in 
pains to eliminate any risk of execut- America Is smoking something. 
lng an innocent defendant. No one in We have the Miranda decision which 
this Chamber is interested in execut- was, ln its ov.-n way, good when lt was 
ing an iwlocent defendant. decided, and then was terribly abused. 
We seem to start on the premise We have had other good decisions like 
that some are here to save the !nno- that, they get used, abused, and then 
cent and others are not. We are all the people go on to greater crimes. 
here to save the Innocent. That ls not But let us also start being fair to the 
what we are talking about. Get that people who pick up the tab for these 
out of the debate. endless delays and frivolous appeals. 
The next big difference is the time Let us also be fair to the voters of at 
allowed to file a habeas petition in least 37 of the States which have 
death penalty cases. The Thurmond- voiced their concerns by having capital 
Specter bill gets serious. We allow 60 punishment statutes. Let us exhaust 
days after the Judgment and sentence the remedies before we exhaust all of 
in the State court have become final. the resources of the Judicial system, 
The Biden-Graham proposal gives the pandering to a clever lot of manipula-
defendants a full year. Believe · me, -tors and often their counsel, too. I 
. they will wait as long as possible in the think that time has come. · 
hopes that evidence or witnesses will We are a remarkable, civilized socfe-
~ lost and the memories fade. Also, ty, and we do meet our obligations to 
and please . hear this; · the Blden- the lesser of society and to those -les-5 
fortune. the disempowered, and all of 
that. But for heavens sakes, we all see 
this abuse . No wonder people are frus-
trated. pained. and some of them- es-
pecially family members of someone 
who has suffered at the hands of one 
of these people-completely lose their 
respect for the laws of the United 
States. That Is not good. They become 
scofflaws of society because they know 
that nothing ever gets done. Under 
this provision something will finally 
get done. 
Let me Just note with regard to ret-
roactivity, which is a burning Issue as 
any other part of this, that the Blden-
Graham proposal allows full retroac-
tlvlty with new rules, and overrules a 
string of Supreme Court cases In the 
process. I think that opens the flood-
gates to a deluge of new petitions. Sec-
tion 2267 of the Thurmond proPoSal 
allows retroactivity application of new 
rules on fundamental, constitutional 
rights, only In habeas proceedings 
brought under this chapter. There are 
many that participated in the crafting 
of that section. I was one of these 
people and I can tell you that the 
Thurmond-Specter proposal Is int.end• 
ed only to codify existing law and not 
to overrule that law. 
So, those are some of the things that 
are of concern to me. We wlll soon 
vote on this. We are either doing a 
crime bill or we are pretending to do a 
crime bill. And we are either doing a 
bill that Is up front-I would hope 
that we could do a bipartlsaii crime 
bill. 
I have watched Senator BIDEN, the 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
and Senator THuRMOND, our well re-
garded and respected ranking member. 
These two men work closely together. 
It would have been good 11 we could 
have come up with a -bipartisan bill. 
We are going to craft something, going 
to get into a couple of more "hot ones" 
like the Racial Justice Act-boy, tell 
us what that one 1s. The needless 
trickery and the games in here are 
wh&.t makes ft tough to legislate. 
Ii one would Just get up on their 
hind legs and say, "I hate the death 
penalty and would not have anything 
to do with It," that 1s guts and that is 
courage. But when you only then play 
around with words and semantics-I 
have heard enough of that in the last 
2 days. I went to law school and then 
practiced law for 18 years. I felt like I 
had been out to lunch during most of 
the discussion yesterday. You have 
some very bright people, speaking 
almost · in tongues-I would love to 
know sometimes what they are speak• 
ing. . . 
I think we should have a rule. I am 
Just going to throw this In-I know it 
will receive very little acknowledgment 
or credence-that before you can come 
here to weave your wonders · on the 
staff of a Senator you must first go 
practice law somewhere fn real llfe for 
5 years: See how It really ts out there 
among the great unwashed. It would · 
~ 
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bi' a shocking thing. I ha\'e said It 
tx-rore right from this Podium. These 
t\re bright. creative, privileged people 
v. h o a rt' often on the Law Rc\'iew. 
T hey are skilled. They are remarkable ... 
We shoJ ld h eed them. But we must be 
care: fc1l \'.-hen they pile distinction 
upon distinction and nuance upon 
r.\l!tn('e F.nd try to get away with It. 
Not o~ of them really knows where 
they 9.-ant to go, they ha\'e lost the big 
,·iew and s0me have lost their way. 
So. let 1.1.5 get in here and put togeth-
n a thoughtful bill , not to see wllo 
can diddle the President or who can 
get to Senator JoE BIDEN, or who can 
hang v.ho on the most vo1es on the 
ce&th p enalty, or who will be called a 
racist bc<:ause we did not do a right 
thing on a racial justice bill. That does 
not hu·e a th.Ing to do with it. The 
racial Justice caper Is nothing more 
than a ploy to arnid standing up to be 
cou:1t.ed lf you do not like capital pun-
ishment. 
So, to trot that thing out-a bill that 
says you must execute as many blacks 
as you will whites-how is that for a 
marvelollS and stupid kind of a propos-
al? Call it a racial justice thing if you 
want, but In certain areas of this coun-
try you are going to ha\·e ca.pit al pun-
ishment on too many blacks. In other 
areas you are going to have capital 
punishment on too many whites. Who 
among you wants to Impose a quota on 
imPoSition of the death penalty? 
What does that have to do with any-
thing tn the real world? If you commit 
a crime. whether you are black or 
white, lf you are responsible for It, you 
v.11J pay the ultimate penalty called 
death. as directed by a Jury of your 
peers. You then go through the appeal 
process after that jury trial .. through 
the appellate processes, to the Su· 
preme Court, and they say "you have 
been aentenced to death, a jury unani-
mously found that sentence weighed 
all of the mlttgat!ng circumstances, 
and you will die." 
Once that message goes out in thls 
country, we will have fewer problems 
1n our society. There Is the question, 
in my mind that is true. It does not 
hal'e a thing to do with whether you 
are black. or white or brown. It has to 
do with the fact you have committed a 
terrible crone, ago.inst your fellow 
nan. In a most heinous and ugly and 
foul wa.y. 
a.ctton. And the action ls the finality 
of the death sentence. 
A!5 soon as society-who ha\'e been 
ready to go on that-and the criminal 
element know that this is the way it ts 
In America. I honestly believe things 
will begin to turn around in this coun-
try. And as soon as we deal with jm·e-
nlles ,r.-ho commit adult crime:; as If 
they were adults, we will begin to 
make progress there too. 
I do hope Senator THURMOND's pro-
posal will receive the careful attention 
of the body. I think It ls a darned good 
propoS11.l. In fact it ls pretty close to 
what could be a bipartisan proposal 
except for nuances of meaning, which 
have really shrouded it and really we 
have almost reached an absurd and 
perhaps Indistinguishable distinction 
which In my mind may not actually 
make any really significant difference. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
BRYAN). The Senator from South 
Carolina. 
Mr. THURMOND. I wish to compli-
ment the able Senator from Wyoming 
for bringing out the points he did, the 
differences between these t wo propos-
als. There Is no question about It, if 
you want a tough proposal that will 
get action, that amendment we have 
offered will do it. We feel. and the Jus-
tice Department feels, that the 
amendment offered by Senator BIDEN 
and Senator GRAHAM will not do the 
job. Why take a chance? It would be 
better to pass nothing, unless we are 
going to get results. 
As I stated, It has been delay, delay, 
delay. People have been killed. It has 
been years and years before the sen-
tence Is finally executed. It Just does 
not make sense. 
I remind the Senate, too, that these 
organizations I am going tQ read en-
dorsed my origlnal bill, which was a 
tougher bill. We came down to the 
Po~ll amendment and then we ha~ 
even modified that. 
These organizations even went for 
the other bill: The International Nar-
cotk: Enforcement Officers Associa-
tion; Airborne Law Enforcement Asso-
ciation; Society of Former Special 
Agents of the FBI; the National 
Troopers Coalition; the Virginia Asso· 
elation of Chiefs of Police; the Victims 
Assistance Legal Organization; the 
Federal Criminal Investigators Asso· 
elation; and the FBI National Acade-
my Associates. The attorney generals 
in a majority of the States, a majority 
of the attorney generals in the whole 
United States including the Attorney 
General of the United States, ap-
proved my original bill. 
As I say, in my ragged practice of 
the la'f., doing a couple of first-degree 
rnurde!' trials and some other "little 
cape~ .. with human beings, I learned 
one thing above all: you must remem-
ber that there are animals in the 
world. They are called human animals 
but they are, Indeed, animals. The 
sooner Wt' arrive at a sensible way, an 
honest v.,.y, a confident way, a caring 
way-there Is no need to chuckle that 
one aspect away either-to gtve them 
e\·eey benefit thJs marvelous society 
can give them. the better. And if they 
fail at every step of the proceedings, 
then mut It off. Get on with too 
·we have tried to go along here to 
get a consensus and we weakened our 
bill to try to do that. All these organi-
zations here were for the original blli. 
A majority of the attorney generals 
were for the original bill. The Attor-
ney General of the United States was 
for the original bill. President Bush 
was for the original bill. 
··•· Are they worth listening to? These 
people have dealt In crime all these 
· years and what they v.-ant Is some-
thing reasonable that will get results. 
What about the victims here, who 
ha\·e been killed? Their families 
suff Pr, years and rears. before there ls 
final completion of the act. It just 
does not make sense. 
If my colleagues want a habeas 
corpus bill to get results. vote for this 
bill. If they do not want that, vote for 
the other bill. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who 
yields time? 
Mr. THtTRMOND. Mr. President, I 
yield the distinguished Senator from 
California such time as he may re-
Qulre. 
The PRE.SIDING OFFICER. The 
Seru1.tor from California [Mr. Wn.so•J 
Is recognized. 
Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I thank 
the distinguished manager. I rise In 
support of his amendment. 
The pas.sion he has just exhibited Is 
entirely warranted. It brings to mind 
the passion, not spoken but felt, by 
crime victims in my State. Mr. Presi-
dent. there are now a number of crime 
victims organizations In California, 
with a growing number of members, 
unhappily, as the number of victims 
increases. 
What we hs.ve before us ls an 
an1endment that seeks t-0 limit an 
abuse of the use of the writ of habeas 
corpus. The writ of habeas corpus has 
long been recognized, 1n the United 
Kingdom. the United States. In my 
State of California, as the most power-
ful remedy available in the law for 
curing some miscarriage of Justice. It 
overcomes almost all other consider-
ations in allo'\ll.1ng a court to consider 
whether or not extraordinary circum-
stances exist in a criminal case which 
demand extraordinary relief. It can be 
said that habeas corpus Is at the very 
foundation of our, system of crtmJnal 
justice. 
But. Mr. President, having said that. 
ft also needs to be said. as has been 
said by the distinguished Senator from 
South Carolina. this important 
remedy has been very much subject to 
abuse; in his State. In mine, and all 
across the Nation. A1J death row popu-
lations swell, as inmates on death row 
grow older and older, there Is clear evi-
dence that the system is not ,rnrldng. 
In my State, twice, the people have 
voted-not the legislature, but the 
people have voted-for a remedy 
whi<:h they felt necessary fn order to 
provide them adequate protection 
from violent crime. They have voted a 
death penalty on two oct:asions. 
But, Mr. President, in the years and 
years that have ensued sfnce they did 
so, they have been denied the protec-
tion of that death penalty. They voted 
for It In the belief that the death pen-
alty is a deterrent, at least ln those 
eases where a crime of \1olence has 
taken place, not in a fit of passion but 
as the result of premedlt!on:· •: ' · 
: They are ·ent1tled to that protection. 
It ~ems to me. But what is very ctear, 
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Mr. President, Is that even as we are The facts In the case are not In dis-
debating this here, as debate ensues In pute. He has even filed a petition on 
my State and others, there are people the grounds, Mr. President. that It is 
who continue to argue that the dc> ath cruel e.nd unusual punishment that he 
penalty Is not a deterrent. Mr. Presi- has spent 11 years on death row when, 
dent, It is not a deterrent H it Is not of course, the length, the duration of 
enforced. h is stay there has been affected by the 
Simply stated, wh::it the Th urmond filing of one petition after another on 
amendment seeks to do is to give some his behalf. It is not unlike the cele-
guarantee that when the r.ccused has brated case of the killer who threw 
been afforded the remedy of a Judicial himself on the mercy of the court de-
system that r. llows for appeal and for claring himself an orphan after he 
the use of the habeas corpus peti~ion, had murdered his parents. 
that t here be some finality. Because This Is a situation In which the lro-
we :ir? all, I think, whether lawyers or nles abound. But the Intolerable lrcny 
not, famlliu with the bromide, the Is that wlt.h all of the effort, all of the 
maxim that comes to first-year law risk taken by conscientious law en-
students in their study in the criminal forccment officers, with all of the tax 
. law, that Justice del~,yed is Justice dollars expended on a criminal justice 
denied. system that begins with detection by 
Well. so it is, hut not nearly as much these law officers and then takes the 
to the accused as, afin- trial, to those criminal accused through the courts in 
who a.re crime victims, who have to a lengthy, lengthy system that, in my 
relive the ordeal that they first experi- judgment, fuHy protects the rights of 
cnced when either they experienced the accused but does not begin to pro-
the trauma of criine or when they, tect the rights of the victims, with all 
worse, lost a loved one. that is spent on probation, all that Is 
The other effects it has spread far spent on that court system, all that is 
be:yond the lmmedi::i.te victims of spent on parole, on corrections, the 
crime, Mr. President, to those who, as people of . my State, and I suspect 
general members of society, begin to many others, !eel that they are not 
feel that the criminal Justice system adequately protected. 
will not protect them. Recently, a rather shocking sun•ey 
I hope I wm bl? pardoned for the revealed that 1 in 5 In my State had 
pride with which I speak of law en- experienced some criminal violation 
!orcement in my home State. Whether within the pa.st 5 years and that a ma-
I go to the o!:!ice of the U.S. attorney jority expected that they would within 
in New York or to FBI headquarters the next 5 years. Mr. President, that is 
here L"l Washington, or the office of Intolerable. We can speak all we wish 
the DEA in North Mia.mi, I have been to of affording opportunity in a var!e-
told, "You have as fine a law enforce- ty of ways. 
ment in California as exists anywhere We spend a great deal of time on 
in the world. They are the most dedi- this floor, and quite properly, talking 
cated; they are the most conscientious; about education, about the needs to 
they are the most professional. They make our young people competitive in 
are highly skilled." a global marketplace so that they can 
The fact of the matter Is that Iron- compete and win. We all know that for 
lcally In our State, the streets are too many, their horizons are limited 
needles.sly dangerous; In part, because and extend not much further than an 
of a drug traffic that Is seeking a large ambition to be a member of a drug 
and lucrative market; in part, because gang. 
the State criminal law is far too le- We also know that for a great many, 
nient. their lot in life will perhaps include 
But most recently, Mr. President, being crime victims, in part because 
the focus has been on the !allure of this drug traffic Is so rampant, but, in 
the criminal justice system, both State part, Mr. President, because the risks 
and Federal, to afford some finality to are seen as rather minimal, even- In 
make real the threat to criminals that the extreme case of the taking of a 
if they take a life, they will have to life. 
pay with their own. The death penalty _ What happens when someone de-
has not been a deterrent because it/ cldes that in order to support a habit 
has not been enforced and it has not he will rob a liquor store or a gas sta-
been enforced because of the abuse of tion late at night when there Is a 
the habeas corpus process. · single attendant and decides that the 
Currently, the focus Is upon Robert odds are with him if he puHs the trig-
Alton Harris. Mr. Harris has been on ger because he may eliminate the sole 
death row in the California penal witness to his crime? And, In fact, if he 
system for over 11 years. He has Just Is caught, in some States where there 
recently filed a fresh petition. Those Is no death penalty, I say the odds 
who have been reading the newspa- very definitely favor his pulling the 
pers and reading, again and again, the . trigger. But even In those States 
recital of the facts of this grim case in where there is a death penalty but 
which this cold-blooded murderer shot where It Is not enforced because of the 
down two teenage boys in cold blood abuse of the habeas corpus process, 
and then ate the hamburger of one, the effect Is much the same. Rational 
found, through comments at the time, criminals clearly figure that the odds 
. that his · callousness. was · almost are In their favor, not in favor of the 
beyond belief; · · · citizen; · that the profits greaUy out~ 
..., vot. • 
weigh the risk to them even In the 
most extreme case where they are paid 
to eliminate a witness, paid to eliml-
na t c compC'tltion In the drug traffic. 
!\fr . President, I repeat, that Is not a 
tolerable situation. It is not tolerable 
to have public confidence undermined 
with respect to the most basic right 
that a ci\·ilized society should afford 
its citizens: The right not to become 
crime victims, the right to feel safe In 
their own homes and unafraid to leave 
them. That is not the case In my 
Sta:e. It is not the case In all too many 
where people are afraid of their homes 
and afraid to leave them. 
Mr. President, what is being sought 
here is not a denial of the due process 
and the Bill of Rights protections that 
we celebrate, and quite properly, with 
pride in a Nation that has afforded 
fairness and justice unparalleled in 
the history of civilization. But to do 
so, Mr. President, does r.ot require 
that we continue to abuse the process 
In a way that undermines quite rea-
sonably the confidence of ordinary 
citizens, decent people, entitled to 
expect and receive the protection of 
the law. That Is what is at stake here. 
That is what the Thurmond amend-
ment is all about. 
I cannot urge too strongly that we 
adopt it because if we fail to adopt it. 
Mr. President, once again the Ameri-
can people will have heard that the 
Senate of the United States has had 
the opportunity to make them safer, 
to attempt to at least change the odds 
In their favor. If we fail, they will 
rightly ask why. Why · Is it that we 
have this overweening concern for the 
rights of the accused at such great 
cost to the rights of the citizens? Why 
do we not worry as much about the 
victims of crime as those who are 
thought to be victimized by a crimlnal 
system which does not afford them 
limitless rights of appeal? 
The answer, Mr. President, Is that It 
Is not justice to those ordinary citi-
zens. It Is certainly not justice to those 
crime victims If we perpetuate a 
system that permits its abuse In a way 
that makes It impossible for those citi-
zens to feel confident because the rea-
sonable expectation is that, In fact, 
the death penalty will continue to be 
on the books as a dead letter, unen-
forced because we permit limitless fil-
ings of petitions for habeas corpus. -
That · is the situation now. It is 
wrong. We must change it. The Thur-
mond amendment will change It. 
I commend my friend from South 
Carolina who has many virtues. But 
perhaps the most Important of those 
Is tenacity In the cause of Justice to 
citizens. And he recognizes that that 
system Is not working and that the 
time has come to change It. Indeed, 
when the number of death row in-
mates across the Nation numbers in 
the thousands, It Is pa.st time to 
change it. · 
Mr. President; no amount of words ' 
will bring ·back • Wyatt· ·Loggins . or 
t<.obert James Devaul. who were 
among the victims of serial killer 
Randy Kraft. No amount of words on 
this floor will bring back Michael 
Baker and John Mayeski. the two 
teenage \ictims of Robert E. Harris, 
nor will th ey bring back Dayle Oka-
kakl, a \'ictim of the nightstalker, 
Richard Ramirez. 
The list of death row inmates ls ex-
ceeded greally by the list of their vic-
tims. The comfort we can give to those 
who are the loved ones of those vic-
tims is rather limited, but at the very 
least they are entitled to believe in 
this country that we will do justice. 
We do not do justice with a system 
that permits those who have been con-
victed by facts that are no longer in 
dispute to continue to escape the pen-
alty that the law provides by the 
abuse o! this process. 
Mr. President, the time has indeed 
come to adopt the Thurmond amend-
ment. 
I thank the Chair and yield the 
floor. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
commend the able Senator from Cali-
fornia for his very pertinent remarks. 
They are Tight on point. He has again 
emphasized that the people of this 
country are sick and tired of the delay, 
delay, delay in the criminal justice 
system. Cases go on, as we have stated 
here. 7, 8, 10. 12, 16, and in one case we 
understand 18 years. How do the fami-
lies feel? Put yourself in their shoes. 
Mr. President, I now yield to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Iowa for 15 
minutes. 
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I 
commend the Senator from South 
CarolinL I thank him for yielding to 
me. I support his compromise. 
The question to ask when we inquire 
whether the Federal habeas corpus 
system needs reform is not what pro-
cedures will apply to a capital defend-
ant who has only "one bite at the 
apple" but what procedures wlll apply 
where the defendant has already had 
numerous "rntes at the apple," includ-
ing having the same claims heard by 
several different State and Federal 
courts? 
Congress can change these proce-
dures-established by statute in 1867-
without doing violence to any right al-
ready guaranteed to individuals under 
the Constitution. 
. The present Federal habeas corpus 
statute has fostered a system that no 
longer seems to be int~rested in the 
factual guilt or innocence of a defend-
ant. 
Instead, prisoners appear to be en-
couraged to attempt to persuade some 
Federal Judge that some kind of tech-
nical error has occurred during the 
criminal prosecution against them. 
The present system allows a· State 
pclsoner to relitiiale virtually every 
aspect of his or her confinement-
from · pretrial through postconviction 
proceedings-an unlimited number of 
times throughout their term of con-
finemenL 
The ele\·atlon of procedure over sub-
stance deprives the criminal justice 
system of a crucial element of deter-
rence: swiftness and cert.alnty of pun-
ishment. 
Particularly in capital cases, the 
present habeas corpus systems under-
mines the effectiveness of the des.th 
penalty as both a deterrent and as a 
legitimate expression of society's 
moral outrage concerning the most 
abominable of intentional killings. 
ConsequenUy, the will of the people 
in the 36 States that have a death pen-
alty ls being thwarted by repetitious 
litigation. 
Because of my strong belief in feder-
alism and my preference that the 
States make their ov.n decisions in 
most areas, I have supported habeas 
corpus reform since the beginning of 
my service in the Congress. 
My goal is to eliminate pointless and 
duplicative relitigation of claims that 
have already been fairly considered 
and decided by State courts at both 
the trial and appellate levels. 
Only then will we make it possible to 
obtain real Justice by eliminating un-
reasonable and illogical results in 
criminal proceedings. 
Mr. President, our goal should be to 
avoid inconsistencies in the treatment 
of similar cases. 
Unfortunately, the result of the 
present habeas system encourages in-
consistencies. 
We need to establish a standard that 
affords protection for both a defend-
ant's due process rights and the integ-
rity of State and Federal crimnal pro-
cedures. 
As we all know, the current habeas 
corpus system allows for no end to the 
litigation of a State criminal convic-
tion. This results in using the Federal 
courts to review ad nauseum convic-
tions in State courts. · 
We need to establish some realistic 
and logical finality to these cases. 
I believe that reasonable time 
limits-similar to those contained in 
the Thurmond-Specter proposal-
a.fford every State prisoner an oppor-
tunity to apply for Federal habeas 
corpus relief following the conclusion 
of the State criminal process. 
Reasonable time limits will create a 
means for control of the filing of peti-
tions years or even decades after the 
natural conclusion of criminal pro-
ceedings, because, as a practical 
matter, the ~age of time may make 
reliable determinations of asserted 
claims~lther during a retrial of the 
petitioner or during another collateral 
proceeding-diificult or practically inl-
l)OSSible. 
Consequently, without in any way 
prejudicing the substantive rights of 
State criminal defendants, a system of 
reasonable time limits on habeas cases 
maintains orderly procedures already 
contained in other areas of Federal 
criminal law and It assures finality of 
State criminal adjudications. 
Mr. Pre.ident, we cannot allow our 
search !or a true, meaninpul, and 
workable solution to the present Fed-
eral habeas corpus morass to be led 
astray. 
We cannot afford to merely go 
through an exercise in reshaping reali-
ty to fit certain slanted notions of fair-
ness or e\·en r ight and wrong. 
If our efforts result in only the illu-
sion of reform. we face the prospect ol 
complicating the ever-growing gridlock 
in capital litigation. 
We must balance greater certainty 
and finality In capital sentences, In ex-
change for a fuJJ and fair adjudication 
of a defendant 's claims. 
As I have said before, the question ls 
not what procedures will apply to a 
capital defendant who has only "one 
bite at the apple" but what procedures 
will apply where the defendant has al-
ready had numerous "bites at the 
apple," including having the same 
claims heard by several different State 
and Federal courts? 
A reasonable and rational habeas ap-
peals system will net allow claims to 
be raised in successive Federal habeas 
corpus petitions that have nothing to 
do v.-ith the question of defendant's 
factual innocence or guilt. 
A reasonable and rational habeas ap-
peals system will not allow claims to 
be raised in successive petitions de-
spite the absence of any justification 
for the defendant's failure to raise the 
same claims in earlier proceedings. 
By encouraging claims unrelated to 
the factual guilt or innocence of the 
defendant or by encouraging relitlga-
tion of claims from the sentencing 
phase of the capital proceedings, the 
goal of finality is defeated. 
Furthermore, I believe very strongly 
that we cannot abandon well-setUed 
law regarding the dUerence to be given 
State procedural rules. 
We know that delay results in ef!ec-
Uve abridgement of the sentence of a 
capital defendant. 
Therefore, convicted capital defend-
ants have a greater incentive to w!th• 
hold claims for use in later proceed-
ings than any other convicted criminal · 
tnca.rcerated in prison. 
Our actions in this area of law 
should not establish the dangerous 
presumption that only by deprivina 
the States of procedural bars and de-
f enses and expanding the scope of 
Federal habeas corpus review and the 
role of Federal courts, can there be 
any assurance of adequate constitu-
tional review of capital cases. 
Mr. President, we need to focus on 
Y,hat actually happened during a par-
ticular criminal proceeding, rather 
than on Issues such as the background 
or compensation of a lawyer represent-
ing a capital defendant. · 
I believe that we should be more 
concerned with the impact of the 
habeas system on America's .citizens 
and on the victims of crime, actual or 
potential, rather than being concerned 
with its impact on America's lawyers. 
It seems to me that if we are really 



























g t ::> 


















t'. ·" .,, tU-'>U1 Ill!; Ula.L capital cases will 
not be deTayed because of, among 
oth er reasons, a lack of qualified coun-
s<' I. v,e must carefully consider options 
0 :, how the habeas appeals system 
sl1ou!d be reformed. 
justice can continue in our great coun-
try." So U. Is an a\·eraire, everyd!lY 
American concun. 
First, we should note that this a.1>-
pllPs only to death penalty cases. That 
Is what a lot of people are worried 
about. On averaire rte-ht now, becair.;e 
of the numerous appeals th.rou~h the 
habeas corpus process, It takes an av-
erage of 8 years after a com:iction, 
after using all o! the processes of the 
States, on a'\lerage, 8 years of waiting 
around for the process to determine. 
with finality that Justice has been 
served and the will o! the peopie Is to 
be complied with. A Jury has been im-
paneled and has convicted and bu 
sentenced, and still they wait. 
.:, "~~ 
filed to get y:ou a. stay for anot.ber 15 
months or 2 or ,t years. 
We sa.y U ~ou want to, file a seeond 
or subzcquent time, you have a lawyew 
and you send It up to three judges u 
the circuit court. And they have to 
decide whether there Is some- ea.use. U 
they say, " It loolu like· we rni&'>eo 
something," then It st&rts again, a:m:t 
you get another time through. Federal 
Judge, circuit Judge, all the way- t.o the 
Supreme Court. It sems to me nothing 
could be fairer. I think we ought to cm 
this. It la h!i"h time. 
I have attempted to keep In mind 
four goals as we iro about the task o! 
reforminir the Federal habea s corpus 
s \·stem: 
· First, a State capital defendant's 
c~e should be afforded a full and fair 
series of appeals-both directly anct 
collat erally-based upon the prisoner's 
guilt or innocence and the procedures-
followed during the State's criminal' 
tri:il proceedings. 
Second, when the capital defendant 
has exhal:tSted his State remedies, he 
should be afforded another- series of 
equally !un and fair appeals in the 
Federal courts. 
Third, once a State capital defend-
ant's- conviction and sentence are 
found to be appropriate, jud1cial pro-
ceedings sfiould be concluded:. 
Fourth. Federal habea3 corpus relief 
should remarn an extraordinary 
remedy which should upset a State-
conviction only where necessary. to re-
dress & fundamental Injustice. 
Mr. President, no reform proposal as 
sweeping &S this is ever perfect. 
While the Thurmond-Specter pro-
posal may, not achieve what I orieinal-
ly hoped we could achieve,. it is a posi-
tive step. 
I urge my colleagues. to support.it. 
I yield the-floor. 
Mr. THURMOND.. Mr. President, I 
wish to commend the· able Sena.tor 
from Iowa for his splendid arguments. 
on this subject. He is a valuable-
member of the Jud1ciary CommJttee, 
and we thank him very much. 
.Mr. President. I yield 5 m:nutes to, 
the able Senator from New Mexieo. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from New Mexfco. 
Mr. DOME-"llflCL Mr. President. r 
thank the distinguished ranking 
member for yielding 5 minutes, and 
while I feel strongly on. thfs issue. r 
might not use the 5 minutes. 
But let me in my own way state wl'ly 
r thin.k.. the Thurmond-Specter amend-
ment should be airreed to_ 
We speak o! habeas corpus. reform as 
if it Is something that.. average Ameri-
cans are not concerned about, some-
thing that average Americans do not 
understand. 
Let me tell you, Mr. President, there 
is no question, whether it be in the 
State of Nebraska, the State the dTs-
tinguished occupant oi the chair 
comes from,. or the St:i.te of New 
Mexico. if you ask average citizens 
what they think. about those \\<ho are. 
waiting on death row for 8, 10, 11,. 12,. 
15 years while· the courts of this coun-
try are determining their fate. and 
while they are on thefr sixth or se\.'-
enth or eighth appeal to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, I! you. nsk average Amer-
icans of good common sense what they 
think about lt. they will tell you, "We 
do not under.stand how thfs. klnd ol 
So I think everyone should know: 
this is a major issue in our- country, 
and people want us to decide it with' 
some Justice and fairness, but with 
some degree o! commcm sense and fl. 
nality. The· approach of the Thur-
mond-Specter &mendment seems to-
the Senator from New Mexfeo to be-
eminently fair. I see- it as very simple; 
but profound. 
First, this amendment would apply· 
once the case is all finished-the con-
victed murderer- has had his- day in 
State court, a Jury ha, convici,ed him~ 
Md then found he should have the 
death penalty-. He has exercised all his 
State remedies and he is- there with 
that case completed. 
What this amendment says is that 
the Judges in the federal system. from 
those who sit at the trial level to the 
circuit and to the SUpreme Court.. 
have to understand that. it. ts impor-
tant that they expedfte this. process. 
So it. is gjven high priority .. They must 
put It at the top of the roster and hear 
it. After ~ there are not thousands. 
o! these cases. . 
So we say to them, "You do it." We 
say to the. defendant, "Yau have iO 
days after all that has been finishe-d-
you have. h&d your tFial. you. have had 
your appeals, and you have gone t.o 
51our State supreme- court. Now you. 
have 60. days. to e-et yow: appeal 
ready." But contrary to. prior law. we· 
furnish him with a lawyer in the. event. 
he. is. ind1gent. He no longer has to 
write up his o,;im habeas carpus. proc-
ess. He gets a lawyer. Within 60 days, 
he files. 
Then we say to the Federal Judge, 
"You put ft at the top, of the list and 
you hear it." Then we say to the cir-
cuit Judge, "Judges, if it is. appealed, 
you put it at the top of the- list and 
you hear it." Then we say to the U.S. 
Supreme Court the- same .. 
So, we are-saying. wil.hin 1 l!ear after 
that has been filed, there will be an 
adjudicaticn by the best eourts in the 
land, yes or no .. It. seems. to me that is,. 
p11etty fair. But second,. we say. since 
we want to be- absolutely certain and 
do not want to deny another bite at 
that apple of appeal, we. give. you 
other opp.ortun!.tJcs, to appeaL. Bu.t, 
what -we say. ls.. that. they should not, be 
frivolous. They should net. be just. 
I thank the manager !or the- time-r 
and li yiel'd the naor: 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. Pl'esfdenC, J 
'lnI1t to commend Ulat e,cceilent state--
ment by the abre Senator froJll'l NeW' 
Mexfco.. He Is not a member. o# the .Ju--
diciar:,r Committee, and he- has not had. 
an opportunity to Itn~- about the bffnJ 
along this fine that have been- befo~ 
the committee- for-years, but he under-
stand that the Ameriean people- a:re 
sick and tired of these delays. 
I want to- emphasize this: Under our 
bill, we will bring a conclusion in t 
year. Under the Biden bt!I, it could tre 
indeteminate for years; 
Mr. President. 1 yield to the able 
Senator from California. 
Mr. WILSON &ddressed the Chair .. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who 
yieWs time? 
The Senator for cailfa.rnfa.. 
Mr. WILSON. Mr.President.,.! than&. 
the Chair. I thank. lllJi friend uooi 
South Carolina. 
Mr. President, I want to raiae: a pomt 
of concern. I h9.Ye. already sp.oken aL. 
some length. in suppart o! the Thw:-
mond amendment. I will not reiten.te 
what I have-said.. 
I have. a concern that we have :aot,. 
either in this ameru!m.ent or in ,ne-
G.raham amendment, or elsewhere in. 
the Biden proposal, addressed lhe. nec-
essary point with respect. to ap"1Jcar-
tion oi what we adopt here as: limit. 
lions upcn the abuse of the. habeas 
corpus procedure, and how it shaU De 
applicable to. existing_ death raw In-
mates.. 
It seems to. me that we. would be- ter-
ribly derelict, Mr. President, if we- diti-
not spell that out in the law. I am weU. 
aware that there is a unanimoos-con-
sent agreement that prevents- the 
mGdification of the amendments tha~, 
are pend:L.,g and that have already 
been acted upon, but, I address to. my 
coUeag-ues an urgent p-lea. that. we not 
leave this sub.Ject, and specWc.ally that. 
we not lea\·e this legislation.. without. 
having amended It, so as to make ele&11 
the application oj the limitattens upon 
the habeas corpus process to existin& 
lruna.tes ol death row-. 
We. have ha.d, as I .Pointed out, the: 
recent in3taoce in California.. of :ret a.er 
other filing by Robert Alton Harns, 
who has been on ~atb row- Ulere for 
over 11 years since his conviction. 
Mr. Preslden~. whateYer we deride 
b,y way of & limit. upon, the- abuse o£ 
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do Is t.o make clear specifically how It 
npplies to the literally thousands of In-
mates of death rows and prisons across 
the Nation. Let there be no doubt that 
we are grandfathering them somehow, 
so that In the prospective application 
of this law we wlll have no application 
of Its requirements to those who are 
presently on death row, convicted of a 
capital offense. 
I thank the Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who 
yields time? 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
am glad the Senator brought that out. 
This bill would apply to those on 
death row. He said some have been 
there for 11 years, and they may be 
there 5 or 10 more years If we do not 
pass this bill. We limit it to 1 year. 
That ls what the public wants, what 
the law enforcement people want, 
what the President wants, what the 
Attorney General wants, what the ma-
jority of attorneys general in the 
United States want. 
Mr. President, I think we are about 
ready for a vote. The Republican 
leader wanted to make some closing 
remarks. I suggest the absence of a 
qUO!'Uill. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it Is so ordered. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 
there are some points I want to clari-
fy. On the Issue of States rights, Sena-
tor BIDEN states that the Thurmond-
Specter proposal would infringe upon 
States rights. This ls not the case. 
This bill would not-I repeat, would 
not-eliminate State habeas corpus 
review. Under our proposal, death row 
inmates may file State habeas peti-
tions whenever the State law permits. 
No State-laws are touched. · 
In addition, the Biden-Graham bill, 
according to the Department of Jus-
tice, would overturn the case of 
Teague versus Lane, which held the 
changes in law are not to be applied 
retroactively in collateral proceedings. 
In other words, by overturning 
Teague, the Senate would be expand-
ing the rights of death row inmates, 
murderers; It would expand the rights 
of convicted murderers on death row. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Chair advises the Senator from South 
Carolina that all of his time has ex-
pired. 
Mr. THURMOND. I suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
tlme wlll be charged to the Senator 
from Delaware. The clerk will call the 
roll 
The assistant clerk proceeded to call 
the roll. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, It Is so ordered. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. 
the able Senator from Delaware has 
agreed to ylrld se\·eral minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from Utah. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does 
the Senator yield time to ~he Senator 
from Utah. 
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 5 minutes to my 
dlstlnghlshed friend from Utah. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Utah Is recognized for 5 
minutes. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank 
my distinguished colleague from Dela-
ware, the chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, and also my distinguished 
friend and colleague from South Caro-
lina, the Republlcan leader on the Ju-
diciary Committee, for allowing me 
the extra time. 
I will take a few minutes to Just 
briefly summarize why I think we 
really have to pass the Thurmond-
Specter amendment if we are to enact 
true habeas corpus reform. 
This is our last chance. To me this is 
the most wonderful opportunity we 
have had to really correct the excesses 
of habeas that have been going on for 
~-ears. The Gacy case since 1980, that 
Is Just through the process of appeal. 
Now they Just filed their first habeas 
case, the first habeas petition. By the 
time they get through with that, that 
ls another 10 years or more. Yet this 
man is convicted of murdering 33 boys, 
as I recall. 
In the case of William Andrews. 17 
years, having murdered a number of 
people after torturing them and pour-
ing Drano down their throats. After 26 
appeals, 15 in the Federal courts, 11 in 
the State courts, he Just filed his 27th 
appeal while I was speaking here on 
the floor on Monday decrying this sit-
uation. 
He knows, and everybody else knows, 
that he committed those murders. It Ls 
a Just penalty. Everybody knows it. 
There ls no more good argument. HJs 
appeals are frivolous. Everybody 
knows that. But they will keep filing 
them as long as we keep this current 
system. 
And the difference betwen these two 
amendment is that the Thurmond-
Specter-Hatch. amendment ends these 
appeals beyond reasonable llmJt.s. 
Mr. THURMOND. One year. 
Mr. HATCH. I have to say that the 
Graham amendment ls a serious, good-
fai th effort on the part of the dlstin-· 
gulshed Senator from Delaware [Mr. 
BIDEN] and the distinguished Senator 
from Florida [Mr. GRAHAM] to address 
this habeas situation. But It Just plain 
does not do It. The debate now Is be-
tween the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch 
amendment, which addresses habeas 
now, and the Graham amendment, 
which Is content to allow the same 
system to continue. 
U Graham Is enacted here today and 
become the law, It Is a step in the 
right direction, but it will not stop 
these frivolous appeals at a cost ·of 
what I think are billions of dollars to 
the American public, unnecessary dol -
lars to the American public. 
There has to be an end to this, and 
we have the chance right here with 
the Thurmond-Specter-Hatch amend-
ment to put an end to it and do It In 
the way that protects all of the Inter-
ests, all of the rights of the defendant 
In the most reasonable way. It does 
have finality, it does give the defend-
ant his opportunity for court, or his 
day In court, In every way, but It puts 
a tlme constraint and a time llmitatlon 
on what happens. 
The Thurmond amendment requires · 
the death row inmate to file a Federal 
habeas corpus petition 60 days after 
the death sentence becomes final. It 
prohibits any Federal district judge 
from thereafter granting any other 
habeas petition for stay of execution. 
It requires a circuit court of appeal 
authorization before any successive 
petition may be brought. That Is a 
major advancement in this Issue. It is 
a fair advancement. You are giving 
them a complete Jump to the circuit 
court of appeals where we know we 
have the appellate ability to handle 
thee matters in the very best constitu-
tional way. If they do not like It, they 
then can go to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. And It forces the 
trial court and the appellate court to 
act expeditiously. 
The district court has to decide the 
case in 110 days, the circuit court in 90 
days, and the Supreme Court in 90 
days after that. It does not postpone 
consideration of State claims at all. 
They can do it. 
The difference under Thurmond is 
we resolve the problem; under 
Graham, we do not resolve it, even 
though I have to admit there have 
been some improvements over what 
the original bill had to say. 
I suggest the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
HAluaN). The clerk will call the roll. 
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it Is so ordered. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 
the distinguished chairman of the 
committee has agreed the Senator can 
talk. 
Mr. DOLE. I will talk in my leader's 
tlme. .· 
Mr. President, was leader time re-
serve earlier? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, 10 
minutes of the leader tlme has been 
reserved. 
Mr. DOLE. I understand the distin-
guished Senator from South Carolina 
has more time. 
Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield 
to the Republican leader. 
Mr. DOLE. I will use my leader time. · 
Mr. President, everyone ln the 
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about tbe so-called habeas corpus Secood, ,he Thurmond-Specter coz1ci.us10x 
me rry -go-round. amendment limits the a\'ai!obi li ty of Mr. P resident, the Thurmond-Spec-
Thousands upon. thousands of .. second or successlve petitions-the pe- ter approach to habeas 1:orp\ia. reform 
habeas petl t! ,:ms clog the F ederal dis- Utlons. In other words, t hat are-a field Is. sound. It Is comprehensi.ve. And I&, 
trict court dockets each year; 40 per- day for ereative attorneys who gin-up will go a Jong way tol':a.rd pu\tiog a 
crnt of these petitions are filed more spurious el alms to keep their clients in stop to the endless litigation delays 
than 5 years after a. person has been· the litigation pipeli.ne. that clog the courts. and consume pre--
convicted. And nearly o.ne-th.ird of the The Thurmond-Specter amendment cious JudJclal resou.rce.s. 
p<' titlons are filed more than a decade would stop this abuse- by providing This is • lL"Ilited retroactive exeep. 
af ter conviction. that &. successive petition can only be- tion that makes sense and it Is only 
Yes, t h a.t is right. A full decade. raised in two. specific circun13tance~ fair since fundamental: cons.tltutiona.l 
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger First, if evidence· becomes available issues wa.uld be at issue. 
describt'd the habea.s quagmire this that calls Into question the guilt or in- Mr. Presiru.:nt,. I know this. is an im-
\\·a.y: nocence of the defendant; or second, ii portant !.;sue, im trnportant ~cision. 
I have seerr cases- and this occurs in many a previously undiscoverable ta.ct comes lf we are· con::emed: about reform, if 
courts today- where 3, 4.. or 5 trle..Ls are ac- ta li&"ht that. calls into question the ap- we are· concerned a.boat. what l re-
corded ta the a.ccused with an appeal !oll'?w~- proprlateness of the original sentence. !erred to in the earlier quote from, the 
ing ea.ch trla.l and reversal of the conv!ct1on Perhaps more il?lJ)ortantly the former: Chief .Justice Warren Burger, 
on purely pr~eduraJ ~ -ounds ... • .. rn one Thurmond-Specter amendmen'i re- it wourd seem to me tl'lat this ap-
casc! more thz.n 60 _Ju.ors and alternates- . . 'naJ d f ~--t t .... ~11.. pr::>ach shoufd be adopted. J u~ my v:ere Involved In 5 tnals • • • more than 30 quires a Crlm.l e eilUd.U O ..., .. u......,,. . . 
differen t lawyers particlpa.t.ed • • • amf get the approval o1 a Federal court of colleagues to· suppo!:1' t.he Thurmond--
mer e- than 5tl appela.t~ Judges reviewed the appeals; before a district. court can Specter. ame~dmen~ when we- vote-
case of th~ appeals. • • • The tragic aspect h ear a sw::cessive petition~ later this e!enmg. . 
wa.s the wastP. and futility since e,ery Mr. President. this approach strikes. Mr. Pres:dent. I reserve any time I 
la ·;,yer. every Judge and e~ery Ju~or was a fair balance. Wlth the F ederal appel- may have; 
fu.Jy co::ivH:ccd of the dc.endant s gunt lat" courts as the ga tekeepers· It v.ill Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Presfdent, I' 
from ~ gmrung to end. ens-ure that frivolous cl:ili:is ~e not intend to- vote against the amendment 
I t hink it is fair to_ say that ,we all ra ised in successive habeas petitions. of the Senator from South Carolina.. I 
share t.l'..e !oz:mer Chief J ustices. con- And, at the· same t ime, it will greatly prefer the G'raI;am-Biden alternative. 
cems. And we an agree t._hat habeas. reduce the risk. of executing an inno- although I contmue: to fltvar addltfon-
ref~r:11- is a~:utely essen t ial ff we. are cent person or a per.son who does not al m e_asnres in several' areas to protect 
r~a!lj' __ mteresLd in restOI!,-'lg SOffie ~a- deserve a capital sentence. const1t utioa:ll rights .. 
!1~~=~ty to our criminal justice When it comes to the successive peti- StroJ:?-&',er counsel standards and com-
l · tions fssue-, ,he Thurmond-8pecter ap- pensat1on modeled' on the. work of the 
mi1 soLU'nos proach beats the Graham-Bfden &J>"- American Bru; Association s?'louJd be. 
When ft eon.res _to me:mir.,if.ul habeas proach h2.nds. down. guaranteed to ca~al defendants. anct 
reform.. there ts- only one proposal on The Graha.m-Bfden proPosa.l would · habeas petitfo!l~ more. protectfon 
the table-and that's the preposal of- allow J'ederaJ eourts to hear a succes- should be provided to habeas. petition-• 
!ered by- my distinguished colleagues, slv~ r,etition 50 long 88 &he facts· aI- ers whose cia.fms ran vfctfm to un!a.1r 
Senators Tlitm:llotrn and SPEClllt. leged! by the defendant-ff proven- procedural default.. rules whieh allow-
Both Sen&tors have· studied the- would place 8 defendant's guilt into ignorance,. negl~ct or Incompetence oC 
ls.$ue-~ They hllve worked ha:rd on the- question counsel to extinguish constitutional 
ls.$ue. And theif' proposal, H enacted, In oth~r words, no proof is- required~ rights; and mo.re should lu~ done _to 
would improve~ habeas.system in at Ko red facts are required. JUBt make undo rec1:nt Supreme Court retroactill-
l.east three slgru!J.<!ant ways. some ailegatiens JU5t alJege some- ity dccis10l'1S that. virtually eliminate 
Pint. the Tlutrmond-Speeter amend- · the ability ol habea& petitioners to, 
meat get.!! serious with des.dlines. It re- tacts, and a dfstrict ~rt ean hear the- obtain iull and fai.r l'.eview o! m&)JI Po--
quires defendants to file a habeas peti- succ~sn-e ?_ia1'lea5 petltlon. tentialll! meritorius claims. These 
tion in. Feders.l court within 60 da,ys. of Mr. President, this approach rs not issues a-o to the heart of ow- sy&tem. Qf 
any Hnal Judgment and sentence by· a. ha?eas reform .. It will not reduce the !ustice and its. a.bility tQ ensure accea 
State supreme eourt. haoeas ~a:seloa.a. . . to equal- justice for. all. Neve.rthelesi;.. 
N-Ot 1 year, a.s I)&opo.sed by my dist~ It is si:nply a PT~~criptio~ for open,- the Graham-Biden alternative. coar-
guished colleag,ues,. Senators. BlllEN Ing np the suecessive- petition flood- tains worthwl-Jle provisions to secu,e 
and GR..\3AM. Not 9 months. Not even ~tes and. for c~ogging t~ eom-ts even counsel for capital defendan~ and. 
6 months. but 60 days. tcrthe; with ~r;olous cla.ims. habeas. petitioners, 11snd it deserres. the 
The Thurm ond-Specter amen dment Fma.i!y, tae Tbunnond-Specter support of the Senate. 
also rec;.ui!'tS: any defendant whore amendrnent would allow the Federal The writ of habeas ccrpus b one of 
Federa: b ;.!;~as application is. denied to courts to conslder-t J:Ie habeas_ cases- the il"eat.. b!storical bulwarks of Angur 
file a ~ u;:-; cme Court petition for certi- only· those intervemng decisions. by American jurisprudence, a.'ld it contln-
orari v.; Ll~in 20 days. of the denial. And the U.S. Suprem':l Court v:hich estab- ucs to play a fundamental and unique 
e,en mare, it requires the Supreme· Iish fundamen tal constitutional rights. role u:i aur modem ~·stem ol justice. 
Court to m:\ke a final decision within This is a. liinl.t ed retroac.tivity ex cet>- Ha.beas corpus, review ol death sen-
90 days of the filing. of the cert. peti- tion that makes s.e.c..se. And it.. is only- tences is the r;,rinclpal means oJ relie{ 
tion. fair, since fundamental constitutional a vail:-.ble to a wrongfully convicted in-
Mr. President, criminal defen dants rights would be at Issue. dhi dual faci!l&" execution.. I.t. has 
may not like t h ese deMlines. Criminal The Grah.am-Biden pro.pos:ll, howev- spared the lin:s of m3JlY innocent per-
dd ense aU.orneys may feel put ou t. er, would go beyon d fundamental con- sons who were uncons.ti tutiorullly eon-
And the nine Justices on the Supreme stitutional ri;rhts. It would 2.ilow the victed iu1d sentenced to death. The 
Court may not like Congress. g!vi.ng courts in hab~:is c::!.Ses to c..in.sider "any righ ts at ir..sue incJude. the right to a. 
them deadlines and telling th em how· interim change in the law prom ulgat- fair and speedy trial, 11. fairly coru;titu~ 
to schedule their o!licial business. . ed by the Supreme Court," I r epeg.t: ed Jury, competent counsel. &nd ace.es. 
But, ln my view. clear-cut and un- "a,ny L.,terim cba.nge in the law." . - .· to evidence and witnesses. are essea. 
breakable deadlines are essential U This ls obviously a. much broa.der tial att.ributes of fairness in Olli: 
we're really serioU& about. redt1clng the retroar.tlvitY exception.. And it wili system of justice. Habeas peUtJQns 
delays. lD the habeas process. And in slmpcy encourage the filing oC ll)Ore- ha\·e saved many individuals from. CODt-
my view, meaningful desLdi.me$ are es- unwelcome and unneeded--ha:beas pe- stit.uti-0.Cal. v.iolatioDS ol. the~ tights 
~t~ to any habe86 ref~rm 1>roPosal.. tiitions. and ultimately, spared. theJr Uves.. Qfteai 
,. 
• 
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of people that we have historically put 1 after repeated denials of relief In State 
court systems. 
I oppose the death penalty, because 
capital punishment is wrong In princi-
ple and wrong In practice. The death 
penal ty Is fundamentally flawed, be-
cause of the likelihood that innocent 
people will be executed. No system of 
Just ice, however wise or resourceful its 
judges and Juries may be, can elimi-
nate this risk. That Is a risk we accept 
when the punishment I! imprison-
ment. because a Jailed defendant can 
alwa5·s be set free when Innocence Is 
proved. But that Is a burden we cannot 
tolerate when the punishment Is 
death. 
The risk of executing Innocent per-
sons ls no theoretical, hypothetical, 
proPoSition. A recent Stanford Law 
Review study lists 350 cases in which 
defendants convicted of capital or po-
tential capital crimes in this century 
have later been found innocent. 
A 1978 Indian conviction and death 
sentence were overturned when, on re-
trial. it was shown that his conviction 
had rested on perjured testimony. 
In 1988, a defendant was released 
from prison in Florida after it was de-
termined that he had been convicted 
on the basis of testimony the prosecu-
tors knew to be false. 
All of these violations were revealed 
on habeas. The list goes on and on. 
How can any of us shut the door to 
relief in cases such as these? 
The need for counsel in capital cases 
ls a protection that · former Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, who chaired the 
Habeas Corpus Study Committee, and 
others have advocated for years. The 
Powell committee proposal, as modi-
fied recently by the Judicial Confer-
ence, would pro,1de counsel for State 
habeas proceedings and this proposal 
Is a starting point. But I believe that 
meaningful representation by counsel 
must include minimum attorney com-
petence standards based on experi-
ence, as well as adequate compensa-
tion. monitoring and investigative re-
sources where necessary. 
The Graham-Blden democratic pro-
posal goes further than the Thur-
mond-Spector proposal and it should 
be supported. 
The Thurmond-Specter alternative 
errs In favor of swifter review of con-
stitutional claims, at the expense of 
fair and adequate representation of 
those claims. To reduce a habeas peti-
tioner's abllity to obtain review of con-
stitutional cla!ms in federal court In 
exchange for representation by coun-
sel, ts a lopsided bargain without addi-
tional guarantees as to the adequacy 
of the counsel's representation and 
adequate procedural opportunity to be 
heard. Habeas corpus review necessari-
ly entails consideration of complex 
constitutional and procedural issues, 
and often requires experienced investi-
gation. The stakes facing a habeas pe-
titioner. in a capital case leave no room 
for error. . • 
At every stage in a capital proceed-
ing, whether at trail or on post-ron\ric-
tlon review. counsel must be familiar 
with the arcane procedures that apply 
In death penalty cases. Meaningful 
r f' prescn ta tion by cou nsf' l at the trail 
level. In particular, in capital proceed-
ings would go even further to assure 
fa irness nnd render the pos t-com·ic-
tlon revf PW process more manageable. 
Incv!l.ably, the death penalty is ap-
plied to minorities and to the poorest, 
the least popular, and the least power-
ful membf' rs of society. ConseQuently, 
too many defendants facing the death 
penalty nt trail are represented by at-
torneys who are poorly prepared. un-
derpaid, overworked. The result ls 
often only minimal legal assistance. 
Th infliction of death at the hands 
of Government brutalizes our society 
instead of atoning for crime. To short 
change Individuals charged with cap-
ital o'f!enses, In terms of the quality of 
their representation or their ability to 
obtain meaningful re,iew of their con-
stitutional claims, unfairly prejudices 
them. I urge the Senate to support the 
Gramm-Blden alternative and oppose 
the Thurmond-Specter amendment, 
and to recognize that further reform is 
needed to ensure that if capital pun-
ishment ls lnfllcted at all, at least 1t is 
inflicted fairly. 
If it ls t-0 be applied at all, capital 
punishment ought to be applied only 
where notions of fairness are given 
priority. Despite procedural safe-
guards, · mistakes a.re often made in 
. criminal prosecutions; in the first 6 
months of 1987, for example, eight 
men were released in four States be-
cause their Innocence was finally de-
termined after many years on death 
row. 
Habeas corpus review of death sen-
tences is virtually the only means of 
relief available to a wrongfully con-
victed individual facing execution 
whose constitutional rights have been 
violated. 
In 1983, an inmate in a Florida 
prison was within 15 hours of his 
scheduled execution and bad been 
fitted for his burial suit when the Fed-
eral court of appeals issued a last-
minute stay. His conviction was later 
overturned. and the main prosecution 
witness subsequently recanted his tes-
timony. The defendant was never re-
tried. 
In 1967, a habeas petitioner came 
within hours of execution before the 
granting of his petition led to the dis-
covery that the prosecutor claimed 
that the petitioner's clothing was 
stained ~1th the victim's blood and in-
duced a witness to testify to that 
effect, despite the fact that the pros-
ecutor knew that the stains were 
paint, rather than blood. 
In 1982. the eleventh circuit re-
manded a capital case where defense 
lawyers repeatedly stressed to the jury 
that they were only representing the 
defendant because they had to, and 
that their client, who his · counsel · de-
scribed to the Jury as "a · little old 
nigger boy," was not unlike "the kind 
. , 
to death here in Georgia." · 
In 1988, the Supreme Court remand- ' 
ed for a new trial a case in which the 
defendant was sentenced to death by a 
Jury that was selected after the pros-
Pcutor secretly lndUC' f' d thf' Jury com- 1 
mission to underrepresent blacks and 
women in Jury pools. 
In 1985. a conviction and death sen-
tence of a mentally retarded defend-
ant were re\'ersed after it was estab-
lished that the prosecutor had with-
held evidence that a key eye,,.itness-
who at trial had positively Identified 
the defendant as the assailant-had 
told the pollce shortly after the arrest :1 
that he could not Identify the perpe- :• 
trator. 
A 1976 conviction was overturned on 
retrial in Arizona after it was deter-
mined by five expert witnesses that 
the victim had not been murdered but 
had died Instead of pneumonia. 
IV..r. EIDEN. I suggest the absence of 
a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. · 
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRE.SIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. 
Mr. EIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 
minutes to the distinguished Senator 
from Florida [Mr. GRAHAM]. 
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, this 
has . been a very full and instructive 
debate this afternoon. We end where 
we started, and that is in substantial . 
agreement. The differences between 
the provision that ls in the bill at the 
present time and the provision offered 
by the Senators from South . Carolina 
and Pennsylvania are 90 to 95 percent 
identical, or at least consistent in 
terms of the objectives that they have. 
I believe, therefore, that within that 
relatively small ambit of disagreement, 
that the pro,1sions which are in the 
bill represent the sounder policy. 
Let me Just mention two of those 
areas of difference. One is the ques-
tion of setting time limits once a peti-
tion has been filed in a Federal court. 
Under the provision as offered by the 
Senators from South Carolina and 
Pennsylvania, a petition, once having 
been filed, must be heard by the Fed-
eral courts within a stipulated number 
of days, 110 days, and then other dates 
subsequent in the Federal process. 
That sounds very good and sounds as 
if It would advance the objective of fl. 
nality and certainty. The difficulty Is, 
what is the sanction if those timeta-
bles are not met? The concern I have 
is with the timetable, the sanction, for 
falling to meet a similar time require-
ment at a trial level where there Is the 
obligation of a speedy trial, bringing -a 
person to trial within a ·certain . 
number of days from the time that 
they ' are indicted; ff the Government 
fails to meet that test and ff the court 














l-.f ay f!J, .J 990 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE S 68:l3 
Is delayed In carrying out its responsi-
bility, the sanction is against t he Gov-
ernment. a~ai !1s t the people in t he 
torm of a dism issal of the charges. 
And the accused person walks free. 
An unknown is what is going to 
happen under the proposal offered by 
the Senators from South Carolina and 
Pennsylvania in the event that the 
timetables which they set are not met. 
Are we going to have an anomalous 
situation in which a State prisoner 
held fo r a capital offense, who has 
fil ed in a Federal court and the Feder-
al court has not met its time period, 
that that prisoner ls going to have his 
j.1.il cell opened? I think that we would 
not want to create t hat possibility. 
Second, Mr. President, Is the Issue of 
exhaustion of remedies. I believe that 
the procedure which we have outlined, 
which maintains t he tradition that a 
Federal prisoner would exhaust his 
S t.ate remedies before going into Fed-
eral court, is sound in terms of federal-
Ism and in terms of the judicial proc-
~ss and will not add to the total time 
required for collateral appeals. 
So, Mr. President, those are two sig-
nificant differences in a sea of slml!ar-
lty. I urge that the amendment that 
has been offered be defeated and that 
the underlying amendment be thus 
adopted. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator"s time has expired. 
Mr, DECONCINI addressed the 
Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who 
yields time? 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 
mlnute3 to the Senat-0r from Arizona. 
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I 
am pleased that the Senate Is turning 
this week to consideration of an omni-
bus crime control package. 
This package Includes a number of 
iterr.s of which consideration is long 
overdue, as well as a number of new 
ideas worthy of our debate. 
I want to take a minute this after-
noon to focus on one particular Item 
of significance-reform of habeas 
corpus procedures. 
The distinguished senior Senator 
from South Carolina may recall how 
many years Congress has debated this 
issue. Certainly much longer than I 
have bi:'e.n nere. 
Finally, we are at the place where 
action is at hand. 
Stu~es have been conducted, hear-
ings held all over t he country, and nu-
merous recommendations have been 
forwarded for congressional review. 
corpus statutes allow unnecessary 
delay In the delivery of Justice. 
These sta t utcs are a deterrence to fi-
nality In a S tate cou rts ' determi nat ion 
of guilt and Imposi tion of ca pit a.I sen-
tences. 
I have Introduced legislation on this 
subject, as have a number of Members 
from both parties In both Chambers. 
In fact, the Senate passed habeas 
corpus reform legislation In the early 
1980's, but the bill was never debated 
In the full House. 
The Powell Commission report and 
recommendat ions issurd In 1989 have 
become the con1erstone for consensus 
on how to reform habeas corpus stat-
utes. 
The Powell Commission put forth a 
new idea which has brought the 
schools of differing thought on this 
issue to the table. 
This idea Is the linkage of ensuring 
lnmri.tes accessibility to competent 
counsel to the imposition of stricter 
habeas corpus statutes. 
Practically every witness that has 
appeared before the Judiciary Com-
mitt,ee In the past yen.r on this issue 
has talked about the effect of Inad-
equate counsel In sl0'.1, lng do\l:n the 
ex ecution of State criminal lav:. 
Mr. President, I am pleased to stand 
here today In support of Senator GRA· 
HAM's habeas corpus amendment. I 
have long been a cosponsor of legisla-
tion that would provide reform for 
habeas corpus. There is no questfon In 
my mind that there Is a dire need for 
reform of the habeas corpus writ. For 
years now the Federal courts have 
been Inundated with habeas corpus pe-
titions, a large number of which are 
trivial at best. The backlog in the Fed-
eral court system ls immense. 
Senator GRAHA)("s proposal is a 
workable solution that should receive 
wide support in t his body. It allows · 
the States to choooe what they each 
individually believe to be the best 
method of providing competent {'.Oun• 
sel for death penalty cases; .It is Impor-
tant that defendants receive counsel, 
even those who commit the most hei• 
nous crimes. I also know that there 
are numerous good attorneys in my 
State of Arizona who are willing to 
provide free counsel to death row in• 
mates. They are not necessarily career 
criminal attorneys, but they ate good 
lawyers who are willing to put in the 
time to represent these death row in-
mates. Let each State decide what 
kind of experience requirement Is nec-
essary. . . . 
The most widely publicized recom-
mendations are those of a special com-
mission appointed by Supreme Court 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and 
chaired by former Supreme Court Jus-
t ice Lewis Powell. 
I need not get Into any more of the 
details of the bill, but I thin.k It is a 
· good proposal, and I support It. 
This distinguished commission-
made up of five Federal Judges-
. pooled their practical experience and 
sought outside Input on options for 
habeas corpus reform. 
The Powell Commission reiterated 
. what :we know: The cµrrent oabeas 
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the 
Senator from South Carolina, and 
then I will yield back all my t ime. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
want to say there Is a tremendous f:iif-
ference in these bills. Under our pro-
posal you wind it up In 1 year. These 
things have gone on now · where there 
was 11 years on , a c~. In Utah one 
. went _for 16 years'. · · 
In Oklahoma one went for 18 years. 
We have to bring finality. Ours Is a 
much tougher bill. It winds It up in l 
year. 
Now, undr r th eir bill, they can con-
tinue. and it may go a num ber of 
years. That Is the difference. 
Do you want l year or do you want 
to go for a number of years which can 
be done under the Blden bill? That Is 
the main question. Finality, finality. 
The people are sick and tired of 
these delays. So. if you want to get re• 
sults, I t hink you will vote for our bill. 
If you want to carry on the present 
system that has improved some but 
not too much, vote for their bill. 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 
back the remainder of the time. · 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
ROCKUELLER). All time is yielded back. 
Mr. BIDEN. Have the yeas and nays 
been ordered? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. They 
have not. 
Mr. BIDEN. I ask for t he yeas and 
nays. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there a sufficient second? 
There is a suff!clent second. 
The yeas and nays were ordered. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment of the Senator from South Caro-
lina. On this question, the yees and 
nays have been ordered and the clerk 
will call the roll. 
The legb;latlve clerk called the roll. 
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that 
the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. 
JoKNSTONJ and the Senator from Lou-
isiana [Mr. BREAUX] are necessarily 
absent. 
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the 
Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. 
CHAFEEJ is necessarily absent. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER . . Are 
there any other Senators In the Cham-
ber desiring to vote? 
The rusult was announced-yeas 4'1, 
nays 50, as follows: 
CRollcall Vote No. 105 Leg.) 
YEAS--47 
Armstron, Gramm . Murltowskl 
Bond GraMley Nlcklea 
Boschwttz Hat.ch NUM 
Bums Hefl!n ~ler 
Byrd Heinz Rocll:e!elln-
Coat.I Helma Roth 
Cochran Holltnp Rudman 
C.>hen Humphrey Shelby 
D'Amato Kassebaum Simpson · 
D&nforth Kasten Stevena . 
Dixon Lott . Symma 
Dole Lugar Thurmond 
Domenlcl Mack Wallop 
Elion McCain Wamer 
Garn McClure WIison 
Gorton McConnell 
NAY~50· 
Adams Cranston Inouye 
Aull:& Da..schle Jeffords 
Baucus DeConclnl Kennedy 
Bentsen Dodd Kerre1, 
Biden Duren berger Kerry 
Bingaman Ford Kohl 
Boren Fowler. Lauuo~rc 
Bradley . Glenn Leahy 
Bryan Gore ·· Levin 
Bumpers Graham Lieberman : 
Burdlcll Harkin. MdsenbaUJn . . 
Conrad . . lialfleld Mlkul8)U . 
., 
-
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M ilchril Reid &L,s,,r 
M oynit.&a Ri ,elr Simon 
i>a('lc .. ood R obb S11<'rlrr 
P~II San ford W irth 
Pr) or Sarbnnes 
NOT VOTI'!'IG - 3 
Drra u ,. Ct:nfee J o h ll!. tO n 
So lhe amendment. <No. 1687>, was 
reJected. 
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President. I 
move to l'ffonsider the vote. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
ques!.ion is on agreeing to the motion 
lo re<'Onsider. 
:Mr. MITCHELL. I sugges t the ab-
sence of a quoruITL 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The legislative clerk proceeded to 
call the roU. 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I 
ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quomm call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection. it ls so ordered. 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I 
ask for tt,e yeas and nays on the 
motion to reconsider the vote by 
which the Thurmond amendment was 
defeat~. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second. 
The yeas and nays were ordered. 
Mr. .MITCHELL. Mr. President. I 
ask unanimous consent that the vote 
on the motion to reconsider the vot.e 
by which lhe Thurmond amendment 
9.•as defeated occur tomorrow morning 
at 10 a.m. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there objection? Without objection. it 
is so ordered. 
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I, like all 
Americans. am anxious to take acUon 
against the scourge of violent cci.r:nf: 
th.at ha.s plagued our country. It is in• 
cwnbent upon us, here in the Con-
gress, to point toward the most sensi• 
ble means of addressing this problem. 
That is why I have reservations about 
certain pronsions of S. 1970, currently 
before the Senate. 
In the la.st several months. I have re-
ceived leUecs from hundreds of Dela-
ware constituents who oppose the gun 
control provisions of S . 1970. These 
letters express concern about the 
unfair burden that this bill would 
place upon law-abiding cltlzens. As the 
bill stands, anyone who owns a weapon 
covered by the bill. even if lawfully 
owned prior to the enactment of thls 
legislation, v.·ould have to fill out a 
fonn to continue lawful ownership. 
Further, U the weapon was ever sold 
or transferred, both parties in the 
transaction would have to keep 
records of the transfer. While these 
recordkeepm.g requirements are sup-
posedly aimed at drug traffickers and 
violent criminals, it is highly unlikely 
that such criminals would bother with 
these fOrtn$. If not, they would be sub-
ject. to fine3 of $1,000 or 6 months In 
jail. These penalties hardly seem a de-
terrent Lqc the hardened drug crlmi~ 
nat ()n. the other hand, honest law 
abiding gun own<'rs are burdened -.·Ith 
the task of recordkeeplng and filling 
out forms . and If they slip up, they 
could be sent to Jail. 
I nm also concerned about a section 
of the b ill which allows the Secretary 
of the T reasury to recommend new 
t ypes of weapons to be banned. This 
provision opens the door for future 
gun regulation and could potentially 
affect guns that are used for legiti-
mate sporting purposes. Hunte rs and 
sportsmen from around my home 
State of Delaware ha\·c expressed 
strong opposition to this portion of S. 
1970. It Is on their behalf that I will 
continue to look for ways to attack 
crime in this country that do not place 
e.n extra burden on the honest citizen. 
I have been a longtime supporter of 
the right to bear arms as embodied In 
the second amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. In the past, however, I 
ha\·e ta,·ored sensible measures re-
stricting certain types of weapons. In 
the last Congress, I supported the Un-
detectable Firearms Act of 1988, which 
effectively outlaws plastic weapons 
that cannot be detected by airport x-
ray machines. I also voted to outlaw 
the indiYldual ownership of machine 
guns, and to stop the Importation of 
the Infamous '·Saturday Night Spe-
cial" handgun. In all of these c:i.ses my 
priority has been to address the crlml-
nal problem without undermining the 
rights of lawful gun owners. 
Mr. President, I will continue to take 
an active role in combating the prob-
lem of violent crime in this country. 
While I feel it ls appropriate to en-
courage people to join in this effort, I 
do not feel that it Is fair to strap them 
with responsibility. We must all work 
together to solve the problems . that 
lay before us. 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
suggest the absence of a Quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The assl.stant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection. it is so ordered. 
IUNANIMOUS<OMSENT AGREDIENT 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that Semi.tor 
THuRMOND now be recognized to offer 
an amendment relating to the bill's 
provision on mental retardation; that 
there be no debate tonight on that 
amendment; that the Senate resume 
consideration of the bill and the Thur-
mond amendment Thursday, May 24, 
at 8:30 a.m., and that at that time 
there be 90 minutes equally divided on 
the Thurmond amendment, and that 
the vote on the Thurmond a~nd, 
ment occur at 11 a.m. 
I further ask unanimous consent 
that. upon disposition of the Thur-
mond mental retardation amendment 
Serut.tor GRAHAM of Florida be recog-
nized . to offer an amendment to strike 
section Hl7. of the ~ll. and that ther-e 
be 2 hours for debate equally dMded 
on the Graham amendment: that 
when all time has been used or yielded 
b:\ck, the Senate. without nny inter• 
\'ening action or debate. ,·ote on the 
G raham amendment; that upon dispo-
sition of the Graham amendment. 
S enator THURMOND be recognized to 
offer an amendment relating to the 
subject of mitigating factors. that 
there be 4 hours of debate equally di-
\'ided on the Thurmond amendment; 
that when all time has been used or 
yielded back, the Senate, without any 
inter\'ening action or debate. vote on 
the Thurmond amendment . 
I further ask unanimous consent 
that no further amendments or mo-
tions to reoommit be in order prior to 
the d isposition of these three amend-
ments and that no other amendments 
relating to age, mental capacity, or ag-
gra,•ated or mitigating circumstances 
in the Thurmond amendment be in 
order, and that the agreement be in 
the usual form with respect to the di• 
\·ision of time. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there objection? 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, v,e 
. ha\'e no objection. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. 
AMENDMENT NO. 1690 
(Pur,>OSe: To add a "right versus v.ron&~ 
standard to the term mentally retarded) 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. I 
send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for Its immediate consideration. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will report the amendment. 
The assistant legislative clerk read 
as follows: 
The Senator from South ca.rouna CJdr. 
THU1U11101rn] proposes an amendment OUin· 
bered 1690. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. I 
ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With• 
out objection, it is so ordered. 
The amendment Is as rono~-s: 
On page 19, line 7, strike the period after 
Uie word Mretarded" and Insert tn lieu the 
follolring: "and is wholly lac.king In the ca• 
paeity to understand the difference between 
right from wrong.". 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President. I thank 
my colleague and his staff particularly 
for ~·ontng out this unanimous-con• 
sent agreement. For the record, so 
that it la clarified, age, mental capac-
ity and a.ggra\•ated and mitigating cir• 
cumstancei; in the Thurmond amend• 
ments relate to the death penalty. 
That is v.-hat we are referring to. · 
I should point out that by earlier 
consent there Is · a vote and will be a 
vote. tomorrow at 10 a.m. on the 
mot.ion to reconsider the .Thurmond 
amendment relative to habeas corpus. 
That will occur at 10 a.m. tomorrow; 
Mr. President,, I see my oolleague 
from Montana ffl · here. I yicld the 
noor. 
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The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
SANFORD). The Senator from Montana 
Is recognized. 
(The remarks of Mr. E mms pertain-
Ing to the introduction of S. 2679 are 
located in today's P.. i::conn under 
•· statements on Introduced Bills and 
Joint Resolutior.s." ) 
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I note 
the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
clerk will call the roll. 
The legislative clerk proceeded to 
call the roll. 
Mr. EIDEN. Mr. President, I nsk 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Wit-h-
out objection, It Is so ordere~. 
MORNING BUSINESS 
Mr. EIDEN. Mr. President, I ask 
unanL'Tlous consent that there be a 
p ::?riod for morning business with Sen-
a tors permitted to speak therein. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it ls so ordered. 
Mr'. WARNER. Mr. ~I rise 
on behalf of myself and my colles.gue, 
Senator ROBB, to pay tribute to a fine 
Virginian and exemplary gentleman, 
Joe Gibbs, who Is the recipient, this 
year, of the Northern Virginia Com-
munity Foundation's Founder's 
Award 
Founded In 1978 by a group of 
northern Virginia residents who 
sought to Improve the quality of life In 
their area, the Northern Virginia 
Community Foundation endeavors to 
promote and acknowledge significant 
individual contribution to the commu-
nity. The foundation is supported by 
individual, corporate, and foundation 
gifts. It provides funding assistance for 
northern Virginia programs In the 
arts, education, and youth actMties as 
well as health and civic programs. 
The Founders Award, the most pres-
tigious award given by the foundation, 
is presented each year to that individ• 
ual who has distinguished himself 
through outstanding community serv-
ice and dedication to the betterment 
l 
of northern Virglnla. This year's recip-
ient is Joe Gibbs, the head coach of 
the Washington Redskins, and a resi-
dent of Vienna, VA. 
This year's Founder's Award recipi-
ent has spent most of his life develop-
ing the potential of young men. Sever-
al years ago, as a counselor to inner-
city youths, Coach Gibbs wJtnessed, 
first hand, the negative influences 
that can pull teenagers into a cycle of 
despair and poverty. He was compelled 
to help these boys, and began, In 1983, 
to look for a way to do It. 
In 1986, Joe, with the generous as-
sistance of all segments of the commu-
nity, opened the Youth for Tomorrow 
New -Life Center, near Manassas, VA. 
. Today, the New Life Center ta, both a 
. home and an educational center from 
which young men begin their lives tribute to Dr. Dawson Allen of Milled-
anew. geville. GA, who celebrates his 96th 
Th_e proJram at _the New L_lfe Center bi r thday today. Dr. Allen is truly a 
pro\·1des a substitu te family which renaissance man. His life and its 
teaches the need fo r obedience and achievements df•sen·e the attention of 
sclf-dis:ipline. Boys at the center the Senate. 
strive to achieve goals in all areas of Most of Dr. Allen's life was devoted 
thei r_ lives: social, acade!Ilic, spiritual, to the practice of psychiatry at Allen's 
phrs1~al, fmanclal, vocational, and cit!- Invalid Home In Milledgeville. During 
zensh1p. Presently the center Is oper- his professional career he wns in 
ating at full capa~ity, with many sue- charge of care for wom~n patients at 
cess stories In its flies. this institu tion, while his late brother, 
March ,of 1989 _saw the _e:5tabl!sh- Dr. Edwin Allen, attended to men. 
n:ent of tne Joe Gibbs Chant1es org~- When his father established this instl-
n_ization, set up to enhance the actlv1- tutlon In the final years of the last 
ties of the Youth for T<?~orrow pro- century, it was the first private-care 
gTam. In addition to pro~idmg fund1ng institution for mentally disturbed pa-
for the center, last years gala at the tients sout1, of Bal t imore Previously 
Kennedy Center also raised funds for · • 
Hope for a Drug Free America, the only State-~~pported care was avail-
Doug Williams Foundation, and ONE able to fam1lles ~n our region. In that 
Ministries. era, care pr?vtdcd by the State 
Already the wlnningest coach in amo~nted to llttle more than custodl-
R ec!skins h istory and one of only 19 ansh1p. An in~alculable num?er of vie-
NFL coaches to ever register 100 v:cto- tlms of despair and d~press1on found 
rics. Coach Joe Gibbs is beginning his new hop~ und;r the pnva~e care of Dr. 
10th season in Washington. Few have Allen, hIS ~ro.~er, and hIS father and 
acccmplished so much so quickly, and their psyeh1atnc insight. 
the Gibbs era has been one of quality He has also been a successful cattle 
as weH as quantity. fa~~r. Just as he and his brother had 
In addition to his 102 victories, Joe a d1v1Si_o~ of labor in patient care, they 
Gibbs has led the Washington Red- also dlVlded their farm~ng interests. 
skins to 3 NFC championships, 4 di\'i- Dawson Allen raised dairy cows and 
sion titles 5 playoff appearances and produced milk and other dairy prod-
3 Super · Bowl games, 2 of v.'.hlch ucts, while his brother, Edwin, raised 
brought home the Lombardi trophy. beef cattle., 
In his customary manner, Joe ls Dr. Allens II?-ost lasting legacy, how-
quick to credit this achievement to ever, is beautiful carpets of red and 
others. " It is a reflection on our entire green over the countryside of Georgia. 
organization beginning with the great A strain of crimson clover that he and 
ownership provided by Mr. Cooke," his brother developed now covers 
said Gibbs, "that Is not passlble with• much of Georgia where there was once 
out sacrifices by players, assistant eroded red clay on wornout fields. 
coaches, scouts, and the support ot This is a Dawson Allen legacy that will 
great fans." last forever. Dr. Allen's strain of crtm-
But it is Joe Gibbs who deserves the son clover Is used to restore nutrients 
credit. From the moment he left hJa . to the soil and prevent erosion. It is 
post as offensive coordinator of the today used all over Georgi11, In pas-
San Diego Chargers in 1981 to Join the tures and along roads. Georgia is a 
Redskins, he set the tone for success. beautiful State that is made even 
In 1982 he became the first head more beautiful by Dr. Allen's crimson 
coach In 20 years to be named Coach clover. 
of the Year by Associated Press in con- An Associated Press article about his 
secutive seasons. And in that same botanical achievement recently ap-
year, his team posted the sixth best peared in the Atlanta Journal and 
record in NFL history and went on to Constitution, and I will ask unanimous 
win Super Bowl XVII. A year later, his C?nsent that It appear at the conclu-
offense set an NFL record for points In s10n of my remarks. 
a season on the way to Super Bowl Dr. Allen remains alert and active at 
XVIII. Coach Gibbs now ranks as the 96. Although his eyesight has failed 
fourth wlnningest active coach in the him, his active, fertile mind has not. 
NFL. He remains abreast of current develop-
The hallmark of Joe Gibbs' career, ments, thanks to the National Library 
on the sidelines and off, has been that Service for the Blind, administered by 
of consistent success. Whether In the Library of Congress. This service 
youth counseling, Christian outreach keeps him supplied with current booka 
work, community development, or on tape, and he spends much of his 
coaching footabll, Joe Gibbs's success day listening to them. His visitors 
touches the lives of many. We are sometime express concern that the 
pleased to salute Joe Gibbs as a coach, service has a tendency to provide one 
citizen. and father, and an ext.raordl· with more information about the con-
nary Virginian. tents of those books than one with a 
short attention span can absorb. Few 
visitors can match the depth of his un-
derstanding of the world around him. TRIBUTE TO DR. DAWSON 
ALLEN -It Is a special privilege for me to take 
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my pur~ note of Dr. Allen's 96th birthday and 
P06e for seeking the noor is . to pay his life of achievement., u well _. µ,ij 
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HALL, Circuit Judge: 
This is a consolidated appeal and cross-appeal arising 
from a class action initiated by death row inmates in the State 
of Virginia pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983. The State appeals an . 
order of the district court requiring the appointment of counsel 
for inmates challenging their death penalty through state habeas 
proceedings. The inmate class cross-appeals the district court's 
refusal to order the appointment of counsel in federal post-
convict ion proceedings. By a majority vote, a panel of this 
Court reversed that portion of the judgment of the district court 
requiring appointment of counsel for death row inmates in state 
proceedings. Giarratano, et al. y. Murray, et al., 836 F.2d 1421 
(4th Cir. 1988). Thereafter, a majority of the Court voted to 
reconsider the case en bane. A majority of the en bane Court has 
now voted to affirm the judgment of the district court for the 
reasons set forth below. 
I • 
Virginia currently provides three forms of legal assis-
tance to death row inmates pursuing post-conviction claims--law 
libraries, unit attorneys, and appointed attorneys. Death row 
inmates are housed at Mecklenberg Correctional Center, the Vir-
ginia State Penitentiary and the Powhatan Correctional Center. 
Each of these three centers maintain law libraries. Mecklenberg 
death row inmates are permitted two half-day periods weekly; 
death row inmates at Powhatan and the Penitentiary are not per-
mitted to visit the libraries, but may borrow materials for use 
in their cells. 
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Unit attorneys are assigned to the various penal insti-
tutions to assist inmates in any matter related to incarceration. 
In addition to these unit attorneys, Virginia provides for the 
appointment of counsel, under certain circumstances, to indigent 
inmates who have been residents of yirginia for six months. 1 Va. 
Code § 14.1-183 (1950). Under this provision the courts in 
Virginia have the discretion to appoint counsel to represent 
inmates proceeding in f orma pauper is. Death row inmates in 
Virginia, seeking collateral relief from their sentences through 
state post-conviction remedies, have traditionally had no 
automatic right to the assistance of counsel. 
This action was originally brought by Joseph M. Giarra-
tano, a Virginia death row inmate, who sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief with respect to post-conviction assistance of 
counsel. The district court permitted other death row inmates to 
intervene in the suit and granted their motion for class certifi-
cation. The class consists of: 
all persons, now and in the future, sentenced 
to death in Virginia, whose sentences have 
been or are subsequently affirmed by the 
Virginia Supreme Court and who either (1) 
cannot afford to retain and do not have 
attorneys to represent them in connection 
with their post-conviction proceedings, or 
( 2) could not afford to retain and did not 
have attorneys to represent them in connec-
t ion with a particular post-conviction pro-
ceeding. 
1 Va. Code§ 14.1-183 was amended in 1987 to delete the 
six-month residency requirement. (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Supp. 1987). 
However, this change in the Code does not alter our disposition 
of this appeal. 
-4-
The death row inmates had presented a number of consti-
tutional grounds in support of their claim of right to post-
conviction assistance of counsel. 2 However, the district court 
granted relief only on the basis of the ~ gh!_,~ ac3 to the 
courts as stated in Bounds y. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). In 
Bounds, the Supreme Court held that prison authorities are re-
quired to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of mean-
ingful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law 
libraries or assistance from legally trained personnel. 
The district court found, based upon evidence presented 
at the trial, that the death row inmates were incapable of effec-
tively using law books to raise their post-conviction claims. 
Three considerations led the district court to this conclusion: 
(1) the limited amount 
inmates had to prepare 
petitions to the courts; 
of time death row 
and present their 
(2) the complexity and difficulty of the 
legal work; and 
(3) the emotional instability of inmates 
preparing themselves for impending death. 
The district court consequently found that the provision of a 
library did little to satisfy Virginia's obligation to assist 
death row inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful 
legal papers as required by Bounds. The district court then 
turned to the examination of the assistance presently provided by 
Virginia to determine if it met the constitutional requirement. 
2 These grounds included the sixth amendment, eighth 
amendment, fourteenth amendment due process clause, Article I, 
the equal protect ion clause, and the right of access to the 
courts. 
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The district court found that the assistance provided 
by unit attorneys was inadequate both in fact and in law. Evi-
dence produced at trial indicated that seven institutional attor-
neys were attempting ~o meet the needs of over 2,000 prisoners 
c..-_:--,, 
and that each attorney could not adequately handle more than one 
capital case at a time. In addition, the unit attorneys were not 
hired to work full time. The district court also noted that even 
if Virginia appointed unit attorneys to service only the death 
row inmates, its duty under Bounds would not be fulfilled because 
the scope of assistance was too limited. 3 The district court 
concluded that only the continuous services of an attorney to 
investigate, research, and present claimed violations of funda-
mental rights could provide death row inmates the meaningful 
access to the courts guaranteed by the Constitution and that the 
assistance of unit attorneys fell short of this requirement. 
The district court then turned to the second form of 
legal assistance, provided by appointed attorneys, and found that 
the timing of the appointmen was a fatal defect with respect to 
the requirements of Bounds. Appointments are made under Va. Code 
§ 14.1-183 only after a petition is filed and then only if a non-
frivolous claim is raised. Thus, the district court reasoned, 
the inmate would not receive the attorney's assistance in the 
3 The evidence indicated that the unit attorneys do not 
perform factual inquiries, sign pleadings, or make court 
appearances. Instead, they act only as legal advisors. 
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critical stages of developing his claims. 4 The district court 
concluded that in view of the inadequacy of the assistance pro-
vided by Virginia and the scarcity of competent and willing 
counsel to assist indigent death row inmates seeking post-convic-
tion remedies, 5 such relief was necessary and warranted. 6 In 
order to provide effective relief, the district court held that 
4 This assistance is particularly critical in Virginia 
where all claims, the facts of which are known at the time of 
filing, must be included in that petition as they may not be 
raised successfully in a subsequent filing and those claims also 
could not be considered in federal court because federal courts 
generally may not consider claims barred by Virginia procedural 
rules. Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 s.ct. 1618 (1987), and Smith v. Murray, 477 u.s. 527, 
106 s.ct. 2661 (1986). 
5 The district court found that in the past Virginia 
had perceived no need to provide counsel to death row inmates 
pursuing post-conviction relief because attorneys volunteered 
their services or were recruited to provide pro bono assistance 
to death row prisoners. However, the evidence presented at trial 
established that few attorneys are now willing to voluntarily 
represent death row inmates in post-conviction efforts. 
that: 
6 The district court's order specifically provided 
(1) indigent Virginia death row inmates are 
entitled to the appointment of counsel upon 
request to assist them in pursuing habeas 
corpus relief in the state courts; 
(2) defendants shall develop a system whereby 
attorneys may be appointed to the death row 
inmates individually as provided above; 
(3) plaintiffs are entitled to their taxable 
costs and attorney fees as provided by law; 
and 
(4) counsel for the parties shall attempt to 
reach an agreement as to counsel fees. Any 
such agreement shall be without prejudice to 
defendants' right to contest the right of 
plaintiffs to recover same. 
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Virginia must provide death row inmates trained legal assistance 
in their state post-conviction proceedings. 
I I. 
On appeal, the State contends that the constitutional 
right of access to the courts does not require appointment of 
counsel for death row inmates in state habeas corpus proceedings 
and that Virginia provides constitutionally adequate legal assis-
tance to death row inmates. Alternatively, the State argues that 
the Supreme Court has determined in Pennsylvania y. Finley, __ 
u.s. __ , 107 s.ct. 1990 {1987), that there is no constitutional 
right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. On cross-
appeal, the death row inmates contend that the district court's 
reading of Bounds limiting its application to state post-convic-
t ion proceedings, does not adhere to the current state of the 
law. We disagree with all of these contentions and address them 
seriatim. 
We are persuaded by the well reasoned opinion of the 
district court that legal assistance presently available to 
Virginia death row inmates in state post-conviction proceedings 
fails to meet the constitutional requirement of meaningful access 
to the courts as set forth in Bounds. It is now established 
beyond a doubt that prisoners have · a constitutional right of 
access to the courts. The district court evaluated the existing ___________ ...., ____ _ 
Virginia program "as a whole to ascertain its compliance with 
constitutional standards." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832. The 
district court made findings of fact based upon the record which 
indicated that Virginia was not in compliance with constitutional 
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rights of access to the courts. Under Anderson y. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), we cannot say these findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous. Nor do we find that the district 
court abused its discretion in formulating the remedy in this 
case. Milliken y. Bradley. (Milliken .ll), 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
The State's reliance on Pennsylvania y. Finley. supra, 
as authority for their contention that state prisoners are not 
constitutionally entitled to state-supplied attorneys in post-
conviction proceedings is misplaced. In Finley, the Supreme 
Court held that the procedural framework of Anders y. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967), does not apply to the situation in which 
counsel appointed pursuant to Pennsylvania state law later seeks 
to withdraw from the representation without first filing a brief. 
The Court stated that because Pennsylvania was not constitution-
ally required to provide counsel in post-conviction proceedings, 
then due process did not require that the counsel's actions 
comport with the Anders procedures. 7 However, Finley was not a 
JL meaningful access case ,~ nor did i't address the rule enunciat:; in 
~
Bounds y. Smith. Most significantly, Finley did not involve the 
death penalty. 
Both society and affected individuals have a compelling 
interest in insuring that death sentences have been constitution-
ally imposed. Moreover, the complexity and difficulty of the 
7 The Anders procedures require counsel to perform a 
conscientious evaluation of the record, to write a brief refer-
ring to arguable support in the record and to give notice to the 
client. 
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legal work involved in challenging a death penalty require par-
ticular safeguards in order to insure meaningful access. The 
Supreme Court has stated that "there is a significant constitu-
tional difference between the death penalty and lesser punish-
ments." Becky. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 {1980}. In addition, 
the Supreme Court recently held that matters affecting an already 
condemned prisoner call for "no less stringent standards than 
those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding." 
Ford y. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986}. See also, Booth 
y. Maryland, __ u.s. __ , 107 s.ct. 2529 {1987} {"death is a 
punishment different from all other sanctions.") 8 We do not, 
therefore, read Finley as suggesting that the counsel cannot be 
required under the unique circumstances of post-conviction 
proceedings involving a challenge to the death penalty. 
I I I. 
The death row inmates argue that the district court 
erred in denying counsel for fedz l habeas corpus and certiorari 
petitions. We disagree. In Ross y. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 
(1974), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that states must 
appoint counsel for indigents seeking a writ of certiorari. The 
Court also observed that in considering a writ of certiorari it 
would have available appellate briefs, a transcript and state 
court opinions. Similarly, a federal court considering a peti-
8 Because of the peculiar nature of the death penalty, 
we find it difficult to envision any situation in which appointed 
counsel would not be required in state post-conviction proceed-
ings when a prisoner under the sentence of death could not afford 
an attorney. 
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tion for habeas corpus would also have briefs of counsel, a 
transcript and opinions because of the exhaustion of remedies 
requirement. 
Virginia provides for a mandatory appeal for capital 
convictions and death sentences and counsel is provided for this 
appeal. The death row inmates would have available the appellate 
briefs, transcripts and state court opinions to use in their 
writs of certiorari. If the inmates are provided with court-
appointed attorneys in their state post-conviction proceedings, 
they will have briefs, transcripts and opinions to use in their 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. We conclude that the provi-
sion of assistance of attorneys at these points insure that the 
inmates are provided with meaningful access to the federal courts 
in their federal post-conviction proceedings. 
IV. 
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the judg-




WIDENER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
I concur in Judge Wilkins' separate opinion without 
reservation, but I would add a few words. 
I 
I am doubtful indeed that the plaintiffs in this case have 
standing to prosecute their case. As Judge Wilkins has 
demonstrated in his dissenting opinion ". • • the record does 
clearly establish that all death row inmates have always been 
represented by counsel in state post-conviction proceedings." 
The majority opinion does not refute this factual statement. 
In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court stated 
that "[t]he requirement of standing, however, has a core 
component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff 
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's 
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief." 468 U.S. at 751. The Court relied for that 
proposition on its recent opinion in Valley Forge College v. 
Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Because the plaintiffs 
and their class have always had appointed attorneys upon request, 
I suggest they have no standing to prosecute this case. 
This suggestion, however, does not meet with favor, so I 
will continue. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 
u. s. 368 (1981). 
II 
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I am at a loss to understand the logic of the majority 
decision which holds that appointed attorneys are not required 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings which examine the merits of 
the prisoners' claims but are required in state habeas corpus 
proceedings which, even if unsuccessful (as must be contemplated 
in the context present here), go no further than exhaustion of 
state remedies and fact finding. 
III 
One cannot but read the majority opinion without the feeling 
that the Commonwealth considers death row inmates some kind of 
second class citizens who get second class service, for, when 
access to the federal courts is provided, sl. op. p. 11, 
attorneys are not required, sl. op. p. 10-11, but, when access 
to the state courts is provided, attorneys are. Only lightly 
veiled is the inference that neither the courts nor the 
legislature of Virginia see fit to take proper care of those 
unfortunates. 
An example which refutes this implied charge of 
insensitivity is Virginia's treatment of those accused of 
felony. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court 
established the right under the federal Constitution that one 
accused of felony, if indigent, has the right to have an 
attorney represent him in the criminal proceeding. Almost 70 
years before, in Barnes v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E. 784 (Va. 1895), 
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the Supreme Court of Virginia established that same right under 
the Virginia Constitution: "Every person convicted of crime has 
a constitutional right to have counsel to aid him in making his 
defense, but no one is compelled to have counsel." 23 S.E. at 
787. And the Court added that "in the defense of one 'who has 
the double misfortune to be stricken with poverty and accused of 
crime. No. • • [attorney] is at liberty to decline such 
appointment, and few it is hoped would be disposed to do so.'" 
23 S.E. at 6787, quoting Cooley on Constitutional Limitations. 
The Barnes decision has been consistently followed in Virginia 
ever since, and indeed was codified in 1940, more than 20 years 
before Gideon. Virginia Acts of Assembly, 1940, ch. 218. 
So, neither the courts nor the legislature of the 
Commonwealth has been insensitive to the needs of those accused 
of crime, and other Virginia statutes yet provide for the 
obligatory appointment of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings 
where a hearing is to be held, as Judge Wilkins demonstrates in 
his opinion, but which appointment 
honored by the Virginia courts in 
demonstrates, even when not obliged. 
authority has in fact been 
all cases as the record 
In sum, I do not agree with either the tenor or effect of 
the majority decision. 
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
I join Judge Wilkins' concurring and dissenting 
opinion. He demonstrates well that the majority's holding is 
impossible to square with the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Penpsylvania v. Finley, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987), and Ross v. 
Mo ff it t , 41 7 U. S • 6 0 0 ( 19 7 4 } • This creation of a right sans 
constitutional basis not only contravenes Supreme Court 
precedent but also disregards the independence of state judicial 
systems and the respective spheres of legislative and judicial 
competence. 
The federal interest in the form of state 
post-conviction review is an attenuated one. 
question that a $tate has no constitutional 
It is beyond 
obligation · to 
~ ---------
provide post-conviction reviEiw . ~, Finley, 107 S. Ct. at 
1994. This is so because post-conviction relief is not a part 
- - - --------------- -
of the crintinal trial itself, but a separate Hiv.i,l proceeding.\" ----- =--- ---- -
Id. The plaintiffs in this case do not seek to have lawyers 
appointed at state expense in order to defend themselves from 
state allegations of which they are presumed innocent. Rather, 
they seek the services of a lawyer as a sword to overturn a prior 
determination of guilt that is presumed to be valid. 




This analysis applies with equal force in capital 
"[D]irect appeal is the primary avenue for review of a 
conviction or sentence, and death penalty cases are no 
exception." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). 
l 
Once the direct appeal process is complete, a presumption of 
legality and finality attaches to the conviction and sentence. 
Id. Al though the Constitution requires that the death penalty 
may be imposed only through procedures that provide the highest 
degree of rel iabi 1 i ty, there is no support for the view that 
death penalty cases are subject to a separate set of standards 
for post-conviction review. See,~, Smith v. Murray, 106 S. 
Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986) (rejecting a separate standard for 
procedural foreclosure in capital cases). 
limited scope of federal habeas corpus further ~ The - -~~->>----=-==~------------
~ demonstrates that the federal interest in the form of state 
post-conviction relief is minimal. The intrusion on state 
interests that federal habeas entails may be exercised only for a 
narrow purpose, to challenge unconstitutional confinement. Thus 
the Courts of Appeals overwhelmingly hold that federal habeas 
corpus is not available to challenge alleged defects in state 
post-conviction proceedings. See Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 
(6th Cir. 1986); Vail v. Procunier, 747 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 
1984); Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1984). The 
principle expressed in these habeas cases is directly applicable 
to the section 1983 claims presented here. The plaintiffs' 
claims have drawn the federal courts into an area where the 
federal interest is small and the costs to federal-state 
relations will be great. 
-16-
\ 
The majority has lost sight of the fact that in our 
dual system, the states no less than the federal government are 
responsible for the protection of constitutional rights. Where 
a state criminal proceeding is involved, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the state's role is paramount. See, ~, 
Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986): Rose v. Lundy, 455 
U.S. 509 (1982): Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981): 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Federal courts should 
act with caution where they are asked to create novel rights that 
intrude significantly on state functions. The lack of such 
caution is all the more startling here, where Virginia provides 
unit attorneys at its prison facilities to assist death row 
inmates and where Virginia courts are required to appoint counsel 
to represent such inmates in presenting nonfrivolous claims. 
Darnell v. Payton, 160 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1968). 
I can perceive no basis for the district court's 
decision other than a policy judgment that it would be a good 
idea to provide state inmates counsel at state expense to pursue 
state post-conviction remedies. That policy judgment may well be 
correct, but the judgment is for the state legislature, the state 
Attorney General's office, and the state courts to make, not the 
federal judiciary. We have been presented with much 
stimulating argument on the benefits that state-provided counsel 
would bring, but far less on the constitutional basis for 
requiring it. We have been invited to issue what is at bottom 
a legislative proclamation of displeasure with a controversial 
penalty which the Supreme Court has held is within the province 
of the states to impose. 
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The nature of the factual findings on which this 
proclamation would be based does not lessen my objections. 
The majority relies on the deference that is accorded to 
particularized findings of fact by trial courts. Yet the 
findings of fact in this case are broad generalizations. 
Indeed, if this case turns on the individual state of mind of the 
condemned prisoner, or the amount of time between conviction and 
imposition of a particular sentence, it is difficult to see how 
the commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 could ever have 
been met. The class action device undoubtedly widens the focus 
of a case, but it should not be taken as a grant of unl imi teo. 
federal judicial authority. 
Judicial legislation brings with it unique costs. :ay 
purporting to base the requirement of state pO$t-conviction 
counsel in the Constitution, the court has cre~ted g rigid rule 
that may not readily be altered in the event of ynfor~s@en 
results. Although the new right to post-convietion counsel does 
not appear to arise from the Sixth Amendment, it will presumably 
carry with it some entitlement to "effective assistance." 
Provision of counsel on constitutional grounds plso brin~~ with 
it a panoply of procedural requirements sych as those at is$.ue in 
Finley, supra (addressing procedural requirements for withdrawgl 
of counsel under Anders v. ,California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)). 
What is more, by analogy to previous "meaningful access" cases, 
future plaintiffs are likely to argue that they are entitled to 
counsel in section 1983 suits as well. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 577-80 (1974). It is hard to imagine a more 
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fertile ground for litigation than that provided by these 
entitlements. The likely result will be additional cycles of 
prisoner litigation in every capital case, each ever further 
removed from the proper focus of criminal adjudication -- the 
trial itself. 
State post-conviction remedies will now move one step 
closer to the status of a federal protectorate. The irony is 
that the development of state post-trial remedies has always held 
substantial promise that the states themselves would assume the 
primary responsibility for collateral review of state criminal 
convictions. If every state initiative is to involve yet another 
blanket of federal administrative oversight, the capacity and 
incentives for the states to undertake meaningful reforms will 
disappear. The guarantees of our Bi 11 of Rights provide 
important federal safeguards for state criminal trials; they 
have not to this point been thought to impose a federal model of 
state post-conviction review. 
Judge Chapman has asked to be shown as joining in this 
opinion. 
-19-
WILKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
The question before us is whether the Commonwealth of 
Virginia must automatically, upon request, provide death row 
inmates with appointed counsel to prepare and file state or 
federal post-conviction petitions in order to meet its obligation 
under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Under the guise of 
meaningful access, the majority has established a right to 
appointed counsel where none is required by the Constitution. 
The ref ore, while I concur with the majority that there is no 
right to assistance of counsel with regard to federal petitions, 
I respectfully dissent with regard to state petitions. 
The district court clearly erred in concluding that the 
Commonwealth of Virginia was not meeting its obligation under 
Bounds to provide death row inmates with meaningful access to the 
courts. Further, there is no factual or legal justification for 
requiring a~ se exception for this class of inmates. 
I • 
In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that the 
constitutional right of access to the courts is satisfied by 
providing inmates "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance 
from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828. Except as to 
death row inmates, the fact that Virginia is in full compliance 
with Bounds is not disputed. Even the inmate who initiated this 
action, Giarratano, conceded that Virginia provides a "decent" 
law library which includes Federal Supplement, Federal Reports, 




Virginia Reports, and the United States Code. Also, death row 
inmates are provided copies of the transcript, briefs, and state 
court opinion from the initial automatic appeal of their 
conviction • 
In addition to satisfying the requirements of 
meaningful access by providing an adequate law library, Virginia 
also provides a system of institutional attorneys to assist 
inmates. Although the majority states that Virginia 
institutional attorneys, approximately two or three per facility, 
are "attempting to meet the needs of over 2,000 prisoners," the 
record does not establish how many of those prisoners are 
actually involved in post-conviction or other litigation. But 
the record does clearly establish that all death row inmates have 
always been represented by counsel in state post-conviction 
proceedings. 
Further, counsel is appointed under Va. Code Ann. 
§ 14.1-183 (1950, Repl. Vol. 1985 & Supp. 1987) for any state 
post-conviction petition which raises a nonfrivolous issue and 
requires a hearing. Virginia also allows liberal amendment to 
pro se habeas corpus petitions. Plaintiffs' expert on Virginia 
post-conviction proceedings testified that he had no firsthand 
knowledge of a Virginia Circuit Court ever denying amendment to a 
habeas corpus petition in a capital case. 
A. Meaningful Access and Pennsylvania v. Finley 
After the district court rendered its decision the 
Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. _, 95 
L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). In that case the Court held that the 
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procedures articulated in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
( 1967), which must be satisfied before appointed counsel may 
withdraw from a frivolous appeal, do not apply to state post-
convict ion proceedings because there is no constitutional right 
to counsel in those proceedings: 
Anders did not set down an independent 
constitutional command that all lawyers, in 
all proceedings, must follow these particular 
procedures. Rather, Anders established a 
prophylactic framework that is relevant when, 
and only when, a litigant has a previously 
established constitutional right to counsel. 
We have never held that prisoners have a 
constitutional right to counsel when mounting 
collateral attacks to their convictions, and 
we decline to so hold today. Our cases 
establish that the right to appointed counsel 
extends to the first appeal of right, and no 
further. 
F1nley, 95 L.Ed.2d at 545 (citation omitted). 
The majority concludes that "[t]he State's reliance on 
[Finley] as authority for their contention that state prisoners 
are not constitutionally entitled to state-supplied attorneys in 
post-conviction proceedings is misplaced." The majority seeks to 
distinguish Finley because it "was not a meaningful access case, 
nor did it address the rule enunciated in Bounds v. Smith. Most 
significantly, Finley did not involve the death penalty." These 
distinctions are unpersuasive in light of Finley's clear 
statement of existing law. 
The decision in Finley relies heavily on Ross v. 
Mo f f i t t , 41 7 U . S • 6 0 0 ( 19 7 4 ) • In Ross, the Supreme Court held 
that states are not required to appoint counsel for indigents 




decision is grounded upon principles of meaningful access: "We 
do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a defendant 
in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not 
appoint counsel to aid him in seeking [discretionary] review in 
that court." Id. at 615. 
The reasoning of Ross effectively compelled the result 
reached in Finley: 
We think that the analysis that we followed 
in Ross forecloses respondent's constitu-
tional claim. The procedures followed by 
respondent's habeas counsel fully comported 
with fundamental fairness. Postconviction 
relief is even further removed from the 
criminal trial than is discretionary direct 
review •••• States have no obligation to 
provide this avenue of relief, and when they 
do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the 
Due Process Clause does not require that the 
State supply a lawyer as well. 
Nor was the equal protect ion guarantee of 
"meaningful access" violated in this case. 
••. In Ross, we concluded that the 
defendant's access to the trial record and 
the appellate briefs and opinions provided 
sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to 
gain meaningful access to courts that possess 
a discretionary power of review. We think 
that the same conclusion necessarily obtains 
with respect to postconviction review. 
Finley, 95 L.Ed.2d at 547 (citations omitted). In view of this 
language, I cannot agree with the majority that Finley was not a 
meaningful access case. 
The result in Finley was compelled because there was no 
fundamental right to counsel in the first instance, a factor that 
was essential to the result reached. It was this, rather than 
the potentially distinguishable nature of the proceedings 
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(appellate in Anders versus trial in Finley), which dictated the 
outcome. We are concerned here with the identical type of 
proceeding addressed in Finley, state habeas corpus, on the heels 
of a clear and recent statement by the Supreme Court that there 
is no previously established constitutional right to counsel in 
state habeas corpus proceedings. 
The majority would additionally distinguish Finley 
because it did not "address the rule enunciated in Bounds v. 
Smith." In Bounds the issue was access to "sources of legal 
knowledge" to prepare meaningful papers, 430 U.S. at 817, and the 
Court explicitly stated that, for inmates seeking to file post-
conviction papers, meaningful access to the courts can be 
satisfied by either providing adequate law libraries or "adequate 
assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. The 
rule of Bounds was not addressed in Finley because Bounds was not 
intended to imply a broad-based right of counsel as the majority 
now would have it interpreted. Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F. 2d 
1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986). 
The final basis upon which the majority seeks to 
distinguish Finley is that it did not involve the death penalty 
and "there is a significant constitutional difference between the 
death penalty and lesser punishments." Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 637 (1980). Therefore, the question is essentially whether 
on the record before us Plaintiffs constitute an exception to 
Finley, or justify an exceptional application of Bounds. 
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B. The Death Penalty and Virginia Procedures 
It is now settled that a state may impose a s entence of 
death on a defendant convicted of aggravated murder . Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has 
focused on "the procedures by which convicted defendants were 
selected for the death penalty rather than on the actual 
punishment inflicted." Id. at 179. The "s ignificant 
constitutional difference" of which the majori ty speaks is 
invoked out of context. The "constitutional d iffe r ence" is, 
under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and subsequent 
decisions, essentially concerned with a sentencing sys t em which 
must not be arbitrary and capricious in its application : that is, 
it must not be "cruel and unusual in the same way that being 
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Furman , 408 U. S. at 
309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Under Furman, the sentencing procedures cons idered were 
unconstitutional because the death penalty was, by virtue· of 
unguided decision-making, "so wantonly and so freakishly 
imposed." Id. at 310. Thus, the "significant cons titutional 
difference" mandated the establishment of procedur es to ensure 
that circumstances under which individual sentences of death are 
imposed demonstrate a principled, consistent basis fo r the fact-
finding dee is ion, and a greater degree of rel iabi 1 i t y than is 
required in noncapital sentencing. See Gregg, 428 U. S . at 206-
07: Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 637-38 ( "significant 
constitutional difference" means that the procedural r u les by 
which a sentence of death is imposed must not dimi nish the 
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reliability of the sentencing phase of the proceeding, or the 
guilt phase upon which it is predicated); Booth v. Maryland, 482 
U.S. __ , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) (a state statute that requires 
consideration of a victim impact statement at the sentencing 
phase of proceedings creates an unconstitutional risk of a death 
sentence based upon impermissible or irrelevant considerations); 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (1986) (Powell, J., 
concurring) ( "heightened procedural requirements on capital 
trials and sentencing proceedings" do not apply in the context of 
post-sentencing proceedings). This "difference," significant as 
it is, is not a basis upon which we may begin implying a separate 
panoply of additional constitutional standards only applicable to 
collateral challenges in death penalty cases. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984) (in both capital and 
noncapital cases, the same principle governs claims as to 
effective assistance of counsel). 
The Commonwealth of Virginia allows a sentence of death 
only in cases of aggravated murder. Va. Code Ann. § 18. 2-31 
(1950, Repl. Vol. 1982 & Supp. 1987). Appeal is automatic from a 
sentence of death, Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.lA (1950 & Repl. Vol. 
1982), and procedural safeguards in excess of that required by 
the Constitution are provided, such as proportionality review of 
the sentence imposed in each case. Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.lC.2 
(1950 & Repl. Vol. 1982); compare Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 
50-51 ( 1984) ( "There is thus no bas is in our cases for holding 
that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is 
required in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and 
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the defendant requests it."). At trial and on the first appeal 
of right, the defendant is guaranteed the assistance of appointed 
counsel as required by the Constitution. The Constitution does 
not provide a right to counsel appointed at state expense in 
subsequent proceedings, Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-11; Finley, 95 
L.Ed.2d at 545, although a state may as a matter of legislative 
choice make counsel available to convicted defendants at all 
stages of judicial review. Ross, 417 u.s. at 618. It is 
significant that the issue of counsel arose in Finley solely 
because Finley sought to expand a state policy Pennsylvania has 
followed since 1967 which "imposes a mandatory requirement upon 
the trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent post 
conviction applicant." Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 427 Pa. 395, 
235 A.2d 148, 149 (1967); see Finley, 95 L.Ed.2d at 548. 
Similarly, Virginia courts may appoint counsel to assist in state 
post-conviction proceedings, Va. Code Ann. § 14.1-183 (1950, 
Repl. Vol. 1985 & Supp. 1987), and are required to appoint 
counsel in cases involving nonfrivolous claims that require an 
evidentiary hearing. Darnell v. Peyton, 160 S.E.2d 749 (1968). 
The Virginia procedure is similar to the procedure followed in 
the federal courts for review of state prisoner petitions under 
28 u.s.c.A. § 2254 (West 1977). Rules Governing Sec. 2254 Cases, 
Rule 8(a), (c). 
I I. 
In addition to there being no fundamental right to 
automatic appointment of counsel, there is no factual basis to 
support the majority's extension of Bounds. Under Anderson v. 
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Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), we must accept the district 
court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. The district 
court's per se exception to the standards of Bounds is grounded 
on three premises, none of which are supported by the record: 
emotional instabi 1 i ty of death row inmates as a result of the 
circumstances of their confinement; the degree of legal 
complexity unique to death penalty cases; and severe time 
constraints before execution of sentence. 
As to the first premise, the thought of execution may 
exact an emotional toll. But, the district court's conclusion 
that death row inmates are rendered incapable of initiating post-
conviction petitions is simply not supported by the facts 
presented. For example, Giarratano has successfully prosecuted 
other prose actions while on death row. See Giarratano v. Bass, 
596 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Va. 1984). And counsel for the inmates 
conceded during oral argument, "the record does not contain 
evidence of specific inmates, currently or in the past," where 
this premise applies. 
The record additionally fails to establish that there 
is a unique legal complexity to death penalty cases. Though the 
facts and issues of criminal cases are of varying complexity, 
"the legal standards for constitutionally effective assistance of 
counsel are constant." Washington v. Watkins, 655 F. 2d 1346, 
1357 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982). Indeed, 
the same argument of "complexity" could be advanced by other 
inmates to compel appointment of counsel in noncapi tal post-
convict ion murder cases to raise complex issues involving burden-
shifting presumptions, or by federal inmates prosecuted under 18 
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u.s.c.A. § 1963 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987) (RICO) or 21 u.s.c.A. 
§ 848 (West 1981 & Supp. 1987) (Continuing Criminal Enterprise). 
Further, other than the occasional reference to the "esoteric," 
"intricate" or "frequently sophisticated" nature of capital 
cases, the complexity addressed in this record refers to factual 
complexity and the need for factual "re-investigation." This 
obscures the fact that the standards of assessing the fairness 
of a capital prosecution are the same as those for other criminal 
cases, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as well as 
the fact that the purpose of the right to counsel is not to 
provide a defendant with a private investigator. United States 
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 191 (1984). Plaintiffs' witnesses also 
described two cases purportedly demonstrating the need for 
complete factual re-investigation, but later conceded that in 
each instance the habeas corpus petition was actually based on 
information gained from the transcript of trial. Finally, during 
oral argument the inmates' counsel agreed that the record did not 
contain a single example of a case or issue which would provide a 
basis for the district court's conclusion, nor could one, 
understandably, be posited by way of illustration. 
As to the third premise, the evidence presented does 
not indicate that Virginia death row inmates are given a limited 
amount of time to prepare and present their petitions to the 
courts. Rather, the evidence establishes the contrary. For 
example, the initiating Plaintiff of the class, Giarratano, has 
been on death row in Virginia for eight years. The record 
indicates that a substantial period of time passed between the 
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affirmance of his conviction by the Virginia Supreme Court and 
the initiation of state or federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
Another inmate in the class, James Clark, has been on death row 
since 1979. Clark v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 237, 257 S.E.2d 784 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980). His sentence was 
vacated on a state habeas corpus petition, based on an initial 
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. This finding was 
reversed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in June, 1984 and the 
trial court was "directed to fix a date for Clark's execution." 
Virginia Dep't of Corrections v. Clark, 277 Va. 525, 318 S.E.2d 
399, 406 (1984). Testimony of Clark's counsel established that 
efforts on his behalf are ongoing. 
The history of inmates on death row in the Commonwealth 
of Virginia is consistent with the histories of capital cases 
throughout the nation. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Bulletin, Capital Punishment, 1986 at 1, 8. It is not 
uncommon to find death penalty cases which have been in 
litigation for as much as "a full decade, with repetitive and 
careful reviews by both state and federal courts," as well as by 
the Supreme Court. Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 
(1983) (application for stay of execution denied); Songer v. 
Wainwright, 469 U.S. 1133 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of petition for certiorari to review sentence of death 
imposed in 1974). The facts, other reliable data, and common 
experience all show significant delay rather than a "limited 
amount of time" in death penalty cases. 
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I I I. 
Under the majority's analysis Virginia death row 
inmates are to be automatically provided counsel upon request for 
preparing state habeas corpus petitions, but are denied this 
right for preparation of federal habeas petitions. I concur in 
the majority's conclusion that the Constitution does not require 
automatic appointment of counsel for the latter, but I disagree 
with the reasoning. The majority bases its distinction in 
treatment upon the fact that federal habeas proceedings are 
analogous to the situation in Ross in which a claim for appointed 
counsel to seek a writ of certiorari was rejected because of 
availability of appellate briefs, a transcript and state court 
opinions. The distinction obscures the fact that inmates will 
also routinely have appellate briefs, a transcript, and state 
court opinions in mounting a challenge to their conviction in 
state court. They wi 11 also be pursuing claims under 1 iberal 
pleading and amendment rules that are essentially the same as 
those followed in the federal courts, and will in fact be 
provided counsel under essentially the same standard in both the 
state and federal courts in Virginia. 
IV. 
In testimony before the district court there was 
reference to an agency created by the State of Florida to handle 
post-conviction capital cases in that state. The district court 
apparently concluded that this would be appropriate for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, and has effectively ordered it to 
create such an agency. While the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
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other states may elect to adopt this procedure, we have no 
authority to order it. Federal courts are not empowered to act 
as "a roving commission to impose ••• [our] own notions of 
enlightened policy. • •• [T]he question for decision is not 
whether we applaud or even whether we personally approve the 
procedures followed in [this case]. The question is whether 
those procedures fall below the minimum level the [Constitution] 
wi 11 tolerate." Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 ( 1967) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). The record before us clearly 
demonstrates that Virginia's procedures more than satisfy 
constitutional requirements. 
I therefore dissent from the majority's rule requiring 
automatic appointment of counsel upon request for assistance in 
preparing state habeas corpus petitions. I concur in the 
majority's decision not to apply this rule with regard to 
preparation of federal habeas corpus petitions. 
Judge Widener, Judge Chapman and Judge Wilkinson have 
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A defendant whose lawyer fails to raise a federal claim at trial 
in state court may sometimes, but not always, raise that claim on 
collateral review. If the mechanism of review is state created, its 
terms are set by state law. If the conviction is attacked in federal 
court, the law of federal habeas corpus governs access to review. 1 
The subject of this article is the law governing federal collateral 
review of claims not properly raised in state court. 
That law is anything but simple. It is a piecemeal doctrinal 
construction, each part more readily explained by the circum-
stances of its addition than by its relation to a coherent whole. The 
cumulation of category and exception threatens to obscure the un-
derlying objectives of federal habeas corpus and to oppress its ad-
ministration. That reform is needed, few will doubt. But the ap-
propriate direction of reform is hotly controverted. The disputes 
t Emerson Spies Professor and John V. Ray Research Professor, the University of Vir-
ginia School of Law. 
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1 This remedy is provided by 28 USC § 2254 (1982). The analogous collateral remedy 
for federal trials is provided by 28 USC § 2255 (1982). In important respects it parallels 
§ 2254. 
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transcend mere questions of doctrine; they strike deep into funda-
mental disagreements about what federal collateral review should 
seek to do. 
It would be vain to suppose that doctrinal reconstruction can 
altogether bridge such divisions or persuade those who find the 
premises of our argument uncongenial. Nevertheless, our purpose 
is to propose doctrinal reform of the requirements for federal col-
lateral review of defaulted claims. We propose a radical simplifica-
tion of existing doctrine so that it can focus more directly on the 
objectives we think habeas corpus, as distinct from direct review, 
should serve in this context. We hope thereby to reduce the inevi-
table distance between doctrine and policy and to present a coher-
ent and plausible conception of the law in this field. Naturally, we 
also hope to attract support for this view. 
Section I surveys existing law. This involves two bodies of doc-
trine that, although separate in origin and divergent in content, 
largely overlap. One is the line of cases, beginning with Wain-
wright v Sykes2, that articulates "cause" and "prejudice" as re-
quirements for federal habeas review of defaulted claims. The 
other involves the Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of 
counsel, as that right is enforced on federal habeas. 3 Because these 
doctrines cover much of the same ground, any plausible suggestion 
for reform must take account of both. 
Section II explains our proposal. We reject the increasing 
proceduralization of habeas law and focus squarely on the sub-
stance of defaulted claims. The question, in our view, should be 
whether consideration of a defaulted claim would present a realis-
tic possibility of correcting an unjust conviction or sentence of 
death. If so, procedural barriers should be swept aside and collat-
eral review should be available. If not, the conviction or sentence 
should stand without "appellate" correction on collateral review of 
other trial errors. This reform would grant relief to those defen-
dants who deserve it, deny relief to others, and would do so while 
simplifying the issues for lawyers and judges. Significantly, it 
would also go some distance toward eliminating the retroactivity 
issue that seems about to engulf habeas doctrine. Of course, the 
focus on innocence is not original with us. Twenty years ago, 
Henry Friendly suggested something similar for habeas corpus as a 
• 433 us 72 (1977). 





































1990] Reforming Habeas Corpus 681 
whole,' and the concern for innocence is one of several strands that 
run through Supreme Court opinions. Yet we think a good deal 
more can be said for this view, particularly in the context of de-
faulted claims. Thus, Section II attempts to refine and defend that 
position. Section III presents illustrative cases. Finally, Section IV 
briefly examines certain related issues in the law of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. 
l. THE LAW OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 
A. Stated Generally 
A defendant whose lawyer fails to raise a claim at the time or 
in the manner required by state procedures may lose the chance to 
have that claim heard. Even if the claim is identified before ap-
peal, the appellate court may stand on the procedural default and 
refuse to address the merits. Such refusal is permitted by federal 
law and ordinarily will be respected by the Supreme Court in the 
unlikely event of direct review. 5 The same is true for claims prop-
erly raised at trial but not properly presented on appeal. Such de-
fault may justify the appellate court in refusing to hear the claim, 
and its refusal will also bar direct review by the Supreme Court. 
Sometimes, however, the defendant6 can attack the default 
collaterally. This can be done in two ways. First, under Wain-
wright v Sykes, the defendant can seek to undo the forfeiture by 
showing "cause" for the default and "prejudice" resulting from it. 7 
If these requirements are met, the federal court will consider the 
merits of the defaulted claim, and if it is sound and its omission 
not harmless, order a new trial (or, in a capital case, a new sentenc-
ing proceeding). Alternatively, the defendant can treat the lawyer's 
failure to raise the claim as an independent constitutional viola-
• Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (1970). 
• Of course, the procedures themselves must be constitutionally permissible and, in or-
der to bar Supreme Court review, "adequate" and "independent" of federal law. A fair num-
ber of cases have found state procedural defaults inadequate to preclude Supreme Court 
review, but most mean less than they seem to say. See,. for example, Williams v Georgia, 349 
US 375, 383 (1955) (suggesting that a procedural default is not adequate to bar Supreme 
Court review if the state court had the power to overlook it). In most of these cases, the 
facts suggested bad faith manipulation of state procedures to defeat federal rights. See gen-
erally Peter W. Low and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State 
Relations 614-56 (Foundation, 2d ed 1989). Since such manipulation surely must be rare, 
and in any event difficult to discern on direct review, Supreme Court findings of the inade-
quacy of state procedural grounds are very much the exception rather than the rule. 
• For ease of exposition, habeas petitioners are referred to as "defendants." 
• Sykes, 433 US at 87-91. 
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tion. Under Strickland v Washington, the attorney's failure to 
raise a pertinent claim constitutes a denial of effective assistance 
of counsel if the error fell below a certain standard of attorney 
competence and likely affected the outcome of the prosecution. 8 
These two lines of attack are only partly convergent. Lawyer 
error constituting ineffective assistance of counsel is indisputably 
"cause" under Sykes,9 but only a small percentage of defaulted 
claims involve such error. Effective assistance of counsel ostensibly 
requires that the lawyer's conduct be "reasonable considering all 
the circumstances,"10 but the Court has emphasized that the Sixth 
Amendment claimant must overcome a "strong presumption" that 
the lawyer's conduct fell within professional norms. 11 This means 
that any colorable reason for not raising a claim (viewing the law-
yer's decision without benefit of hindsight) 12 defeats a defendant's 
later assertion of a Sixth Amendment violation based on that de-
fault. In practice, the constitutional standard for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel approximates gross negligence. 
Given this standard, it is less important that ineffective assis-
tance is "cause" than that most other attorney error is not. Ordi-
nary oversight, simple miscalculation, bad judgment-none consti-
tutes "cause" for failure to raise a constitutional claim.13 There is a 
category of "cause" arising from wholly non-negligent er-
ror-failure to raise a claim the basis for which was created by a 
subsequent change in the law14-but this category is narrowly con-
fined111 and in any event inapplicable if a new pronouncement does 
• 466 us 668, 687-96 (1984). 
• See Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 488 (1986). 
10 Strickland, 466 US at 688. 
11 Id at 689-91. 
11 Id at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time."). 
18 See, for example, Carrier, 477 US at 486-88; and Smith v Murray, 477 US 527, 534-
36 (1986). 
14 Reed v Ross, 468 US 1, 13-16 (1984). 
'" See Engle v Isaac, 456 US 107, 130-34 (1982). The defaulted claim in Engle was that 
the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of proof on self. 
defense. The trial occurred after In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970) (establishing a constitu-
tional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases), but before the 
Court had applied Winship to overturn rules shifting the burden of proof on some grading 
elements, see Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 (1975), or on intent generally, see Sandstrom 
v Montana, .442 US 510 (1979). The Engle Court stated that "dozens" of defense lawyers 
had challenged similar instructions by the time of the defendant's trial, but acknowledged 







































1990] Reforming Habeas Corpus 683 
not apply retroactively. 16 (This category is necessary to allow retro-
active application of new rulings; otherwise, no institutional appa-
ratus would exist for implementing fully retroactive decisions.) Ad-
ditionally, "cause" will be found where a claim was not raised due 
to "some objective factor external to the defense"17 (not merely to 
the defendant), such as government misconduct that suppresses 
facts giving rise to the claim.1s But these rare cases aside, "cause" 
for failing to raise a claim exists only where the misjudgment or 
oversight amounts to an independent constitutional violation 
under the Sixth Amendment, and the mistake must be truly egre-
gious to violate this standard. 
The upshot of all this is easy to state, but hard to justify: 
criminal defendants are often bound by the mistakes of their law-
yers. This might be tolerable if the stakes were less high, but the 
prospect of defendants sitting in jail because of attorney error is at 
least unsettling. This is the chief objection to both Sykes 19 and 
Strickland,20 at least among academics. Their proposed remedies 
also are parallel. "Cause" should be defined more expansively, 
along the lines of the deliberate bypass standard of Fay u Noia. 21 
found the fact that some defense counsel had made such arguments enough to preclude a 
finding of "cause" for failure to do so. 
10 See Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that the rule of Batson v 
Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), should not be applied retroactively on federal habeas to con-
victions that became final before Batson was announced); see also Teague v Lane, 109 S Ct 
1060 (1989) (plurality opinion) (concluding that rules that cannot be applied retroactively 
on federal habeas cannot be announced on federal habeas); and Penry v Lynaugh, 109 S Ct 
2934, 2944-47 (1989) (adopting Teague plurality's analysis and applying it to rules governing 
the imposition of capital punishment). 
17 Carrier, 477 US at 488. 
18 See, for example, Amadeo v Zant, 486 US 214 (1988). 
'" See, for example, Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federal-
ism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L J 1035, 1100-02 (1977); Barry Friedman, A 
Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn L Rev 247 (1988); Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitu-
tional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default Principle, 16 NYU Rev 
L & Soc Change 321, 332 (1987-88); Daniel J . Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal 
Rights, 99 Harv L Rev 1128, 1215-18 (1986); Yale L. Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: 
Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 Minn L Rev 341, 425 (1978); 
and Peter W. Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: 
The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 Stan L Rev 1, 67 (1978). 
•• See, for example, Vivian 0 . Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old 
Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 Colum L Rev 9, 81-100 (1986); Gary Goodpaster, The 
Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 
NYU Rev L & Soc Change 59, 67 (1986); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No 
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel, 13 Hastings Const L Q 625, 640-45 (1986). 
11 372 US 391, 438 (1963) (holding that the independent and adequate state ground 
doctrine does not limit the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a federal 
court has discretion to deny relief only where an applicant "has deliberately by-passed the 
684 The University of Chicago Law Review [57:679 
Similarly, ineffective assistance of counsel should be expanded to 
cover a wider range of merely negligent mistakes. 22 In these sugges-
tions, the critics share the Court's approach, if not its conclusions .  
They would continue to inquire into the reason for a default in 
order to assess its enforceability.23 The differences lie chiefly in the 
showings that would suffice. 
If the defendant can show Strickland ineffectiveness or other 
Sykes "cause," the court's attention then turns to "prejudice." 
Here, too, habeas and Sixth Amendment doctrine converge, for 
both require a showing of "prejudice." The term means some like-
lihood-greater than that sufficient to create a reasonable doubt 
but perhaps less than "more likely than not" -that the error or 
default affected the outcome of the prosecution. Strickland ex-
presses the idea this way: 
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasona-
ble probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome. 24 
The Court has not expressly adopted this test for the "prejudice" 
prong of Sykes, but its opinions suggest something very similar.26 
orderly procedure of the state courts"). See, for example, Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1215-22 
(cited in note 19) (arguing for a deliberate bypass standard, with conscious decisions by 
defense counsel counting as deliberate bypass); Tague, 31 Stan L Rev at 38-56 (cited in note 
19) (arguing that the Court should have limited the scope of claims that can be raised on 
federal habeas instead of enforcing procedural defaults) . 
11 See, for example, sources cited in note 20. This argument is often coupled with the 
suggestion that the prejudice requirement be scrapped. See, for example, Berger, 86 Colum 
L Rev at 89-100 (cited in note 20). The critics who argue for a broader conception of ineffec-
tiveness and abandonment of the prejudice requirement largely endorse the position taken 
by Justice Marshall in his Strickland dissent. 466 US at 707-15 (Marshall dissenting) . 
•• Two notable exceptions are Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitu-
tional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 Hofstra L Rev 617, 
702-14 (1984); and Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and 
the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U Chi L Rev 1380, 1419-29 (1983). Professor Guttenberg 
reaches a conclusion close to ours-we should say ours is close to his-but the structure of 
the arguments is different and, in at least one important respect, we reach a different result. 
Compare Guttenberg, 12 Hofstra L Rev at 716-17 (arguing that courts should categorize 
constitutional protections as guilt-related or not) with text at notes 48-49 (suggesting that 
such categorization is both difficult and unnecessary). 
"' Strickland, 466 US at 694. 
11 See United States v Frady, 456 US 152, 168-69 (1982), which, like Strickland, de-
fines "prejudice" in terms that avoid both the conventional harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard and the more-likely-than-not outcome determinative test. Both Frady and 
Strickland link "reasonable probability" of affecting outcome with due process notions of 











































1990] Reforming Habeas Corpus 685 
Note the nature of this standard. All agree that errors harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt do not require reversal of a convic-
tion, whether on direct appeal or collateral review. This simply rec-
ognizes the futility of a search for perfection. But the Court's 
"reasonable probability" standard of prejudice requires a much 
higher likelihood of effect on the outcome than the mere possibility 
of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the "reasonable probability" stan-
dard applies to errors of all sorts. An omitted claim that has less 
than a "reasonable probability" of affecting the outcome is barred, 
whether it concerns factual guilt or merely the enforcement of a 
prophylactic rule. The outcome-oriented definition of "prejudice" 
thus treats the possibility of a factually erroneous conviction and 
the possibility of mistaken nonenforcement of a prophylactic rule 
as equally (non)serious. 
An obvious alternative is to shift the focus from the likelihood 
of effect on the outcome to the kind of effect that should matter. 
"Prejudice" could be used to differentiate among defaulted claims 
according to their impact on guilt. This approach would restrict 
collateral review of defaulted claims, but in a different way from 
the indiscriminate requirement of heightened likelihood of an ef-
fect on outcome, as reflected in the definition of "reasonable 
probability." 
The Supreme Court has toyed with this approach, but its pro-
nouncements to date are mixed and inconclusive. It has supported 
a safety valve exception to the requirement of "cause." Where pro-
cedural default has "probably resulted in the conviction of one 
who is actually innocent," habeas relief is available without regard 
to the nature of the lawyer's error.26 This willingness to overlook 
141, 147 (1973) (the habeas "prejudice" standard is "whether the ailing instruction by itself 
so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process"), with Strick-
land, 466 US at 696 ("the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of 
the proceeding whose result is being challenged"). 
Despite these parallels, the matter is sufficiently unclear that some argue that the two 
"prejudice" standards differ. See James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and 
Procedure § 24.5(d) at 357-58 (Michie, 1988) (suggesting that Sykes prejudice is "consistent 
with traditional harmless error analysis"); and Maria L. Marcus, Federal Habeas Corpus 
After State Court Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 Fordham L Rev 663, 
701-03 (1985) (arguing that Sykes "prejudice" is actually more stringent than Strickland 
"prejudice"). 
•• Carrier, 477 US at 495-96, quoting Engle u Isaac, 456 US 107, 135 (1982): 
"[A]s we [] noted in Engle, '[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality 
that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of cor-
recting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.' ... We remain confident that, for the 
most part, 'victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-
prejudice standard.' ... But we do not pretend that this will always be true. Accord-
686 The University of Chicago Law Review [57:679 
"cause" to avoid a "miscarriage of justice" is welcome, but the 
Court's accommodation is only partial, for the exception applies 
only to the "extraordinary" case where the showing of actual inno-
cence rises to the required level of probability.27 Nevertheless, the 
"miscarriage of justice" exception does indicate, in partial answer 
to Henry Friendly, that innocence is not altogether irrelevant in 
habeas review.28 
On the Sixth Amendment side, the Court's interest in inno-
cence as the criterion of "prejudice" has been even less consistent. 
In Nix u Whiteside,29 the Court rejected the ineffective assistance 
claim of a defendant deterred from committing perjury by his law-
yer's threat to disclose the falsehood. Whiteside is famous for the 
Court's endorsement of the lawyer's aggressive steps to prevent cli-
ent perjury.30 Less attention has been paid to the gloss Whiteside 
seemed to place on Sixth Amendment "prejudice." All nine Jus-
tices concluded that, even if defense counsel acted incompetently 
and even if that action had the requisite effect on outcome, coun-
sel's behavior still would not have been prejudicial. The reason was 
apparently that perjury is criminal conduct that detracts from the 
reliability of judgments.31 If the right to effective assistance of 
counsel aims to promote reliable outcomes, then any effect on out-
come flowing from the Whiteside lawyer's threat to expose perjury 
would not count for Sixth Amendment purposes. As Justice Black-
mun put it, "this Court must ask whether its confidence in the out-
come of Whiteside's trial is in any way undermined by the knowl-
edge that he refrained from presenting false testimony."32 The 
obvious answer was no. 
Whiteside suggested that some errors affecting outcome can-
not establish Strickland "prejudice" (or, by hypothesis, Sykes 
"prejudice"), and that the kind of errors that do not count are 
ingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has prob-
ably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court 
may grant the writ even in the absence of showing of cause for the procedural default." 
Accord Harris v Reed, 109 S Ct 1038, 1043 (1989); and Smith v Murray, 477 US 527, 537 
(1986). 
17 Carrier, 477 US at 495-96. 
11 Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (cited in note 4). 
11 475 us 157 (1986). 
•• Id at 17 4-75. See Brent R. Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside on Attor-
ney-Client Relations, 136 U Pa L Rev 1913 (1988); Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confi-
dences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U Pa L Rev 1939 (1988); and 
Patrick R. Grady, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the Criminal Justice System: The 
Defendant's Position, 23 Am Crim L Rev 1 (1985). 
11 475 US at 175-76; id at 184-88 (Blackmun concurring) . 









































1990] Reforming Habeas Corpus 687 
those that do not affect the factual reliability of the determination 
of guilt. This reading was undercut, however, later that Term in 
Kimmelman v Morrison. 33 Neil Morrison was convicted of rape in 
state court, based in part on laboratory tests of a bedsheet that 
had been seized, apparently illegally, from his apartment.34 Morri-
son's lawyer had failed to file a timely motion to suppress the bed-
sheet and lab reports. Federal habeas review of the Fourth Amend-
ment claim was barred by Stone v Powell, which held that a 
Fourth Amendment claim can be raised on federal habeas review 
only where there was not a full and fair opportunity to have the 
claim heard in state court. 36 Morrison therefore pursued a Sixth 
Amendment claim, arguing that his lawyer had been ineffective in 
failing to raise this issue. 
The Court unanimously found that Stone v Powell did not bar 
the Sixth Amendment claim, even though it was based on default 
of a Fourth Amendment objection. The Justices further found that 
the lawyer's performance fell below standards of professional com-
petence, but they divided over the kind of "prejudice" that Morri-
son had to show. Justice Brennan's majority opinion looked for a 
"reasonable probability" of effect on outcome: if there was a rea-
sonable likelihood that his counsel's incompetence affected the 
outcome of the prosecution, Morrison was entitled to habeas re-
lief. 36 Justice Powell, writing for himself and two others, looked for 
an effect on innocence. Powell argued that the right to effective 
assistance of counsel was designed to prevent unjust outcomes and 
that the attorney's error in no way rendered the conviction un-
just. 37 Powell nevertheless voted to grant relief on the ground that 
the state had not raised the issue of Strickland "prejudice." For 
the same reason, he maintained that the Court's opinion should 
not be read to foreclose an innocence-based conception of 
"prejudice," although the majority's language seemed to do just 
that.38 
•• 477 us 365 (1986) . 
•• Id at 368-69. The seizure was warrantless, but it was not clear whether exigent cir-
cumstances were present. No court had ruled on the legality of the search when the Su-
preme Court decided the case . 
•• 428 us 465 (1976). 
•• 477 US 365, 379-80, 391 (1986). The Court did not apply this test itself but re-
manded the case to the lower courts. 
37 Id at 394-97 (Powell concurring in the judgment). 
•• Id at 397-98 (Powell concurring in the judgment). Compare id at 380 (majority state-
ment that "we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel 
belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination 
of actual guilt"). 
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Whiteside and Kimmelman are hard to reconcile. Both cases 
dealt with lawyer acts that enhance, rather than undermine, one's 
confidence in the factual accuracy of the convictions. In Whiteside, 
that fact seems to have convinced the Court that the lawyer's con-
duct, even if incompetent, did not merit remedy. In Kimmelman, 
the Court reached the opposite conclusion.39 Kimmelman is also in 
obvious tension with Stone v Powell, and for the same reason. 
Stone precludes federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment 
claims because they do not undermine the finding of guilt; Kim-
melman allows the defendant to make an end-run around Stone by 
recharacterizing a defaulted Fourth Amendment claim as a Sixth 
Amendment violation. Under Kimmelman, Sixth Amendment 
"prejudice" is shown by an effect on outcome, even if, as on the 
facts of that case, it actually increases the factual reliability of the 
conviction. 
B. An Illustrative Application 
The preceding discussion states the law, but it gives scant fla-
vor of the elaborate decisionmaking required of federal habeas 
courts in procedural default cases. To get some idea of the opera-
tional complexity of these doctrines (and of certain related matters 
that we have not recounted fully), we suggest the following 
hypothetical. 
. Imagine a defendant whose lawyer fails to move to suppress an 
arguably involuntary confession until the beginning of the trial. 
The state has a rule requiring that such motions be made before 
trial but allowing trial courts to consider late motions on a discre-
tionary basis. 40 The trial judge decides that the motion should not 
be heard, both because there is no excuse for the untimeliness and 
because, in any event, "the confession plainly appears to be volun-
tary." After conviction and appeal, the defendant seeks federal 
habeas corpus. He seeks both to have the habeas court determine 
the voluntariness of his confession and to attack his lawyer's fail-
ure to raise that issue as ineffective assistance of counsel. How 
would a federal district judge (or magistrate) dedicated to imple-
menting Supreme Court decisions proceed in this case? 
•• The leading treatise endorses Kimmelman's position. See Wayne LaFave and Jerold 
H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.l0(d) at 50 (West, Supp 1989). 
•• Rules providing for court discretion to consider late suppression motions are com-
mon. See, for example, Colo R Crim P 41(g) (1984); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 54-33f(b) (West, 
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With respect to the confession's voluntariness, the first issue is 
whether the trial judge's statement of the grounds for decision sat-
isfied the required plain statement of reliance on the procedural 
default, or whether the claim was "really" decided on the merits.41 
If the state court addressed the merits, the federal court should do 
likewise. If the state court did not reach the merits, the next issue 
is whether the state's procedural requirement was fairly applied. 
This resolves into the question of whether the state court's discre-
tion to consider late claims vitiated the requirement that claims be 
timely made. If procedural foreclosure ordinarily was not invoked 
in such cases, the federal habeas court should address the merits. 42 
If such defaults were routinely enforced, the court should proceed 
to the Sykes test of "cause" and "prejudice." 
Was there "cause" for the default, apart from the lawyer's al-
leged ineffectiveness? Conceivably so, if the defendant could show 
"some objective factor external to the defense" that would have 
prevented the attorney from recognizing the claim and raising it in 
a timely fashion;43 otherwise not, as there was no colorable claim of 
"new law." If "cause" is found, the court should inquire into 
whether the claim of involuntariness had a "reasonable 
probability" of affecting the outcome. If "cause" is not found, the 
court should ask whether failure to consider the involuntariness 
claim would "probably" result in the continued incarceration of 
one who is "actually innocent."44 
There is a second progression of issues for the ineffective assis-
tance claim (and for ineffective assistance as the most likely form 
of Sykes "cause"). Did the attorney's failure to move to suppress 
fall below minimal standards of professional competence? This 
question may be troublesome, as it requires estimation of the ap-
parent strength of such a motion at the time filing was required, 
given the information then available to counsel.45 If ineffective as-
sistance is found, the court should inquire (as above) into the "rea-
" See Harris v Reed, 109 S Ct 1038 (1989). 
•• See, for example, Ulster County Court v Allen, 442 US 140, 147-54 (1979). 
•• The quoted language comes from Carrier, 477 US at 488. Amadeo v Zant, 486 US 
214 (1988), provides an example of such an "objective factor"; the state suppressed informa-
tion that could have supported a claim that the defendant's grand jury and petit jury were 
discriminatorily selected. 
•• Carrier, 477 US at 496. Accord, Harris, 109 S Ct at 1043. 
•• See Strickland, 466 US at 689-90, on the importance of avoiding hindsight when 
assessing the competence of an attorney's acts. 
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sonable probability" of the mistake affecting the outcome. If inef-
fective assistance is not found, the court should deny relief."6 
This fairly simple example makes an obvious point: the deci-
sion tree for habeas review of defaulted claims is intricate and 
costly. To be sure, in many cases, the issues raised in the preceding 
paragraphs will be easy. Often, "cause" and "prejudice" are plainly 
absent, and the court can dispose of the petition without great ef-
fort. But many of these issues require intricate analysis and pre-
sent opportunities for error. Most importantly, those legal issues 
seem largely unrelated to the merits of the defendant's claim. This 
is surely the greatest vice of the current system. Cases like the hy-
pothetical discussed above are analyzed and resolved without any 
serious attention to whether the defendant's claim is one that war-
rants relief. 47 
In essence, Sykes and Strickland require habeas lawyers and 
federal judges and magistrates to work through the equivalent of a 
law school exam every time a defendant tries to escape procedural 
default. We mean no disrespect to those who labor in this field 
when we voice the suspicion that most do not routinely track the 
ins and outs of this progression. In practice, federal habeas review 
may well be more direct, more casual, less preoccupied with the 
procedural preliminaries of habeas corpus, and more responsive to 
the court's perception (perhaps very quickly attained) of the mer-
its of the claim. All this may be true. It may even be true that, 
despite the aesthetic sensibilities of academics and the sympa-
thetic frustration of their students, habeas review achieves gener-
ally reasonable results. But even if such speculation were verified, 
it would not justify complacency about the law of procedural fore-
closure, for it cannot be a very great recommendation of existing 
law that it works tolerably well when largely ignored. 
•• A further puzzle is whether the exhaustion requirement demands that the defendant 
have presented his ineffective assistance claim to any then-available state court. The Court 
seems to have said that exhaustion is required whether the defendant is raising ineffective 
assistance as an independent claim or as Sykes "cause" for a procedural default. See Car-
rier, 477 US at 488-89. If that is so, the adjudication of defaulted claims involves yet an-
other layer of complication. 
" The question of effective assistance of counsel is not a close proxy for the question of 
the merits of the claim because the court is only to consider what the lawyer knew (or 
should have known) at the time the claim was defaulted. The lawyer's reasonable assess-
ment at the time and the actual merits of the claim (as judged by hindsight) are potentially 
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II. REFORMING HABEAS REVIEW OF DEFAULTED CLAIMS 
We favor reorienting habeas review of defaulted claims toward 
protection of the arguably innocent. This means that defendants 
should have easy access to habeas review where consideration of 
the defaulted claim might correct an unjust conviction (or sentence 
of death), but not otherwise. Such an approach would be both 
more and less restrictive than existing law. It would be more re-
strictive in that it would limit Sykes and Strickland "prejudice" to 
those omissions that impair the reliability of the finding of guilt. 
Where, as in Kimmelman, a default only enhances the reliability of 
a conviction, it would not be set aside on habeas corpus. At the 
same time, our approach would be less restrictive than existing law 
in that we would junk the requirement of "cause." We would not 
undertake to characterize the lawyer's error as competent, incom-
petent, negligent, non-negligent, or whatever. We would ask simply 
whether the error might have caused an unjust result. If so, we 
would grant habeas relief despite the absence of "cause"; if not, we 
would deny review despite effect on outcome. 
Our focus is on factual innocence. By that phrase, we mean to 
include anyone who did not commit the crime with which he or she 
is charged. This includes defendants who are guilty of some crime 
but not the offense charged. In other words, factual innocence 
comprehends both the fact and grade of criminal liability. Of 
course, the "facts" supporting criminal liability are really findings 
or conclusions reached by the trier of fact, although we hope these 
conclusions closely correspond to real-world events. A claim sug-
gesting "factual innocence" is, therefore, one that, if heard by the 
trier of fact, would militate with some appreciable force against the 
findings or conclusions needed to support criminal liability. 
The arguable innocence standard can be expressed in many 
ways. The approach closest to the Court's own language would re-
quire the defendant to show a "reasonable probability" that the 
procedural default resulted in an erroneous conviction. We prefer 
"reasonable possibility" because it avoids the implication that fac-
tual innocence need be more likely than not. If relief were to be 
granted only on proof of actual probability of innocence, the 
Court's "miscarriage of justice" exception to "cause" would be suf-
ficient. In our view, however, refusal to consider a defaulted claim 
is objectionable if there is any significant prospect of a factually 
erroneous conviction (or an unjustified sentence of death) resulting 
from that default. We think that that is true where the prospect of 
erroneous conviction is distinctly less than probable. At the same 
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time, we do not mean to endorse habeas review of claims whose 
supposed benefit to the defendant is fanciful or remote. We sug-
gest the phrase "reasonable possibility" to capture this combina-
tion of leniency and realism. 
This approach obviously resembles Henry Friendly's sugges-
tion, delivered with characteristic elegance and force, that habeas 
relief be limited to those petitioners who can make a colorable 
showing of factual innocence. Our proposal for defaulted claims 
also resembles the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Stone 
v Powell, which barred most habeas review of Fourth Amendment 
claims based on the non-guilt-related character of those claims.48 
But while the thrust of all these models is to take innocence into 
account on federal habeas review, the approaches differ in imple-
mentation. Judge Friendly's standard apparently would allow liti-
gation of non-guilt-related claims in cases that, for reasons unre-
lated to those claims, were close on the merits.49 Stone, on the 
other hand, seems to require the categorization of constitutional 
claims in the abstract as guilt-related or not-a task that is partic-
ularly problematic for those constitutional rights that may protect 
innocence in some contexts but not others. 
Asking whether the default raised a reasonable possibility of 
an unjust conviction avoids both difficulties. Defendants would not 
automatically be permitted to relitigate the merits of the charges 
against them by virtue of having, for example, a legally plausible 
defaulted Fourth Amendment claim. And there would be no need 
to decide, as a categorical matter, whether a given constitutional 
right protects innocence or some other cluster of interests; the is-
•• 428 us 465 (1976). 
•• See Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (cited in note 4). In other words, Judge Friendly 
would reopen claims on federal habeas corpus that we would not. Consider, for example, two 
rape cases. In both the evidence could have supported either conviction or acquittal; in both 
the defendants were convicted in part on judgments as to credibility. Also, consent was the 
only issue in both cases; intercourse was established by laboratory analysis of a bedsheet 
from the defendant's apartment. In case one, the bedsheet was illegally seized, but defense 
counsel failed to move to suppress it. In case two, the bedsheet was obtained lawfully. 
As we read Judge Friendly, he would allow relitigation of the defaulted claim in case 
one. We would not because, from the standpoint of remedying injustice, the two cases 
should be treated the same. Both defendants were convicted in close cases, meaning that 
either defendant could have made a colorable showing of innocence. The fact that the de-
fendant in case one has a plausible Fourth Amendment claim has nothing to do with that 
showing, since the bedsheet did not in any way undermine the accuracy of the jury's deter-
mination. On the contrary, it properly focused the jury's attention on consent, the only real 
question in the case. Unless one is prepared to relitigate all cases in which the factual judg-
ment at trial was a close one, one should not grant relief because of the procedural default 
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sue would be reduced to whether innocence is plausibly at stake in 
the particular case at hand. 
More importantly, Stone and Judge Friendly propose solu-
tions to the general problem of how to allocate federal habeas re-
lief. The premise of their proposals is that, for the most part, 
habeas corpus relief should aim to rectify particular injustices, and 
not (for example) to deter inattention to federal law on the part of 
recalcitrant state judges. We generally agree with that premise, 
but-and this is important-our proposal does not depend on it. 
No matter what one's approach to allocating habeas relief gener-
ally, there is no good argument against focusing on innocence 
when dealing with defaulted claims. 
The test proposed here at least has the virtues of simplicity 
and directness. The real issue is not whether our test would sim-
plify habeas review, but whether it would improve it. A "reasona-
ble possibility" of innocence standard is about as economical and 
uncomplicated as any legal standard is likely to be. The question is 
whether it is also right. 
A. The Affirmative Argument 
It is easy to argue for using habeas review to protect against 
injustice. No habeas petitioner evokes more sympathy than one 
who can show a reasonable possibility of innocence based on proce-
dural default. In such a case, there is a colorable showing that pro-
cedural error caused the administration of justice to go fundamen-
tally wrong. A proper regard for the relative values at stake 
demands that we forgive the procedural default. This is not to say 
that the state's interests in the integrity of its procedures and in 
the finality of its judgments are trivial. It is only to say that those 
values are not absolute; they should give way to the imperative of 
correcting injustice. We think this simple statement a sufficient ex-
planation of the grounds for habeas review of defaulted claims 
where there is a reasonable possibility of innocence. In our view, it 
also applies to the analogous case of a prisoner sentenced to death 
who can show a reasonable possibility of a factually unjustified 
sentence. It is unthinkable to send a defendant to execution with-
out considering such a claim. 
B. The Negative Argument 
The hard part of the argument is to show that habeas review 
of defaulted claims should be unavailable when the default does 
not undermine the factual reliability of the conviction. Kim-
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melman v Morrison is an example.50 There the lawyer's failure to 
raise the Fourth Amendment claim likely had a decisive effect on 
outcome,51 but did not conceivably affect the reliability of the con-
viction. At trial, the defendant claimed that he and the victim had 
not had sexual relations. The bedsheet and lab reports that were 
admitted into evidence, but that might have been excluded had 
the lawyer objected, tended to confirm the falsity of the defen-
dant's claim. 52 It is our view-contrary to the prevailing opinion 
among academics and to much of the Court's current doc-
trine-that such defaults should not be undone on federal habeas 
review. 
In part, this view rests on the state's legitimate interest in the 
finality of its criminal judgments. Federal habeas review, which 
comes only after one (and often two) full rounds of litigation, 
should not be equated with the first-line appellate function of cor-
recting all errors. Finality of judgments is an important value, as is 
confirmed by the law's regard for civil judgments. For all the rea-
sons identified by Paul Bator-conservation of judicial resources, 
maintenance of a sense of importance and responsibility associated 
with the criminal trial, the need to avoid sending mixed signals 
about the defendant's punishment or rehabilitation, and avoidance 
of the institutional paralysis that flows from leaving decisions al-
ways open to challenge-criminal convictions, once obtained and 
affirmed on appeal, should not be lightly set aside. 53 This is not to 
say that direct review should be similarly restricted. On the con-
trary, it is to assert a distinction between direct and collateral re-
view in terms of the kinds of problems that resources should be 
used to correct. 
These concerns are greatly bolstered if, as Justice Stevens has 
surmised, 54 the fact that a claim was not raised at trial suggests its 
irrelevance. Massaged by a trained advocate, a given set of facts 
may yield a great many constitutional claims. Some are obvious 
and central to the case; others are inventive long-shots. Like Jus-
•• 477 us 365 (1986). 
01 See Morrison v Kimme/man, 650 F Supp 801, 809 (D NJ 1986) (on remand) (con-
cluding that the failure to suppress the bedsheet "dramatically affected the evidentiary pic-
ture in this case"). 
•• See id at 808-09 . 
.. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners , 76 Harv L Rev 441, 451-53 (1963). 
•• See Engle v Isaac, 456 US at 136 n 1 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 547-48 n 17 (1982) (Stevens dissenting); Carrier, 477 US 
at 506 n 13 (Stevens concurring in the judgment); and Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72, 96-
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tice Stevens, we suspect that even marginally competent lawyers 
ordinarily raise those claims that the facts most nearly support. 
The claims most likely to go unmentioned are those that are le-
gally remote or factually fanciful. It seems likely, therefore, that 
successive habeas petitions based on defaulted claims will be in-
creasingly occupied with the chaff of constitutional argumenta-
tion.1111 Of course, the occasional exception is precisely the point of 
habeas review, but the probabilities involved are certainly relevant 
in assessing the state's interest in the finality of convictions.116 
In addition to its proper interest in finality, the state has a 
significant interest in enforcing the procedural rules that give rise 
to defaults. States have good and legitimate reasons for requiring 
timely presentation of claims; an orderly adjudicative process de-
pends on such requirements. It is wasteful to wait until trial to 
decide whether the key piece of government evidence is admissible, 
and also wasteful to have a second round of review because the 
litigant did not raise the winning claim on the first appeal. These 
concerns are no makeweight. Critics of the procedural default doc-
trine argue that "mere" timing rules are not important enough to 
justify precluding constitutional claims, yet virtually no one argues 
that such timing rules should be dispensed with in federal prac-
tice.117 Surely if federal courts are entitled to insist on routine com-
pliance with sensible procedures in their own trials, state courts 
should also be entitled to do so. 
•• This may also explain why federal courts are usually content to screen habeas peti-
tions with rather cursory procedures. See 28 USC § 2254 Rule 4 (1982) (authorizing such a 
process). 
•• An additional concern might, at least in theory, augment the state's interest in final-
ity. Defense lawyers might abuse federal habeas corpus by intentionally defaulting on their 
federal claims in state court in order to save them for subsequent federal review. The occur-
rence of such "sandbagging" is hard to disprove, but we doubt its frequency. Defendants 
have strong and obvious incentives to seek state court adjudication of their federal claims, 
even if review is automatically available on federal habeas. Other things being equal, two 
bites at the apple are better than one. Also, federal habeas review will be long delayed, 
forcing the defendant to serve much of his sentence before obtaining relief. Even for claims 
challenging death sentences, where the last factor is not relevant, the defendant loses the 
opportunity to have his claim heard by state trial and appellate courts, on state collateral 
review as well as on direct appeal. Finally, the usual incentives to raise constitutional claims 
must be strongest when the claims are guilt-related, and those are the claims for which we 
would ignore attorney performance. For these and other reasons, the sandbagging argument 
has been criticized by commentators who otherwise differ greatly on habeas issues. See 
Friedman, 73 Minn L Rev at 292 (cited in note 19); Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev at 158-59 
(cited in note 4); Guttenberg, 12 Hofstra L Rev at 694-97 (cited in note 23); Meltzer, 99 
Harv L Rev at 1197-99 (cited in note 19); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S Cal L Rev 837, 896-98 
(1984); and Tague, 31 Stan L Rev at 43-46 (cited in note 19). 
07 See Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1202-07 (cited in note 19). 
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Of course, the states' interests in finality and in enforcing their 
procedures are well understood. Different observers may weigh 
them differently, but nobody denies their existence. The real issue 
is whether these concerns are outweighed by some countervailing 
interest in allowing habeas review of all outcome-related defaulted 
claims. In other words, the argument against federal habeas review 
of defaulted claims that do not go to factual guilt is clear; the 
question is whether there is any strong argument for hearing such 
claims. 
We can identify four arguments in favor of federal habeas re-
view of all defaulted claims. First, federal habeas relief might be 
justified as a deterrent to unconstitutional conduct by state of-
ficers. Second, denial of habeas relief might be thought unfair to 
defendants who are, in moral terms, identical to other defendants 
whose lawyers raised similar claims in a timely fashion and who 
consequently obtained relief. Third, federal habeas review might 
be thought justified by the inherent importance of federal constitu-
tional rights, an argument usually cast as an assertion that there 
should be no hierarchy among such rights. Fourth, review of non-
guilt-related claims might be thought necessary as a surrogate for 
review of claims that bear directly on guilt or innocence, but that 
are difficult or impossible to identify. We consider each of these 
arguments in turn in the sections that follow. 118 
•• All four of the arguments view the process of hearing defaulted claims as valuable for 
instrumental reasons-because it promotes good outcomes in particular cases, deters official 
misconduct, or affirms the importance of constitutional rights. One might take a different 
approach and argue that the process of hearing defaulted claims is valuable not for what it 
accomplishes, but for its own sake. 
Frankly, we consider this position untenable. Process costs money, and it seems sensible 
· to use the limited resources available to our criminal justice system where they will do the 
most good. For that reason, we start from the premise that process is a means of achieving 
certain substantive outcomes outside the courtroom-in this context, the proper allocation 
of criminal punishment and compliance with federal law by state and local officials. Obvi-
ously, those who view process as an end rather than a means will find our proposal 
mistaken. 
A variant on this non-instrumental position might be that habeas review is valuable for 
the satisfaction it gives habeas petitioners, whether or not it achieves any substantive ends. 
A rich literature (one in which we are far from expert) explores the concept of party satis-
faction and its relevance to a society's choices about legal process. See, for example, E. Allan 
Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 93-106 (Plenum, 
1988); John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 67-
101 (Wiley, 1975). That literature is both important and potentially useful in thinking about 
how to structure existing systems of dispute resolution. We do not, however, think it useful 
for deciding whether to litigate a given claim or dispute in the first place. Perhaps habeas 
petitioners gain some sense of satisfaction from raising Kimmelman-type defaulted claims 
in federal court. But if litigating such claims accomplishes nothing beyond making petition-
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1. Deterrence of unconstitutional conduct. 
The deterrence argument for habeas relief in cases such as 
Kimmelman is familiar. The police officer who conducted an ar-
guably illegal search presumably wanted to solve a crime and catch 
a rapist. Undoing the procedural default, vacating the conviction, 
and suppressing the evidence in a new trial will send a signal to 
officers in similar positions that illegal searches do not pay.119 This 
argument does not depend on factual innocence; it justifies habeas 
relief with reasons wholly independent of that concern.60 
There are, however, good (and familiar) reasons to believe that 
habeas relief for defaulted claims is, in deterrence terms, insignifi-
cant. To be effective, the prospect of deterrence must be visible ex 
ante. So viewed, the deterrent effect of federal habeas review of 
defaulted claims is likely to be trivial. The police handle a great 
many cases. In some cases, constitutional violations would be so 
obvious and so central as to preclude prosecution altogether. In 
those cases that go to trial, arguable constitutional violations will 
almost certainly be raised by defense counsel. The few exceptions, 
such as Kimmelman, cannot be identified in advance. And any cost 
to the police in terms of lost convictions will be long delayed. It 
will come after trial, default, conviction, and affirmance on appeal. 
Thus, although the matter is incapable of quantification, we are 
confident that the incremental deterrent effect of federal habeas 
review of defaulted constitutional claims is vanishingly slight.61 
federal judiciary, government lawyers, and litigants in other cases who suffer delays because 
of crowded dockets. 
•• This is the standard judicial justification for exclusion of evidence. See, for example, 
United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906 (1984); Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 486-88 (1976); 
and United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 347-48 (1974). To be sure, some Justices offer 
different justifications, as noted in James v Illinois, 110 S Ct 648, 651 n 1 (1990), but deter-
rence is, and has been for some time, the only rationale that commands a Supreme Court 
majority. 
•
0 At the outset, one should note an important, though not in itself debilitating, limita-
tion of this argument. Granting habeas relief can, at most, deter constitutional violations by 
those who are trying to keep convicted defendants in jail. It cannot deter defense counsel, 
who presumably have a different objective. If anything (we would guess that the effect is 
small), defense counsel might have a greater incentive to raise claims in timely fashion if 
they knew that their mistakes were irrevocable. On the other hand, it may be that any such 
effect would be offset by the stigmatization of a finding of ineffectiveness, which would in-
crease rather than decrease the cost to the lawyer of procedural default. On balance, the 
deterrent effect on defense counsel is probably not significant one way or the other, and we 
therefore discount the effect on attorneys as a reason for granting or denying habeas relief. 
•
1 This conclusion is buttressed by the absence of a comparable deterrence argument in 
roughly analogous civil contexts. No one claims that a plaintiff who loses a product liability 
case by failing to object to the introduction of some piece of evidence ought to be permitted 
to relitigate the case in order to deter unsafe product design. In the civil context, the as-
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Of course, there is another possible target of deterrence. Fed-
eral habeas review might be directed not so much against state law 
enforcement officers as against state judges.62 The Supreme Court 
does not often say much about this point, but one's view of the 
integrity and reliability of state courts is perhaps the single most 
important factor in determining the appropriate role for federal 
habeas corpus. 
In defense of our proposed standard, we offer two observa-
tions. First, distrust of state courts warrants federal court relitiga-
tion of previously considered claims more than it warrants consid-
eration of defaulted claims. In other words, a frank mistrust of 
state courts would more nearly justify Brown v Allen than Fay v 
Noia. 63 And if one were to assume that state courts systematically 
skew Fourth Amendment decisions in favor of the government, the 
sensible response would be to overrule Stone v Powell64 and insti-
tute routine federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims 
heard and rejected in state court. Absent such review, it is hard to 
sumption is that neutral procedural rules generate about an even number of mistaken out-
comes on each side, and that any bias from such rules is small. To be sure, the civil and 
criminal contexts differ in important respects, but the differences do not substantially un-
dermine this conclusion. Also, the fact that tort scholarship, which is dominated by incen-
tive and deterrence arguments, has paid no notice to the effects of procedural timing rules 
on primary conduct suggests that the ultimate effects on deterrence are probably too small 
to worry about in both contexts. 
There may be one class of cases where this point does not hold true. Where government 
officials conceal evidence of their own misconduct, habeas review, while flawed, may be the 
only deterrent available. But note that such misconduct will usually implicate innocence 
concerns: a prosecutor who suppresses evidence of the defendant's innocence gives the de-
fendant a viable claim under any theory of prejudice. As for other claims, such as that the 
government suppressed evidence of grand jury discrimination, the proper solution may be to 
require state courts to hear such federal claims in the first instance, rather than to remedy 
the problem via the law of defaulted claims. In any event, cases of this sort must be a small 
subset of the cases governed by Sykes and Strickland, and can hardly justify treating all 
outcome effects alike under those doctrines. 
•• For an extended argument that federal habeas should play precisely this role, see 
Larry W. Y ackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 NYU L Rev 991 (1985). 
•• In Brown u Allen, 344 US 443 (1953), the Court determined that federal courts 
should hear and decide federal constitutional claims that were rejected on the merits in 
state court. In Fay u Noia, 372 US 391 (1963), the Court held that federal courts should 
reach the merits of defaulted constitutional claims-Le., claims that had never been decided 
on the merits-unless the habeas petitioner deliberately withheld his claim in state court. 
It is worth noting that Fay might be a good response to state court intransigence if 
there were reason to believe that state courts were stretching procedural default rules to bar 
subsequent federal habeas review of constitutional claims. In our view, the best solution to 
that problem is to regulate state procedural default rules directly, to ensure that they (1) 
are not unreasonably harsh, and (2) are applied fairly. For purposes of our argument, we 
take as a given that the state rules governing procedural defaults meet these standards. 
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believe that the behavior of state judges would be much influenced 
by the prospect of federal habeas review of the occasional case 
where a winning Fourth Amendment claim is defaulted by defense 
counsel. The exceptional nature of such cases, the difficulty of 
their identification, and the long delay in obtaining judgments sug-
gest that habeas review of defaulted claims would have little bear-
ing on the general behavior of state judges. We think the system is 
therefore free to decide defaulted claims with a view toward insur-
ing just outcomes in those cases rather than in pursuit of some 
more general deterrence of state judges. 
More broadly, and perhaps more importantly, we do not be-
lieve that any generalized mistrust of state courts is warranted to-
day. Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court's docket twenty or 
thirty years ago could scarcely have escaped noticing that some 
state courts, particularly in some areas and particularly with re-
spect to some litigants, were hostile to the enforcement of federal 
rights. If, as we think, state courts were generally inhospitable to 
federal rights, habeas review offered the only corrective; direct Su-
preme Court review of large numbers of federal claims was obvi-
ously impossible. Today, however, a review of the Supreme Court's 
docket confirms that state court enforcement of the Constitution 
has vastly improved. The Court sees mostly cases that we would 
describe as borderline-disputes concerning the marginalia of con-
stitutional requirements-rather than, as was once true, cases sug-
gesting wholesale disinterest in constitutional guarantees. There is 
some evidence to support this view,66 but it is ultimately as much a 
question of evaluation as of observation. In any event, we record 
our views frankly, not because they are directly relevant to the 
problem of defaulted claims, but because they form the essential 
background of our general views on the appropriate role of federal 
habeas corpus. 
2. Equality among defendants. 
A second possible justification for an outcome-oriented defini-
tion of "prejudice" is equality among defendants. Kimmelman, one 
might say, is not really about the need to deter unconstitutional 
searches or to ensure that state judges take such claims seriously. 
Rather, one might argue, Neil Morrison should be granted relief 
•• See Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Pre-
liminary Study, 77 Georgetown L J 251 (1988) (concluding, based on a study of appellate 
opinions in nine states, that state courts do not systematically err in the government's favor 
in adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims). 
-
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because a similarly situated defendant with a better lawyer would 
have raised the Fourth Amendment claim, had the bedsheet sup-
pressed, and vitiated the prosecutor's case. Quite plausibly, such a 
defendant would have been acquitted. There is something wrong, 
the argument goes, with a system that sends Morrison to jail but 
lets his hypothetical counterpart rapist go free, where the only dif-
ference between the two is the performance of their lawyers. Gary 
Goodpaster has put the point as follows: 
Fairness to the defendant also requires that criminal defen-
dants be treated evenhandedly. Equal protection principles 
should ensure that the criminal justice system, which relies on 
defense attorneys of widely varying abilities, skills, knowledge, 
industry, and professional moralities, does not treat similarly 
situated defendants unequally. Similar defendants who have 
committed similar crimes under similar circumstances ought 
not to receive vastly different dispositions because of their re-
spective lawyers' varying professional attributes.66 
This intuition has widespread currency, both in the classroom 
and among thoughtful scholars, but we nevertheless think it wrong. 
For one thing, the argument proves too much. The inequality com-
plained of is not unique to an innocence-based construction of 
"prejudice." It exists also under the current regime. Under Sykes a 
non-ineffective lawyer's error binds the client, placing the defen-
dant in a worse position than a hypothetical defendant who is sim-
ilarly situated but better represented. Nor could the problem be 
solved by returning to the Fay rule that claims are defaulted only 
by the defendant's deliberate bypass, or even by eliminating proce-
dural defaults altogether. So long as some defendants have better 
lawyers than others, similarly situated defendants will fare differ-
ently-unequally, if you will-because of their attorneys. 
But this objection strikes only a glancing blow at the equality 
argument. That across-the-board equality cannot be achieved 
hardly compels indifference to inequalities that can be corrected. 
Our greater objection is that the particular inequality in question, 
while troubling, does not have the moral force commonly ascribed 
to it. To see why that is so, one need only shift attention from the 
small-scale inequality among those prosecuted with varying grades 
of defense counsel to the large-scale inequality between those who 
are prosecuted for their crimes and those who are not. Many, prob-
ably most, criminals are not caught, and many of those who are 
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caught are not prosecuted, in some instances because of police 
oversight or mistake. The inequality between those who are and 
those who are not caught and tried dwarfs any inequality about 
which someone in Morrison's position can complain. Yet the much 
greater arbitrariness resulting from imperfect law enforcement is 
not commonly thought to raise serious fairness concerns. 
Consider the following example. Two confederates rob a bank. 
One is more slow-footed, less quick-witted, or more easily recog-
nized than the other, and he is caught and convicted. The other 
gets away. The convicted robber undoubtedly feels aggrieved, but 
no one, to our knowledge, believes that he has a strong moral claim 
to equal treatment with his more fortunate confederate. This con-
clusion does not depend on the supposition that the reasons for the 
different outcomes were beyond the government's control. The 
lucky robber might escape only because of police negligence (fail-
ure to follow obvious leads, failure to take a suspect into custody at 
the first opportunity, etc.). Indeed, he might escape punishment 
only because of unconstitutional police behavior. If the police ille-
gally search his apartment, he would have a Fourth Amendment 
claim while another robber would not. Again, no one, to our knowl-
edge, suggests that a properly prosecuted defendant should escape 
punishment simply because the police erred in searching another. 
The conviction of the one bank robber is not unjust, but merely 
unlucky.67 
Neil Morrison is in a position very much like the unlucky bank 
robber. A factor unrelated to moral blameworthiness (police error 
or lack of foot speed in the one case, a lawyer's mistake in the 
other) is a but-for cause of his conviction. A perfectly just system 
might acquit both Morrison and the bank robber on that ground, 
for different treatment of like cases is surely a vice. In a system 
striving to do justice within real-world constraints, however, the 
bank robber's conviction is always deemed just because the de-
fendant did in fact commit the crime charged. The same should be 
17 To be sure, commentators do complain about the broad scope of prosecutorial discre-
tion, but not out of concern for these kinds of formally "unequal" outcomes. The most com-
mon concern is that, because of their vast authority, prosecutors may do a good deal of 
under-the-table lawmaking and may exercise their discretion on illegitimate (and not simply 
arbitrary) grounds. See, for example, James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial 
Power, 94 Harv L Rev 1521, 1555-57 (1981). Commentators also note that prosecutors may 
have incentives to not exercise their discretion in a consistently public-interested manner. 
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J Legal 
Stud 43, 49-53 (1988). These arguments identify systemic problems associated with 
prosecutorial discretion, but they do not question the fairness of particular charging deci-
sions to the particular individuals involved. 
702 The University of Chicago Law Review [57:679 
true for Morrison. Comparing him to another with a better lawyer 
may prompt regret about the role of chance in life (and in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice), but it cannot make a sufficiently 
strong moral case for exculpation. Were it otherwise, any defen-
dant could escape punishment simply by pointi~g to others, no less 
guilty, who avoided criminal liability due to some police or 
prosecutorial mistake. 
A narrower version of the equality argument might seem more 
promising. Some factors affecting the outcome of trials, even 
though unrelated to the factual guilt or moral culpability of the 
defendant, should be excluded because they are invidious. Race is 
the plainest example, but perhaps not the only one. Pursuing this 
line of reasoning, one might point out that attorney mistakes likely 
correlate with client poverty, since poor defendants have court-ap-
pointed, and perhaps low-quality, counsel. In this view, the real 
problem with letting the Kimmelman conviction stand is that it 
may hurt defendants who are poor68 and result in a particular kind 
of inequality between poor and non-poor defendants.69 
Here, too, the equality argument cuts too broadly to be con-
vincing. Wealth effects are not limited to, nor are they produced 
by, trial procedure. A large portion of the prison population are 
persons who, one might think, would not be there had they been 
born into middle-class homes. We do not indulge the common but 
insulting assumption that poor people commit crimes simply be-
cause they are poor. But we do think it plausible that many per-
sons who commit crimes would not be the persons they are (and 
also would not face the temptations they face) had they been born 
into better economic circumstances. Their claim of invidious treat-
ment on account of wealth seems at least as strong as Morrison's, 
in the sense that poverty plausibly might be (but in any individual 
case cannot be proved to be) a but-for cause of punishment. 
Most courts and scholars have concluded, however, that pun-
ishing such people is not unjust, even if it reminds us of unattrac-
tive features of our society, because poverty did not in any real 
sense compel the commission of crime.70 In other words, the per-
sons in question (at least by hypothesis) could have chosen not to 
•• This problem may not have occurred in Kimmelman itself, where the defendant re-
tained private counsel. 
•• Perhaps we should say rich and non-rich defendants, for poor defendants are not the 
only ones who could have a complaint based on wealth inequality. Anyone unable to hire the 
best could make a similar claim. 
1
• See, for example, United States v Alexander, 471 F2d 923, 968 (DC Cir 1973); San-
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commit crimes, as do most persons who are similarly situated. 
Their actions are in a sense "caused" by many factors, some of 
which have no just bearing on punishment. But so long as the 
defendant's own choice was one cause of the criminal conduct, con-
viction is just. 71 
Both for Morrison and for those defendants who might not 
have committed crimes but for their poverty, the inequality is 
something to be regretted. At the same time, the poor defendants 
surely have the stronger claim for relief; they would not have com-
mitted crimes at all but for their poverty. Since that claim is not 
granted by our criminal justice system, it is hard to see why Morri-
son's should be; his claim is only that he would have been able to 
escape punishment for his crimes had he been wealthier. 
Finally, it is important to note that not all constitutional 
rights intrinsically require equal treatment of all individuals who 
may be affected by their administration. Constitutional criminal 
procedure contains many rules designed to deter governmental 
misconduct. Implementing these rules benefits some defendants, 
but that benefit is incidental to the purpose of the rules. It follows 
that the benefits of such rules need not be made equally available 
to all, just as the benefits of, say, a punitive damages award in a 
civil case need not be equally distributed to all victims of the de-
fendant's tortious misconduct. Where a given constitutional re-
quirement is designed to deter police misconduct across the board 
rather than to secure correct outcomes in individual cases, there is 
no a priori reason why the protection of that requirement should 
be equally or comprehensively available to all defendants. 
The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Baze/on, 49 S Cal L Rev 1247, 
1251-54 (1976). 
As the title of Morse's article suggests, the most prominent dissent from these views is 
David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S Cal L Rev 385, 388-98 (1976). 
For a recent response to Judge Bazelon and to his critics, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Just 
Punishment in an Imperfect World, 87 Mich L Rev 1263, 1287-92 (1989) (reviewing David 
L. Bazelon, Questioning Authority: Justice and Criminal Law (Knopf, 1988), and sug-
gesting that punishment of the sort described in the text is not fair but is nonetheless 
necessary). 
71 The key to this familiar point is to recognize that while many factors, some of them 
random, may "cause" a criminal action, causation does not logically negate responsible 
choice. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal L Rev 1091, 1139-48 
(1985); Stephen J. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in The Ne-
braska Symposium on Motivation 35, 42-50 (U Nebraska, 1986). The argument is that in 
many cases both of the following propositions are true: (1) the defendant would not have 
committed the crime but for his (economically or otherwise) deprived background and cir-
cumstances; and (2) most persons from the same background and circumstances would not 
commit comparable crimes. 
-
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of harmless error.79 Many, probably most, constitutional violations 
go unremedied because they are harmless. They are harmless, that 
is, in that they do not affect outcomes. Viewed from a symbolic 
concern for the affirmation of rights, constitutional violations that 
do not affect outcomes might not be harmless at all. Though super-
ficially plausible, this view is widely rejected because it would de-
mand a perfection in the administration of justice that no human 
institution can achieve. Therefore, affirmation of rights is usually 
said to require the remedying of all non-harmless errors, although 
it is hard to see why that is anything more than an arbitrary stop 
in the reasoning. 
More commonly, the concern for affirmation of rights takes 
the form of the negative claim that there should be no hierarchy 
among constitutional rights. This is an important assertion, for it 
poses the chief rhetorical barrier to differentiating among claims 
according to their impact on innocence. Rebuttal is essential to our 
case, and requires separate consideration of two allied strands of 
the argument: first, that the Constitution itself admits of no hier-
archy of rights; and second, that in any event the habeas corpus 
statute does not permit differentiation among the rights to be 
enforced. 
The assertion that the Constitution admits of no ranking of 
rights or values is commonly made,80 but deeply puzzling. In a 
sense, all of modern constitutional law is to the contrary. The fa-
mous footnote four of Carolene Products is celebrated precisely 
because it laid the foundation for a redirection of emphasis among 
constitutional rights. 81 Modern theorists do battle over the criteria 
•• The Supreme Court has emphasized that, with rare exceptions, errors that clearly 
did not affect the outcome of a criminal proceeding cannot justify reversal. See, for example, 
Rose v Clark, 478 US 570, 579 (1986) ("The thrust of the many constitutional rules gov-
erning the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct 
judgments. Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment 
should be affirmed."). 
For a recent, comprehensive effort to unravel the Court's harmless-error jurisprudence 
(and also to suggest some changes), see Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error, 88 Colum L Rev 79 (1988). 
•• See, for example, Friedman, 73 Minn L Rev at 320 (cited in note 19) ("ranking of 
constitutional rights finds no basis in the habeas statute or the Constitution itself'); and 
Stacy and Dayton, 88 Colum L Rev at 90 (cited in note 79) ("The Constitution does not 
create a hierarchy of rights or values."). 
•
1 United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938). There is a mas-
sive literature on Carolene Product's transformation of constitutional law. For some deserv-
edly famous discussions, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard, 1980); 
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for constitutional adjudication, but all envision something other 
than a featureless plane of undifferentiated rights. No one thinks 
the Second Amendment is as important as the First, or that the 
cumulation of precedent leaves the Tenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments effectively unranked. The "economic" and "personal" as-
pects of constitutionally protected "liberty" have been sharply dis-
tinguished;82 the apparent exclusivity of Article III adjudication is 
more hole than cheese;83 and the Commerce Clause has expanded 
beyond recognition.84 Whatever may be said for or against these 
decisions, they all proceed from the common ground that there is a 
hierarchy among constitutional protections. The only sense in 
which this is not true is the verbal sleight of hand that some rights 
have been greatly expanded, while others have been defined away, 
but that all rights, as reconstructed, have a sort of nominal equal-
ity. This fiction is too threadbare to require rebuttal. 
The real point of the no-hierarchy-of-rights rhetoric, we be-
lieve, is not that differentiation among constitutional rights is in-
herently wrong, but that it is impermissible to introduce such dif-
ferentiation into the law of habeas corpus. The contention is that 
rights that are vindicated on direct appeal must also prevail on 
collateral review. Properly understood, this argument is not about 
the nature of constitutional rights but about the scope of federal 
habeas corpus. 
Both commentators and Supreme Court justices have ob-
served that the federal habeas statute gives no textual warrant for 
differentiating among constitutional rights.811 That is true. It is also 
true that virtually all ingredients of federal habeas law were an-
nounced without statutory authority. At least since 1886, federal 
habeas law has developed by judicial innovation, followed (some-
times) by legislative ratification. This is true of the exhaustion re-
11 Compare, for example, the deference paid to state rules that affect individuals' inter-
est in choosing their occupations, see Williamson u Lee Optical Co., 348 US 483 (1955), with 
the exacting scrutiny paid to state regulation of personal associations, Moore u City of East 
Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977). 
11 Northern Pipeline Co. u Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982), may represent 
the last bit of cheese. 
.. For two examples of the limitless reach of the Clause, see Garcia u San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985); and Wickard u Filburn, 317 US 111 
(1942). 
11 See Stone u Powell, 428 US at 503-06, 515-33 (Brennan dissenting); J. Patrick Green, 
Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the Burger Court , 10 Creighton L Rev 655 (1977); 
and Mark Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 25 UCLA L Rev 1301, 1316-18 (1978). 
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quirement, which was announced in 1886,86 codified in 1948,87 and 
has been significantly modified since then.88 It is also true of the 
range of legal issues that, once heard in state court, could be reliti-
gated on federal habeas corpus. Decisions early in this century de-
fined a relatively narrow scope for relitigation (whether in accord 
with congressional intent, we do not say).89 The range of such 
claims cognizable on federal habeas review was expanded in Brown 
u Allen°0 and partly contracted in Stone u Powell,91 all without aid 
of statutory intervention. Similarly, the scope of relitigation of the 
facts underlying federal claims was first announced by decision92 
and only later codified by statute.93 
Finally, and most to the point, judicial innovation has deter-
mined the scope of habeas review for defaulted claims. Whatever 
one might say about the supposed original intent of the habeas 
statute,94 federal habeas review of defaulted claims was at first 
88 Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241 (1886). 
87 Act of June 25, 1948, ch 646, 62 Stat 967 (1948), codified at 28 USC § 2254(b),(c) 
(1982). 
88 See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509 (1982). 
89 This historical issue has occasioned a good deal of debate. The standard argument 
that Congress intended the 1867 habeas statute to cover only jurisdictional claims is made 
in Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 463-77 (cited in note 53). For the argument that the statute was 
meant to cover a much larger category of claims, see Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal 
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev 579, 603-63 (1982). 
•• 344 US 443 (1953). Brown extended the scope of federal habeas to federal constitu-
tional claims generally, holding that it did not apply merely to claims bearing on the juris-
diction or authority of the relevant state court. 
•
1 428 US 465. Stone barred relitigation of Fourth Amendment claims, save where the 
defendant did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court. 
•• Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293 (1963). 
•• Act of Nov 2, 1966, Pub L No 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat 1105 (1966), codified at 28 USC 
§ 2254(d) (1982). Section 2254 requires a federal habeas court to defer to "a determination 
after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court." Interestingly, the 
statutory amendment departed from the Court's pronouncements in a way that, although 
seemingly significant, was not given effect until the Court itself decided to constrict the 
scope of factual relitigation. Sumner v Mata, 449 US 539 (1981), on review following re-
mand, 455 US 591 (1982) (per curiam), held that § 2254(d) applies when a state appellate 
court made the factual findings, as well as when a trial court made the factual findings. In 
Mata, the majority's ahistorical emphasis on statutory text had a constrictive rather than 
expansive effect on the scope of the federal habeas remedy, perhaps explaining why the 
approach has not received approval from all quarters. Compare Mata, 449 US at 544-49 
(majority opinion undertaking a close text-bound construction of§ 2254(d)) with id at 555-
59 (Brennan dissenting) (emphasizing prior Supreme Court decisions rather than the statu-
tory text). 
•• Compare Fay v Noia, 372 US 391, 399-415 (1963) (arguing from history for broadly 
available habeas relief for defaulted claims) with id at 449-63 (Harlan dissenting) (arguing 
from history for the opposite conclusion). 
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completely foreclosed, 96 then substantially allowed,96 and later 
partly restricted,97 all without statutory change. Indeed, the issue 
is not now, and never has been, expressly resolved by statute. 
Against this background, one can hardly insist on the primacy 
of legislative innovation in the law of federal habeas corpus. To 
put the matter bluntly, it is simply too late in the day to assert a 
lack of judicial authority to reform habeas law.98 No doubt the sep-
aration of powers argument, as it is sometimes called, is attractive 
to one who is alarmed at the direction of judicial innovation, but 
this kind of tactical response will not do. Judicial authority to ex-
pand habeas review necessarily implies the authority to restrict it 
also. That, at least, is the view taken by the Supreme Court,99 and 
we think it fairly meets the expectations in this field. At the very 
least, it applies where, as here, prior decisions have not been 
codified. 
This is not to say that Congress could not override the Court's 
decisions, nor that a genuine legislative command ought not be 
respected. It is only to acknowledge that the pattern of statutory 
amendment in this area has been merely to confirm judicially an-
nounced changes in the law. We suggest that this tradition should 
be presumed to continue, unless and until Congress indicates its 
dissatisfaction. 
In short, there is nothing inherently wrong with differentiating 
among constitutional rights, either directly or as a condition of 
habeas review. The question is not whether such distinctions are in 
principle permissible-surely they are-but whether they are wise. 
In our view, it is wise to differentiate among constitutional claims 
according to whether they raise a "reasonable possibility" of factu-
ally erroneous conviction (or factually unsupported sentence of 
death), at least when these claims were defaulted in state court. 
This approach would, in most cases, respect the states' interests in 
finality of judgments and in enforcing legitimate procedural re-
quirements. At the same time, it would vindicate the overriding 
.. Brown u Allen, 344 US 443 (1953). 
" Fay, 372 US 391. 
.., Sykes, 433 US 72; Carrier, 477 US 478 . 
.. David Shapiro has argued that this proposition extends well beyond federal habeas: 
that the exercise of judicial discretion is a proper and useful part of defining the bounds of 
federal jurisdiction as a general matter. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 
60 NYU L Rev 543 (1985). 
" See Sykes, 433 US at 81 (analysis of Court's habeas decisions "illustrates this Court's 
historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even 
where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged.") . 
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federal interest in hearing federal claims suggesting unjust convic-
tion or punishment. The federal interest would be addressed di-
rectly, without the deflective intermediate step of categorizing rea-
sons for the default. Defaulted federal claims that do not arguably 
demonstrate innocence (or unjustified sentence of death) would 
not be heard on habeas corpus, simply because there is no compel-
ling reason to do so. 
4. Attorney ineffectiveness and pervasive neglect. 
Paradoxically, review of non-guilt-related defaulted claims 
might be thought necessary to protect innocence. One could argue 
that a defense attorney's incompetent handling of an issue signals 
possible incompetence in other areas-including matters not 
known to the court or, for that matter, to the defendant. This 
point suggests that even if the law were concerned solely with 
preventing unjust convictions, attorney ineffectiveness could be a 
useful tool for determining which convictions are unjust. Indeed, 
the Strickland Court suggested as much, in the course of explain-
ing why it was not adopting an even more stringent prejudice stan-
dard than reasonable probability.100 
The idea of attorney error as a sign of pervasive neglect im-
plies that claims of the sort raised in Kimmelman must be heard 
not because those claims themselves suggest injustice, but because 
the underlying attorney errors do. One might say that in Kim-
melman, for example, the defense attorney's failure to move to 
suppress the bedsheet calls into question the competence of the 
rest of his representation. Perhaps, the argument goes, Neil Morri-
son was not really guilty, but was convicted only because an attor-
ney foolish enough not to file a suppression motion was also suffi-
ciently inept to botch an available factual defense. 101 
This point has some rough plausibility. It is a familiar idea 
that one instance of misconduct may be evidence of other undis-
covered misconduct, and this proposition surely holds true of pro-
fessional incompetence. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to 
weigh this chain of inferences too heavily. The fact that errors 
100 See Strickland, 466 US at 694 (rejecting the more-probable-than-not outcome deter-
minative standard used for newly-discovered evidence claims, and noting that "[a]n ineffec-
tive assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of 
the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate 
standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower"). 
101 See Strickland, 466 US at 710 (Marshall dissenting); and Berger, 86 Colum L Rev at 
92-93 (cited in note 20). This, of course, is the accuracy-based argument for the performance 
prong. 
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sometimes come in bunches does not change the fact that they 
often come alone. More importantly, the signaling argument re-
quires simultaneous acceptance of three propositions: that the er-
ror in question indicates a substantial likelihood of other errors; 
that those other errors bear on the defendant's guilt or innocence; 
and that those other errors are undiscoverable. For if errors that 
suggest injustice are uncovered, they can support a claim directly, 
making it unnecessary to use non-guilt-related errors as a marker 
for pervasive incompetence. We think it likely that Kimmelman-
type mistakes coexist only rarely with other, undiscoverable errors 
that result in the conviction of innocent defendants. 
This conclusion is reinforced by another aspect of ineffective 
assistance doctrine. In United States u Cronic, the Court held that 
truly pervasive neglect by counsel (or action by the government 
that pervasively prevented counsel from doing his or her job) re-
quires reversal without any showing of prejudice.102 Although the 
Court discussed pervasive neglect in the context of a claim that 
defense counsel lacked adequate time to prepare the case, there is 
no reason why Cronic should be limited to that context. When a 
defense attorney makes a series of mistakes rather than an isolated 
error, the inference of pervasive neglect is much stronger. Accord-
ingly, when a defense attorney has made a series of clear misjudg-
ments, the case should be treated as one where the possibility of 
injustice is high regardless of the nature of the attorney's mis-
takes. This would require some expansion of Cronic's scope, but 
the expansion seems wholly appropriate.103 In short, Cronic imple-
ments the signaling insight by allowing for relief when there is rea-
son to believe that counsel did many things badly. Given the 
Cronic remedy, it seems excessive to assume pervasive neglect 
based only on evidence of one discrete attorney mistake, even if 
the error was serious. 
1
•• 466 US 648, 657-62 (1984) (prejudice may be presumed when there has been "a 
breakdown in the adversarial process that would justify a presumption that [the defend-
ant's] conviction was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Constitution"). 
108 Lower courts have generally assumed that Cronic applies to pervasive defense attor-
ney neglect, and not simply to excessive constraints placed on defense counsel by the gov-
ernment. See LaFave and Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.l0(a) at 39 n 22.8, § 11.lO(d) at 
51 n 76.10 (Supp 1989) (cited in note 39). At the same time, the lower courts have defined 
pervasive neglect very narrowly. Id. If the courts reduced the number of Strickland claims 
by defining prejudice in guilt-related terms, they could expand the scope of Cronic by defin-
ing pervasive neglect to include all cases with a large number of serious attorney errors. 
~ 
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III. DEFINING AND APPLYING A GUILT-RELATED PREJUDICE 
STANDARD 
We have suggested that the law of defaulted claims should be 
radically simplified by limiting relief to cases where the defendant 
can show that the default created a reasonable possibility of an 
unjust result. What that standard would mean in practice depends 
on how it is applied. In particular, any rule for defaulted claims 
must take account of the different categories of constitutional rules 
at issue in federal habeas. Some constitutional claims are wholly 
unrelated to guilt. Others clearly bear on the accuracy of the de-
fendant's conviction. A third category of claims invoke constitu-
tional rules that enhance the accuracy of criminal adjudications 
generally, but have an indeterminate effect on any particular case. 
Finally, an increasing number of federal habeas petitions challenge 
death sentences rather than criminal convictions. These different 
types of constitutional claims raise different issues of habeas ad-
ministration, and complicate the definition and application of any 
rule for defaulted claims. What follows is an attempt to deal with 
these differences in a way that is consistent with a focus on 
preventing unjust outcomes, but that avoids the complexity of the 
Court's defaulted claims jurisprudence. 
To explain how our proposed standard might work in practice, 
we apply it to four of the Court's recent procedural default deci-
sions, representing the four kinds of federal constitutional claims 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Kimmelman v Morrison in-
volved a Fourth Amendment claim unrelated to the defendant's 
guilt. The defendant in Murray v Carrier raised a due process 
claim that went directly to the accuracy of his conviction. Teague v 
Lane offers an example of a systemic accuracy-enhancing rule that 
may or may not have affected the outcome in that particular case. 
Finally, Dugger v Adams involved an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to the defendant's death sentence. 
A. Non-Guilt-Related Claims: Kimmelman v Morrison 10• 
Kimmelman, for us, is an easy case. The defendant had a 
plausible claim that the bedsheet introduced in his rape trial had 
been illegally seized. Defense counsel did not object to the evi-
dence in a timely fashion. The evidence was therefore admitted, 
and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court found that 
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the lawyer's error could show ineffective assistance of counsel, 
which would support federal habeas review of the defaulted Fourth 
Amendment claim. 
Under our approach, the defaulted claim would not be re-
opened. Whatever the character of the lawyer's error, there is no 
chance that the failure to ask for suppression impaired the accu-
racy of the conviction. On the contrary, the admission of relevant, 
non-misleading physical evidence could only have enhanced the ac-
curacy of the outcome, however unwelcome that effect may have 
been to a guilty defendant. We therefore would have denied habeas 
review, unless it could have been shown that the lawyer's error was 
not an isolated default, but rather part of a larger pattern of in-
competence that undermined the reliability of the defendant's 
conviction . 
It is perhaps conceivable that an isolated error could be so ex-
travagant as to call into question the lawyer's ability to do any-
thing else correctly, but we think that kind of loose inference 
should prevail, if at all, only in extraordinary cases. Generally 
speaking, pervasive incompetence should require proof of more 
than an isolated mistake-particularly where, as in Kimmelman, 
counsel's error seems to have actually increased the reliability of 
the guilt determination. 
The same result would follow in virtually every case of a de-
faulted Fourth Amendment claim. We think that entirely proper. 
We also note that our approach has the advantage (others will view 
it differently) of aligning the Sykes standard for review of de-
faulted claims with the Stone v Powell limitation of habeas review 
of litigated claims. It is an indictment of current law that these 
two channels for federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment 
claims are unaccountably divergent. We see no reason for the dis-
parity and would extend the policy of Stone v Powell to defaulted 
as well as litigated claims, so long as there was a full and fair op-
portunity to raise the claim in state court. 
B. Guilt-Related Claims: Murray v Carrier106 
Prior to Carrier's trial for rape and abduction, his lawyer 
sought to discover the victim's statements to the police. The trial 
judge examined the statements in camera, concluded that none 
was exculpatory, and denied discovery. This was almost surely er-
ror, since, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, "the 
••• 477 us 478 (1986). 
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conclusion that there was no 'exculpatory' material in the victim's 
statements does not foreclose the possibility that inconsistencies 
between the statements and the direct testimony would have ena-
bled an effective cross-examination to demonstrate that [Carrier] 
is actually innocent."1°6 In an apparent oversight, Carrier's lawyer 
failed to include the discovery claim in his petition for appeal, 
thereby defaulting the claim under state law. The Supreme Court 
concluded that (1) the Sykes cause-and-prejudice test applies to 
procedural defaults on appeal as well as at trial, 107 and (2) non-
ineffective lawyer error was not "cause" for a procedural default. 108 
(The Court also said that ineffective assistance would constitute 
"cause," but that this claim should be exhausted in state court 
before federal habeas review.) 109 Since Carrier did not claim that 
the lawyer's oversight amounted to ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, the default was conclusive. 
Our approach to this case would be more direct. We would ask 
only if there was a "reasonable possibility" that the failure to make 
the victim's statements available to defense counsel resulted in the 
conviction of one who was factually innocent. Answering that ques-
tion would require an analysis of the statements Carrier sought to 
discover, together with the victim's testimony at Carrier's trial, to 
determine whether the course of the trial plausibly could have 
been different had defense counsel known the contents of the 
statements. We have not examined the record, and cannot say 
what conclusion that analysis would yield. But we are confident 
that it focuses on the right question. 
This approach should not be especially burdensome for federal 
habeas courts. Indeed, courts should find our analysis natural, 
since it is precisely the analysis that governs the merits of Carrier's 
claim. Carrier's claim is that the government failed to disclose ma-
terial exculpatory evidence. Under a line of cases governing prose-
cutors' duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, a defendant is enti-
tled to have his conviction overturned if the nondisclosure of such 
evidence created a reasonable probability of an effect on the out-
come.110 Satisfying this standard would necessarily satisfy our pro-
posed prejudice standard. Thus, under our approach, Carrier's 
, .. Id at 499 (Stevens concurring). 
101 Id at 490-92 (majority opinion). 
,.. Id at 485-88. 
109 Id at 488-89. 
110 See United States v Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985); United States v Agurs, 427 US 97 
(1976); and Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963). 
iii 
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claim should be granted if it is a valid claim on the merits, and not 
otherwise. The presence or absence of "cause"-the issue that 
dominated forty-five pages in the United States Reports-would 
be irrelevant. 
Our approach is similar to, but a good deal simpler than, that 
offered by Justice Stevens in his separate opinion in Carrier. m 
Stevens argued that the focus should be on "prejudice" rather than 
on "cause" whenever the claim relates to fundamental fairness, a 
category that, for Stevens, would extend beyond guilt-related-
ness.112 Otherwise, apparently, the ordinary cause and prejudice 
test would apply. Additionally, in cases where the claim does relate 
to fundamental fairness, Stevens apparently would require a fed-
eral habeas court to balance the interests protected by the claim 
against the state's interest in enforcing the relevant procedural 
rule. 113 It is not clear how courts are supposed to balance such in-
commensurate interests in specific cases, and we think the inquiry 
is in any event unnecessary. It would be sufficient-and a good 
deal easier-to ask directly whether Carrier had shown a "reasona-
ble possibility" of a factually unreliable conviction and there let 
the matter rest. 
C. Claims Involving Systemic Accuracy-Enhancing Rules: 
Teague u Lane114 
Teague, a black man, was convicted of attempted murder, 
armed robbery, and aggravated battery by an all-white jury. The 
prosecutor had obtained the all-white jury by using all ten of his 
peremptory challenges against blacks. Teague's lawyer objected on 
the ground that this process violated the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement that the jury represent a fair cross-section of the com-
munity; this objection was overruled. On federal habeas corpus, 
Teague pressed three related claims: (1) that the prosecutor vio-
lated Batson u Kentucky,115 which announced, after Teague's trial, 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited (at least in some cir-
cumstances) the race-based use of peremptory challenges; (2) that 
the prosecutor also violated the more lax pre-Batson equal protec-
111 477 US at 497-516 (Stevens concurring). 
111 See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens dissenting) . 
111 See Carrier, 477 US at 506 (Stevens concurring) ("An inquiry into the requirements 
of justice requires a consideration, not only of the nature and strength of the constitutional 
claim, but also of the nature and strength of the state procedural rule that has not been 
observed."). 
m 109 S Ct 1060 (1989). 
111 476 us 79 (1986). 
716 The University of Chicago Law Review [57:679 
tion standard of Swain v Alabama;116 and (3) that the prosecutor 
violated the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement. 
T.he Court's resolution of these claims illustrates the excessive 
proceduralization of habeas review. Each theory was rejected for a 
different reason, none of which addressed the merits of the rele-
vant claim. First, the Batson argument was rejected on the ground 
that, as the Court had held previously,117 Batson did not apply to 
convictions that had become final before the decision was an-
nounced. Second, the Swain claim was rejected because it had 
been defaulted: Teague's lawyer had not raised the equal protec-
tion argument at trial or on direct appeal. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the fair cross-section claim was rejected because it re-
quired a departure from existing Sixth Amendment doctrine. A 
plurality of the Court declared that new rules of that sort118 could 
not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus. The plural-
ity concluded that the new rule sought by Teague could be ap-
proved only if other litigants in his position would also enjoy its 
benefit. Since a new Sixth Amendment requirement governing per-
emptory challenges would not apply retroactively on federal 
habeas corpus (as in Batson), neither could it be announced on 
federal habeas corpus.119 In other words, the Court concluded that 
even if Teague's Sixth Amendment claim was valid, he could not 
get the benefit of it on federal habeas corpus. The Court thus de-
nied all three related claims without reaching the merits of any of 
them. 
Teague provides wonderful fodder for law school exam ques-
tions, but it only complicates the administration of habeas corpus. 
The retroactivity tangle that dominated the opinion and the proce-
11
• 380 US 202 (1965). Under Swain, defendants had to prove, in essence, a pattern of 
race-based peremptory challenges unrelated to the nature of the case or the defendant. See 
id at 223-24 (describing the kind of evidence that would give rise to an inference of pur-
poseful discrimination). A defendant could not make out an equal protection claim based 
solely on the prosecutor's decision to strike members of the defendant's race in the defen-
dant's case. 
117 See Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255 (1986) (per curiam). 
11
• A different result might have been reached had the new rule concerned a procedure 
"without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 109 S Ct at 
1076-77. 
110 The retroactivity analysis was announced in a plurality opinion by Justice 
O'Connor, joined on this point by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Jus-
tice White did not join this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, although his separate 
opinion does not disagree with the plurality's analysis or result. See id at 1078-79 (White 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In any event, a majority of the Court 
later adopted Teague's retroactivity analysis and applied it to rules governing the imposi-
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dural bar doctrine that precluded the Swain claim share a common 
objective. Both are designed to allow relief in cases of injustice, but 
otherwise to avoid wholesale collateral review of federal claims. 120 
Teague illustrates the complexities of an essentially procedural ap-
proach to this objective. Yet the issue is not so difficult if ap-
proached directly. 
We would ask simply whether the prosecutor's conduct in 
striking blacks from the jury raised a "reasonable possibility" of a 
factually unreliable conviction. Quite possibly, such a showing 
could be made. The r ace-based use of peremptory challenges would 
tend to undermine the accuracy of determinations of guilt, at least 
in close cases. Thus, in a general way, the Batson rule is designed 
to secure just outcomes, not merely to deter misconduct that is 
otherwise objectionable. 121 The force of this point is amplified 
when one remembers that the accuracy of conviction concerns not 
merely the fact, but also the grade, of criminal liability. Even if it 
were clear beyond doubt that Teague was guilty of some form of 
assaultive behavior, the jury may have had room for judgment as 
to the appropriate grade of criminal liability.122 Accordingly, we 
think it likely that Teague could have shown a "reasonable possi-
bility" of factual error, and, in any event, that this is the right bat-
tleground. If such error could be shown, it is simply intolerable not 
to grant relief. 
Having said that, we add that cases like Teague raise difficult 
administrative issues: they involve protections that promote accu-
racy in a systemic sense, yet do not necessarily affect accuracy in 
any particular case. In other words, the fact that the Batson rule 
was designed in part to promote accuracy does not mean that 
every violation of that rule creates a significant risk of an inaccu-
rate judgment. The task is to find a mechanism for separating 
those cases in which the jury selection might have led · to an unjust 
conviction from those cases in which any jury would have con-
victed. That is precisely what the Court's approach, focusing on 
110 On the role of retroactivity in protecting against basic injustice, see Penry, 109 S Ct 
at 2952-53; and Teague, 109 S Ct at 1076-77. On the role of habeas review of defaulted 
claims in serving the same goal, see Sy kes, 433 US at 90-91. 
111 See Allen v Hardy , 478 US 255, 259 (1986) (accuracy of results is one justification 
for the Batson rule). 
111 Teague was found guilty of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed 
robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. The court entered judgment only on the at-
tempted murder and armed robbery counts, sentencing him to thirty years' imprisonment 
on each count. People v Teague, 108 Ill App 3d 891, 439 NE2d 1066, 1068 (1982). 
Teague's lawyer sought an instruction for lesser included offenses at trial, but the trial 
court refused. That decision was upheld on appeal. 439 NE2d at 1076-77. 
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retroactivity, does not do. Retroactivity analysis inevitably has an 
all-or-nothing character; either everyone with Teague's claim will 
receive a new trial or no one will. Since the number of cases at 
stake is large, and the number of potential injustices a good deal 
smaller, the Court predictably has decided that the costs of blan-
ket reversal are too high. Those costs are a good deal more beara-
ble, however, if one aims to distinguish worthy from unworthy 
claimants. 
The only solution is to look at the record to see whether the 
case was close on the merits. If the evidence-against Teague was 
overwhelming, he should not get relief. On the other hand, if area-
sonable jury could have acquitted (and if no inadmissible evidence 
clearly established guilt), he should get relief, for the very sort of 
bias that Batson aimed to prevent might have caused an unjust 
conviction. In other words, a viable Batson claim should entitle 
Teague to greater-than-usual scrutiny of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence against him, but not to automatic reversal. 
This approach makes it unnecessary to consider either 
Teague's Swain claim or his fair cross-section claim. Teague could 
thus obtain the benefit of his most clearly meritorious legal theory 
(and courts could avoid his more controversial claims), because the 
prejudice standard sufficiently limits the universe of possible 
claims. 
Our approach also makes the retroactivity analysis that lay at 
the heart of Teague unnecessary. This is no small benefit. The 
most recent term of the Supreme Court suggests that retroactivity 
is likely to become the newest, and perhaps the messiest, proce-
dural thicket to trip up habeas courts. Deciding retroactivity under 
the Court's analysis requires a federal court to determine both (1) 
whether the defendant's claim requires adoption of a "new rule" or 
merely application of existing law,123 and if the former, (2) whether 
the new rule is one "without which the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished."124 Each of these issues is com-
plicated and hard. Many arguments involve some marginal altera-
tions of existing law, and no one knows when such arguments seek 
"new rules" and when they do not. And many constitutional rules 
protect innocent defendants sometimes, yet do not necessarily pro-
tect innocence in any particular case. An approach that looks di-
rectly to the merits avoids both of these categorization problems. 
And although retroactivity analysis extends beyond defaulted 
118 See Butler v McKellar, 110 S Ct 1212, 1216-18 (1990). 
12
• Teague, 109 S Ct at 1076-77; see also Saff/,e v Parks, 110 S Ct 1257, 1263-64 (1990). 
1990) Reforming Habeas Corpus 719 
claims, we suspect that a substantial portion of the cases that raise 
retroactivity issues will, like Teague itself, involve efforts by coun-
sel to excuse a procedural default by pointing to new law. Making 
such claims easier to decide would go far toward untying the proce-
dural knot Teague has created. m 
D. Challenges to Death Sentences: Dugger v Adams126 
Adams was convicted of murdering an eight-year-old girl in 
1978. At his capital sentencing proceeding, the trial judge repeat-
edly told the jury that its recommendation would be advisory only 
and that the court had ultimate responsibility for fixing the sen-
tence. These instructions were improper under state law because 
the jury's recommendation enjoyed a presumption of correctness 
and could be overturned only on clear and convincing evidence of 
error, but the defense counsel did not object. The jury recom-
mended death, and the court imposed this sentence. 
On federal habeas corpus, Adams argued that the judge's in-
struction violated Caldwell v Mississippi, 127 a 1985 decision hold-
ing that the Eighth Amendment requires that juries not be misled 
about their role (as set by state law) in imposing death sentences. 
Adams won in the lower courts, but the Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court found that, even though Caldwell had not been decided 
at the time of Adams's sentencing, his claim was barred by his law-
111 Eliminating retroactivity analysis is useful generally, but particularly so in cases 
(unlike Teague) where the prejudice issue is easy. For example, in Butler v McKellar, 110 S 
Ct 1212 (1990), the defendant declined to talk to the police and asked to see a lawyer when 
police questioned him about an assault charge. The next day, officers gave him Miranda 
warnings, and, with the defendant's permission, proceeded to question him about a then-
unsolved murder. He made several incriminating statements, all of which were concededly 
voluntary and reliable. 110 S Ct at 1214-15. The defendant argued, correctly, that these 
statements were obtained in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v Rober-
son, 486 US 675 (1988), which held that police may not question a defendant who has in-
voked his right to counsel, even if the questioning concerns a different crime. Roberson was 
decided long after Butler's conviction became final. In a detailed and controversial applica-
tion of Teague, the Court found that Roberson had created a "new rule," and was not 
merely an application of existing law. 110 S Ct at 1216-18. Consequently, the Court held, 
Roberson could not be applied retroactively to Butler's case. 
Butler's claim was not defaulted. Had it been, the Court's analysis would have been 
even more complicated: the Court would have had to consider whether Roberson created the 
type of new rule that satisfies Sykes "cause." See notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
There is a much simpler way to resolve cases of this sort. Butler's claim resembles the 
claim in Kimme/man v Morrison, since it aims to suppress concededly reliable evidence of 
guilt. Thus, the claim cannot possibly raise any serious doubt about the fairness of Butler's 
conviction. At least if the claim were defaulted, we would deny relief on that ground alone. 
, .. 109 S Ct 1211 (1989). 
117 472 us 320 (1985). 
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yer's failure to object to the instruction. The reasoning behind this 
conclusion is a little complex. A Caldwell Eighth Amendment 
claim logically requires a violation of state law. If the instructions 
accurately state the role assigned to the jury by state law in capital 
sentencing proceedings, there is no Eighth Amendment violation. 
Even though Caldwell was decided later, the Court concluded that 
the underlying error of state law should have been recognized at 
the time of Adams's sentencing. Therefore, the Court concluded, 
the lawyer's failure to raise the state law claim barred federal 
habeas review of the associated Eighth Amendment claim. 
In one sense, Adams's claim closely resembles Teague's. Both 
involve systemic rules that enhance the accuracy of jury decision-
making. The two cases are different, however, because of the dif-
ference between capital sentencing proceedings and more ordinary 
criminal adjudications. Given the judgmental and evaluative char-
acter of the criteria used to sentence Adams to death, 128 we think 
it very likely that Adams could have shown a "reasonable possibil-
ity" of error, though that ultimately would depend on the 
evidence. 
The point can be generalized. Our approach is broadly forgiv-
ing of procedural defaults concerning the sentencing stage of capi-
tal proceedings. The reason is not primarily that the death penalty 
is special, although that may be thought sufficient. The reason is 
that the statutory and constitutional criteria governing the death 
sentence involve irreducible elements of subjectivity and discre-
tion.129 Where that is so, the concept of factual reliability loses its 
128 The trial judge, in upholding the jury's recommendation of death, found three ag-
gravating and three mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstances were (1) that 
the murder was committed in the course of a rape and/or kidnapping, (2) that it was com-
mitted for the purpose of preventing arrest, and (3) that it was "especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel." Adams v State, 412 S2d 850, 854 (Fla 1982). The mitigating factors were (1) 
that Adams had no significant prior criminal history, (2) that he was "under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance," and (3) that he was only 20 years of age at the 
time of the crime. Id. The third aggravating factor, the first two mitigating factors, and the 
ultimate recommendation call for evaluative judgments that differ appreciably from those 
required at the guilt-innocence phase of most criminal proceedings. And a jury that knows it 
will probably have the final say on such issues may react very differently from one that 
thinks it is merely offering advice to the trial court. 
,.. This is due partly to the nature of the beast, see McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 
(1987) (rejecting an elaborate statistical challenge to Georgia's imposition of the death pen-
alty and emphasizing the role of individualized discretion in imposing the death sentence), 
and partly to the Supreme Court's disapproval of a more categorical approach. See, for ex-
ample, Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104 (1982) (holding that sentencing juries and judges 
must consider individual mitigating circumstances); and Sumner v Shuman, 483 US 66 
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clarity and hardness. To the extent that the determination is 
overtly evaluative and judgmental, any defaulted claim that is not 
constitutionally harmless would have a "reasonable possibility" of 
affecting the reliability of the sentence of death. 
Of course, that is not inevitably so. The defaulted claim might 
concern an issue that is no more indeterminate and judgmental 
than the factual conclusions that typically underlie a guilty ver-
dict. But in general, the concept of "reasonable possibility" of fac-
tual error would have a broader reach in capital cases because of 
the broader range of facts relevant to the imposition of a capital 
sentence. In other words, for defaulted claims with respect to 
death sentences, we would expect the difference between an 
outcome-based construction of "prejudice" and one oriented to-
ward the factual reliability of the underlying findings to be rela-
tively insignificant. Both standards are likely to converge on the 
traditional concept of harmless error. 
Though our approach is generally favorable to capital defen-
dants, it would not aggravate the problem that seems to bother 
some of the Justices-the long, drawn-out nature of litigation in 
capital cases. That problem arises not from defaulted claims, but 
from repetitious habeas petitions. Any legal change that would en-
courage defendants to collapse all possible claims into one habeas 
petition, and thereby allow courts to resolve all merits issues at 
once, would reduce that problem. We think that that is exactly the 
effect of our proposal, since it would tend to lead directly to a mer-
its decision on all available claims. 
IV. SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
Our discussion of procedurally defaulted claims is now at an 
end. The argument need not be carried further, as it is possible to 
simplify and, we think, to improve the law of defaulted claims 
without affecting the rest of the habeas landscape. At the same 
time, our argument does cast a shadow on at least two other im-
portant habeas issues: (1) the proper standards for purely factual 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (2) the proper stan-
dards for claims of constitutionally insufficient evidence. We do 
not treat these issues exhaustively, because the concerns they raise 
are different from those raised by defaulted claims and merit fuller 
treatment than is possible here. What follows is therefore brief and 
somewhat speculative. 
,.....__ 
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A. Factual Ineffective Assistance Claims 
Most ineffective assistance claims are not based on the defense 
counsel's failure to raise a federal claim or defense. More com-
monly, the allegation of ineffectiveness concerns a decision that af-
fected the development of the facts-for example, failure to offer 
an alibi or character witness or to uncover and present other excul-
patory evidence. Such cases are in some ways like the allegation of 
ineffectiveness based on defaults of federal claims. In both in-
stances, the defendant argues that, through no fault of his own, 
some claim or evidence was not properly presented. The law of de-
faulted claims seeks to sift through such arguments to identify in-
justices that require habeas relief. In our view, ineffective assis-
tance doctrine should have the same aim in factual error cases. 
This last step is quite controversial. The conventional wisdom, 
among both judges and academics, is that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel goes not to the substance of the conviction, 
but to the process by which it was obtained.13° Consequently, the 
argument goes, such claims should be granted regardless of the na-
ture of the attorney error in question-essentially the position 
adopted in Kimmelman v Morrison. 
In our view, this process-oriented approach to ineffectiveness 
is flawed for the same reasons that argue against federal habeas 
review of defaulted Fourth Amendment claims. Consider, for ex-
ample, a defendant who tells his lawyer that he wants to testify on 
his own behalf. The lawyer responds with a simple, "Fine with 
me," and neither dissuades the defendant from testifying nor 
warns him of the attendant risks. The defendant then takes the 
stand and testifies that he was in another place at the time of the 
crime. On cross-examination the prosecutor shreds his story, forc-
ing him to admit that his direct testimony was false. Predictably, 
the jury convicts. 
Even if the defense counsel made no other error, one could 
argue that the defendant was convicted in part because of his law-
yer's incompetence in failing to make him aware of the risks of 
130 See, for example, LaFave and Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.10 at 50 (Supp 
1989) (cited in note 39)(criticizing the argument that ineffective assistance doctrine should 
focus exclusively on outcome effects that bear on the defendant's guilt); Berger, 86 Colum L 
Rev at 94 (cited in note 20)(arguing that the "prejudice" prong of Strickland should be 
abandoned because the constitutional protection concerns the proceBB of effective represen-
tation, without regard to its effects); and Goodpaster, 14 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 68-70 
(cited in note 20)(arguing that ineffective assistance doctrine must protect the entire pro-
cess, not merely determination of guilt, on the ground that the adversary system serves 
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waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege. Yet, even assuming that 
incompetence can be shown, it is not so clear why relief should be 
granted. The defendant fared worse than he might have, in that a 
better lawyer might have gotten him off, but the error does not 
cast doubt on the reliability of the determination of guilt. The 
problem here seems to us very much like the situation in Kim-
melman, and our response might well be the same.131 
One is left with the argument that this hypothetical defendant 
should get relief on the ground that effective assistance of counsel 
is not an aid to accurate results but an end in itself. This proposi-
tion may be the implicit premise of those who maintain that guilt 
and innocence should be irrelevant to assessing ineffectiveness. But 
it is hard to see why counsel should be viewed as an end rather 
than a means. Counsel, after all, is part of a larger adjudicative 
process, and the entire process is short-circuited whenever the de-
fendant pleads guilty. The fact that this happens in the majority of 
cases132 suggests that our attachment to the process as an end in 
itself is, at best, half-hearted. Unless disposition of criminal prose-
cution by guilty plea is necessarily and inherently wrong, 133 it is 
hard to escape the conclusion that the trial process-including ef-
fective assistance of counsel-is a tool for reaching right results 
and not an end in itself. 
On that view, factual ineffectiveness claims present a classic ex 
ante/ex post problem. Ex ante, adequate representation across the 
board is required so that innocent defendants (or merely arguably 
111 One might argue that the defendant should have a viable Fifth Amendment claim 
on the ground that his waiver was not sufficiently "knowing" and "intelligent." This argu-
ment is a hard one to make out, however, given that defendants regularly waive the privilege 
without legal advice of any sort in the police station, and such waivers are not thought to 
raise constitutional problems. See, for example, Moran v Burbine, 475 US 612 (1986) . Nor 
can one distinguish police station waivers from courtroom waivers based on their practical 
consequences: the likeliest consequence of a confession in the police station, as in the court-
room, is conviction. For the classic exposition of this point, see Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice 
in the Gatehouses and Mansions of Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Es-
cobedo to ... , in A.E. Dick Howard, ed, Criminal Justice in Our Time 1, 9-25 (U Virginia, 
1965). 
111 Estimates vary, but all agree that more than half of all prosecutions are resolved by 
guilty pleas. See, for example, Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Mod-
ern Criminal Procedure 17 (West, 7th ed 1990) (estimating that guilty pleas dispose of 70-
90 percent of felony cases not dismissed); and Michael 0 . Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis 
of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 Harv L Rev 293, 313 (1975) (reporting 
guilty plea data from selected federal districts from 1970-74 which show that more than half 
of all cases not dismissed were terminated by guilty pleas). 
111 That is, apart from inducements offered by the government to secure the plea. 
Many persons think that plea bargaining is normatively unacceptable, but few assert that 
disposition by plea is itself unacceptable. 
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innocent defendants) can successfully defend the charges against 
them. In other words, one cannot deny counsel to guilty defen-
dants while granting counsel to innocent ones, because it is impos-
sible to tell them apart in advance of trial. Ex post, however, it is 
sometimes possible to separate cases where lawyer error raises a 
"reasonable possibility" of injustice from cases where it does not. 
The defendant whose lawyer failed to prevent the client's false 
(and damning) testimony falls into the latter category. Arguably, 
relief should not be granted in such a case. 
In short, the argument for applying a unitary innocence-
related prejudice standard in this context is the same as the argu-
ment for applying such a standard to defaulted claims. If the law's 
goal is to respect the states' interests in finality by denying relief in 
most cases, while correcting cases of real injustice, the courts 
should focus directly on the risk of injustice when deciding 
whether to grant relief. That is why we have proposed a simple 
prejudice test for defaulted claims. The same reasoning applies to 
other attorney errors as well. If an alibi witness suggests that the 
defendant may be innocent, the defendant deserves relief no mat-
ter how negligent or reasonable was his attorney's decision not to 
call that witness. By the same token, if the witness's testimony 
shows nothing of consequence, it should make no difference 
whether, given the information available to counsel at the time, the 
decision not to call the witness was or was not grossly negligent. If 
preventing unjust punishment is the goal, an innocence-related 
prejudice standard is both a necessary and sufficient means of 
achieving it. 
Yet simply abolishing the performance prong of Strickland for 
all cases would raise serious practical problems. Anytime a crimi-
nal defendant loses his case at trial, he can point to a long list of 
evidentiary decisions by counsel that could have been made differ-
ently. Every choice to investigate (or not investigate) a defense or 
argument, to interview (or not interview) a potential witness, or to 
ask (or not ask) a question at trial can be second-guessed. A sound 
ineffective assistance doctrine must weed out the mass of such 
claims, yet preserve relief for those defendants who most deserve 
it. The system cannot afford to examine closely the impact of the 
lawyer's every action on the factual record. 
Unfortunately, the screening process is a good deal harder in 
cases of factual error than in cases involving defaulted claims. 
First, while the list of legally plausible defaulted claims in any 
given case must be fairly short, the list of evidentiary decisions is 
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defaulted claims can quickly be categorized as irrelevant to the jus-
tice of the defendant's conviction. That is because many constitu-
tional claims-including virtually all Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
claims-do not bear on the question whether the defendant in fact 
committed the crime charged. 
Factual errors by defense counsel are different. Most eviden-
tiary decisions by lawyers do bear on guilt or innocence, for the 
simple reason that only evidence relevant to that issue can be in-
troduced at trial. For every criminal trial that generates a convic-
tion, the defendant can point to a host of evidentiary decisions by 
his lawyer that, with hindsight, might conceivably have affected 
the accuracy of the guilty verdict. 
One can plausibly defend the performance prong as a conve-
nient device for screening such claims. It may be easier to dispose 
quickly of many ineffective assistance claims on the ground that 
the attorney decisions at issue were within the range of competent 
lawyering than to look into the likelihood that the relevant deci-
sions undermine one's faith in the outcomes. (But perhaps not; the 
answer is not obvious.) Note, however, what that rationale implies 
about the purpose of the inquiry into attorney performance. That 
inquiry may be useful, but not because attorney performance is 
particularly important in itself. Instead, the performance prong 
makes sense, if at all, as a rough proxy for prejudice-that is, as a 
way of screening out those cases where a prejudice inquiry would 
be costly, and in any event would probably result in a denial of 
relief. 
No such proxy is needed in cases of defaulted claims, and for 
those cases the performance prong therefore should be discarded. 
Indeed, a separate doctrine of ineffective assistance is unnecessary 
in that context; a single doctrine for procedural defaults should 
suffice. Whether the proxy is useful in purely factual cases depends 
on whether it is an effective proxy-whether a focus on lawyer per-
formance reaches substantially the same results as would a focus 
on prejudice. That is a hard question. But even if the performance 
prong should remain intact, it is worthwhile to focus judicial atten-
tion on that prong's ultimate purpose of promoting fair outcomes, 
and not on process for process's sake. 
B. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claims 
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review raises the question of how 
far the system should (or can) go to protect innocence. Since we 
have argued for innocence-protective review in the context of de-
faulted claims, one might fairly ask how we would apply our ap-
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proach when a claim of innocence is not tied to any direct claim of 
constitutional error. 
Consider two cases. In the first, the defendant seeks to compel 
the government to disclose certain witness statements prior to 
trial, on the ground that the statements might suggest that some-
one other than the defendant committed the crime in question. 
The trial court, after reviewing the witness st~tements, denies the 
defendant's motion, and the defendant is convicted. The defendant 
fails to raise the discovery claim on direct appeal, thus triggering a 
state-law procedural bar. On federal habeas, he seeks to resurrect 
the discovery claim, and the habeas court concludes that had the 
evidence in question been disclosed, the defendant reasonably 
might have been acquitted. If the court were to apply our proposed 
standard, it would vacate the conviction and order a new trial.134 
In the second case, the trial court decides in advance of trial, 
correctly, that the evidence must be disclosed. Defense counsel 
then uses the witness statements skillfully at trial, marshalling the 
evidence to show that the government may have prosecuted the 
wrong person. Inexplicably, the jury convicts. The trial court de-
nies the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and the convic-
tion is affirmed on appeal. On federal habeas, the defendant argues 
not that his trial or appeal were constitutionally flawed in some 
procedural sense, nor that his counsel was incompetent, but simply 
that he is innocent-that the system got his case wrong. Under 
Jackson v Virginia, the defendant is entitled to relief if the habeas 
court finds that no rational jury could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 1311 While this standard sounds hard to meet in 
the abstract, in practice it is even harder: simple insufficiency-of-
the-evidence relief on federal habeas is almost unheard of. 
If our argument about defaulted claims is right, then the in-
sufficient evidence claim should receive a more favorable hearing. 
The defendant's claim of injustice is essentially the same in both 
situations. And, one might contend, there is no obvious reason to 
grant relief to arguably innocent defendants who happen to have 
constitutional claims, but to deny relief to arguably innocent de-
fendants who are victims of factfinder error. An innocence-
protective law for defaulted claims, such as our proposal, seems to 
134 This hypothetical is derived from Carrier, 477 US 478. We have added the addi-
tional facts (which may or may not have been true in Carrier) that the undisclosed evidence 
was exculpatory in suggesting a misidentification, and that nondisclosure thus prejudiced 
the defendant. 
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lead logically to the position that habeas courts should regularly 
and strictly review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting state 
convictions. If this conclusion is accurate, our argument has more 
radical implications for habeas corpus than we have acknowledged. 
This point is at least partly true. It is wrong to worry a great 
deal about protecting innocence in the first hypothetical, but not 
at all in the second. To that extent, our argument does imply that 
habeas courts should take seriously (more so than they probably 
now do) claims of insufficient evidence. But Jackson suggests as 
much. The rarity with which such claims are granted in federal 
habeas may indicate that current practice is not consonant with 
Jackson's promise. This may be because habeas doctrine concen-
trates on purely procedural issues-issues that may have the effect 
of drowning out less "legal" claims that go directly to the justice of 
the defendant's conviction. If so, reforming the law of defaulted 
claims along the lines we have suggested would facilitate more seri-
ous review of Jackson claims by simplifying the process of getting 
to the merits. 
Having said that, we also think that habeas courts should un-
dertake sufficiency-of-the-evidence review in a very deferential 
manner. This position is not at odds with a less deferential 
prejudice standard for defaulted claims. Sufficiency-of-the-
evidence review simply allows another decisionmaker to second-
guess the conclusion reached earlier on the same facts. In deciding 
what standard to apply to such claims, there is no good reason to 
prefer the bottom-line judgment of the second decisionmaker to 
that of the first, given a constant record. Indeed, the opposite is 
true. The jury that heard the case, complete with live testimony, 
was in a better position to assess the evidence than subsequent 
decisionmakers. The jury's judgment should be accorded substan-
tial deference, particularly when state appellate courts have af-
firmed that judgment. 
The analysis changes when a constitutional claim (other than 
the Jackson insufficiency claim) is involved. Deference to the 
factfinder should recede when the jury's judgment was based on an 
incomplete record, as when the prosecution failed to disclose excul-
patory evidence prior to trial. Deference is also less appropriate in 
cases like Teague, where the jury was selected in a manner that 
might bias it in the government's favor. These examples show that 
the presence or absence of a defaulted constitutional claim may 
not be irrelevant to the defendant's claim of innocence, but instead 
is sometimes a strong piece of evidence supporting that claim. At 
least that is so when the constitutional claim in some way suggests 
728 The University of Chicago Law Review 
that the outcome was unjust. The presence of a constitutional issue 
should therefore be a significant factor-albeit not an essential 
one-in evaluating the defendant's-claim of innocence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine that governs disposition of defaulted claims on 
federal habeas corpus is needlessly complex, and does not clearly 
serve any sensible policy of collateral review. We have argued for 
two complementary reforms. First, the concept of "prejudice," 
under both Wainwright u Sykes and Strickland u Washington, 
should be narrowed to include only outcome effects that create a 
"reasonable possibility" of factually erroneous conviction (or sen-
tence of death). Second, the Sykes requirement of "cause" for pro-
cedural default and the analogous and intersecting Strickland re-
quirement that attorney error reflect incompetence should be 
ignored. When a default raises a "reasonable possibility" of unjust 
outcome, relief should be granted without regard to the "cause" or 
competence categorization of the error. This approach would allow 
courts to grant relief where it is most justified and deny relief 
where it is not warranted. Equally important, it would foster sim-
plicity and rationality, qualities sorely lacking in the current law. 
The temptation at this point is to suggest that our argument 
implies a much broader and deeper reform of habeas law, going far 
beyond the law of defaulted claims. We might find such a reform 
congenial. But defaulted claim cases raise unique problems, and 
the analysis of such claims may not be transferable to other con-
texts. Because defaulted claims arise infrequently and unpredict-
ably, the deterrence argument for relief in such cases is weak. That 
may not be true for non-defaulted claims. Similarly, because the 
list of potential defaulted claims in any one case is small or nonex-
istent (and usually consists of non-guilt-related claims), applying a 
unitary prejudice standard such as the one we propose should 
prove workable. That may not be so for other ineffective assistance 
claims, where the list of potential attorney "errors" in any given 
case is very long indeed. 
Thus, the reform we urge is not especially far-reaching. It is an 
effort to rectify a fairly small problem of habeas administration 
that has received far more judicial time and energy than it de-
serves, in the process generating noticeably inequitable results. 
This may be one of those rare opportunities to improve the caliber 
of justice offered by our system, without the heavy adjudication 
costs such improvements usually entail. If so, it is an opportunity 
that our criminal justice system can hardly afford to abandon. 
